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FOREWORD
This Phase 2 report is based
on case studies of 26 (of a total of 70)
Bank-supported global programs that
accounted for 90 percent of the Bank’s
global program expenditures in 2002.1
It follows on the phase 1 report com-
pleted in 2002 and the meta-evalua-
tion of the CGIAR completed in 2003
that evaluated Bank involvement in
global programs. The phase 1 report
addressed strategic and programmatic
issues facing the Bank’s global pro-
gram portfolio. The meta-evaluation
of the CGIAR evaluated the Bank’s per-
formance as a co-founder and lead
partner in addressing the challenges
posed by the rapidly changing exter-
nal and internal environment facing
this oldest—and the largest—program
supported by the Development Grant
Facility. 
Since 2002, global program fi-
nancing has grown rapidly. Annual
disbursements to global and re-
gional activities increased by $400
million, to $1.2 billion in 2004. A
significant portion of this increase
was for a new program—the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria—for which the Bank is
a trustee. Excluding the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) Ini-
tiative and International Finance
Corporation (IFC), 64 percent of
the Bank-managed trust fund bal-
ance ($7.1 billion in 2004) sup-
ported global and regional
programs, compared with 57 per-
cent in 2003. The Bank has been
PRÓLOGO
Este informe de la fase 2 se
basa en el estudio de casos de 26
programas mundiales (de un total de
70) respaldados por el Banco, que en
2002 representaron el 90 por ciento
del gasto del Banco destinado a pro-
gramas mundiales.1 Este informe es la
continuación del informe de la fase 1
finalizado en 2002 y de la metaeva-
luación del GCIAR que se completó en
2003, destinados a evaluar la partici-
pación del Banco en los programas
mundiales. El informe de la fase 1
abordó las cuestiones estratégicas y
programáticas que ha enfrentado la
cartera de programas mundiales del
Banco. La metaevaluación del GCIAR
examinó el desempeño del Banco, en
su carácter de cofundador y asociado
principal, al abordar los retos que en-
frenta este programa, el más antiguo
y el de mayor envergadura respal-
dado por el Fondo de Donaciones
para el Desarrollo, debido a los rápi-
dos cambios en los entornos externo
e interno. 
Desde 2002, el financiamiento
de los programas mundiales ha cre-
cido rápidamente. Los desembol-
sos anuales con destino a
actividades mundiales y regionales
aumentaron en $400 millones a
$1.200 millones en 2004. Una por-
ción importante de este aumento se
destinó a un nuevo programa, el
Fondo Mundial de Lucha contra el
SIDA, la Tuberculosis y la Malaria, en
el cual el Banco se desempeña
como depositario. Si se excluyen
AVANT-
PROPOS
Ce rapport sur la phase 2 se
base sur des études de cas de 26 (sur
un total de 70) programmes mondiaux
financés par la Banque mondiale qui
représentaient 90% des dépenses des
programmes mondiaux en 20021. Ce
rapport fait suite au rapport sur la
phase 1 clôturé en 2002 et à la méta-
évaluation du GCRAI terminée en 2003
qui évaluaient la participation de la
Banque mondiale à des programmes
mondiaux. Le rapport sur la phase 1
abordait les problèmes stratégiques
et programmatiques que rencontrait
le portefeuille de programmes mon-
diaux de la Banque mondiale. La méta-
évaluation du GCRAI a évalué
l’efficacité de la Banque mondiale en
tant que cofondateur et en tant que
partenaire important pour aborder des
problèmes que pose l’environnement
interne et externe en rapide change-
ment à ce programme, qui est le plus
ancien et le plus grand programme fi-
nancé par la DGF (Development Grant
Facility).
Depuis 2002, le financement des
programmes mondiaux a rapide-
ment augmenté. Les décaissements
annuels pour des activités régio-
nales et mondiales ont augmenté
de 400 millions de dollars pour at-
teindre 1,2 milliards de dollars en
2004. Une partie importante de
cette augmentation était destinée
à un nouveau programme, le Fonds
mondial de lutte contre le SIDA, la
tuberculose et le paludisme
(GFATM), dont la Banque mondiale
F O R E W O R D
x i
E
N
G
L
IS
H
F
R
A
N
Ç
A
IS
E
S
P
A
N˜
O
L
working well with external
partners on a program-by-
program basis. It now needs
to improve the linkages be-
tween priorities for global
programs and Bank client
needs.
Management introduced
a number of reforms in response to
the recommendations of the ear-
lier reports, including: establishing
the Global Program and Partner-
ship Council, instituting stronger
ex ante and external reviews of pro-
posals, and requiring more regular
external evaluations of programs.
While improving the management
of the ongoing portfolio is neces-
sary, OED believes that more re-
mains to be done—particularly in
the area of strengthening the strate-
gic framework for the Bank’s in-
volvement in global programs.
Steps taken to improve portfolio
management will help identify er-
rors of commission, but not errors
of omission—such as the need for
greater attention to global trade
and health issues. 
The phase 2 report’s recommen-
dations therefore stress two key el-
ements:
• The need for a global strategy for
the Bank that will focus Bank
support on high-priority, well-
funded global public goods pro-
grams and that will be based on
a consultative process involving
key partners
• Better routine management of
the global portfolio in order to set
international standards for qual-
ity, add value, and enhance re-
turns to Bank country operations
and clients.
la Iniciativa para los países
pobres altamente endeuda-
dos (PPAE) y la Corporación
Financiera Internacional
(CFI), el 64% de los fondos
fiduciarios administrados
por el Banco ($7.100 millo-
nes en 2004) se destinó a
respaldar programas mundiales y
regionales, en comparación con un
57% en 2003. El Banco ha trabajado
satisfactoriamente con los asociados
externos por programa. Ahora es
preciso mejorar los vínculos entre
las prioridades de los programas
mundiales y las necesidades de los
clientes del Banco.
La administración introdujo una
serie de reformas en respuesta a las
recomendaciones de los dos in-
formes, entre las que se incluyen la
creación del Consejo de Asocia-
ciones y Programas Mundiales, el
establecimiento de exámenes ini-
ciales y externos más rigurosos de
las propuestas, y la exigencia de
que se realicen evaluaciones ex-
ternas de los programas con mayor
regularidad. Si bien es necesario
mejorar la gestión de la cartera de
programas en curso, el DEO con-
sidera que aún quedan cosas por
hacer, en particular con miras a for-
talecer el marco estratégico de la
participación del Banco en los pro-
gramas mundiales. Las medidas
para mejorar la gestión de la cartera
ayudarán a identificar errores por
acción, no así por omisión, como es
la necesidad de prestar mayor aten-
ción al comercio y la salud mun-
diales.
Por lo tanto, las recomendacio-
nes del informe de la fase 2 hacen
hincapié en dos elementos princi-
pales:
est administrateur. En de-
hors de l’Initiative PPTE
(pays pauvres très endettés)
et de la SFI (Société finan-
cière internationale), 64%
des fonds fiduciaires gérés
par la Banque mondiale (7,1
milliards de dollars en 2004)
ont été utilisés pour financer des
programmes régionaux et mon-
diaux, contre 57% en 2003. La
Banque a bien travaillé avec des par-
tenaires extérieurs programme par
programme. Il faut à présent ren-
forcer les liens entre les priorités
des programmes mondiaux et les
besoins des clients de la Banque
mondiale.
La direction de la Banque mon-
diale a introduit un certain
nombre de réformes en réponse
aux recommandations des rap-
ports précédents, notamment
l’établissement du Conseil des
programmes et des partenariats
mondiaux (GPP), l’institution de
révisions externes et ex ante ren-
forcées des propositions et l’exi-
gence d’évaluations externes plus
régulières des programmes. S’il
faut améliorer la gestion du por-
tefeuille actuel, l’OED pense qu’il
reste encore beaucoup plus à
faire, en particulier dans le do-
maine du renforcement du cadre
stratégique de la participation de
la Banque mondiale à des pro-
grammes mondiaux. Les mesures
adoptées pour améliorer la ges-
tion du portefeuille contribueront
à identifier les erreurs de com-
mission, mais pas d’omission –
comme la nécessité de prêter une
plus grande attention aux pro-
blèmes de santé et de commerce
au niveau mondial.
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Some key elements of a
Bank global strategy would
likely include an under-
standing and exploitation of
the comparative advantage
of the Bank and its key part-
ners, including U.N. agencies;
a clear focus on key global
public goods and global policies that
adversely affect developing coun-
tries’ prospects for growth and
poverty alleviation; and support of
poverty reduction activities that
complement rather than compete
with Bank country operations. 
With respect to the improvement
in the portfolio, OED recommends
that the Bank:
• Separate oversight from man-
agement.
• Improve standards of governance
and management of individual
programs.
• Revisit selection and exit criteria.
• Strengthen evaluations of global
programs and their review within
the Bank.
• La necesidad de una estra-
tegia mundial para el Banco
que se centre en el apoyo del
Banco a programas de bienes
públicos mundiales de alta
prioridad y con suficiente fi-
nanciamiento, y que se base
en un proceso consultivo con
la participación de los asociados
principales.
• Una mejor gestión de rutina de la
cartera mundial a fin de establecer
normas internacionales de cali-
dad, agregar valor y mejorar los re-
sultados de las operaciones del
Banco por país y de los clientes. 
Algunos elementos principales
de una estrategia mundial del
Banco probablemente incluyan la
comprensión y el aprovechamiento
de la ventaja comparativa del Banco
y sus asociados principales, inclui-
dos los organismos de las Naciones
Unidas; un enfoque claro en polí-
ticas mundiales y bienes públicos
mundiales esenciales que afectan
en forma adversa las probabilidades
de crecimiento y erradicación de la
pobreza en países en desarrollo; y
la promoción de actividades para
reducción de la pobreza que com-
plementan en lugar de competir
con las operaciones del Banco por
país.
En relación con la mejora de la
cartera, el DEO recomienda al
Banco:
• Separar la función de supervisión
de la gestión.
• Mejorar las normas de gobierno y
gestión de los programas indivi-
duales.
• Revisar los criterios de selección y
de salida.
Les recommandations du
rapport sur la phase 2 souli-
gnent donc deux éléments
essentiels:
•La nécessité d’une stratégie
mondiale pour la Banque
mondiale qui concentrerait
l’aide de la Banque mondiale sur
des programmes de biens pu-
blics mondiaux bien financés et
à haute priorité et qui se baserait
sur une procédure de consulta-
tion impliquant les principaux
partenaires;
• Une meilleure gestion courante
d’un portefeuille mondial qui
contribue à établir des normes
internationales pour la qualité et
la valeur ajoutée et augmente les
revenus pour les opérations na-
tionales de la Banque mondiale et
pour les clients.
Certains éléments essentiels
d’une stratégie mondiale de la
Banque mondiale pourraient être,
entre autres, la compréhension et
l’exploitation de l’avantage com-
paratif de la Banque et de ses prin-
cipaux partenaires, y compris les
agences de l’ONU; l’accent clair sur
les principaux biens publics mon-
diaux et sur les politiques mon-
diales qui nuisent aux perspectives
des pays en développement en ma-
tière de croissance et de réduction
de la pauvreté; et le financement
d’activités de réduction de la pau-
vreté qui complètent les opérations
nationales de la Banque mondiale
au lieu d’être en concurrence avec
elles. 
Concernant l’amélioration du
portefeuille, l’OED recommande
que la Banque mondiale:
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• Fortalecer las evaluaciones
de los programas mundiales y
su examen dentro del Banco.
•Sépare le contrôle de la ges-
tion;
•Améliore les normes de
gouvernance et de gestion
de programmes individuels;
•Réexamine des critères de
sélection et de sortie;
•Renforce les évaluations des
programmes mondiaux et leur
révision au sein de la Banque
mondiale.
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Gregory K. Ingram 
Director-General, Operations Evaluation
PREFACE
This report completes the sec-
ond phase of the Operations Evaluation
Department’s independent evaluation
of the World Bank’s involvement in
global programs. The approach paper
for the overall evaluation was pre-
sented to the Committee on Develop-
ment Effectiveness (CODE) of the World
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors
in January 2001. The draft Evaluation
Strategy Paper was discussed at a
June 19, 2001, workshop in Washing-
ton that brought together representa-
tives of Bank management and
policymakers from developing coun-
tries, U.N. organizations, international
and regional financial institutions, non-
governmental organizations, and the
private sector. The workshop pro-
ceedings and the final Evaluation Strat-
egy Paper were distributed to
participants in July 2001. The paper
was then posted on the study Web site
(http://www.worldbank.org/oed/gppp).
The Evaluation Strategy Work-
shop produced two changes in the
evaluation design. First, at manage-
ment request, the Operations Eval-
uation Department (OED) agreed
to do the evaluation in two phases,
with the first phase timed to inform
the Bank’s budgeting processes. Sec-
ond, at the demand of the work-
shop participants, OED included a
substantial meta-evaluation of the
Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
among the 26 cases to be examined
in the study’s second phase. 
The Phase 1 report, The World
Bank’s Approach to Global Pro-
PREFACIO
Este informe completa la se-
gunda fase de la evaluación indepen-
diente del Departamento de Evaluación
de Operaciones (DEO) sobre la parti-
cipación del Banco Mundial en los
programas mundiales. El documento
de enfoque para la evaluación general
se presentó ante el Comité sobre la
Eficacia en Términos de Desarrollo
(CODE) del Directorio Ejecutivo en
enero de 2001. La versión preliminar
del Documento de Estrategia de Eva-
luación se analizó en un taller organi-
zado en Washington el 19 de junio de
2001, el cual reunió a representantes
de la administración del Banco y a los
responsables de la formulación de po-
líticas en los países en desarrollo, los
organismos de las Naciones Unidas,
las instituciones financieras interna-
cionales y regionales, las organiza-
ciones no gubernamentales y el sector
privado. Las actas del taller y la versión
final del Documento de Estrategia de
Evaluación se distribuyeron a los par-
ticipantes en julio de 2001. El docu-
mento se publicó luego en el sitio web
(http://www.worldbank.org/oed/gppp).
El taller de estrategia de evaluación
produjo dos cambios en el diseño
de la evaluación. En primer lugar, a
solicitud de la administración del
Banco, el Departamento de Evalua-
ción de Operaciones (DEO) aceptó
realizar la evaluación en dos fases,
programando la primera fase para
dar información a los procesos de
presupuestación del Banco. En se-
gundo lugar, a instancia de los parti-
cipantes del taller, el DEO incluyó
una metaevaluación significativa del
PRÉFACE
Le rapport met un terme à la
deuxième phase de l’évaluation indé-
pendante, par le Département de l’éva-
luation rétrospective des opérations
(OED), de la participation de la Banque
mondiale à des programmes mondiaux.
Le document d’orientation pour l’éva-
luation générale a été présenté au Co-
mité pour l’efficacité du développement
(CODE) du Conseil des administrateurs
de la Banque mondiale en janvier 2001.
L’avant-projet de document de stratégie
d’évaluation a été débattu lors de l’ate-
lier du 19 juin 2001 à Washington, qui
a rassemblé des représentants de la
direction de la Banque mondiale et des
responsables politiques des pays en
développement, des organisations de
l’ONU, des institutions financières ré-
gionales et internationales, des orga-
nisations non gouvernementales et du
secteur privé. Le compte rendu de l’ate-
lier et le document final de stratégie
d’évaluation ont été distribués aux par-
ticipants en juillet 2001. Le document a
ensuite été publié sur le site web de
l’OED (http://www.worldbank.org/
oed/gppp - en anglais).
L’atelier sur la stratégie d’évalua-
tion a amené deux changements
dans la conception de l’évaluation.
Tout d’abord, à la demande de la di-
rection de la Banque mondiale, le
Département de l’évaluation ré-
trospective des opérations (OED) a
convenu de procéder à l’évaluation
en deux phases, le moment de la
première phase étant choisi pour
contribuer aux procédures de bud-
gétisation de la Banque mondiale.
Ensuite, à la demande des partici-
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grams, focused on the strate-
gic and programmatic man-
agement of the Bank’s global
portfolio of 70 programs in
five Bank networks (each of
which covers a cluster of
closely related sectors). The
Phase 2 report, which is
based on case studies of 26 global
programs, derives additional lessons
for such broad management; it also
derives lessons for the design and
management of individual programs.
The first and largest case study, of
the CGIAR, was completed in April
2003. The remaining case studies
have been undertaken in parallel
with the Phase 2 report. OED cir-
culated most of the case studies in-
ternally and externally to partners for
comments and has received com-
ments on many of them from both
sources. All publicly disclosed re-
ports are being posted on the
study’s external Web site. 
The study has benefited from an
external advisory committee con-
sisting of Rolf Lüders, Professor and
Editor, Cuadernos De Economía,
Pontifical Catholic University of
Chile; Wolfgang Reinicke, Managing
Director, Galaxar SA, Geneva, and
Director, Global Public Policy Pro-
ject; Nafis Sadik, former Executive
Director, United Nations Population
Fund; and Adele Simmons, Vice
Chairman and Senior Executive,
Chicago Metropolis 2020, and for-
mer President of the MacArthur
Foundation. (Biographical sum-
maries are available on the study
Web site.) The Phase 2 study design
benefited from the contributions of
Robert Picciotto, Director-General
of OED until October 2002.
The evaluation was also informed
by a joint UNDP/World Bank work-
shop, held in July 2000 in Washing-
Grupo Consultivo sobre In-
vestigaciones Agrícolas Inter-
nacionales (GCIAI) entre los
26 casos que se examinarían
en la segunda fase del estudio. 
El informe de la fase 1, The
World Bank’s Approach to
Global Programs (El Banco
Mundial y su abordaje de los pro-
gramas globales), se centró en la
gestión estratégica y programática
de la cartera global del Banco inte-
grada por 70 programas en 5 redes
(cada una de las cuales comprende
un grupo de sectores estrechamente
relacionados). El informe de la fase 2,
basado en el estudio de 26 programas
mundiales, recoge nuevas lecciones
para la gestión de programas en ge-
neral como así también para el di-
seño y la gestión de programas
individuales.
El estudio del caso del GCIAI, que
fue el primero y de mayor enverga-
dura, concluyó en abril de 2003. Los
demás estudios de casos se han lle-
vado a cabo en forma simultánea con
el informe de la fase 2. El DEO di-
fundió la mayoría de los estudios en
el seno del Banco y, en el ámbito ex-
terno, entre los asociados del Banco
para que éstos hicieran los comen-
tarios pertinentes, y de hecho ha re-
cibido comentarios sobre muchos
de los estudios, tanto de fuentes in-
ternas como externas. Todos los in-
formes que se dan a conocer al
público se colocan en el sitio web
externo del Banco.
El estudio se ha enriquecido al
contar con un comité de asesora-
miento externo integrado por Rolf
Lüders, Profesor y Editor, Cuader-
nos De Economía, Pontificia Univer-
sidad Católica de Chile; Wolfgang
Reinicke, Director General, Galaxar
SA, Geneva, y Director, Proyecto de
política pública mundial; Nafis Sadik,
pants de l’atelier, l’OED a in-
clus une méta-évaluation im-
portante du Groupe
consultatif pour la recherche
agricole internationale
(GCRAI) des 26 cas à exami-
ner au cours de la deuxième
phase de l’étude.
Le rapport sur la phase 1, L’ap-
proche de la Banque mondiale sur
les programmes mondiaux, s’est
concentré sur la gestion stratégique
et programmatique du portefeuille
mondial de la Banque mondiale,
composé de 70 programmes répar-
tis dans 5 réseaux de la Banque mon-
diale (chacun couvrant une série de
secteurs étroitement reliés entre
eux). Le rapport sur la phase 2, qui
se base sur des études de cas de 26
programmes mondiaux, tire des le-
çons supplémentaires pour une
vaste gestion de ce type; il tire éga-
lement des leçons pour la concep-
tion et la gestion de programmes
individuels. 
La première étude de cas, et la
plus grande, du GCRAI a été termi-
née en avril 2003. Les autres études
de cas ont été entreprises parallèle-
ment au rapport sur la phase 2.
L’OED a distribué la plupart des
études de cas au niveau interne et
externe à des partenaires pour ob-
servations et il a reçu des deux
sources des observations sur la plu-
part de ces études. Tous les rapports
rendus publics sont publiés sur le
site web de l’OED.
L’étude a bénéficié d’un comité
consultatif externe composé de Rolf
Lüders, éditeur de Cuadernos De
Economía et professeur à l’Univer-
sité catholique pontificale du Chili;
de Wolfgang Reinicke, directeur gé-
néral de Galaxar SA, Genève, et di-
recteur du Projet de vision de l’ONU
sur les réseaux mondiaux d’inter-
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ton, DC, which gathered to-
gether some of the foremost
analysts of global public poli-
cies and goods and the de-
signers and implementers of
global programs. The pro-
ceedings of that workshop
were published by the World
Bank. The Swiss Agency for Devel-
opment and Cooperation has pro-
vided generous funding, contributed
to the design of the OED review,
and enabled broad-based consulta-
tions in conducting the case studies.
Findings of the Phase 1 report and
the CGIAR meta-evaluation were dis-
seminated at the meeting of the U.N.
Interagency Working Group in June
2002; the U.N. High Level Commit-
tee of Programs in September 2002;
the CGIAR Annual General Meetings
in Manila in October 2002; the Allied
Social Sciences Association meet-
ings in Washington, DC, in January
2003; the journal Science; the USDA
Ministerial Conference on Agricul-
tural Science and Technology in
Sacramento in June 2003; and the
Canadian Evaluation Society in
Saskatoon in May 2004.
This report has three distin-
guishing features. First, it looks
across the global programs to draw
crosscutting lessons about the de-
sign, implementation, and evalua-
tion of global programs. Second, it
identifies sector-specific lessons.
Third, it focuses on the Bank’s role
in the global program partnerships.
Evaluating those partnerships’ global
activities entailed a meta-evaluation
of the various self-evaluations and
monitoring done by the partnerships
themselves, by the networks, and by
the Trust Fund Quality Assurance
and Compliance Unit (TQC). 
Each of the case studies involved
extensive interviews and information-
ex Director Ejecutivo, Fondo
de Población de las Naciones
Unidas; y Adele Simmons, Vi-
cepresidente y Ejecutivo Prin-
cipal, Chicago Metropolis
2020, y ex presidente de
McArthur Foundation. (Las
reseñas biográficas están dis-
ponibles en el sitio Web en donde se
publica el estudio). El diseño del es-
tudio en la fase 2 contó con el aporte
del Sr. Robert Picciotto, Director Ge-
neral del DEO hasta octubre de 2002.
La evaluación también se informó
en un taller conjunto del
PNUD/Banco Mundial, organizado
en julio de 2000 en Washington, DC,
en donde se dieron cita algunos de
los analistas de políticas y bienes pú-
blicos mundiales más prestigiosos y
los encargados del diseño e imple-
mentación de los programas mun-
diales. Las actas de ese taller fueron
publicadas por el Banco Mundial. La
Agencia Suiza para la Cooperación y
el Desarrollo proporcionó un im-
portante financiamiento, contribuyó
con el diseño del examen del DEO y
facilitó un amplio proceso consul-
tivo durante el estudio de casos. Las
conclusiones del informe de la fase
1 y de la metaevaluación del GCIAI se
han dado a conocer en la reunión
del Grupo Interinstitucional de Tra-
bajo de las Naciones Unidas en junio
de 2002, el Comité de Alto Nivel sobre
programas de las Naciones Unidas
en septiembre de 2002, las Asam-
bleas Generales Anuales del GCIAI
en Manila en octubre de 2002, las
reuniones de la Allied Social Scien-
ces Association en Washington, DC,
en enero de 2003, la publicación
Science, la Conferencia Ministerial
sobre Ciencia y Tecnología del De-
partamento de Agricultura de EE.UU.
en Sacramento en junio de 2003, y la
Sociedad de Evaluación Canadiense
vention (UN Vision Project
on Global Public Policy Net-
works); de Nafis Sadik, an-
cien directeur général du
Fonds des Nations Unies
pour la population; et de
Adele Simmons, vice-prési-
dent et cadre supérieur de
Chicago Metropolis 2020 et ancien
président de la Fondation McArthur
(des résumés biographiques sont
disponibles sur le site web de
l’OED). La conception de l’étude
sur la phase 2 a bénéficié des contri-
butions de Robert Picciotto, direc-
teur général de l’OED jusqu’en
octobre 2002.
Cette évaluation a également bé-
néficié des contributions d’un atelier
mixte Banque mondiale/PNUD, qui
s’est tenu en juillet 2000 à Washing-
ton D.C. et qui a réuni certains des
plus éminents analystes des poli-
tiques et produits publics mondiaux
ainsi que les concepteurs et les per-
sonnes chargées de l’application des
programmes mondiaux. Le compte
rendu de cet atelier a été publié par
la Banque mondiale. La Direction
du développement et de la coopé-
ration (DDC) a apporté des fonds
importants, a contribué à la concep-
tion de l’examen de l’OED et a per-
mis de vastes consultations en
réalisant les études de cas. Les
conclusions du rapport sur la phase
1 et de la méta-évaluation du GCRAI
ont été distribuées lors de la réunion
du Groupe de travail interagences de
l’ONU en juin 2002, lors de la ré-
union du Comité de haut niveau
chargé des programmes de l’ONU en
septembre 2002, lors de l’assemblée
générale annuelle du GCRAI à Ma-
nille en octobre 2002, lors de la ré-
union de l’Allied Social Sciences
Association à Washington D.C. en
janvier 2003, dans la revue Science,
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gathering fieldwork. Inter-
views were held with mem-
bers of the Board of the World
Bank and International Mon-
etary Fund; senior managers at
the World Bank Group; DGF
Council members and staff in-
volved in Strategic Resource
Management, Concessional Financ-
ing, and Global Partnerships; the
Global Programs and Partnership
Group; the Development Grant Fa-
cility (DGF) Secretariat; Trust Fund
Operations; Bank Operations; the
World Bank Institute; the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation; the World
Health Organization; the Food and
Agriculture Organization; UNICEF;
the United Nations’ Development
Program; the International Labor Or-
ganization; the United Nations Envi-
ronment Program; UNAIDS; UNHCR;
the Department for International De-
velopment (U.K.); the Swiss Agency
for Development and Cooperation
(SDC); and the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Field visits were made
to Botswana, Bulgaria, China, the
Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana,
India, Latvia, Morocco, the Philip-
pines, Poland, the Russian Federa-
tion, Singapore, South Africa,
Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. Annex
F lists the study sources, and Annex
G lists the people consulted.
en Saskatoon en mayo de
2004.
Este informe tiene tres ca-
racterísticas distintivas. Pri-
mero, analiza los programas
mundiales para recoger lec-
ciones interdisciplinarias
sobre el diseño, la imple-
mentación y la evaluación de los pro-
gramas mundiales. Segundo,
identifica lecciones específicas para
cada sector. Tercero, se centra en la
función del Banco en las asociaciones
de colaboración para programas mun-
diales. Para evaluar las actividades
mundiales de tales asociaciones de
colaboración fue necesaria una me-
taevaluación de las diversas autoeva-
luaciones y seguimientos realizados
por las asociaciones propiamente di-
chas, por las redes y por la Unidad de
Garantía de Calidad y Cumplimiento
de Fondos Fiduciarios.
En cada estudio de casos se reali-
zaron entrevistas exhaustivas y tra-
bajo de campo para la recopilación de
información. Se entrevistó a miem-
bros del Directorio del Banco Mundial
y del Fondo Monetario Internacional,
gerentes principales del Grupo del
Banco Mundial, miembros del Con-
sejo del Fondo de Donaciones para el
Desarrollo y personal que participa de
las operaciones de gestión estraté-
gica de recursos, financiamiento con-
cesionario y asociaciones mundiales;
Grupo de Asociaciones y Programas
Mundiales, la secretaría del Fondo de
Donaciones para el Desarrollo, las
operaciones de fondos fiduciarios,
las operaciones del Banco, el Insti-
tuto del Banco Mundial, la Corpora-
ción Financiera Internacional, la
Organización Mundial de la Salud, la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas
para la Agricultura y la Alimentación,
UNICEF, el Programa de las Naciones
Unidas para el Desarrollo, la Organi-
lors de la conférence minis-
térielle sur la science et la
technologie dans l’agricul-
ture du Département de
l’Agriculture des États-Unis à
Sacramento en juin 2003 et
lors de la réunion de la So-
ciété canadienne d’évalua-
tion à Saskatoon en mai 2004.
Ce rapport présente trois carac-
téristiques distinctives. Tout d’abord,
il examine les programmes mon-
diaux pour tirer des leçons trans-
versales quant à la conception, à
l’application et à l’évaluation des
programmes mondiaux. Ensuite, il
identifie des leçons spécifiques aux
secteurs. Enfin, il se concentre sur le
rôle de la Banque mondiale dans les
partenariats des programmes mon-
diaux. L’évaluation des activités mon-
diales de ces partenariats a généré
une méta-évaluation des différentes
évaluations et des contrôles réali-
sés par les partenariats eux-mêmes,
par les réseaux et par le Trust Funds
Quality Assurance and Compliance
Unit (TQC).
Chacune des études de cas a im-
pliqué un important travail de col-
lecte d’informations sur le terrain
ainsi que des entrevues de grande
envergure. Les entrevues ont été réa-
lisées avec des membres du Conseil
de la Banque mondiale et du Fonds
monétaire international, des cadres
supérieurs du Groupe de la Banque
mondiale, des membres du Conseil
de la DGF (Development Grant Fa-
cility) et du personnel travaillant dans
la gestion des ressources straté-
giques, des membres des partena-
riats mondiaux et du financement
concessionnel; du Secrétariat de la
DGF, du Département des opéra-
tions du Trust Fund, du Départe-
ment des opérations de la Banque
mondiale, de l’Institut de la Banque
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zación Internacional del Tra-
bajo, el Programa de las Na-
ciones Unidas para el Medio
Ambiente, ONUSIDA, ACNUR
(Alto Comisionado de las Na-
ciones Unidas para los Refu-
giados), el Departamento para
el Desarrollo Internacional, la
Agencia Suiza para la Cooperación y
el Desarrollo, y el Ministerio de Rela-
ciones Exteriores de Suecia. Se reali-
zaron visitas a Botswana, Bulgaria,
China, Etiopía, Federación de Rusia,
Filipinas, Ghana, India, Latvia, Ma-
rruecos, Polonia, República Checa,
Singapur, Sudáfrica, Tailandia, Tur-
quía y Vietnam. El anexo F incluye
un listado de las fuentes de los estu-
dios y el anexo G un listado de las per-
sonas consultadas.
mondiale, de la Société fi-
nancière internationale, de
l’Organisation mondiale de
la santé, de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies pour l’alimen-
tation et l’agriculture, du Pro-
gramme des Nations Unies
pour le développement, de
l’Organisation internationale du tra-
vail, du Programme des Nations
Unies pour l’environnement, de
l’UNAIDS, du HCR de l’ONU, du De-
partment for International Deve-
lopment (Royaume-Uni), de la
Direction du développement et de la
coopération (DDC), et du ministère
des Affaires étrangères suédois. Des
visites ont été réalisées sur le terrain
en Afrique du Sud, au Botswana, en
Bulgarie, en Chine, en Éthiopie, en
Fédération de Russie, au Ghana, en
Inde, en Lettonie, au Maroc, aux Phi-
lippines, en Pologne, en République
tchèque, à Singapour, en Thaïlande,
en Turquie et au Vietnam. L’annexe
F donne la liste des sources des
études et l’annexe G donne la liste
des personnes consultées.
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Executive Summary
The accelerated pace of globalization has stimulated dramatic changesin trade, finance, intellectual property, private investment, informationand communications technology, health, environment, security, and civil
society. Addressing the challenges posed by globalization often requires col-
lective action at the global level. Increasingly, global programs are used as a
means to organize global collective action, particularly for providing global pub-
lic goods. 
Global programs have also gone beyond pro-
viding global public goods to serve other ob-
jectives that the World Bank has traditionally
addressed through its country-level operations.
Such multicountry and “corporate advocacy”
programs aim to take advantage of economies of
scale and scope in providing country-level serv-
ices and advocating policies that benefit devel-
oping countries.
Meeting the increased demand for global pro-
grams is difficult, absent a global government
with the authority to establish and enforce pol-
icy regimes and rules, collect taxes, and raise
revenues. Stagnation in official development as-
sistance (ODA) compounds the challenge,
though global programs—both global public-
goods and multicountry programs—are now
taking a larger share of ODA. 
The World Bank is an important participant in
these global activities because its global reach, its
convening power, its ability to mobilize resources,
and its multisectoral expertise position it well to
deal with the challenges of globalization. The
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors has raised a
variety of issues and concerns about the Bank’s
growing global partnership programs. These is-
sues have guided OED’s evaluation of the Bank’s
involvement in global programs. The Phase 1 re-
port addressed several strategic and program-
matic issues. The meta-evaluation of the CGIAR
illustrated the challenges that a global program
faces in this changed internal and external envi-
ronment. This Phase 2 report synthesizes results
from OED’s review of 26 programs.
The specific objectives of this report are: 
• To assess how well these case study programs
measure up to the selectivity and oversight
criteria and priorities for global programs es-
tablished by the Development Committee and
the Bank, particularly the Bank’s Development
Grant Facility (DGF)
• To derive crosscutting lessons for the Bank on
program selectivity, design, implementation,
governance, management, financing, and eval-
uation
• To assess progress in implementing the rec-
ommendations of OED’s 1998 grant program
review, Phase 1 report, and meta-evaluation
of the CGIAR, with respect both to the Bank’s
strategic and programmatic management and
to the choice, design, and implementation of
individual programs (box ES.1).
• To identify areas where further Bank action
on its global-level strategy and programming
is needed to improve global program effec-
tiveness. 
Management of Bank involvement in global programs.
The architecture for Bank involvement in global
programs has been evolving since 2000. The se-
lectivity, oversight, and eligibility criteria (figure
ES.1 and box ES.2) were developed at different
times and in different contexts, and are applied
in different ways. The Phase 2 evaluation ap-
plied these 3 sets of criteria as appropriate to the
26 programs and developed lessons for the fu-
ture strategic directions for the Bank’s involve-
ment in global programs. 
The scope of Bank involvement in global pro-
grams has also been increasing. Today, global
partnerships have become an important line of
Bank business. At the time this was being writ-
ten, the Bank was engaged in more than 200 part-
nerships; about 70 of these meet the definition
of a global program. The Bank also manages the
largest amount of trust fund monies ($7.1 billion
as of June 2004) of any international organization;
64 percent of this support goes to global and re-
gional programs (compared with 57 percent last
year). Trust fund disbursements to global and re-
gional activities increased by $400 million to
$1.2 billion in FY04. Much of this was directed
toward the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
culosis, and Malaria (GFATM).
Brief Overview of the 26 Case Study
Programs
In 2002, the 26 programs represented 90 percent
of the annual expenditures of Bank-supported
global programs. The programs vary by subject
area; institutional location; number and types of
partners; and organizational design, financing,
and implementation. They range in age from 2
to 32 years, and in size from $560,000 to $447 mil-
lion in annual expenditures.
The selected programs are concentrated in the
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable De-
velopment (ESSD) Network (71 percent of total
program expenditures and 67 percent of DGF
grants in FY03). This is comparable to the over-
all distribution of global programs. The next-
largest concentration is in health (22 percent of
total program expenditures, excluding GFATM).
The health, trade, and social protection pro-
grams are housed in the concerned U.N. agen-
cies. All infrastructure programs and some others
(in environment, finance, and social develop-
ment) are housed in the Bank. A few programs
involved in capacity building have recently been
spun off from the Bank. Figure ES.2 summarizes
the activities of the 26 evaluated programs.
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Since OED’s Phase 1 report, Bank management has adopted
several organizational and procedural changes in the manage-
ment of global programs. Management has established a Global
Programs and Partnerships Council (chaired by two managing
directors), reconstituted a Concessional Financing and Global
Partnerships Vice Presidency, and formed a Global Programs and
Partnerships Group within this vice presidency. Management
also indicated that it would strengthen oversight to enhance the
strategic focus of the Bank’s global portfolio and apply the sub-
sidiarity principle more rigorously. The Development Grant Fa-
cility has instituted an external peer-review process for new
programs seeking grant support. In response to OED’s meta-
evaluation of the CGIAR, Bank management accepted the prin-
ciple of independent oversight by assigning oversight of the
CGIAR to the Bank’s chief economist. This last change is still
being implemented.
O E D ’ s  P h a s e  1  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  
M a n a g e m e n t  A c t i o n
B o x  E S . 1
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S e l e c t i v i t y  a n d  O v e r s i g h t  o f  G l o b a l
P r o g r a m sF i g u r e  E S . 1
a. From the Development Committee Communiqué issued on September 25, 2000. Both the Development Committee and Bank Management envisaged global programs as being the prin-
cipal instrument for Bank involvement in providing global public goods.
b. Global programs are expected to meet all six approval criteria. 
c.These are the five corporate advocacy priorities and the five global public goods priorities (and bulleted sub-categories) from the Strategic Directions Paper for FY02-04 (World Bank 2001b).
Within the Partnership Approval and Tracking System (PATS), global programs are expected to identify, for tracking, their alignment with at least one of these 10 corporate priorities.
Selectivity Criteria for Bank Involvement in Global Public Goods: 
Endorsed by Development Committee (September 2000)a
1. An emerging international consensus that global action is required
2. A clear value added to the Bank’s development objectives
3. The need for Bank action to catalyze other resources and partnerships
4. A signiﬁcant comparative advantage for the Bank.
Approval Criteria for Bank Involvement in Partnership Initiatives beyond the Country Level, 
Established by Bank Management (November 2000)b
1. A clear link to the Bank’s core institutional objectives and, above all, to the Bank’s country work
2. A strong case for Bank participation based on comparative advantage
3. A clear assessment of the ﬁnancial and reputational risks to the Bank and how these will be managed
4. A thorough analysis of the expected level of Bank resources (both money and time) required and the contribution of other partners
5. A clear delineation of how the new commitment will be implemented, managed, and assessed
6. A clear plan for communicating with and involving key stakeholders and for informing and consulting the Executive Directors.
Global Public-Goods Prioritiesc
Communicable diseases
• HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and  
 childhood communicable diseases,  
 including the relevant link to  
 education
• Vaccines and drug development  
 for major communicable diseases  
 in developing countries
Environmental commons 
• Climate change
• Water 
• Forests 
• Biodiversity, ozone depletion, and  
 land degradation 
• Promoting agricultural research 
Information and knowledge 
• Redressing the digital divide and  
 equipping countries with the  
 capacity to access knowledge 
• Understanding development and  
 poverty reduction
Trade and integration 
• Market access 
• Intellectual property rights  
 and standards  
International ﬁnancial architecture
• Development of international  
 standards
• Financial stability (incl. sound  
 public debt management)
• International accounting and  
 legal framework
Corporate Advocacy Prioritiesc
Empowerment, security, and
social inclusion
• Gender mainstreaming
• Civic engagement and 
 participation
• Social risk management
 (including disaster mitigation)
Investment climate
• Support to both urban and rural 
 development
• Infrastructure services to 
 support private sector development 
• Regulatory reform and 
 competition policy
• Financial sector reform 
Public sector governance 
• Rule of law (including anti- 
 corruption 
• Public administration and civil 
 service reform (including public 
 expenditure accountability)
• Access to, and administration of, 
 justice (judicial reform)
Education 
• Education for all, with emphasis 
 on girls’ education 
• Building human capacity for the 
 knowledge economy 
Health
• Access to potable water, clean 
 air, and sanitation
• Maternal and child health
Strategic Focus for Oversight of 
Global Programs: Established 
by Bank Management (March 2003) 
a. Provide global public goods
b. Support international advo- 
 cacy for reform agendas that in a 
 signiﬁcant way address policy 
 framework conditions relevant 
 for developing countries
c. Are multicountry programs that  
 crucially depend on highly  
 coordinated approaches
d. Mobilize substantial incremental
 resources that can be used for
 development
Each program conducts many different kinds
of activities, but two dimensions of global pro-
gramming are important from a strategic and
programmatic perspective:
• Whether each program primarily aims to pro-
vide global public goods that require global col-
lective action or to engage in “corporate
advocacy” in support of the provision of na-
tional and local public, private, or merit goods.
Programs in this latter category must pass the
test of subsidiarity. That is, the benefits of col-
lective action relative to the transaction costs
of global partnerships to partners (including
developing countries) must exceed the net
benefits of the Bank acting through its normal
instruments.
• Whether the programs have their own financ-
ing mechanism or rely on the investments or
technical assistance of others (for example,
Bank loans and credits, or donor or national
funding).
Global public goods represent a minority of
programs, but a majority of funds. When their
most essential characteristics are considered,
only 11 programs (including a part of the Global
Alliance for Vaccines and Information—GAVI)
provide global public goods (figure ES.3). Of
these, only seven finance global or country in-
vestments. Only GAVI finances such investments
on a significant scale at both levels, and hence
is included in both global and national public-
goods programs. The other four global public-
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• Subsidiarity
• Comparative advantage
• Multicountry benefits
• Financial leverage
• Managerial competence
• Arm’s-length relationship
• Disengagement strategy
• Promoting partnerships
E l i g i b i l i t y  C r i t e r i a  f o r  G r a n t  
S u p p o r t  f r o m  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t
G r a n t  F a c i l i t y  ( O c t o b e r  1 9 9 8 )
B o x  E S . 2
T h e  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  A r e  E n g a g e d  i n  a
W i d e  R a n g e  o f  A c t i v i t i e s
F i g u r e  E S . 2
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Knowledge generation & dissemination
Advocacy
Capacity building
National policy & institutional reform
Improving donor coordination
Implementing conventions, rules, & standards
Directly mobilizing incremental resources
Indirectly mobilizing incremental resources
Financing country-level investments for GPGs
R&D for new products & technologies
Common approaches to communicable diseases
Financing country-level investments for NPGs
High/substantial Modest Negligible
Extent to which the programs are engaged in each activity
Source: Table H.8: OED assessment of programs’ actual activities.
goods programs promote common approaches
to mitigating major communicable diseases or re-
search on the diseases of the poor. They advo-
cate increased public investments by others to
combat communicable diseases, but, unlike GAVI,
they do not finance investments at either level.
The seven global and the two national public-
goods programs that do finance investments
(with GAVI being included in both) undertook
83 percent of the total expenditures of the case
study programs in FY04 (figure ES.4). The re-
maining 18 programs not financing investments
(including the 4 programs in health mentioned
above) primarily finance activities related to in-
formation and knowledge, advocacy, capacity
building, and technical assistance. 
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These programs stimulate country demand for
additional technical assistance, training, and ca-
pacity building, but lack resources to meet it. The
programs thus rely on donors, including the
Bank, for complementary investments. While
the programs expect that complementary activ-
ities will be included in Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Papers (PRSPs) and Country Assistance
Strategies (CASs), such inclusion has thus far
been limited, reflecting the weak link between
multicountry advocacy programs and country
activities.
OED Findings
Selectivity
“Letting a thousand flowers bloom” and exper-
imenting with many new programs has helped
the Bank understand the diversity and com-
plexity of global challenges and provided op-
portunities to learn about the intricacy of
global-country links. This has informed both the
formulation and the refinement of the Bank’s se-
lectivity criteria.
Global public-goods programs meet most criteria.
While largely supply-driven, most Bank-sup-
ported global public-goods programs, includ-
ing the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation
of the Montreal Protocol (MLF), the Global En-
vironmental Fund (GEF), Prototype Carbon Fund
(ProCarbFund) and Critical Ecosystem Partner-
ship Fund (CEPF), CGIAR, the Special Program
for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases
(TDR), the Joint United Nations Program on
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Stop TB, Roll Back Malaria,
the Global Forum for Health Research, and the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization’s
(GAVI’s) Global Research Funding, largely meet
the four Development Committee criteria for se-
lectivity. Most global programs also largely meet
the approval and eligibility criteria for Bank in-
volvement. CGIAR does not meet the arm’s-
length criterion; the Bank did not involve
developing country stakeholders in CEPF’s es-
tablishment or its global-level governance; the
Bank did not do a thorough analysis of the ex-
pected level of Bank resources required for the
health programs, or of how to implement and
manage this new commitment. These are ex-
ceptions to the general rule, however. 
The corporate advocacy programs meet the Develop-
ment Committee selectivity criteria. This is largely be-
cause the criteria are broad and difficult to apply
precisely. For example, the first criterion—“an in-
ternational consensus that global action is re-
quired,” which all programs claim as their raison
d’être—provides no basis for selectivity because
the concept of international consensus is amor-
phous and loosely applied. The case studies il-
lustrate that the consensus is often driven by
constituencies in donor countries and the staff
of international agencies. At the same time, few
of the networks demand links to country oper-
ations, one of the most important criteria, before
approval, nor do they track them during imple-
mentation. 
The Bank deploys its comparative advantages more at
the global level than at the country level. Financial and
reputational risks and budgetary and staffing
implications are rarely sufficiently assessed. The
international consensus on the existence of a
problem is usually strong; consensus on what col-
lective action is required is often weak. Many
global programs are implicitly (sometimes ex-
plicitly) established to promote consensus, to
“harmonize” donor approaches to specific prob-
lems, to delineate donor comparative advan-
tages in addressing those problems, and to give
the donors specialized knowledge to use on the
problems. Capacity building in the recipient
countries is secondary in such projects.
Evidence is lacking that the programs are exploiting
economies of scale and scope in such activities as
knowledge creation and dissemination, capacity build-
ing, technical assistance, and donor coordination. It
is also not clear whether the knowledge they dis-
seminate is sufficiently evidence-based, quality-
tested, and contextual to add value to what the
Bank’s client countries themselves do, need, or
want, or what the Bank can achieve working
through country-level partnerships. Performance
indicators to assess changed donor or interna-
tional agency behavior do not exist. Performance
indicators, when they exist at all, are focused on
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the behavior of developing countries. OED was
able to identify only a few program-specific in-
dicators of changed Bank and donor practices,
procedures, and actions in response to the ad-
vocacy of global programs. In the case of cor-
porate advocacy programs, the needs of the
Bank’s client countries should be the prime con-
sideration for Bank involvement.
The voices of developing countries, or even those of
the Bank’s operational Regions, are inadequately rep-
resented in the international consensus. Case studies
of many of these corporate advocacy programs
show that including developing-country voices at
the concept stage enhances program ownership,
makes the organizational design more effective,
and increases program impacts. Based on the
evidence OED has provided so far, management
has acknowledged the need to strengthen the
role of developing countries and the Bank’s op-
erational Regions in global programs.
Value Added to the World Bank’s Development
Objectives
Evidence varies on the value added to the Bank’s de-
velopment objectives, but it is growing. Some pro-
grams lack clearly defined objectives, and others
have many unstated objectives; this makes it dif-
ficult to judge what value they have added. It is
difficult to assess many young programs that have
not had time to demonstrate impacts. However,
evaluations are increasing, in part prompted by
the DGF, and are beginning to affect program
design and implementation. When programs do
not meet all three requirements for effective eval-
uation—clear, shared, and measurable objectives;
appropriate methodology; and measurable evi-
dence—their global impacts remain unclear.
Programs delivering global public goods often add
value. Global public-goods programs (CGIAR,
TDR, MLF, parts of GEF, and even some new
global health programs) rate well in their impacts
on reducing poverty or on focusing on the pol-
icy, institutional, infrastructural, or technologi-
cal constraints developing countries face in
achieving sustainable economic growth. Adding
value on the ground in client countries is typi-
cally a joint product of global and country-level
activities. For example, CGIAR, like TDR, has
demonstrated impressive poverty-reducing im-
pacts in part because the Bank, donors, and
some governments made complementary in-
vestments at the country level. However, as
country-level investments have shrunk, donors
have tried to compensate by encouraging CGIAR
to move downstream. They have offered fund-
ing tied to research programs that demonstrate
immediate impacts to push CGIAR toward more
national- and local-level applied and adaptive
work. Management agrees that the activities of
several CGIAR research centers now resemble
those that regular Bank instruments would sup-
port through country-level investments.
Programs close to the Bank currently add more value.
Not surprisingly, the programs for which the
Bank is an implementing agency are more closely
linked with Bank operations than are other pro-
grams. This is in part because the Bank is better
at absorbing and using information and findings
produced internally or nearby. The Bank needs
to devise ways to increase its links to programs
more distant from it. Keeping the governance of
global programs at arm’s length from the Bank
and maintaining clear accountability for pro-
gram performance offer the greatest potential for
bringing new information and fresh perspec-
tives to Bank operations.
Global programs have revealed major investment gaps.
Evidence indicates that investments in health re-
search have substantial poverty-reducing impacts.
The current global policy and aid environment has
huge investment gaps at the global level in the
provision of global health research, as well as
gaps in complementary investments at the coun-
try level. Health research, like agricultural re-
search, is a long-term activity that the private
sector is unlikely to address on the scale needed.
Global programs have also revealed gaps in global
public policy. Several global programs highlight the
existence of global public-policy gaps—often in-
volving developed-country policies in trade, aid,
finance, and intellectual-property rights—that
affect developing countries. Few programs re-
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gard it as within their mandate to address these
policy gaps. If changing the international ground
rules is the objective of the programs, and if ad-
vocacy is the means to achieve it, then the pro-
grams should be assessed on their ability to
deliver changed policies or a changed global en-
vironment from the perspective of the poor.
Governance, Management, and Financing
Governance is weak in several programs. While pure
shareholder models of program governance are
being replaced by stakeholder models, programs
are still struggling to balance legitimacy and ac-
countability for results with efficiency in achieving
them. The permanent members of the programs’
governing bodies, who tend to be the major in-
ternational organizations and donors, have greater
de facto responsibility, relative to the rotating
members, to ensure that programs are successful.
But such responsibility and accountability are
rarely clearly articulated. Lack of effective gover-
nance and management must be addressed if the
Bank’s financial support is to continue.
Management arrangements can alter perceived and
actual responsibilities. When the Bank or another
international organization chairs programs that
they house, this reduces the responsibility for
shared governance. When programs are housed
in the Bank or other international organization,
the program manager often reports both to the
programs’ governing body and to a line manager
in the housing organization. This situation often
places responsibility for both management and
oversight in the same management chain, which
in turn creates real or perceived conflicts of in-
terest in monitoring performance. 
Global programs have increased overall aid very lit-
tle. At the aggregate level, global programs have
added little new money to ODA. Exceptions in-
clude funds from private sources for the Proto-
type Carbon Fund; from the Gates Foundation
for health; and small amounts from pharma-
ceutical companies through new public-private
partnerships for drug and vaccine development.
Given the opportunity cost of ODA funds, the
Bank’s involvement in programs with important
goals but little demonstrated value needs re-
consideration. In some cases, too close an as-
sociation with the Bank has hampered
mobilization of other funds for these programs.
It is time to move from “letting a thousand flow-
ers bloom” to assessing which programs deserve
continuing Bank support, and which do not.
World Bank Performance
Bank performance in global programs is better at the
global than at the country level. Other partners view
the Bank’s leadership role, its financial clout, its
access to policymakers, its operational support,
and its fiduciary oversight as a seal of approval,
giving them the confidence to invest in global
programs, both in-house and externally man-
aged. Even at the global level, though, the Bank’s
performance can be improved, particularly with
respect to strategy, independent oversight, and
global-country linkages.
The recent reforms are promising. The establishment
of the Global Programs and Partnership Council,
together with the GPP Group, is a positive devel-
opment. In line with the Phase 1 report’s recom-
mendation, the GPP Council could help oversee
the development of the Bank’s global strategy,
anticipate changes in the global environment, and
help set priorities and funding strategies. It can
move global programs from the current network
perspective to a Bankwide perspective and es-
tablish Bankwide standards for global program-
ming and performance. The Bank still needs to
strengthen its appraisal of new programs and to
make its selectivity, oversight, evaluation, and exit
strategies more transparent and results based. Fi-
nally, assessment and oversight of complex global
partnerships requires expert knowledge and input,
not only from the program managers who promote
them, but also from other partners, developing
countries, and experts in the field.
Independent oversight is needed. The Bank needs
to institute independent oversight of all its pro-
grams—in the case of in-house programs, by
senior managers outside the line management
of the vice presidency handling the program.
Oversight of both externally managed and in-
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house programs needs to be guided by clear
terms of reference and have the necessary budget
and accountability for performance. Indepen-
dent oversight is particularly important early on
to ensure that programs get off to a good start.
Bank management also needs to institute routine
procedures of quality assurance, internal audits,
risk assessment, and risk management. 
Exit strategies of programs are not working well. The
Bank’s record in managing the separation of in-
house programs from the Bank needs improve-
ment. For example, the mechanical, hands-off,
three-year rule for DGF Window 2 programs has
not facilitated orderly financial exits. More at-
tention needs to be paid to strengthening gov-
ernance and sustainable financing of the
programs being spun off.
The Bank’s strategy for global programs is poorly de-
fined. The Bank has lacked, but clearly needs, a
global strategy that is developed in conjunction
with its key partners and draws on the capacity
of its central vice presidencies, network anchors,
and Regions to do so. The strategy needs to ad-
dress the coherence, or lack thereof, between
global expectations (particularly in the donor
community) and the needs of developing coun-
tries. At its center, the global strategy needs a
clear focus on sustainable, poverty-reducing
growth in the Bank’s client countries; on global
policy issues that prevent such growth; and on
mobilizing incremental, unrestricted funding to
address global issues that are of high priority for
developing countries. Such a strategy will not
simply emerge from improved selectivity or over-
sight of individual global programs—it must be
worked out. Furthermore, strengthening over-
sight in the absence of an overall strategy risks
micromanaging the global program portfolio. 
OED Recommendations
Strategic Framework for the Bank’s
Involvement in Global Programs
1. In consultation with U.N. agencies, donors,
developing countries, and other partners, man-
agement should develop a global strategy for
the Bank’s involvement in global programs,
approved by the Board and periodically up-
dated, that:
– Exploits the Bank’s comparative advantage
as a multisectoral development financing
institution with a global reach and strong 
capacity in policy analysis
– Gives greater prominence to alleviating
poverty and to addressing global public
policies that limit developing countries’
prospects for rapid, sustainable, poverty-
reducing growth
– Fosters stronger links between global pro-
grams and the Bank’s Regional and country
operations in prioritizing its global pro-
gramming activities
– Ensures that global programs add value be-
yond what the Bank can accomplish through
partnerships at the country level.
Linking Financing to Priorities 
2. Management should develop a financing plan
for high-priority programs, particularly for
those providing genuine global public goods,
whether in the form of global policies, new
products, technologies, knowledge, or prac-
tices that benefit the poor. This requires:
– Identifying under-funded long-term global
public-goods programs that benefit the
poor—such as a global health research and
a product-development network for diseases
that disproportionately affect the poor—and
using the Bank’s convening power to mobi-
lize additional resources for them
– Improving the criteria and procedures re-
lating to the DGF’s Window 2 to create a
more rational and informed approach to
funding “venture capital” programs, in which
the DGF only provides initial support
– Developing a policy on the use of trust
funds in the context of the overall strategy
for global programs.
Selectivity and Oversight of the Global Program
Portfolio
3. Management should establish approval, over-
sight, evaluation, and exit/reauthorization cri-
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teria and procedures for Bank-supported global
programs that will help them to add value to
the Bank’s mission. This includes:
– Streamlining and clarifying the eligibility
and approval criteria for Bank selectivity
and grant support and instituting a two-
stage approval process for global programs
at the concept and appraisal stages
– Sharpening and more rigorously applying
the subsidiarity criterion for approval and
grant support
– Separating Bank oversight from the imple-
menting management and, for Bank staff
serving on the governing bodies of global
programs, clarifying their roles, responsi-
bilities, and accountabilities through stan-
dard terms of reference and training
– Allocating money for oversight and money
that the network anchor and Regional staff
can use to operationalize global programs
in the Bank’s Regional operations
– Instituting clear, well-planned, and well-exe-
cuted reauthorization/exit processes and en-
suring that the programs the Bank spins off
have an independent identity, accountability
for results, and a good chance of succeeding.
Governance and Management of Individual
Programs
4. Management should work with its global part-
ners to develop and apply universally accepted
standards of good governance, management,
results-orientation, and evaluation to all Bank-
supported global programs. These include:
– Legal status and/or written charters as ap-
propriate
– Transparent selection criteria and processes
for board chairs and board members; clar-
ifying their roles, responsibilities, account-
abilities, and constituencies; and giving them
authority to direct and oversee the pro-
gram, its policies, and its budget
– Voice of the Bank’s client countries on the
governing bodies of global programs for
better balance between developed and de-
veloping countries
– Guidelines on conflicts of interests, on the
roles of NGOs and the private sector in gov-
erning bodies, and on the roles and quality
of advisory boards
– Designation of evaluation and auditing as
functions of the governing body, not the
program management, with results that
should routinely be made available to pro-
gram financiers and other stakeholders.
Evaluation
5. OED should include global programs in its
standard evaluation and reporting processes.
This includes:
– Working with the Bank’s global partners to
develop international standards for the eval-
uation of global programs 
– Reviewing selected program-level evalua-
tions conducted by Bank-supported global
programs (both internally and externally
managed), much as OED reviews other self-
evaluations at the project and country levels.
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Resumen ejecutivo
El ritmo acelerado de la globalización ha promovido cambios drásticosen el comercio, las finanzas, la propiedad intelectual, la inversión delsector privado, la tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones,
la salud, el medio ambiente, la seguridad y la sociedad civil. Para poder en-
frentar los desafíos que presenta la globalización normalmente se requiere la
acción colectiva en el ámbito mundial. Los programas mundiales se utilizan
cada día más como un medio para organizar la acción colectiva, en particular
para la provisión de bienes públicos mundiales. 
Los programas mundiales también han trascen-
dido la provisión de bienes públicos mundiales
para cumplir otros objetivos que tradicionalmente
eran abordados por el Banco Mundial mediante
operaciones específicas para países. Los progra-
mas dirigidos a varios países que “promueven el
desarrollo institucional” se proponen aprovechar
las economías de escala y de alcance en la provi-
sión de servicios específicos en cada país y pro-
mover políticas que redunden en beneficio de los
países en desarrollo.
Resulta difícil satisfacer la creciente demanda
de programas mundiales, debido a la ausencia
de un gobierno mundial con autoridad para es-
tablecer y hacer cumplir políticas y normas, co-
brar impuestos y recaudar ingresos. El
estancamiento de la asistencia oficial para el de-
sarrollo (AOD) acrecienta el desafío, aunque los
programas mundiales, tanto los que se centran en
la provisión de bienes públicos mundiales como
los programas dirigidos a múltiples países, ab-
sorben una mayor proporción de la AOD. 
El Banco Mundial es un participante importante
de estas actividades mundiales dado que su alcance
internacional, su poder de convocatoria, su capa-
cidad para movilizar recursos y su conocimiento
práctico de múltiples sectores hacen que esté en
condiciones de enfrentar los desafíos de la globa-
lización. El Directorio Ejecutivo del Banco ha plan-
teado diversos temas e inquietudes acerca de los
programas de asociaciones mundiales en franco
aumento. Estos temas han servido de guía para la
evaluación del DEO sobre la participación del Banco
en tales programas. El informe de la fase 1 abordó
diversos aspectos estratégicos y programáticos. La
metaevaluación del GCIAI puso de manifiesto los
desafíos que enfrenta un programa mundial en
este entorno interno y externo modificado. Este in-
forme de la fase 2 sintetiza los resultados del exa-
men de 26 programas realizado por el DEO.
Los objetivos específicos de este informe son
los siguientes:
• Evaluar hasta qué punto estos programas to-
mados para el estudio de casos cumplen con
los criterios de selectividad y supervisión y
con las prioridades de los programas mundia-
les, definidos por el Comité para el Desarrollo
y por el Banco, en particular el Fondo de Do-
naciones para el Desarrollo. 
• Recoger lecciones interdisciplinarias sobre la
selectividad, el diseño, la implementación, el
gobierno, la gestión, el financiamiento y la eva-
luación de programas.
• Medir el avance realizado en la implementación
de las recomendaciones del examen de pro-
ceso realizado por el DEO en 1998, y de la
metaevaluación del GCIAI, en relación con la
gestión estratégica y programática del Banco
y la elección, el diseño e implementación de
programas individuales (recuadro RE.1).
• Identificar áreas en donde se requiere una
mayor intervención del Banco en su estrategia
y programación mundial a fin de mejorar la efi-
cacia de los programas mundiales.
Gestión de la participación del Banco en los programas
mundiales. La arquitectura de la participación del
Banco en programas mundiales ha ido evolucio-
nando desde 2000. Los diversos criterios de se-
lectividad, supervisión y admisibilidad (figura RE.1
y recuadro RE.2) se desarrollaron en diferentes
momentos y contextos, y se aplican de diferentes
maneras. La evaluación de la fase 2 aplicó estos
tres grupos de criterios, según su pertinencia, a
los 26 programas, y extrajo lecciones para las fu-
turas orientaciones estratégicas de la participación
del Banco en los programas mundiales.
El alcance de la participación del Banco en los
programas mundiales ha ido en aumento. En la
actualidad, las asociaciones mundiales se han
transformado en una línea de actividad impor-
tante del Banco. A la fecha de elaboración de este
informe, el Banco participaba en más de 200 aso-
ciaciones, 70 de las cuales cumplían con la de-
finición de un programa mundial. Además, el
Banco administra la mayor cantidad de fondos
fiduciarios (US $7.100 millones en junio de
2004) de toda organización internacional, de
los cuales el 64 por ciento se destinan a pro-
gramas mundiales y regionales (frente a 57 por
ciento el año anterior). Los desembolsos de los
fondos fiduciarios con destino a actividades
mundiales y regionales aumentaron en US $400
millones a US $1.200 millones en el ejercicio fis-
cal 2004. Gran parte de estos fondos se desti-
naron al Fondo Mundial de Lucha contra el
SIDA, la Tuberculosis y la Malaria.
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A partir del informe del DEO de la fase 1, la administración
del Banco ha incorporado varios cambios en la organiza-
ción y en los procedimientos de la gestión de los programas
mundiales (estos cambios se describen en el memorando de
marzo de 2003 dirigido a los directores ejecutivos, “Update
on Management of Global Programs and Partnerships” [Ac-
tualización sobre la gestión de los programas y asociaciones
mundiales]). La administración ha creado un Consejo de Aso-
ciaciones y Programas Mundiales (presidido por dos geren-
tes generales), ha restablecido la vicepresidencia de
Financiamiento Concesional y Asociaciones Mundiales, y
creado el Grupo de Asociaciones y Programas Mundiales
que depende de dicha vicepresidencia. La administración
también declaró que fortalecería la supervisión para poten-
ciar el enfoque estratégico de la cartera mundial del Banco
y aplicar el principio de subsidiaridad de manera más rigu-
rosa. El Fondo de Donaciones para el Desarrollo ha estable-
cido un proceso de revisión externa de pares para los nuevos
programas que procuran la asistencia de donantes. En res-
puesta a la metaevaluación del GCIAI que realizó el DEO, la
administración del Banco aceptó el principio de supervisión
independiente, asignándole la supervisión del GCIAI al Pri-
mer Economista del Banco. Esta última modificación aún
está en proceso de implementación.
R e c o m e n d a c i o n e s  d e  l a  f a s e  1  d e l  D E O  y
r e s p u e s t a  d e  l a  a d m i n i s t r a c i ó n
R e c u a d r o
R E . 1
R E S U M E N  E J E C U T I V O
x x x i i i
S e l e c t i v i d a d  y  s u p e r v i s i ó n  d e  
l o s  p r o g r a m a s  m u n d i a l e s
F i g u r a  R E . 1
Criterios de selectividad para la participación del Banco en los bienes públicos mundiales:
Respaldado por el Comité para el Desarrollo (septiembre de 2000)a
1. Consesnso internacional que requiere de acción global
2. Un valor agregado claro para los objectivos de desarrollo del Banco
3. Necesidad de acción del Banco como catalizador de otros recursos y associaciones
4. Una ventaja comparativa significativa para el Banco
Criterios para la aprobación de la participación del banco en las iniciativas de asociación que trascienden
el nivel de país, establecidos por la dirección del Banco (noviembre de 2000)b
1. Un vínculo claro con los objetivos institucionales básicos del Banco y, por sobre todo, con el trabajo del Banco por país
2. Argumentos sólidos para la participación del Banco en función de su ventaja comparativa
3. Una evaluación clara de los riesgos financieros y para la reputación del Banco, y de la manera en que se gestionarán
4. Un análisis claro del nivel previsto de recursos del Banco (de tiempo y dinero), y de la contribuciones de los otros asociados
5. Un descripción clara de la implementación, gestión y evaluación del nuevo compromiso
6. Un plan claro para comunicarse con las principales partes interesadas, y promover su participación, así como para informar 
    y consultar a los directores ejecutivos
Prioridades de bienes públicos mundialesc
Enfermedades transmisibles
• VHI/SIDA, tuberculosis, malaria y 
 enfermedades transmisibles en menores, 
 incluido el vínculo relevante con la 
 educación
• Desarrollo de vacunas y medicamentos 
 para las principales enfermedades
Aspectos de medio ambiente 
• Cambio climático
• Agua
• Bosques 
• Biodiversidad, degradación de la tierra 
 y agotamiento de la capa de ozono 
• Promoción de la investigación 
 agropecuaria 
Información y conocimiento 
• Cómo cerrar la brecha digital y dotar 
 a los países con la capacidad para  
 acceder al conocimiento 
• Desarrollo y reducción de la pobreza
Comercio e integración
• Acceso a mercados 
• Derechos de propiedad intelectual y 
 normativa 
Arquitectura financiera internacional
• Elaboración de normas internacionales
• Estabilidad financiera (incluida la 
 gestión responsable de la deuda 
 pública)
• Marco internacional de normas 
 contables y legales
Prioridades de promoción del 
desarrollo institucionalc
Empoderamiento, seguridad e inclusión 
social
• Integración del género
• Compromiso civico
• Gestión del riesgo social (incluida 
 la mitigación de desastres)
Clima de inversión
• Apoyo para el desarrollo urbano 
 y rural
• Servicios de infraestructura para 
 apoyar el desarrollo del sector privado
• Reforma normativa y política de 
 competencia
• Reforma del sector financiero 
Gobierno del sector público 
• Estado de derecho (incluida la 
 lucha contra la corrupción) 
• Reforma de la administración y la 
 función pública (incluida la rendición 
 de cuentas del gasto público)
• Acceso y administración de la 
 justicia (reforma judicial)
Educación 
• Educación para todos, con especial 
 énfasis en la educación de las niñas 
• Fortalecimiento de la capacidades 
 para la economía del conocimiento 
Salud
• Acceso a agua potable, aire puro y 
 sanidad
• Salud materna e infantil
Enforque estatégico para la supervisión 
de programas mundiales: establecido por 
la administración del Banco (marzo de 2003) 
a. Proveer bienes públicos mundiales
b. Respaldar la promoción interna- 
 cional para la reforma de la agendas  
 que, de alguna menara, abordan las  
 condiciones del marco normativo  
 relevante para los países  
 en desarrollo
c. Son programas destinados a múltiples 
 países que dependen necesariamente 
 de enfoques estrechamente coordinados
d. Movilizar recursos incrementales 
 sustanciales que pueden emplearse 
 con eficacia para el desarrollo
a. Del Comunicado del Comité para el Desarrollo emitido el 25 de septiembre de 2000. Tanto el Comité para el Desarrollo como la administración del Banco conciben a los programas
mundiales como el instrumento principal de la participación del Banco en la provisión de los bienes públicos mundiales. 
b. Los programas mundiales deben cumplir con los seis criterios de aprobación. 
c. Estas son las cinco prioridades en la promoción del desarrollo institucional y las cinco prioridades en la provisión de bienes públicos mundiales (y sus subcategorías ordenadas con vi-
ñetas) que se definen en el Documento de Orientación Estratégica 2002-2004 (Banco Mundial 2001b). Dentro del Sistema de Seguimiento y Aprobación de Asociaciones (Partnership Ap-
proval and Tracking System o PATS), los programas mundiales deben identificar, para fines de seguimiento, su alineación con al menos una de estas 10 prioridades institucionales.
Breve descripción de los 26 programas
tomados para el estudio de casos
En 2002, los 26 programas representaban el 90 por
ciento del gasto anual de los programas mundia-
les respaldados por el Banco. Los programas va-
rían en función del área temática, la ubicación
institucional, el número y clase de asociados, y el
diseño, financiamiento e implementación de la or-
ganización. Tienen una antigüedad de dos a 32
años y el volumen de gasto anual oscila entre US
$560.000 y US $447 millones.
Los programas seleccionados se concentran
en la red de Desarrollo Ambiental y Socialmente
Sostenible (ESSD) (71 por ciento del gasto total
de programas y 67 por ciento de las donaciones
del Fondo de Donaciones para el Desarrollo en
el ejercicio fiscal 2003). Esta proporción es se-
mejante a la distribución general de los programas
mundiales. La segunda concentración en impor-
tancia es en el sector de salud (22 por ciento del
gasto total destinado a programas, excluido el
Fondo Mundial de Lucha contra el Sida, la Tu-
berculosis y la Malaria). Los programas para la
salud, el comercio y la protección social tienen su
sede en los órganos de las Naciones Unidas per-
tinentes. Todos los programas de infraestructura
y algunos otros (de desarrollo ambiental, finan-
ciero y social) tienen su sede en el Banco. Re-
cientemente, algunos programas para el
fortalecimiento de capacidades se han separado
del Banco. La figura RE.2 resume las actividades
de los 26 programas evaluados.
Cada programa lleva a cabo gran variedad de
actividades, pero en los programas mundiales
hay dos dimensiones importantes desde la óptica
estratégica y programática:
• Si el objetivo primordial del programa es pro-
veer bienes públicos mundiales para los cua-
les se requiere la acción colectiva mundial, o
bien “fomentar el desarrollo institucional” para
respaldar la provisión de bienes públicos, pri-
vados o de mérito, en el ámbito nacional o
local. Los programas que se encuadran en esta
segunda categoría deben cumplir con el re-
quisito de subsidiaridad. Es decir que, para los
asociados (incluidos los países en desarrollo),
la relación entre los beneficios de la acción
colectiva y los costos de transacción de las aso-
ciaciones mundiales, debe exceder los bene-
ficios netos que se obtendrían si el Banco
actuara mediante sus mecanismos habituales.
• Si los programas tienen su propio mecanismo
de financiamiento o si dependen de inversio-
nes o de la asistencia técnica de terceros (por
ejemplo, préstamos y créditos del Banco, fi-
nanciamiento nacional o de donantes).
Los programas de bienes públicos globales re-
presentan una minoría, pero absorben la mayor
parte de los fondos. Al evaluar sus características
fundamentales, se observa que apenas 11 pro-
gramas (incluida una parte de la Alianza Mundial
para Vacunas e Inmunización, GAVI) proveen bie-
nes públicos mundiales (figura RE.3). De estos,
sólo siete financian inversiones mundiales o en un
país. Únicamente la Alianza GAVI proporciona fi-
nanciamiento en gran escala para tales inversio-
nes, en ambos niveles, y por ello se encuadra en
los programas de bienes públicos mundiales y
nacionales. Los otros programas de bienes pú-
blicos mundiales promueven enfoques comunes
para mitigar las principales enfermedades trans-
misibles, o la investigación de las enfermedades
que afligen a los pobres. Promueven mayores
inversiones públicas de terceros para luchar con-
tra las enfermedades transmisibles, pero a dife-
rencia de la GAVI, no financian las inversiones en
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• Subsidiaridad
• Ventaja comparativa
• Beneficios para múltiples países
• Apalancamiento financiero
• Competencia de gestión
• Relación de independencia
• Estrategia de salida
• Promoción de asociaciones
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ningún ámbito. Los siete programas de bienes
públicos mundiales y los dos de bienes públicos
nacionales que efectivamente financian inversio-
nes (incluido el GAVI en ambas categorías) com-
prometieron el 80 por ciento del gasto total de los
programas usados para el estudio de casos en el
ejercicio fiscal 2003 (figura RE.4). Los 18 progra-
mas restantes que no financian inversiones (in-
cluidos los cuatro programas de salud antes
mencionados) fundamentalmente financian acti-
vidades relacionadas con la información y el co-
nocimiento, la promoción del desarrollo
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Fortaleciminento de la capacidad
Reforma institucional y de la política nacional
Mejoramiento de la coordinación entre donantes
Implementación de convenciones, normas y regamentaciones
Movilización directa de recursos incrementales
Movilización indirecta de recursos incrementales
Financiamiento de inversiones para bienes público mundiales por país
I+D para nuevos productos y technologías
Abordajes comunes para enfermedades transmisibles
Financiamiento de inversiones para bienes públicos naciones por país
Alto/substancial Moderado Irrelevante
Grado de participación de los programas en cada actividad
Fuente: Cuadro H.8: Evaluación del DEO sobre las actividades de los programas.
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institucional, el fortalecimiento de las capacida-
des y la asistencia técnica. 
Estos programas estimulan la demanda de
mayor asistencia técnica, capacitación y fortale-
cimiento de las capacidades por parte de los pa-
íses, pero carecen de los recursos para satisfacerla.
Por esa razón dependen de los donantes, incluido
el Banco, para que realicen las inversiones com-
plementarias. Si bien los programas pretenden que
las actividades complementarias se incluyan en los
DELP y los EAP, hasta el momento su inclusión se
ha visto limitada, lo que refleja el vínculo débil que
existe entre los programas dirigidos a varios paí-
ses y las actividades por país.
Conclusiones del DEO
Selectividad
La “proliferación” y experimentación con muchos
programas nuevos ha permitido que el Banco
comprendiera la diversidad y complejidad de los
desafíos que se plantean en el ámbito mundial, y
ha generado oportunidades para aprender los in-
trincados vínculos que existen entre la esfera mun-
dial y la nacional. Esto ha sido instructivo tanto para
la formulación como para el perfeccionamiento de
los criterios de selectividad del Banco.
Los programas de bienes públicos mundiales cum-
plen con la mayoría de los criterios. Pese a estar im-
pulsados fundamentalmente desde la oferta, la
mayoría de los programas de bienes públicos
mundiales respaldados por el Banco (el Fondo
Multilateral, Fondo para el Medio Ambiente Mun-
dial, Fondo Tipo del Carbono y el Fondo de Asis-
tencia para Ecosistemas Críticos, el Grupo
Consultivo sobre Investigaciones Agrícolas In-
ternacionales, programa de investigación de en-
fermedades tropicales, ONUSIDA, la iniciativa
Alto a la Tuberculosis, la iniciativa Hacer Retro-
ceder la Malaria, el Foro Mundial para la investi-
gación de salud y el Financiamiento de la
investigación mundial de la GAVI) cumplen ma-
yormente con los cuatro criterios de selectividad
del Comité para el Desarrollo. La mayoría de los
programas mundiales también cumplen en gran
parte con los criterios de aprobación y admisibi-
lidad para la participación del Banco. El GCIAI no
cumple con el criterio de independencia; el Banco
no promovió la participación de partes interesa-
das de países en desarrollo en el establecimiento
del Fondo para Alianzas Estratégicas en Ecosis-
temas Críticos (CEPF, por sus siglas en inglés) ni
en su gobierno en el ámbito mundial; el Banco no
analizó en forma exhaustiva el nivel estimado de
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recursos del Banco que serían necesarios para
los programas de salud, ni la forma de imple-
mentación y gestión de este nuevo compromiso.
Sin embargo, éstas son excepciones a la regla. 
Los programas de promoción del desarrollo institu-
cional cumplen con los criterios de selectividad del
Comité para el Desarrollo. Esto obedece en gran me-
dida a que los criterios son generales y no es fácil
aplicarlos con precisión. Por ejemplo, el primer
criterio - “consenso internacional sobre la nece-
sidad de acción mundial”, que todos los progra-
mas proclaman como su razón de ser – no
constituye una base para la selectividad del pro-
grama, ya que el concepto de consenso interna-
cional es amorfo y se aplica con poca rigurosidad.
Los estudios de casos indican que el consenso nor-
malmente surge de los representantes de países
donantes y del personal de los organismos in-
ternacionales. Por otra parte, pocas redes re-
quieren vínculos con las operaciones para países,
uno de los criterios más importantes, antes de la
aprobación, y no hacen un seguimiento durante
la etapa de ejecución. 
El Banco aprovecha sus ventajas comparativas más en
el ámbito mundial que en el nacional.  Prácticamente
nunca se evalúan lo suficiente los riesgos finan-
cieros y para la reputación, como así tampoco las
repercusiones presupuestarias y de personal. El
consenso internacional sobre la existencia de un
problema suele ser fuerte; el consenso sobre la ac-
ción colectiva necesaria suele ser débil. Muchos
programas mundiales se establecen en forma im-
plícita (en ocasiones explícita) para promover
consenso, “armonizar” la forma en que los do-
nantes abordan los problemas específicos, des-
cribir las ventajas comparativas de los donantes al
abordar tales problemas, y dotar a los donantes de
conocimiento especializado para usar en la reso-
lución de los problemas. En esos proyectos, el
fortalecimiento de las capacidades en los países be-
neficiarios pasa a ocupar un segundo plano.
No hay pruebas suficientes de que los programas ex-
ploten economías de escala y de alcance en activi-
dades como la creación y difusión del conocimiento,
el fortalecimiento de las capacidades, la asistencia
técnica y la coordinación de los donantes. No queda
claro si el conocimiento que difunden se funda-
menta en pruebas, se someten a control de cali-
dad y se define conceptualmente, en forma
suficiente, para añadir valor a las acciones, nece-
sidades u objetivos de los países clientes del
Banco, o a los logros que puede alcanzar el Banco
trabajando mediante asociaciones para países. Se
carece de indicadores de desempeño para evaluar
el cambio de actitud de los donantes o de los or-
ganismos internacionales. Los indicadores de de-
sempeño, en caso de existir, se centran en el
comportamiento de los países en desarrollo. El
DEO pudo identificar únicamente unos pocos
indicadores específicos por programa que miden
el cambio en las prácticas, procedimientos y ac-
ciones del Banco y de los donantes, en respuesta
a la promoción de los programas mundiales. En
el caso de programas de promoción del desa-
rrollo institucional, las necesidades de los países
clientes del Banco deberían ser la consideración
primordial para decidir la participación del Banco.
La ingerencia de los países en desarrollo, o incluso de
las regiones operativas del Banco, no está adecua-
damente representada en el consenso internacional.
Los estudios de casos de muchos de estos pro-
gramas de promoción del desarrollo institucional
indican que la inclusión de los países en desarrollo
en la etapa de desarrollo conceptual potencia la
identificación con el programa, aumenta la efica-
cia del diseño orgánico y los impactos en el pro-
grama. En función de la evidencia presentada por
el DEO hasta el momento, la administración ha
reconocido la necesidad de fortalecer la función
de los países en desarrollo y las regiones opera-
tivas del Banco en los programas mundiales.
Valor agregado para los objetivos de desarrollo
del Banco Mundial
El valor agregado que se ha comprobado para los ob-
jetivos de desarrollo del Banco varía según el pro-
grama, pero está en franco aumento. Algunos
programas carecen de objetivos claramente defi-
nidos, y otros tienen muchos objetivos no decla-
rados; por ello es difícil determinar su valor
agregado. Resulta difícil evaluar muchos programas
recientes que no han tenido tiempo suficiente
para demostrar sus impactos. Sin embargo, las
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evaluaciones están aumentando, en parte induci-
das por el Fondo de Donaciones para el Desarro-
llo (DGF, por sus siglas en inglés), y comienzan a
afectar el diseño y la implementación de progra-
mas. Cuando los programas no cumplen con todos
los requisitos de una evaluación eficaz – objetivos
claros, compartidos y mensurables; metodología
adecuada; y evidencia mensurable – su impacto en
el ámbito global sigue siendo poco claro.
Los programas que proveen bienes públicos mundia-
les suelen agregar valor. Los programas de bienes
públicos mundiales (el GCIAI, el Programa de in-
vestigación de enfermedades tropicales (TDR), el
Fondo Multilateral, partes del Fondo para el Medio
Ambiente Mundial, e incluso algunos nuevos pro-
gramas mundiales de salud) logran tener un im-
pacto satisfactorio en la reducción de la pobreza
o concentrarse en las limitaciones normativas,
institucionales, de infraestructura y tecnología
de los países desarrollo que dificultan la conse-
cución de un crecimiento económico sostenible.
El hecho de agregar valor en los propios países
clientes normalmente es producto de las activi-
dades en el ámbito mundial y nacional. Por ejem-
plo, el GCIAI, al igual que el TDR, han demostrado
tener un impacto significativo en la reducción de
la pobreza, en parte porque el Banco, los do-
nantes y algunos gobiernos realizaron inversiones
complementarias en el ámbito nacional. Sin em-
bargo, dado que las inversiones en el ámbito na-
cional se han reducido, los donantes han
procurado contrarrestar esta situación alentando
al GCIAI a ocuparse de actividades secundarias.
Han ofrecido financiamiento reservado para pro-
gramas de investigación con impactos inmediatos
evidentes, para llevar al GCIAI a un trabajo más
adaptativo con aplicación en el orden nacional y
local. La administración coincide en que las acti-
vidades de varios centros de investigación del
GCIAI actualmente se asemejan a aquellos que los
instrumentos normales del Banco respaldarían
mediante inversiones en programas para países.
Los programas cercanos al Banco actualmente tienen
mayor valor agregado. Como es de esperar, los pro-
gramas en donde el Banco es el organismo eje-
cutor tienen vínculos más estrechos con las
operaciones del Banco. Esto se debe, en parte, a
que el Banco incorpora y utiliza mejor la infor-
mación y las conclusiones que se originan en el
ámbito interno o cercano. El Banco debe imple-
mentar mecanismos para aumentar sus vínculos
con programas que son menos cercanos. El go-
bierno independiente de los programas mun-
diales fuera del seno del Banco y la rendición
clara de cuentas para el desempeño de programas
ofrecen enormes posibilidades de incorporar in-
formación nueva y otros puntos de vista a las
operaciones del Banco.
Los programas mundiales han dejado al descubierto
grandes brechas de inversión... Se ha comprobado
que las inversiones en investigación en el sector de
salud tiene gran impacto en la reducción de la po-
breza. La política mundial actual y el contexto de
la ayuda presentan enormes brechas de inversión
en el orden mundial para la investigación mundial
en materia de salud, como también brechas en las
inversiones complementarias en el ámbito na-
cional. La investigación en el sector de salud, al
igual que la investigación en el sector agrícola, es
una actividad de largo plazo que el sector privado
difícilmente emprenda en la escala necesaria.
... como así también brechas en la política pública
mundial. Varios programas mundiales hacen hin-
capié en la existencia de brechas en la política pú-
blica mundial, que normalmente incluye las
políticas comerciales, asistenciales, de finanzas y
derechos de propiedad intelectual de países de-
sarrollados - que afectan a los países en desarro-
llo. Son pocos los programas que incorporan
dentro de su mandato la tarea de cerrar estas
brechas. Si el objetivo de los programas consiste
en modificar las directrices internacionales, y si la
promoción del desarrollo institucional es el medio
para lograrlo, entonces los programas deben eva-
luarse en función de su capacidad para lograr la
modificación de políticas o del marco mundial,
desde la perspectiva de los pobres.
Gobierno, gestión y financiamiento
El gobierno es débil en varios programas. Si bien los
modelos de gobierno puramente accionario son
reemplazados por modelos de partes interesa-
das, los programas aún pugnan por lograr el equi-
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librio entre la legitimidad y la rendición de cuen-
tas de resultados, por un lado, y la eficiencia para
su consecución, por el otro. Los miembros per-
manentes de los órganos de gobierno de los pro-
gramas, que habitualmente son las principales
organizaciones y donantes internacionales, tie-
nen mayor responsabilidad de hecho que los
miembros alternos, para garantizar el éxito de
los programas. Pero dicha responsabilidad y ren-
dición de cuentas pocas veces se definen con cla-
ridad. Es preciso abordar la falta de un gobierno
y una gestión eficaces para que pueda continuar
el apoyo financiero del Banco. 
Las disposiciones en materia de gestión pueden mo-
dificar las responsabilidades reales y las percibidas.
Cuando el Banco u otro organismo internacional
ejerce la presidencia en programas que albergan
en su propio seno, se reduce la responsabilidad
de un gobierno compartido. Cuando los progra-
mas tienen su sede en el Banco u otros organis-
mos internacionales, el gerente del programa
suele estar bajo las órdenes del órgano de go-
bierno del programa y de un gerente de línea en
la organización que sirve alberga el programa.
Como consecuencia, la responsabilidad por la
gestión y la supervisión tiende a recaer en la
misma cadena gerencial, lo que a su vez crea con-
flictos de intereses reales o presuntos en el se-
guimiento del desempeño.
Los programas mundiales han aumentado muy poco la
asistencia en general. En su conjunto, los progra-
mas mundiales han añadido pocos fondos nuevos
a la asistencia oficial para el desarrollo. Entre las
excepciones se incluyen fondos del sector privado
para el Fondo Tipo del Carbono; de la Fundación
Gates para programas de salud; y pequeñas sumas
de dinero aportadas por empresas farmacéuti-
cas mediante asociaciones de colaboración entre
el sector público y privado para el desarrollo de
vacunas y medicamentos. Dado el costo de opor-
tunidad de los fondos de la AOD, debe reconsi-
derarse la participación del Banco en programas
con objetivos importantes, pero de escaso valor
probado. En algunos casos, la existencia de una
asociación muy estrecha con el Banco ha obsta-
culizado la movilización de otros fondos para
estos programas. Ha llegado el momento de pasar
de “privilegiar la proliferación de programas” a eva-
luar qué programas merecen seguir recibiendo el
apoyo del Banco y cuáles no.
Desempeño del Banco Mundial
El Banco ha tenido un mejor desempeño en el ámbito
mundial que en el nacional en relación con los pro-
gramas mundiales. Otros socios perciben la fun-
ción de liderazgo del Banco, su peso en materia
financiera, su acceso a los responsables de la for-
mulación de políticas, su asistencia operativa y su
supervisión fiduciaria como un sello de aprobación,
que les inspira confianza para invertir en los pro-
gramas mundiales que se administran dentro o
fuera del seno del Banco. Sin embargo, incluso en
el ámbito mundial es posible mejorar el desem-
peño del Banco, particularmente en lo que atañe
a la estrategia, la supervisión independiente y los
vínculos entre la esfera mundial y la nacional.
Las reformas recientes son prometedoras. El estable-
cimiento del Consejo de Asociaciones y Programas
Mundiales, junto con el Grupo GPP (Bienes Pú-
blicos Mundiales) es una medida positiva en ese
sentido. En sintonía con la recomendación del in-
forme de la fase 1, el Consejo GPP podría ayudar
a supervisar el desarrollo de la estrategia mundial
del Banco, prever cambios en el entorno mundial
y contribuir a establecer prioridades y definir es-
trategias de financiamiento. Puede modificar la
perspectiva de red que tienen actualmente los
programas mundiales por una perspectiva inte-
gradora, y definir normas que rijan en todo el
Banco para el establecimiento de programas mun-
diales y su desempeño. El Banco todavía necesita
fortalecer la evaluación inicial de nuevos progra-
mas y dar mayor transparencia a sus estrategias de
selectividad, supervisión, evaluación y salida, ade-
más de una mayor orientación a la obtención de
resultados. Por último, la evaluación y supervi-
sión de asociaciones mundiales complejas re-
quiere el conocimiento de expertos y la opinión
no sólo de los gerentes de programas que los pro-
mueven sino también de otros asociados, países
en desarrollo y expertos en la materia.
Se requiere una supervisión independiente. Es preciso
que el Banco establezca la supervisión indepen-
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diente de todos sus programas; en el caso de tra-
tarse de programas dentro el seno del Banco, la
supervisión debe estar a cargo de gerentes prin-
cipales ajenos a la línea gerencial de la vicepresi-
dencia que tiene a su cargo el programa. La
supervisión de programas con gestión externa e
interna debe guiarse por términos de referencia
claros, contar con el presupuesto necesario y ren-
dir cuentas por su desempeño. La supervisión
independiente es particularmente importante en
las primeras etapas a fin de garantizar que los
programas tengan un buen comienzo. La admi-
nistración del Banco también tiene que estable-
cer procedimientos de rutina para control de
calidad, auditorías internas, evaluación y gestión
del riesgo. 
Las estrategias de salida de los programas no funcio-
nan bien. El Banco debe gestionar mejor la escisión
de los programas internos. Por ejemplo, la norma
mecánica teórica de tres años para los programas
de la Ventanilla 2 del Fondo de Donaciones para
el Desarrollo no ha facilitado salidas financieras or-
denadas. Debe prestarse más atención a fortale-
cer el gobierno y el financiamiento sostenibles de
los programas que se escinden.
La estrategia del Banco para los programas mundia-
les no se define con claridad. El Banco carece, pero
sin duda necesita una estrategia mundial que se
formule conjuntamente con sus principales aso-
ciados y se nutra de las capacidades existentes en
las vicepresidencias centrales, los coordinadores
de las redes y las regiones. La estrategia debe
abordar la coherencia, o incoherencia, entre las ex-
pectativas mundiales (particularmente en la co-
munidad de donantes) y las necesidades de los
países en desarrollo. En esencia, la estrategia mun-
dial necesita un enfoque claro en el crecimiento
sostenible que ayude a reducir la pobreza en los
países clientes del Banco; en los problemas de po-
lítica mundial que impiden el crecimiento; y en la
movilización de financiamiento incremental no
sujeto a restricciones para abordar los problemas
mundiales que tienen máxima prioridad para los
países en desarrollo. Una estrategia con esas ca-
racterísticas no surgirá simplemente de mejorar la
selectividad o la supervisión de cada programa
mundial; es preciso reformularla. Por otra parte,
con el fortalecimiento de la supervisión sin una es-
trategia general, se corre el riesgo de microges-
tionar la cartera de programas mundiales.
Recomendaciones del DEO
Marco estratégico de la participación del
Banco en los programas mundiales
1. Previa consulta con los organismos de las Na-
ciones Unidas, los donantes, los países en de-
sarrollo, y otros asociados, la administración
debería elaborar una estrategia mundial para
la participación del Banco en los programas
mundiales, aprobados por el Directorio y ac-
tualizada en forma periódica, que: 
– Aproveche la ventaja comparativa del Banco
como institución de financiamiento para el
desarrollo multisectorial con alcance mun-
dial y sólida capacidad para el análisis de po-
líticas.
– Dé mayor prominencia al alivio de la po-
breza y aborde las políticas públicas mun-
diales que limitan las posibilidades de los
países en desarrollo para alcanzar un creci-
miento rápido, sostenible y que reduzca la
pobreza.
– Fomente vínculos más fuertes entre los pro-
gramas mundiales y las operaciones regio-
nales y nacionales del Banco al priorizar las
actividades de programación mundial.
– Asegure que los programas mundiales agre-
guen valor más allá de los logros que pueda
alcanzar el Banco mediante asociaciones
de orden nacional.
Vinculación del financiamiento con las
prioridades
2. La Dirección debe elaborar un plan de finan-
ciamiento para programas de alta prioridad, en
particular para aquellos que proveen bienes pú-
blicos mundiales genuinos, ya sea en la forma
de políticas mundiales, nuevos productos, tec-
nologías, conocimiento o prácticas que bene-
fician a los pobres. Para ello es preciso:
– Identificar programas de bienes públicos
mundiales a largo plazo que beneficien a los
pobres con financiamiento insuficiente,
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como es la red mundial de desarrollo de pro-
ductos e investigación en el sector de salud
para aquellas enfermedades que afectan a
los pobres en forma desmedida, y usar el
poder de convocatoria del Banco para mo-
vilizar recursos adicionales.
– Mejorar los criterios y procedimientos re-
lacionados con la Ventanilla 2 del DGF, a fin
de crear un enfoque más racional e infor-
mado para el financiamiento de programas
de “capital de riesgo”, en donde el DGF se
limite a proporcionar el apoyo inicial.
– Desarrollar una política que rija el uso de los
fondos de fideicomisos en el marco de la es-
trategia general para los programas mun-
diales.
Selectividad y supervisión de la cartera de
programas mundiales
3. La administración debe establecer criterios de
aprobación, supervisión, evaluación y sa-
lida/nueva autorización, y procedimientos para
los programas mundiales respaldados por el
Banco, que le permitirán agregar valor a la mi-
sión del Banco. Esto conlleva:
– Racionalizar y clarificar los criterios de ad-
misibilidad y aprobación para la selectividad
del Banco y el acceso a las donaciones, y es-
tablecer un proceso de aprobación de dos
etapas para los programas mundiales, en
las etapas de definición conceptual y de
evaluación inicial.
– Agudizar y aplicar con mayor rigurosidad el
criterio de selectividad para la aprobación y
el apoyo financiero mediante donaciones.
– Separar la función de supervisión del Banco
de la gestión de la ejecución; y para el per-
sonal del Banco que desempeña funciones
en órganos de gobierno de los programas
mundiales, clarificar sus funciones, res-
ponsabilidades y rendición de cuentas me-
diante términos de referencia estándar y
capacitación.
– Asignar fondos para supervisión, y fondos que
podrán ser utilizados por el coordinador de
la red y el personal regional a fin de opera-
tivizar los programas mundiales en la órbita
de las operaciones regionales del Banco.
– Establecer procesos de reautorización/sa-
lida claros, bien planificados y ejecutados,
y garantizar que los programas que se es-
cinden del Banco tienen identidad inde-
pendiente, rinden cuenta por sus resultados
y tienen buenas probabilidades de éxito.
Gobierno y gestión de los programas
individuales
4. La administración debe trabajar con sus so-
cios mundiales para desarrollar y aplicar nor-
mas de aceptación universal de buen gobierno,
gestión, orientación a los resultados y evalua-
ción a todos los programas mundiales respal-
dados por el Banco. Para ello se requieren:
– Personalidad jurídica o actas constitutivas,
o ambos, según corresponda.
– Criterios y procesos de selección transpa-
rentes para los presidentes y miembros de
directorios; clarificar sus funciones, res-
ponsabilidades, rendición de cuentas y re-
presentaciones; y facultarlos para dirigir y
supervisar el programa, sus políticas y su
presupuesto.
– Ingerencia de los países clientes del Banco
en los órganos de gobierno de los programas
mundiales, para un mejor equilibrio entre los
países desarrollados y en desarrollo.
– Directrices que rijan los conflictos de inte-
reses, las funciones de las ONG y del sector
privado en los órganos de gobierno, y las fun-
ciones y calidad de los consejos de asesoría.
– Determinación de las funciones de evalua-
ción y auditoría dentro de las funciones del
órgano de gobierno, no la dirección del
programa; los resultados deben ponerse a
disposición de las instituciones que finan-
cian el programa y de otras partes intere-
sadas en periodicidad regular.
Evaluación
5. El DEO debe incluir los programas mundiales
en sus procesos estándar de evaluación e in-
formación. Esto supone:
– Trabajar con los socios mundiales del Banco
para desarrollar normas internacionales
para la evaluación de programas mundiales. 
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– Examinar evaluaciones de programas selec-
cionadas realizadas por programas mundia-
les respaldados por el Banco (con gestión
fuera y dentro del seno del Banco), así como
el DEO examina otras autoevaluaciones en el
plano de proyectos y operaciones para países.
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Résumé analytique
Le rythme de plus en plus rapide de la mondialisation a engendré des chan-gements spectaculaires dans le domaine du commerce, des finances, dela propriété intellectuelle, des investissements privés, de la technologie
de l’information et des communications, de la santé, de l’environnement, de
la sécurité et de la société civile. Aborder les défis posés par la mondialisation
requiert souvent une action collective au niveau mondial. Des programmes
mondiaux sont de plus en plus souvent utilisés pour organiser l’action collective
mondiale, en particulier pour fournir des biens publics mondiaux.
Les programmes mondiaux ont également été
au-delà de la fourniture de biens publics mon-
diaux pour servir d’autres objectifs que la
Banque mondiale a généralement abordés par
le biais de ses opérations au niveau national. De
tels programmes multinationaux et de « dé-
fense générale » cherchent à tirer profit des
économies d’échelle et d’envergure en four-
nissant des services au niveau national et en dé-
fendant des politiques qui profitent aux pays en
développement.
Il est difficile de répondre à la demande crois-
sante de programmes mondiaux, en l’absence
d’un gouvernement mondial habilité à établir
et à appliquer des régimes et règlements poli-
tiques, à percevoir des impôts et à générer des
recettes. La stagnation de l’aide publique au dé-
veloppement (APD) aggrave le problème, bien
que les programmes mondiaux – tant les pro-
grammes de biens publics mondiaux que les
programmes multinationaux – participent au-
jourd’hui davantage à l’APD.
La Banque mondiale est un acteur important
de ces activités mondiales car sa portée mondiale,
son pouvoir de rassemblement, sa capacité à
mobiliser les ressources et son expertise multi-
sectorielle la placent dans une bonne position
pour aborder les défis posés par la mondialisa-
tion. Le Conseil des administrateurs de la Banque
mondiale a soulevé une variété de problèmes et
d’inquiétudes quant au nombre croissant de
programmes de partenariat mondiaux de la
Banque mondiale. Ces problèmes ont guidé
l’évaluation de l’OED de la participation de la
Banque mondiale à des programmes mondiaux.
Le rapport sur la phase 1 a abordé plusieurs
problèmes stratégiques et programmatiques. La
méta-évaluation du GCRAI a illustré les pro-
blèmes que rencontre un programme mondial
dans cet environnement interne et externe dif-
férent. Le rapport sur la phase 2 synthétise les
résultats de l’examen des 26 programmes par
l’OED.
Les objectifs spécifiques de ce rapport sont les
suivants:
• Évaluer la mesure dans laquelle les pro-
grammes d’études de cas sont à la hauteur des
critères et des priorités de sélectivité et de sur-
veillance des programmes mondiaux établis
par le Comité pour le développement et la
Banque mondiale, en particulier la DGF (De-
velopment Grant Facility).
• Tirer des leçons transversales pour la Banque
mondiale sur la sélectivité, la conception,
l’application, la gouvernance, la gestion, le
financement et l’évaluation des programmes.
• Évaluer les progrès dans la mise en œuvre
des recommandations de l’examen de la pro-
cédure de 1998 de l’OED, du rapport sur la
phase 1 et de la méta-évaluation du GCRAI
concernant la gestion stratégique et pro-
grammatique et le choix, la conception et la
mise en œuvre de programmes individuels
(encadré RA.1).
• Identifier des domaines requérrant une action
plus poussée de la Banque mondiale au niveau
de la programmation et de la stratégie mon-
diale afin d’améliorer l’efficacité des pro-
grammes mondiaux.
Gestion de la participation de la Banque mondiale à des
programmes mondiaux. L’architecture de la partici-
pation de la Banque mondiale à des programmes
mondiaux a évolué depuis 2000. Les différents cri-
tères de sélectivité, de surveillance et d’éligibilité
(tableau RA.1 et encadré RA.2) ont été dévelop-
pés à différents moments et dans différents
contextes et ils sont appliqués de manières dif-
férentes. L’évaluation de la phase 2 a appliqué ces
trois séries de critères selon le cas aux 26 pro-
grammes et a tiré des leçons pour les orientations
stratégiques futures de la participation de la
Banque mondiale à des programmes mondiaux.
L’ampleur de la participation de la Banque
mondiale à des programmes mondiaux a égale-
ment été de plus en plus importante. Aujour-
d’hui, les partenariats mondiaux sont devenus
une ligne importante des activités de la Banque
mondiale. Au moment de la rédaction de ce do-
cument, la Banque mondiale participait à plus de
200 partenariats, dont environ 70 répondent à
la définition d’un programme mondial. La
Banque mondiale est également l’organisation in-
ternationale qui gère la plus grande quantité de
fonds fiduciaires (7,1 milliards en juin 2004),
dont 64 % sont destinés à des programmes ré-
gionaux et mondiaux (contre 57 % l’année der-
nière). Les décaissements de fonds fiduciaires
pour des activités régionales et mondiales ont
augmenté de 400 millions de dollars à 1,2 mil-
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Depuis le rapport sur la phase 1 de l’OED, la direction de la
Banque mondiale a procédé à plusieurs changements de procé-
dure et d’organisation dans la gestion des programmes mon-
diaux (ces changements sont soulignés dans un mémorandum de
mars 2003 à l’attention des directeurs exécutifs, « Mise à jour sur
la gestion des programmes et des partenariats »). La direction de
la Banque mondiale a instauré un Conseil des programmes et des
partenariats mondiaux (présidé par deux directeurs généraux),
a reconstitué une vice-présidence des partenariats mondiaux et
du financement concessionnel et a créé un Groupe des pro-
grammes et des partenariats mondiaux au sein de cette vice-
présidence. La direction de la Banque mondiale a également si-
gnalé qu’elle renforcerait la surveillance afin d’améliorer l’accent
stratégique du portefeuille mondial de la Banque mondiale et
qu’elle appliquerait le principe de subsidiarité de manière plus
rigoureuse. La DGF a établi une procédure externe de révision par
les pairs pour les nouveaux programmes à la recherche de sub-
ventions. En réponse à la méta-évaluation du GCRAI de l’OED, la
direction de la Banque mondiale a accepté l’idée d’une sur-
veillance indépendante en attribuant la surveillance du GCRAI à
l’économiste en chef de la Banque mondiale. Ce dernier chan-
gement est toujours en cours d’application.
R e c o m m a n d a t i o n s  e t  a c t i o n  d e  g e s t i o n  d e
l a  p h a s e  1  d e  l ’ O E D
E n c a d r é  R A . 1
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T a b l e a u  R A . 1
Critères de sélectivité pour la participation de la Banque mondiale à des biens publics mondiaux :
Avalisés par le Comité pour le développement (septembre 2000)a
1. Un nouveau consensus international sur la nécessité d’une action mondial
2. Une valeur ajoutée claire aux objectifs de développement de la Banque mondiale
3. La nécessité que l’action de la Banque mondiale catalyse d’autres ressources et partenariats
4. Un avantage comparatif important pour la Banque mondiale
Critères d’approbation de la participation de la Banque mondiale à des initiatives de partenariat au-delà
du niveau national, établis par la direction de la Banque mondiale (novembre 2000)b
1. Un lien clair avec les princiapux objectifs institutionnels de la Banque mondiale et, surtout, avec le travail de la Banque mondiale au niveau national
2. Des solides arguments en faveur de la participation de la Banque mondiale se basant sur un avantage comparatif
3. Une évaluation claire des risques ﬁnanciers et de réputation pour la Banque mondiale et la manière dont ils seront gérés
4. Un analyse approfondie du niveau prévu de ressources nécessaires de la Banque mondiale (en temps et en argent) et de la contribution d’autres partenaires
5. Un exposé clair de la manière dont le nouvel engagement sera mis en œuvre, géré et évalué
6. Un plan clair de communication avec les principaux intervenants (avec la participation de ceux-ci) et d’information et de consultation des directeurs 
    exécutifs
Priorités des biens publics mondiauxc
Maladies transmissibles
• VIH/SIDA, tuberculose, paludisme et 
 maladies transmissibles de l’enfance, y 
 compris le lien pertinent avec l’éducation
• Développement de vaccins et de 
 médicaments pour les principales  
 maladies transmissibles dans les pays  
 en développement
Patrimoine environnemental commun
• Changement climatique
• Eau
• Forêts 
• Biodiversité, baisse de l’ozone et 
 dégradation des sols 
• Promotion de la recherche agricole 
Information et connaissances 
• Combler le fossé numérique et équiper 
 les pays en capacités d’accès aux 
 connaissances 
• Comprendre le développement et la 
 réduction de la pauvreté
Commerce et intégration
• Accès aux marchés 
• Normes et droits de propriété 
 intellectuelle 
Architecture ﬁnancière internationale
• Développement de normes internationales
• Stabilité ﬁnancière (y compris gestion 
 saine de la dette publique)
• Comptabilité internationale et cadre 
 juridique
Prioriés de défense généralec
Autonomisation, sécurité et inclusion 
sociale 
• Intégration de la dimension de genre
• Participation et engagement civiques
• Gestion des risques sociaux (y compris 
 atténuation des caatastrophes)
Climat d’investissement
• Soutenir le développement urbain 
 et rural
• Services d’infrastructures pour soutenir
 le développement du secteur privé 
• Politique de concurrence et réforme  
 des règlements
• Réforme du secteur ﬁnancier 
Gouvernance du secteur public 
• État de droit (y compris anti-corruption)
• Réforme de l’administration publique
 et de la fonction publique (y compris
 responsabilité des dépenses publiques)
• Accès à la justice et administration
 de la justice (réforme judiciaire)
Éducation 
• Éducation pour tous, en particulier pour 
 les ﬁlles 
• Renforcement des capacités humaines
 pour l’économie de la connaissance 
Santé
• Accès à l’eau potable, à l’air pur et
 à l’hygiène
• Santé des enfants et des mères
Accent stratéguqie pour la surveillance
des programmes mondiaux : établi par la
direction de la Banque mondiale (mars 2003) 
a. Fournir des biens publics mondiaux
b. Soutenir la défense internationale  
 pour la réforme des programmes qui  
 abordent de manière importante les  
 conditions du cadre politique pertinentes  
 pour les pays en développement
c. Être des programmes multinationaux
 dépendant essentiellement d’approches
 hautement coordonnées
d. Mobiliser d’importantes ressources
 supplémentaires qui peuvent être utilisées
 de manière efﬁcace pour le développement
a. Du communiqué du Comité pour le développement émis le 25 septembre 2000. Le Comité pour le développement et la direction de la Banque mondiale ont examiné les programmes
mondiaux comme étant le principal instrument de la participation de la Banque mondiale à la fourniture de biens publics mondiaux.
b. Les programmes mondiaux devraient répondre aux six critères d’approbation.
c.Il s’agit des cinq priorités de défense générale et des cinq priorités des biens publics mondiaux (et sous-catégories non numérotées) du Document d’orientation stratégique pour les
exercices 02-04 (Banque mondiale 2001b). Dans le cadre du Système d’approbation et de suivi des partenariats (PATS), les programmes mondiaux doivent identifier, à des fins de suivi,
leur alignement sur une des dix priorités générales au moins.
liards de dollars pour l’exercice 2004. Une grande
partie de ces fonds était destinée au Fonds mon-
dial de lutte contre le SIDA, la tuberculose et le
paludisme (GFATM).
Bref aperçu des 26 programmes d’études
de cas
En 2002, les 26 programmes représentaient 90
% des dépenses annuelles des programmes mon-
diaux financés par la Banque mondiale. Les pro-
grammes varient selon le domaine,
l’emplacement institutionnel, le nombre et le
type de partenaires et la conception, le finan-
cement et la mise en œuvre organisationnels.
Leur ancienneté varie de 2 à 32 ans et leur taille
de 560.000 à 447 millions de dollars en dépenses
annuelles.
Les programmes choisis se concentrent dans
le réseau du développement durable au niveau so-
cial et environnemental (71 % des dépenses to-
tales des programmes et 67 % des subventions de
la DGF au cours de l’exercice 2003). Cela est com-
parable à la distribution globale des programmes
mondiaux. La santé arrive en deuxième place (22
% des dépenses totales des programmes, à l’ex-
ception du GFATM). Les programmes de santé, de
commerce et de protection sociale sont intégrés
dans les agences de l’ONU concernées. Tous les
programmes d’infrastructure et certains autres
programmes (dans le domaine de l’environne-
ment, des finances et du développement social)
sont intégrés dans la Banque mondiale. Quelques
programmes dans le domaine du renforcement
des capacités ont récemment été séparés de la
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• Subsidiarité
• Avantage comparatif
• Bénéfices multinationaux
• Effet de levier financier
• Compétence en gestion
• Relation sans lien de dépendance
• Stratégie de désengagement
• Promotion de partenariats
C r i t è r e s  d ’ é l i g i b i l i t é  p o u r  l ’ o c t r o i
d e  s u b v e n t i o n s  d e  l a  D e v e l o p m e n t
G r a n t  F a c i l i t y  ( o c t o b r e  1 9 9 8 )
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Production & diffusion de connaissances
Défense
Renforcement des capacités
Réforme institutionnelle & de la politique nationale
Amélioration de la coordination des donateurs
Mise en œuvre des conventions, règles & normes
Mobilisation directe de ressources supplémentaires
Mobilisation indirecte de  ressources supplémentaires
Financement d’investissements nationaux pour les BPM
R&D de nouveaux produits & technologies
Approches communes des maladies transmissibles
Financement des investissements nationaux pour les BPN
Élevé/important Modeste Négligeable
Mesure dans laquelle les programmes sont engagés dans chaque activité
Source: Tableau H.8: Évaluation des activités annuelles des programmes par l’OED.
Banque mondiale. Le tableau RA.2 résume les ac-
tivités dans lesquelles sont engagés les 26 pro-
grammes évalués.
Chaque programme réalise de nombreux
types d’activités différents mais deux dimen-
sions des programmes mondiaux sont impor-
tantes d’un point de vue stratégique et
programmatique:
• Le fait de savoir si chaque programme vise es-
sentiellement à fournir des biens publics mon-
diaux requérrant une action collective ou à
s’engager dans une « défense générale » afin de
soutenir la fourniture de biens privés, publics ou
tutélaires locaux et nationaux. Les programmes
de cette dernière catégorie doivent passer le test
de la subsidiarité. En d’autres termes, les bé-
néfices d’une action collective relative aux frais
de transaction des partenariats mondiaux pour
les partenaires (y compris les pays en dévelop-
pement) ne doivent pas être supérieurs aux
bénéfices nets d’une action de la Banque mon-
diale en utilisant ses instruments ordinaires.
• Le fait de savoir si les programmes ont leur
propre mécanisme de financement ou s’ils
se basent sur les investissements ou l’assis-
tance technique de tiers (par ex., prêts et cré-
dits de la Banque mondiale ou fonds
nationaux ou de donateurs).
Les biens publics mondiaux représentent une
minorité des programmes mais une majorité
des fonds. Lorsque leurs caractéristiques les plus
essentielles sont examinées, seuls 11 pro-
grammes (y compris une partie de l’Alliance
mondiale pour les vaccins et la vaccination -
GAVI) fournissent des biens publics mondiaux
(tableau RA.3). Parmi ceux-ci, sept seulement
financent des investissements mondiaux ou na-
tionaux. Seule la GAVI finance de tels investis-
sements à une grande échelle au niveau mondial
et national et est donc reprise dans les pro-
grammes de biens publics mondiaux et natio-
naux. Les quatre autres programmes de biens
publics mondiaux encouragent des approches
communes pour atténuer les principales mala-
dies transmissibles ou encouragent la recherche
sur les maladies des pauvres. Ils défendent des
investissements publics accrus par des tiers
pour lutter contre les maladies transmissibles
mais, contrairement à la GAVI, ils ne financent pas
les investissements, à aucun niveau. Les sept
programmes de biens publics mondiaux et les
deux programmes de biens publics nationaux qui
financent les investissements (la GAVI étant re-
prise dans les deux catégories) ont assumé 80 %
des dépenses totales des programmes d’études
de cas au cours de l’exercice 2003 (tableau RA.4).
Les 18 autres programmes ne finançant pas
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Nombre de programmes
des investissements (y compris les 4 programmes
précités dans le domaine de la santé) financent
essentiellement des activités liées à l’information
et à la connaissance, à la défense, au renforce-
ment des capacités et à l’assistance technique.
Ces programmes stimulent la demande exis-
tante des pays en matière d’assistance tech-
nique, de formation et de renforcement des
capacités mais ne disposent pas des ressources
pour répondre à cette demande. Les pro-
grammes dépendent donc de donateurs, y com-
pris la Banque mondiale, pour des
investissements supplémentaires. Si les pro-
grammes espèrent que les activités complé-
mentaires seront inclues dans les DSRP et dans
les SAP, cette inclusion a été limitée jusqu’à pré-
sent, reflétant le faible lien existant entre les
programmes de défense multinationaux et les ac-
tivités nationales.
Conclusions de l’OED
Sélectivité
Le fait de « laisser un millier de fleurs éclore » et
d’expérimenter de nombreux nouveaux pro-
grammes a permis à la Banque mondiale de
comprendre la diversité et la complexité des
problèmes mondiaux et a permis de tirer des le-
çons de la complexité des relations monde-pays.
Cela a contribué à la formulation et à l’amélio-
ration des critères de sélectivité de la Banque
mondiale.
Les programmes de biens publics mondiaux répondent
à la majorité des critères. S’ils dépendent en grande
partie de l’approvisionnement, la plupart des
programmes mondiaux de biens publics finan-
cés par la Banque mondiale (Fonds multilatéral,
FEM, FPC et CEPF, GCRAI, TDR, UNAIDS, Halte
à la tuberculose, Faire reculer le paludisme,
Forum mondial pour la recherche en santé,
Fonds mondial pour la recherche de la GAVI) ré-
pondent en grande partie aux quatre critères
de sélectivité du Comité pour le développement.
La plupart des programmes mondiaux répondent
en grande partie également aux critères d’ap-
probation et d’éligibilité pour la participation
de la Banque mondiale. Le GCRAI ne répond
pas au critère de pleine concurrence; la Banque
mondiale n’a pas fait participer les intervenants
des pays en développement à l’établissement
du CEPF ou à sa gouvernance mondiale; la
Banque mondiale n’a pas procédé à une analyse
approfondie du niveau prévu de ressources de
la Banque mondiale nécessaire pour des pro-
grammes de santé ni de la manière de mettre en
œuvre et de gérer ce nouvel engagement. Ce sont
toutefois des exceptions à la règle.
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Les programmes de défense générale répondent aux
critères de sélectivité du Comité pour le développe-
ment. Cela est en grande partie dû au fait que les
critères sont larges et difficiles à appliquer pré-
cisément. Par exemple, le premier critère – « un
consensus international sur la nécessité d’une ac-
tion mondiale », que tous les programmes re-
vendiquent comme leur raison d’être – ne fournit
aucune base pour la sélectivité car le concept de
consensus international est informe et appliqué
librement. Les études de cas illustrent le fait que
le consensus dépend souvent des intervenants
dans les pays donateurs et du personnel des
agences internationales. Parallèlement, peu de
réseaux demandent des liens avec les opéra-
tions nationales, l’un des critères les plus im-
portants, avant l’approbation, et ils ne les
surveillent pas non plus pendant la mise en
œuvre.
La Banque présente ses avantages comparatifs da-
vantage au niveau mondial qu’au niveau national. Les
risques financiers et de réputation ainsi que les
implications budgétaires et de dotation en per-
sonnel sont rarement suffisamment évalués. Le
consensus international sur l’existence d’un pro-
blème est généralement fort; le consensus sur
l’action collective nécessaire est souvent faible.
De nombreux programmes mondiaux sont im-
plicitement (parfois explicitement) établis pour
promouvoir le consensus, pour « harmoniser »
les approches des donateurs quant à des pro-
blèmes spécifiques, pour déterminer les avan-
tages comparatifs des donateurs pour résoudre
ces problèmes et pour donner aux donateurs des
connaissances spéciales à utiliser pour ces pro-
blèmes. Le renforcement des capacités dans les
pays bénéficiaires est secondaire dans de tels
projets.
Il n’y a pas de preuves que les programmes exploitent
les économies d’échelle et d’envergure dans des ac-
tivités telles que la création et la diffusion des connais-
sances, le renforcement des capacités, l’assistance
technique et la coordination des donateurs. Il n’est
également pas clair si les connaissances qu’ils dif-
fusent se basent suffisamment sur des preuves,
si leur qualité est éprouvée et si elles sont contex-
tuelles pour apporter une valeur ajoutée à ce que
les pays clients de la Banque mondiale font, né-
cessitent ou veulent eux-mêmes ou à ce que la
Banque mondiale peut obtenir en travaillant par
le biais de partenariats au niveau national. Il
n’existe pas d’indicateurs de performance afin
d’évaluer un changement de comportement des
donateurs ou des agences internationales. Les in-
dicateurs de performance, lorsqu’ils existent, se
concentrent sur le comportement des pays en
développement. L’OED n’a pu identifier que
quelques indicateurs spécifiques aux pro-
grammes indiquant des changements dans les
pratiques, procédures et actions des donateurs
et de la Banque mondiale en réponse à la défense
de programmes mondiaux. Dans le cas des pro-
grammes de défense générale, les besoins des
pays clients de la Banque mondiale devraient
être la première considération pour la partici-
pation de la Banque mondiale.
L’opinion des pays en développement, ou même celle
des régions opérationnelles de la Banque mondiale,
n’est pas bien représentée dans le consensus inter-
national. Les études de cas sur bon nombre de ces
programmes de défense générale montrent que
la prise en considération de l’opinion des pays
en développement à l’étape de la conception
améliore la possession des programmes, rend la
conception organisationnelle plus efficace et
renforce les impacts des programmes. Sur les
bases de preuves que l’OED a fournies jusqu’à
présent, la direction de la Banque mondiale a re-
connu la nécessité de renforcer le rôle des pays
en développement et des régions opération-
nelles de la Banque mondiale dans des pro-
grammes mondiaux.
Valeur ajoutée aux objectifs de développement
de la Banque mondiale
Les preuves de la valeur ajoutée aux objectifs de dé-
veloppement de la Banque mondiale varient mais sont
de plus en plus importantes. Certains programmes
n’ont pas d’objectifs clairement définis et d’autres
ont de nombreux objectifs non déclarés, ce qui
complique l’évaluation de la valeur qui a été
ajoutée. Il est difficile d’évaluer de nombreux pro-
grammes récents qui n’ont pas eu le temps
d’avoir des impacts. Toutefois, les évaluations
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sont de plus en plus nombreuses, en partie pro-
voquées par la DGF, et elles commencent à af-
fecter la conception et la mise en œuvre des
programmes. Lorsque les programmes ne ré-
pondent pas aux trois exigences pour une éva-
luation efficace – des objectifs clairs, partagés et
mesurables, une méthodologie appropriée et
des preuves mesurables –, leurs impacts mon-
diaux restent flous.
Les programmes fournissant des biens publics mon-
diaux apportent souvent une valeur ajoutée. Les pro-
grammes mondiaux de biens publics (GCRAI,
TDR, Fonds multilatéral, des parties du FEM et
même certains nouveaux programmes mon-
diaux de santé) sont bien considérés quant à
leurs impacts pour réduire la pauvreté ou se
concentrer sur les contraintes politiques, insti-
tutionnelles, technologiques ou d’infrastruc-
tures auxquelles sont confrontés les pays en
développement pour parvenir à une croissance
économique durable. Ajouter une valeur sur le
terrain dans les pays clients est en général un pro-
duit commun des activités au niveau mondial et
national. Par exemple, le GCRAI, comme le pro-
gramme TDR, s’est révélé avoir des impacts
éprouvés impressionnants en matière de ré-
duction de la pauvreté, en partie parce que la
Banque mondiale, les donateurs et certains gou-
vernements ont réalisé des investissements sup-
plémentaires au niveau national. Toutefois,
comme les investissements au niveau national
ont diminué, les donateurs ont tenté de les com-
penser en encourageant le GCRAI à se déplacer
en aval. Ils ont proposé des fonds liés à des pro-
grammes de recherche qui ont des effets im-
médiats, afin de pousser le GCRAI vers un travail
plus adaptatif et plus appliqué au niveau local et
national. La direction de la Banque mondiale
convient que les activités de plusieurs centres de
recherche du GCRAI ressemblent à présent à
celles que financeraient les instruments de la
Banque mondiale par le biais d’investissements
au niveau national.
Les programmes proches de la Banque mondiale ap-
portent réellement une valeur ajoutée. Il n’est pas sur-
prenant que les programmes dont la Banque
mondiale est un organisme d’exécution sont
plus étroitement liés aux opérations de la Banque
mondiale. Cela est dû en partie au fait que la
Banque mondiale arrive mieux à absorber et à uti-
liser des informations et des conclusions pro-
duites au niveau interne ou proche. La Banque
mondiale doit concevoir des moyens d’aug-
menter ses liens avec des programmes qui sont
plus distants d’elle. Le fait de conserver la gou-
vernance de programmes mondiaux sans lien
de dépendance vis-à-vis de la Banque mondiale
et de conserver une claire obligation de résultats
des programmes donne une plus grande possi-
bilité d’apporter de nouvelles informations et de
nouvelles perspectives pour les opérations de la
Banque mondiale.
Les programmes mondiaux ont révélé de grandes la-
cunes en matière d’investissements… Des preuves
indiquent que les investissements dans la re-
cherche en santé ont d’importants effets sur la
réduction de la pauvreté. L’environnement mon-
dial actuel en matière de politique et d’assis-
tance présente de grandes lacunes en matière
d’investissements au niveau mondial dans la
fourniture de la recherche mondiale en santé,
ainsi que des lacunes dans les investissements
supplémentaires au niveau national. La re-
cherche en santé, comme la recherche agri-
cole, est une activité à long terme que le secteur
privé est peu susceptible d’aborder à l’échelle
nécessaire.
…ainsi que des lacunes dans la politique publique
mondiale. Plusieurs programmes mondiaux sou-
lignent l’existence de lacunes dans la politique
publique mondiale – impliquant souvent les po-
litiques des pays développés en matière de com-
merce, d’assistance, de finances et de droits de
propriété intellectuelle – qui affectent les pays
en développement. Peu de programmes consi-
dèrent que le fait de combler ces lacunes poli-
tiques fait partie de leurs missions. Si le
changement des règles de base internationales
est l’objectif des programmes et si la défense est
le moyen d’y parvenir, les programmes devraient
alors être évalués par rapport à leur capacité à
fournir de nouvelles politiques ou un nouvel
environnement mondial, du point de vue des
pauvres.
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Gouvernance, gestion et financement
La gouvernance est mauvaise dans plusieurs pro-
grammes. Si les modèles d’actionnaires purs de
gouvernance de programmes sont actuellement
remplacés par des modèles d’intervenants, les
programmes luttent toujours pour mettre en
équilibre la légitimité et l’obligation de résul-
tats avec l’efficacité lors de l’obtention de ceux-
ci. Les membres permanents des organes
directeurs des programmes, qui sont générale-
ment des donateurs et des grandes organisa-
tions internationales, ont de facto une plus
grande responsabilité, par rapport aux membres
tournants, pour garantir la réussite des pro-
grammes. Toutefois, une telle responsabilité est
rarement clairement articulée. Le manque de
gouvernance et de gestion efficaces doit être
résolu si l’on veut que la Banque mondiale conti-
nue à apporter une aide financière.
Les accords de gestion peuvent altérer les responsa-
bilités réelles et perçues. Lorsque la Banque mon-
diale ou une autre organisation internationale
dirige les programmes dont elle s’occupe, cela
réduit la responsabilité d’une gouvernance par-
tagée. Lorsque les programmes sont intégrés
dans la Banque mondiale ou une autre organi-
sation internationale, le gestionnaire du pro-
gramme fait souvent un rapport à l’organe
directeur du programme et à un cadre respon-
sable dans l’organisation hôte. Cette situation
place souvent la responsabilité de la gestion et
du contrôle dans la même chaîne de gestion, ce
qui crée à son tour des conflits d’intérêt réels ou
perçus pour le contrôle des performances.
Les programmes mondiaux ont augmenté l’aide globale
de très peu. Dans l’ensemble, les programmes
mondiaux ont ajouté très peu de fonds supplé-
mentaires à l’aide publique au développement.
Des exceptions englobent des fonds de sources
privées pour le Fonds prototype pour le car-
bone; de la Fondation Gates pour la santé; et de
petites sommes provenant d’entreprises phar-
maceutiques par le biais de nouveaux partena-
riats public-privé pour le développement de
médicaments et de vaccins. Vu le coût de re-
nonciation des fonds de l’APD, la participation
de la Banque mondiale à des programmes ayant
de grands objectifs mais peu de valeur démon-
trée doit être réexaminée. Dans certains cas,
une association trop étroite avec la Banque mon-
diale a gêné la mobilisation d’autre fonds pour
ces programmes. Le temps est venu de passer du
principe de « laisser un millier de fleurs éclore »
à la détermination des programmes qui méritent
d’être financés en permanence par la Banque
mondiale.
Performances de la Banque mondiale
Les performances de la Banque mondiale dans des pro-
grammes mondiaux sont meilleures au niveau mondial
qu’au niveau national. D’autres partenaires consi-
dèrent le rôle prépondérant de la Banque mon-
diale, son poids financier, son accès aux
responsables politiques, son soutien opération-
nel et son contrôle fiduciaire comme un sceau
d’approbation, leur donnant la confiance pour
investir dans des programmes mondiaux, tant
gérés en interne qu’en externe. Même au ni-
veau mondial, cependant, les performances de
la Banque mondiale peuvent être améliorées,
en particulier concernant la stratégie, le contrôle
indépendant et les relations monde-pays.
Les récentes réformes sont prometteuses. L’établis-
sement du Conseil des programmes et des par-
tenariats mondiaux (GPP), et du Groupe des
GPP, est un événement positif. Conformément à
la recommandation du rapport sur la phase 1, le
Conseil des GPP pourrait contribuer à surveiller
le développement de la stratégie mondiale de la
Banque mondiale, anticiper les changements de
l’environnement mondial et contribuer à éta-
blir des priorités et des stratégies de financement.
Il peut déplacer les programmes mondiaux de la
perspective de réseau actuelle vers une pers-
pective à l’échelle de la Banque mondiale et éta-
blir des normes de la Banque mondiale pour
les performances et les programmes mondiaux.
La Banque mondiale doit encore renforcer son
évaluation des nouveaux programmes et rendre
ses stratégies de sélectivité, de contrôle, d’éva-
luation et de sortie plus transparentes et da-
vantage basées sur les résultats. Enfin, l’évaluation
et le contrôle de partenariats mondiaux com-
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plexes requièrent les connaissances et les idées
d’experts, pas seulement de gestionnaires de
programmes qui les encouragent mais égale-
ment d’autres partenaires, de pays en dévelop-
pement et d’experts dans le domaine.
Il faut un contrôle indépendant. La Banque mon-
diale doit établir un contrôle indépendant de tous
ses programmes – dans le cas de programmes in-
ternes, par des cadres supérieurs en dehors de
la gestion hiérarchique de la vice-présidence en
charge du programme. Le contrôle des pro-
grammes internes et des programmes gérés en
externe doit être orienté par un mandat clair, dis-
poser du budget nécessaire et avoir une res-
ponsabilité en matière de résultats. Le contrôle
indépendant est en particulier important au
début afin de garantir que les programmes par-
tent sur de bonnes bases. La direction de la
Banque mondiale doit également établir des
procédures de routine en matière d’assurance de
la qualité, d’audits internes, d’évaluation des
risques et de gestion des risques. 
Les stratégies de sortie des programmes ne fonction-
nent pas correctement. Les dossiers de la Banque
mondiale concernant la gestion de la séparation
des programmes internes de la Banque mon-
diale doivent être améliorés. Par exemple, la
règle mécanique de non-intervention de trois ans
pour les programmes en phase 2 de la DGF n’a
pas facilité les sorties financières ordonnées. Il
faut prêter davantage attention au renforcement
de la gouvernance et au financement durable des
programmes.
La stratégie de la Banque mondiale pour les pro-
grammes mondiaux est mal définie. La Banque mon-
diale ne dispose pas, et elle en a clairement
besoin, d’une stratégie mondiale qui est déve-
loppée en collaboration avec ses principaux
partenaires et qui encourage la capacité qui
existe dans ses principales vice-présidences, les
points d’ancrage des réseaux et les régions à le
faire. La stratégie doit aborder la cohérence, ou
le manque de cohérence, entre les attentes
mondiales (en particulier au sein de la com-
munauté des donateurs) et les besoins des pays
en développement. La stratégie mondiale doit
se concentrer clairement sur la croissance du-
rable réduisant la pauvreté dans les pays clients
de la Banque mondiale, sur les problèmes de po-
litique mondiale qui empêchent cette crois-
sance et sur la mobilisation de fonds non affectés
supplémentaires pour résoudre les problèmes
mondiaux qui sont une grande priorité pour
les pays en développement. Une telle stratégie
ne découlera pas simplement d’une meilleure
sélectivité ou d’un contrôle accru des pro-
grammes mondiaux individuels, elle doit être
mise au point. Par ailleurs, le renforcement du
contrôle en l’absence d’une stratégie globale
risque d’entraîner la microgestion du porte-
feuille de programmes mondiaux.
Recommandations de l’OED
Cadre stratégique de l’implication de la
Banque dans les programmes mondiaux
1. Après consultations auprès des agences des
Nations unies, des donateurs, des pays en
développement et d’autres partenaires, la di-
rection devrait élaborer une stratégie mon-
diale pour servir de fondement à
l’engagement de la Banque dans les pro-
grammes mondiaux, qui serait approuvée par
le comité de direction, mise à jour de ma-
nière périodique et qui :
– Exploite les avantages comparatifs de la
Banque mondiale en tant qu’institution
multisectorielle de financement du déve-
loppement ayant une portée mondiale et
une forte capacité d’analyse politique.
– Se consacre davantage à réduire la pau-
vreté et à aborder les politiques publiques
mondiales qui limitent les perspectives des
pays en développement en matière de
croissance rapide, durable et réduisant la
pauvreté.
– Encourage des liens plus étroits entre les
programmes mondiaux et les opérations ré-
gionales et nationales de la Banque mon-
diale concernant l’établissement des
priorités de ses activités de programmes
mondiaux.
– Garantisse que les programmes mondiaux
apportent une valeur ajoutée au-delà de ce
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que la Banque mondiale peut accomplir par
le biais des partenariats au niveau national.
Relier le financement aux priorités 
2. La direction de la Banque mondiale devrait éla-
borer un plan de financement pour les pro-
grammes à haute priorité, en particulier pour
ceux qui fournissent de véritables biens pu-
blics mondiaux, que ce soit sous forme de po-
litiques mondiales, de nouveaux produits, de
technologies, de connaissances ou de pratiques
qui bénéficient aux pauvres. Cela requiert :
– L’identification de programmes mondiaux
de biens publics à long terme sous-financés
qui bénéficient aux pauvres – comme la re-
cherche mondiale en santé et le réseau
mondial de développement de produits
pour des maladies qui affectent les pauvres
de manière disproportionnée – et l’utilisa-
tion de pouvoir de rassemblement de la
Banque mondiale pour mobiliser des res-
sources supplémentaires pour ces pro-
grammes.
– L’amélioration des critères et procédures
concernant la phase 2 de la DGF, afin de
créer une approche plus rationnelle et plus
approfondie du financement de pro-
grammes de « capital-risque », dans les-
quels la DGF n’apporte que l’aide initiale.
– Le développement d’une politique sur l’uti-
lisation de fonds fiduciaires dans le cadre
de la stratégie globale pour les programmes
mondiaux.
Sélectivité et contrôle du portefeuille de
programmes mondiaux
3. La direction de la Banque mondiale devrait
établir des critères et des procédures d’ap-
probation, de contrôle, d’évaluation et de
sortie/nouvelle autorisation pour les pro-
grammes mondiaux financés par la Banque
mondiale qui les aideront à apporter une va-
leur ajoutée à la mission de la Banque mon-
diale. Cela englobe :
– La rationalisation et la clarification des cri-
tères d’approbation et d’éligibilité pour
l’aide à la sélectivité et à l’octroi de sub-
ventions de la Banque mondiale et l’insti-
tution d’une procédure d’approbation en
deux étapes pour les programmes mon-
diaux au moment de la conception et de
l’évaluation.
– L’affûtage et l’application plus rigoureuse
du critère de subsidiarité pour l’approba-
tion et l’aide aux subventions.
– La séparation du contrôle de la Banque
mondiale et de la gestion de la mise en
œuvre; et, pour le personnel de la Banque
mondiale travaillant dans les organes di-
recteurs des programmes mondiaux, la cla-
rification de leurs rôles et responsabilités
par le biais d’une formation et d’un man-
dat standard.
– L’allocation de fonds pour le contrôle et de
fonds que le point d’ancrage du réseau et
le personnel régional peuvent utiliser pour
rendre opérationnels les programmes mon-
diaux dans les opérations régionales de la
Banque mondiale.
– L’établissement de procédures de sor-
tie/nouvelle autorisation claires, bien pla-
nifiées et bien exécutées et la garantie que
les programmes que la Banque mondiale
a séparés ont une identité indépendante,
une obligation de résultat et de bonnes
chances de succès.
Gouvernance et gestion de programmes
individuels
4. La gestion devrait travailler avec ses parte-
naires mondiaux pour élaborer et appliquer
des normes universellement acceptées
concernant la bonne gouvernance, la ges-
tion, l’orientation des résultats et l’évalua-
tion à tous les programmes mondiaux
financés par la Banque mondiale. Il s’agit
entre autres de :
– Statuts juridiques et/ou chartes écrites le
cas échéant.
– Procédures et critères transparents pour la
sélection des présidences et membres des
conseils; précisant leurs rôles, responsa-
bilités et structures de base; et leur donnant
l’autorité d’orienter et contrôler le pro-
gramme, ses politiques et son budget.
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– Opinions des pays clients de la Banque
mondiale quant aux organes directeurs
des programmes mondiaux, pour un
meilleur équilibre entre les pays dévelop-
pés et les pays en développement.
– Directives sur les conflits d’intérêts, sur
les rôles des ONG et du secteur privé dans
les organes directeurs et sur les rôles et la
qualité des conseils consultatifs.
– Désignation de l’évaluation et de l’audit
comme des fonctions de l’organe direc-
teur, pas de la direction du programme,
avec des résultats qui devraient être ré-
gulièrement mis à disposition des finan-
ciers du programme et d’autres
intervenants.
Évaluation
5. L’OED devrait inclure les programmes mon-
diaux dans ses procédés standard d’évaluation
et de rapport. Cela englobe le fait de :
– Travailler avec les partenaires mondiaux
de la Banque mondiale pour développer
des normes internationales pour l’évalua-
tion des programmes mondiaux. 
– Réviser les évaluations des programmes
choisies réalisées par des programmes
mondiaux financés par la Banque mon-
diale (tant ceux gérés en interne que ceux
gérés en externe), comme l’OED révise
d’autres auto-évaluations au niveau des
pays et des projets.
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List of Case Study Programs
Acronym/ Operational Size
short form Full name start date ($ millions)a
Environment & Agriculture
1. CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 1972 395.0 
2. GEF Global Environment Facility 1991 387.53
3. MLF Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol 1991 158.6
4. ProCarbFund Prototype Carbon Fund 2000 6.5
5. CEPF Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 2000 20.19
6. GWP Global Water Partnership 1997 10.25
7. GIF Global Integrated Pest Management Facility 1996 1.3
Health, Nutrition & Population
8. TDR Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases Dec 1975 47.5
9. Global Forum Global Forum for Health Research Jan 1998 3.07
10. UNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS Jan 1996 95.0
11. RBM Roll Back Malaria Nov 1998 11.4
12. Stop TB Stop TB Partnership July 1999 20.8
13. GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization Oct 1999 124.1
Infrastructure & Private Sector Development
14. WSP Water and Sanitation Program Mar 1978 12.4
15. ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Program Jan 1982 7.58
16. CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Aug 1995 12.67
17. infoDev Information for Development Program Sept 1995 8.90
18. PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility Dec 1999 15.61
19. CA Cities Alliance Dec 1999 13.25
Social Development & Protection
20. PostConFund Post-conflict Fund 1998 10.60 
21. UCW Understanding Children’s Work 2000 0.56
Trade & Finance
22. IF Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance 1997 2.71
23. FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program May 1999 10.46
24. FIRST Financial Sector Reform & Strengthening Initiative July 2002 4.64
Information & Knowledge
25. GDN Global Development Network Dec 1999 8.67
26. World Links World Links for Development 1998 6.52
a. FY04/CY03 expenditures. For the following cases, updated data were not readily available so the previous fiscal or calendar year expenditures were used: Global Integrated Pest Man-
agement Facility, Water and Sanitation Program, The Information for Development Program, Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance. 
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Currency amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars (US$)
AERC African Economic Research Consortium
AfDB African Development Bank
AFTHD Africa Region Human Development Unit
AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ARD Agriculture and Rural Development Department
ARV anti-retroviral
AsDB Asian Development Bank
BB World Bank administrative budget
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CBC Committee of Board Chairs (CGIAR)
CBD Convention on the Conservation of Biodiversity
CCD U.N. Convention on Combating Desertification
CDC Center Directors’ Committee (CGIAR) 
CEO chief executive officer
CEPF Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund
CERG-EI Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University 
and Economics Institute of the National Academy of Sciences 
CFP Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships 
CG Consultative Group
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research
CI Conservation International
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CODE Committee on Development Effectiveness
CRC U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
CY calendar year
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DC Development Committee
DEC Development Economics Vice Presidency
DECPG DEC Prospects Group
DECRG Development Economics Research Group
DFID Department for International Development (U.K.)
DGF Development Grant Facility
DOTS Directly Observed Treatment/Therapy Short Course
DTIS Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECOSOC U.N. Economic and Social Council
ECSHD Europe and Central Asia Region Human Development Sector Unit
EDU/SP Education and Social Protection Department
EMRO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office
ENV Environment Department
ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
ESSD Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Vice Presidency and 
Network
EU European Union
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
EWD Energy and Water Department
EWDDR Energy and Water Department, Office of the Director
ExCo Executive Committee
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FIRST Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Initiative
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSE Financial Sector Vice Presidency and Network
FSE/OPD Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department
FSEGP FSE Global Partnerships
FY fiscal year
GAMET Global HIV/AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation Support Team
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GDN Global Development Network
GEF Global Environment Facility
GFAR Global Forum on Agricultural Research 
GFATM Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
GIF Global Integrated Pest Management Facility
GPG global public good
GPPs global programs and partnerships
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH 
GWP global water partnerships
HDN Human Development Vice Presidency and Network
HDNGA Human Development Vice Presidency and Network Global HIV/AIDs Program
HDNHE Human Development Vice Presidency and Network Health Nutrition & 
Population Team
HDNSP Human Development Vice Presidency and Network Social Protection Team 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HIV human immunodeficiency virus
HNP Health, Nutrition, and Population Vice Presidency
ICT information and communications technology
IDA International Development Association
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IDRC International Development Research Center
IF Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
infoDev Information for Development Program
INF Infrastructure Vice Presidency and Network
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPEC ILO/International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
IPM integrated pest management
IPR intellectual property right
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
ITC International Trade Center 
IWRM integrated water resources management
JCB Joint Coordinating Board
LCR Latin America and Caribbean Region
LCRCE Latin America and Caribbean Region, Chief Economist Unit
LCSER Latin America and Caribbean Region, Rural Development Family
LCSHE Latin America and Caribbean Region, Education Sector
LDC least-developed country
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LICUS low-income countries under stress
MAP multicountry AIDS Program
MD managing director
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MLF Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
MMV Medicines for Malaria Venture
MNA Middle East and North Africa Region
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NARS national agricultural research system
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIH National Institutes of Health (U.S.)
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development
NPG national public good
ODA official development assistance
ODS ozone-depleting substances
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED Operations Evaluation Department
OEG Operations Evaluation Group
OEU Operations Evaluation Unit
OORG Ozone Operations Research Group
OP Operational Policy
OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services Vice Presidency
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAN-UK Pesticide Action Network, United Kingdom
PATS Partnership Approval and Tracking System 
PCB Program Coordinating Board
PostConFund Post-conflict Fund
ProCarbFund Prototype Carbon Fund
POP Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice Presidency and Network
PREMEP Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Economic Policy Division
PRMTR Poverty Reduction and Economic Management International Trade Department
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSI Population Strategies International
RBM Roll Back Malaria
R&D research and development
ROSC Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes
SADC Southern African Development Community
SANEI South Asian Network of Economic Institutes
SASRD South Asia Sector Rural Development Department
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDV Social Development Department
SGP Special Grants Program
SIDA Swiss International Development Agency
SSP Sector Strategy Paper
TA technical assistance
TAC Technical Advisory Committee (CGIAR)
TAG Technical Advisory Group
TAP technical assistance program
TB tuberculosis
TDR Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases
A B B R E V I AT I O N S  A N D  A C R O N Y M S
l i x
TEAP Technical Economic Assessment Panel (UNEP)
TF trust fund
TOR terms of reference
TRIPS trade-related intellectual property rights
TQC Trust Fund Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit
TUD Transportation and Urban Development Department
UCW Understanding Children’s Work
U.N. United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VHAI Voluntary Health Association of India
VPU vice presidential unit
WBI World Bank Institute
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WPRO World Health Organization Regional Office for the Western Pacific
WSP Water and Sanitation Program
WSSCC Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council
WTO World Trade Organization
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1Introduction and Context:
Global Challenges and the
Need for Collective Action
Rapid changes in the Bank’s external and internal environment and thegrowth of global issues relevant to developing countries have acceler-ated the Bank’s involvement in global and regional programs since 1998.
While the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors has recognized the need for
the Bank to be involved at the global level, the growing number of activities
has also prompted concerns among Board members that the objectives and
procedures for such involvement have not been clear. 
Board members’ concerns about partnership
proliferation, development impact, and related
reputational risks led them to call for prioritiz-
ing. The goal would be to increase selectivity,
clarify responsibilities and accountabilities,
more rigorously monitor the use of Bank
resources, and improve reporting to the Board
on the development impact of global programs
(defined in box 1.1). 
To help guide the prioritization process, the
Board asked the Operations Evaluation Depart-
ment (OED) to evaluate the Bank’s global activi-
ties. The evaluation has been conducted in two
phases. OED’s Phase 1 report focused on the
Bank’s overall portfolio of 70 global programs
(OED 2002c). It clarified concepts with regard to
global programs and partnerships and their
management and assessed the Bank’s internal
decisionmaking processes, including its internal
and external responsibilities and accountabili-
ties. Taking into account the recommendations
of OED’s 1998 internal review of the Bank’s
grant programs (OED 2002a) and the Bank’s
comparative advantage in relation to its
partners, the Phase 1 report derived lessons for
the strategic and programmatic management of
the Bank’s involvement in global programs,
including decisionmaking processes with regard
to the Bank budget, the Bank’s Development
Grant Facility (DGF), trust funds, and links
between global programs and country
operations. Management has acted on several of
the report’s recommendations. (See table 1.1 at
the end of this chapter, and Annexes A and B.)
Phase 2 carried out 26 case studies of global
programs, including a review of the Consulta-
tive Group for International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR), which was the first global
program to receive grants from the Bank and is
still the largest recipient of grants from the
DGF.1 The meta-evaluation of the CGIAR
presented OED’s assessment of CGIAR’s
impact and drew some implications for the
Bank’s leadership and oversight of this
1
program, in light of CGIAR’s changing environ-
ment and the growing competition for the
Bank’s limited grant resources (OED 2003b). 
Based on these foundations, and as
proposed in the evaluation design, this report
synthesizes the case study findings of 26 of the
Bank’s 70 global programs. It summarizes the
practical lessons for the design and implemen-
tation of individual global programs and for the
development of a strategic framework within
which to approve and oversee these programs.
The specific objectives of the Phase 2 evalua-
tion are:
• To assess how well the case study programs
measure up to the selectivity and oversight
criteria and the priorities for global programs
established by the Development Committee
and the Bank, particularly the DGF
• To derive crosscutting lessons for the Bank on
program selectivity, design, implementation,
governance, management, financing, and eval-
uation
• To assess progress in implementing the rec-
ommendations of OED’s 1998 review, the Phase
1 report, and the meta-evaluation of the CGIAR,
with respect to the Bank’s strategic and pro-
grammatic management and to the choice, de-
sign, and implementation of individual programs
• To identify areas where further Bank action is
needed. 
The OED team used 20 questions (listed in
Annex C) in each case study to assess the
2
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Global programs are defined as partnerships and related ini-
tiatives whose benefits are intended to cut across more than one
region of the world and in which the partners:
• Reach explicit agreements on objectives
• Agree to establish a new (formal or informal) organization 
• Generate new products or services
• Contribute dedicated resources to the program.
Approval of global programs. Since November 2000, all new
global and regional programs have had to be approved at the ini-
tial concept stage, based on the six approval criteria that were
shown in figure ES.1 in the Executive Summary, by the manag-
ing director responsible for the vice presidential unit (VPU) ad-
vocating the Bank’s involvement. Such approval then authorizes
the respective VPU to enter into agreements with partners and
to mobilize resources for the program—whether from the DGF,
trust funds, or the Bank’s administrative budget. Both before
and after November 2000, the Bank’s participation in some high-
profile programs—such as the Global Environment Facility, the
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Pro-
tocol, the Prototype Carbon Fund, and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria—has been considered and
approved by the Bank’s Executive Board. 
Oversight and management of global programs. Once pro-
grams have been approved at the initial concept stage, the net-
work vice presidencies are responsible for their oversight,
management, and quality assurance. This includes establishing
priorities among programs, ensuring their coherence with the
Bank’s sector strategies, sponsoring applications for DGF grants,
managing programs that are housed in the Bank, fostering links
to the Bank’s country operations, and promoting synergy among
programs, both internally and externally. While regional pro-
grams are not covered in this OED evaluation, many global pro-
grams have strong regional dimensions (which are addressed in
the case studies), in addition to their links to the Bank’s country-
level economic and sector work, policy advice, and lending.
The Global Programs and Partnership Council has been 
established in response to one of the recommendations of OED’s
Phase 1 report. Consolidating the functions of the former Part-
nership Council and DGF Council, the new council is the man-
agement committee responsible for overseeing the strategic
framework and operational policies for global programs and part-
nerships (GPPs). Composed of 19 Regional, network, and cen-
tral vice presidents and co-chaired by two managing directors,
its current terms of reference are: 
• To set the Bank’s vision and priorities for its engagement in
GPPs 
• To review VPU portfolios and the Bank’s institutional part-
nerships
• To set and oversee criteria for selection and evaluation of
GPPs, including governance structures, risk management, exit
strategies, and best practices.
D e f i n i t i o n  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t  o f  G l o b a l  
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relevance, efficacy, efficiency, and Bank
performance of each global program. Chapters
3 through 7 of this report roughly correspond
to the following four standard OED criteria,
adapted by drawing upon the Bank’s eligibility
and approval criteria for global programs:
• Relevance (chapter 3) – assessing the inter-
national consensus for the 26 global programs
• Efficacy (chapter 4) – assessing the outcomes,
impacts, and value-added of global program ac-
tivities, both to developing countries and to the
Bank’s country operations
• Efficiency (chapters 5 and 6) – focusing on
governance, management, financing, partner-
ships, and participation (since these influence
efficiency and the programs’ value-added)
• Bank performance (chapter 7) – in the nu-
merous roles that the Bank plays in these
global programs.
The case studies were based on meta-
analysis of available program evaluations,2
OED’s review of the related literature, and its
analysis of the programs’ objectives, design,
implementation, results, and Bank oversight.
OED also interviewed stakeholders,3 including
Bank managers and program partners, and
visited partnering agencies and developing
countries. Not all stakeholders have equal
knowledge about the partnerships, making
analysis of stakeholders’ perspectives and roles
complex.
As with CGIAR, the other case studies
evaluate each partnership as a whole and focus
on the Bank’s role and performance in realizing
its comparative advantage in each program (box
1.2). The Bank acts
variously as a convener,
trustee, and donor and
typically is the largest
lender for activities
related to the global
programs. In the case of
the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), the Bank
is a trustee and an implementing agency. For the
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol (MLF), the Bank is an
implementing agency but not a trustee. The
Bank’s financial support to global programs
comes from the Development Grant Facility
(DGF), from the Bank’s net administrative
budget, and from Bank-administered trust
funds. Thus, the assessment of Bank perform-
ance includes the use of the Bank’s convening
power, the Bank’s trusteeship, Bank financing
and implementation of global programs, and,
where appropriate and necessary, links to the
Bank’s country operations. Bank oversight of
this set of activities is an important aspect of the
Bank’s strategic and programmatic manage-
ment of its portfolio of global programs.
Issues and Trends in Global Programs
Global programs have become an important
Bank activity, supplementing its lending and
advisory work. The Bank is now engaged in
more than 200 global and regional partner-
ships. Of these, about 70 programs fit the
definition of global programs (box 1.1).4 Their
total expenditures were about $1.2 billion in
FY01. That year the Bank spent $30 million of
its administrative budget on global programs,
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Comparative advantage describes the ability of one economic
actor to produce a good, a service, or knowledge at a lower op-
portunity cost than another economic actor. 
Opportunity cost is the cost of forgoing one activity in favor
of another, measured in terms of the goods, services, or knowl-
edge whose production is forgone. 
The Bank’s Strategic Directions Paper for fiscal 2002–04
identified three comparative advantages for the Bank at the
global level—global mandate and reach, convening power, and
ability to mobilize financial resources—and three at the coun-
try level—multisectoral capacity; expertise in country and sec-
tor analysis; and in-depth, country-level knowledge.
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The Bank acts variously
as a convener, trustee,
and donor and typically
is the largest lender for
activities related to the
global programs.
provided $120 million in grants from the DGF,
and disbursed another $500 million from Bank-
administered trust funds. Although DGF grants
represent less than 10 percent of the total
expenditures, these grants signal the Bank’s
priorities and de facto set standards for Bank-
supported global programs.
The Bank remains by
far the largest manager
of donor trust funds
among international
agencies. The stock of
trust funds held by the
Bank increased from
$3.8 billion at end of
FY02 to $7.1 billion at
the end of FY04. Almost two-thirds of these trust
funds were committed to global and regional
programs. Disbursements to global and regional
activities increased by 6 percent, from $495
million in FY02 to $526 million in FY03. CGIAR,
GEF, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) accounted
for 56 percent of these disbursements.5
Global program priorities are changing. The
programs reviewed represented 90 percent of
Bank-supported global programs expenditures
in 2001 (when the Phase 1 evaluation was
launched). At that time, environmental
programs had the highest share of expendi-
tures of Bank-supported global programs.
Since then, health’s share has increased
dramatically. GFATM disbursed about $200
million during its first two years of operation
(in 2002 and 2003) and plans disbursements of
about $750 million in 2004—equivalent to
about 60 percent of the total expenditures of
the Bank’s global program portfolio in 2001. 
Strategic planning and priority setting are
difficult because issues
requiring global collec-
tive action have been
multiplying. The diversity
of issues that programs
face reflects diverse views
of globalization. To some,
globalization means the
liberalization of interna-
tional trade and invest-
ment or setting global rules and standards with
respect to air and sea navigation, to trade in
endangered species of plants and animals, or to
the trafficking of women and children. To others,
it means the spread of ideas, values, and norms
consistent with the principles of democracy and
equal rights for all. Moreover, thanks to the
communications revolution, global, national, and
local issues increasingly interact, requiring consid-
erable thought about where and how global
collective action can be most useful (Scholte
2000). The programs are responding to the
emerging consensus that dramatic changes in
areas such as trade, finance, intellectual property,
investment, technology, health, environment, and
security offer both opportunities and threats that
spill over national borders.
Global programs provide global public goods,
and more. Awareness of cross-border spillovers
and the need for collective action has helped
produce a specialized vocabulary related to
global public goods (box 1.3). The Bank has
defined global public goods as “commodities,
resources, services—and also systems of rules
or policy regimes with substantial cross-border
externalities that are important for development
and poverty reduction, and that can be
produced in sufficient supply only through
cooperation and collective action by developed
and developing countries” (World Bank 2000, 
p. 2). Pure global public goods are few: peace
and security; information and knowledge; trade
and traffic rules; and the mitigation of climate
change, financial contagion, and communicable
diseases.
The global program agenda has widened
beyond the provision of pure global public
goods requiring supra-national action. The
agenda increasingly includes multicountry
“corporate advocacy” programs that aim to
exploit economies of scale and scope in the
provision of national and local public goods,
private goods, and merit goods, such as
empowerment, social inclusion, gender,
education for all, maternal and child health,
and water and sanitation—all areas in which
the Bank is active at the country level. The
conception of some goods as public or private
has also changed. For example, research on
4
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Strategic planning and
priority setting are
difficult because issues
requiring global collective
action have been
multiplying.
Global, national, and
local issues increasingly
interact, requiring
considerable thought
about where and how
global collective action
can be most useful.
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Public goods are distinguished from private goods by nonri-
valry and nonxcludability. Nonrivalry means that many people
can consume, use, or enjoy a public good at the same time: one
person’s consumption does not reduce the benefits that others
can derive from consuming the same good at the same time.
Nonexcludability means that it is difficult to exclude from con-
sumption those who do not pay for or otherwise contribute to the
cost of supplying the good.
Global public goods are distinguished from national and local
public goods by their reach. Their nonrivalry and nonexcludability
spill across national boundaries. People in more than one country
can benefit from the provision of a global public good, whether or
not they contributed to the cost of supplying the good. For national
and local public goods, only those who live in a given country or in
a given locality can benefit from the provision of such public goods. 
The distinctions between public and private and between
local, national, and global vary in practice, depending on such
factors as the level of economic development, prevailing tech-
nology, and social choices.
Market mechanisms tend to undersupply public goods and
to oversupply public “bads” such as air and water pollution.
While large countries sometimes find it in their own interest to
supply a global public good, in the absence of a global govern-
ment with taxation powers, some kind of global collective ac-
tion or partnership is generally necessary to supply them.
Partners contribute grants, again because there is no global gov-
ernment to lend to. 
Merit goods are goods whose value derives from the ac-
tivities or consumption patterns of others or, in the case of
foreign assistance, individual nations. The concept of merit
(or demerit) goods should not be confused with that of pub-
lic goods, since it transcends the distinction between pub-
lic and private goods. When donors direct development
assistance to certain uses, rather than providing pure, untied
assistance to developing countries, they are implicitly at-
taching merit to their own preferences, whether the assis-
tance is tied to the provision of public or private goods. (See
Musgrave 1998.)
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child work and labor issues, which arose in
relation to international trade discussions, has
fostered awareness of the global benefits of
moving children from work to school (Basu
and Tzannatos 2003). Because the size of
official development assistance (ODA) has
been relatively stable in recent years (figure
1.1), the increased spending on global
programs translates into a larger share of ODA
going to such programs.
Demand for new organizational forms is
spawning global programs. The growing
popularity of global programs reflects the
concern that established international organi-
zations and the governments that constitute
them lack the capacity to address these
complex, multilayered, and increasingly
multisectoral issues by themselves. Addressing
these issues requires the voices of multiple
stakeholders. The traditional international
organizations do not sufficiently incorporate
the perspectives and comparative advantages
of stakeholders such as civil society organiza-
tions, nongovernmental organizations, and the
private sector. Global programs seek more
agile organizational forms to reflect these
perspectives and to bring fresh approaches to
the challenges of globalization. They also aim
to mobilize additional resources from
unconventional sources; exploit the various
actors’ comparative advantages; and provide
speedier, more targeted responses.
The needs of Bank
clients are becoming
more diverse. Establish-
ing coherence between
global program priori-
ties and country priori-
ties poses a challenge
because the relative
importance of the
constraints that the
Bank’s client countries
face varies considerably.
Communicable diseases,
climate change and
conflict afflict the
poorest of the Bank’s
The growing popularity of
global programs reflects
the concern that
established international
organizations and the
governments that
constitute them lack the
capacity to address these
complex, multilayered,
and increasingly
multisectoral issues by
themselves.
186 members more than they do others.
Intellectual property rights and private capital
flows affect the countries with large industrial
bases and domestic markets differently than the
resource- and import-dependent countries. Yet
the scope for cooperation among the Bank’s
client countries, for example in the production
and trade of drugs and vaccines, has also
increased considerably. 
The World Bank’s involvement in global
programs is responding to the new global
reality. Like many other international organiza-
tions, the Bank has
recognized that, in an
era of aid harmoniza-
tion, it cannot single-
handedly address many
global issues that affect
its clients. Nor should it be perceived by the key
opinionmakers in the donor countries to be
acting alone. The Bank has been adjusting to
this new reality. But how well is it using global
programs to shape and manage this new
external environment for the benefit of the
poor in its client countries? Because of its global
reach and the multisectoral nature of its analytic
and lending activities at the country level, the
Bank is, in principle, in a unique position to
influence the relevance and content of individ-
ual global programs and to set clear priotities
among them. Moreover, through its support
for, and active involvement in, global programs,
the Bank can help bring new global knowledge,
technologies, products, practices, and stan-
dards to its client countries. Is the Bank exploit-
ing its comparative advantage well?
6
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
O f f i c i a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s i s t a n c e  H a s  
F l u c t u a t e d ,  b u t  N o t  G r o w n ,  s i n c e  1 9 9 0
F i g u r e  1 . 1
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
US$ billions (in 2002 U.S. dollars)
Source: OECD, net official development assistance from Development Assistance Committee member countries, in real terms, adjusted for inflation and fluctuations in exchange rates.
The World Bank’s
involvement in global
programs is responding to
the new global reality.
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OED Phase 1 recommendations Management actions
Organization
Management should strengthen strategic planning and oversight of global A Global Programs and Partnerships (GPP) Council, 
programs and partnerships. While the networks would continue to have the primary composed of key Regional, network, and central vice
responsibility for task management and partner relations, management should presidents and co-chaired by two managing direc-
task a central vice presidential unit (VPU) to: tors, has been established and is becoming opera-
• Set standards, oversee programming and budgeting, perform quality assurance tional.
functions, and report annually to senior management and the Board on program A GPP Group has been established to support and 
implementation. advise teams involved in GPPs and to provide an an-
• Provide intellectual leadership, monitor and anticipate changes and emerging chor for coordination and analysis across the Bank.
opportunities in the global environment, and draw partnership implications for 
the Bank.
• Identify constraints in the global policy environment that need to be addressed 
to improve development outcomes for the Bank’s clients.
Strategy
Management should articulate a strategy for Bank involvement in global programs GPPs are being incorporated into the business plan-
and policies that establishes overarching objectives, oversight responsibilities, and ning processes of network anchors, Development 
the Bank’s comparative advantage. The central VPU should: Economics, and the World Bank Institute.
• Develop and monitor performance indicators to ensure that networks and Regions Tracking of spending on GPPs is being improved by 
are linking global programs, country assistance strategies, and sector strategies. more uniform use of business processes and prod-
• Develop clear and transparent criteria and guidelines for resource allocation; uct lines related to GPPs.
budgeting, accounting, and auditing practices; and information systems for Rules have been clarified for allowable use of Bank 
global programs. budget and grants for support of GPPs.
Selectivity
The central VPU should establish and monitor standards for networks to follow for External ex ante review by peers outside the Bank 
global programs relating to verifiable objectives, dedicated Bank resources, has been instituted for new GPP proposals for DGF 
appropriate organizational and funding arrangements, and some form of cost-benefit funding. 
or other ex ante criteria for Bankwide prioritization and quality assurance. During the vetting and prioritization process for the 
The central VPU should: FY04 DGF budget, sector boards were more thor-
• For programs above a threshold size, help institute a transparent identification, ough in reviewing applications than in the past.
preparation, appraisal, Board approval, supervision, and evaluation process. The Bank’s chief economist has been designated 
• For new small programs of a merit-goods nature that are not presented to the responsible for oversight of CGIAR.
Board, help improve approval, monitoring, and auditing in the DGF, in particular by 
introducing independent reviews that are external to the programs.
• Help adapt to global programs the standards and procedures applied to innovative 
lending operations such as learning and innovation loans and adaptable 
program loans. 
Program Implementation
Management should clarify the responsibilities and accountabilities of the Board, Standardized governance models are being devel-
Regions, networks, and task managers and provide each with the resources needed oped.
to fulfill the Bank’s commitments with its partners, including: More early-stage advisory support is being provided 
• Introducing a more systematic and regular approach for task-manager monitoring to new programs.
of program performance Improved terms of reference have been developed 
• Ensuring independence of program evaluations for evaluations of DGF-supported programs.
• Including global programs in the standard evaluation and reporting processes of OED.
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9Overview of the Case
Study Programs
The programs are very heterogeneous. Their diversity poses a challengenot only for evaluating individual programs and for deriving crosscut-ting lessons, but also for equipping the Bank to develop an effective global
strategy and program selectivity.
The programs vary widely in size. They range
from Understanding Children’s Work (UCW),
with expenditures of $560,000 in CY02, to the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR), with expenditures of $395
million in CY03. As shown in table H.1, only six of
the programs, or 23 percent of the programs
reviewed, had annual expenditures of more than
$21 million in CY03/FY04.1 These programs
represent 82 percent of the total FY04/CY03
expenditures of the case study programs.
Another eight programs had expenditures
between $10 and $21 million in the same period.
The programs also vary in age. They range
from the CGIAR, which began in 1972, to the
Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening
Initiative (FIRST), which began in December
2002. Only six programs are more than 10 years
old (figure 2.1). Although less can be said about
the outcomes and impacts of the newer
programs, reviewing them offers lessons about
establishing clear and shared objectives, a
sound strategy, good governance, and resource
mobilization. This report thus reviews these
dimensions of the programs, in addition to
their outcomes and impacts.
The programs are heavily concentrated in a
few of the Bank’s networks and sectors. The
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable
Development Network accounts for the bulk of
total program expenditures and DGF grants
from the programs in FY03 (table 2.1), with the
Human Development Network a distant
second.2 These network and sector shares are
representative of the Bank’s global program
portfolio, but they differ greatly from the sector
distribution of Bank lending commitments,
since the latter reflect country and Regional
priorities arising from the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) and Country Assistance
Strategy (CAS) processes.3
Divergence between the Bank’s global
programs and country lending priorities is to be
expected in the case of global programs that
provide global public
goods because of
externalities, spillovers,
and the differences
between global and local
costs and benefits. Such
a divergence would
prevail whether the
2
The Environmentally and
Socially Sustainable
Development Network
accounts for the bulk of
total program expenditures
and DGF grants.
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CGIAR
TDR
WSP
ESMAP
GEF, MLF
CGAP, GIF, infoDev, UNAIDS
GWP, IF
Global Forum, Post-Conflict Fund, World Links
FSAP, RBM
FIRST
a
FY04 program FY04 DGF 
expenditures a grants b
Network Sector Programs $Millions Percent $Millions Percent
ESSD Environment (ENV) GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, CEPF 572.8 40.8 4.0 4.0
Agriculture & Rural Development (ARD) CGIAR, GWP, GIF 406.6 29.0 50.0 50.3
Social Development (SDV) PostConFund 10.6 .8 9.2 9.3
HDN Health, Nutrition, & Population (HNP) TDR, Global Forum, UNAIDS,
RBM, Stop TB, GAVI 301.8 21.5 16.2 16.3
Education & Social Protection (EDU/SP) World Links, UCW 4.5 .3 1.6 1.6
INF Infrastructure WSP, ESMAP, infoDev, PPIAF, 
Cities Alliance 57.7 4.1 6.4 6.4
FSE Finance CGAP, FSAP, FIRST 27.8 2.0 6.7 6.7
PREM Poverty Reduction & Economic 
Management IF, GDN 21.4 1.5 5.3 5.3
Total 1,403.2 100.0 99.4 100.0
a.  Or most recent fiscal year.
b. Grants from the Bank’s Development Grant Facility (DGF). Eight programs—GWP, GIF, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, WSP, ESMAP, and FSAP—did not receive DGF grants in FY04. 
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a. CEPF, Cities Alliance, GAVi, GDN, Prototype Carbon Fund, PPIAF, Stop TB, and UCW.
global public goods affect both industrial and
developing countries (as does climate change),
or benefit mostly the world’s poor (as do
vaccines and drugs). The issue of divergence is
more complex in the case of the multicountry
corporate advocacy programs that promote
policy reforms at the national and local levels. 
Moreover, global programs often have as an
implicit or explicit objective the coordination of
donor approaches and practices in a sector, and
the shifting of country priorities toward the
approaches and activities being advocated at the
global level. The necessary links between global
and country programs depend on program
design objectives, activities, and intended
outcomes and must be adapted to account for
country needs and priorities. When global
programs are not well linked to country priori-
ties, country needs, and country activities, they
raise issues about country demand and
ownership, and about exactly whose needs and
priorities are being advocated.
Program Objectives
The programs vary in their objectives, their
activities, and whether they produce primarily
global or national, public, private, or merit
goods. Generating and disseminating informa-
tion and knowledge about best practices in a
sector, advocating approaches to development
in a sector, capacity building, and supporting
national-level policy and institutional reforms
are the most common activities among the case
study programs (figure 2.2).4 Few programs
provide global public goods or mobilize
substantial incremental resources. 
Notwithstanding this range of activities, two
aspects of global programs are of particular
interest for the Bank from a strategic and
programmatic perspective: 
• Whether each program aims primarily to pro-
vide global public goods for which global col-
lective action is required, or to engage in
“corporate advocacy” in support of the pro-
vision of national and local public, private,
or merit goods. The latter try to use multi-
country programming to exploit economies
of scale and scope in developing and promot-
ing consensus on how to address national and
local problems. Programs in this category must
pass the subsidiarity test (box 2.1). 
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Note: GPG = Global Public Good; NPG = National Public Good.
Source: Table H.8: “OED Assessment of Actual Program Activities.”
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• Whether the programs
have their own financ-
ing mechanism or rely
on the investments or
technical assistance ac-
tivities of others, such as
Bank loans and credits
and donor or national
funding. The programs
that lack a direct invest-
ment component pose by
far the most complex is-
sues in determining what
constitutes a “global pro-
gram.” Does a program
comprise only the activi-
ties of the global program secretariats, or does
it also include the supporting—particularly
the investment—activities of the partners? The
latter activities are typically not considered
part of global programs, since they are not
under the program’s direct control.
When the 26 programs are classified accord-
ing to these 2 criteria (table 2.2), only 2
programs (CGIAR and the Special Program for
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases
[TDR]) and part of a third (the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI]) are
financing global-level investments to deliver
global public goods by mobilizing the best of
science with a view to developing new
technologies and processes for the benefit of
the poor in developing countries.5 Moreover,
because of increasingly restricted donor
funding, CGIAR’s activities have moved
downstream to include applied and adaptive
research of a national and local public-goods
nature, as well as agricultural development. If
they have enough Bank and donor assistance,
developing countries could conduct these latter
types of activities more cost-effectively and
sustainably, while freeing up global resources
for those activities that are best done at the
global level.6 In short, at least a portion of the
$50 million allocated to CGIAR from the DGF
has violated the DGF’s subsidiarity principle by
financing Center activities that regular Bank
instruments could support better and longer.7
For TDR as well, donor funding has become
more restricted. Pressures on TDR have
increased to deliver downstream results,
rather than to conduct long-term health
research that might benefit the poor, which is
best done at the global level (TDR, Third
External Review Committee). Moreover, unlike
the situation for agriculture, neither donors
nor governments have financed much
national-level health research in borrowing
countries (though Bank experience, based on
the limited health research it has financed,
suggests that it has high returns).8 GAVI, which
is primarily a child vaccination program, also
finances global-level research and develop-
ment for vaccine and drug development and,
indeed, has now become the largest source of
funding for global research and development
on the health issues of the poor. It is also
helping to stimulate global spending on
research and development by others.
Four environment programs—the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), the Multilateral
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal
Protocol (MLF), the Prototype Carbon Fund,
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Of the 26 programs, only
2 and part of a third are
financing global-level
investments to deliver
global public goods by
mobilizing the best of
science with a view to
developing new
technologies and
processes for the benefit
of the poor in developing
countries.
The subsidiarity principle addresses the issue of se-
lecting the most appropriate level at which activities
should be carried out. Management has posited this
issue for global programs as “whether an activity
should be carried out by a global program rather than,
as the preferred option, implemented through country
operations.” Global programs would be the appropri-
ate level for an activity when the benefits of collective
action relative to the transaction costs of the global
partnership exceed the net benefits from the Bank,
using its normal instruments.
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and the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund
(CEPF)—finance country-level investments to
deliver global public goods, such as preserving
biodiversity, protecting international waters,
and reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and
other ozone-depleting substances.9 One social
development program and one health
program—the Post-conflict Fund and GAVI—
finance country-level investments to deliver
national public goods.10 Even though peace
and security are global public goods, OED
concluded that the Post-conflict Fund, as 
the program is currently designed and
implemented, is delivering primarily national,
at best regional, public goods.11 The eight
programs with investment components
represented 83 percent of the case studies’
total FY04 expenditures. 
Three health programs—the Joint United
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Roll
Back Malaria (RBM), and the Stop Tuberculosis
Partnership (Stop TB)—promote common
approaches to mitigating communicable
diseases, and a fourth program—the Global
Forum for Health Research—is advocating
increased global research on the diseases most
prevalent in developing countries. While these
four programs advocate political mobilization
for increased public investment in these areas,
they do not provide a significant level of financ-
ing for investment.12 Rather, they are designed
to encourage countries to follow the program’s
advice or approach in their ongoing activities.13
But each program also calls on donors and
countries to invest more in their respective
health activities. Partly thanks to their advocacy,
Bank lending for communicable diseases grew
by an average of 7.6 percent annually between
1993 and 2003, and for HIV/AIDS alone by 17.6
percent annually, while overall health sector
lending remained constant.
Of the remaining 14 programs, 5 finance
country-level technical assistance for reforms to
stimulate public and private investments in their
respective sectors. These are the Water and
Sanitation Program (WSP), the Energy Sector
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Fostering Financing 
Financing Financing country-level country-level Strengthening  
global country-level approaches, technical country-level Number of 
investments investments standards assistancea capacity programs
Delivering global public goods CGIAR (1972), GEF (1991), UNAIDS (1996), 10
TDR (1975) MLF (1991), RBM (1998), 
ProCarbFund Global Forum 
(2000), (1998), 
CEPF (2000) Stop TB (1999)c
Delivering national public goods PostConFund CGAP (1995), WSP (1978), infoDev (1995), 16
(1998), GIF (1996), ESMAP (1982), World Links 
GAVI (1999)b GWP (1997), IF (1997), (1998), 
UCW (2000) PPIAF 1999), GDN (1999), 
Cities Alliance FSAP (1999), 
(1999) FIRST (2002)
Number of programs 2 6 8 5 5 26
Note: Each program is classified by OED according to only one category, corresponding to its primary activity. Programs are listed chronologically by start date within each category.
a. With the intent of stimulating public or private investments in the sector.
b. The GAVI Vaccine Fund also finances research and development of new vaccines and promotes strategies to address the constraints to R&D investment. 
c. Stop TB also has a small drug facility that is financing country-level investments in the form of drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis.
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Management Assistance
Program (ESMAP), the
Integrated Framework
for Trade-Related Techni-
cal Assistance (IF), the
Public-Private Infrastruc-
ture Advisory Facility
(PPIAF), and the Cities
Alliance. The programs
do not finance invest-
ments, because the benefits of such investments
would largely be national or local. It is assumed
that the respective national, subnational, or local
governments would be prepared and able to
borrow funds or receive grants to finance such
investments. As demonstrated below, evidence
does not always bear out this assumption. In
addition, for the Integrated Framework for Trade-
Related Technical Assistance, PPIAF, and the Cities
Alliance, to finance country-level technical
assistance could also violate the DGF subsidiarity
criterion. The extent to which these programs
replace or compete with regular Bank technical
assistance will be addressed in the later chapters.
Four programs—the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest (CGAP), the Global Water
Partnership (GWP), the Global Integrated Pest
Management Facility (GIF), and UCW—
promote approaches and standards (box 2.2)
for addressing global concerns at the country
level. Some of these programs are also
intended to help deliver global public goods
indirectly by providing information and
knowledge to improve national capacities and
practices in areas where it is not easy to distin-
guish between a national and a global public
good, such as financial management or food
safety. Some of these same programs are also
geared to improve donor practices and to
harmonize the standards they use and the
approaches they promote—for example,
through policy advice, institutional develop-
ment, and financial assistance in the areas of
microfinance, or through safeguards with
regard to the uses of pesticides.
Three programs—the Information for
Development Program (infoDev), World Links
for Development, and Global Development
Network (GDN)—are intended to build
capacity in information and communication
technologies, education, and socioeconomic
research. Their activities are primarily at the
national level, although, once again, some of
their intended activities are to promote
national capacity to share knowledge across
countries and across regions. The final two
programs—the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) and FIRST—strengthen
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Some of these same
programs are also geared
to improve donor
practices and to
harmonize the standards
they use and the
approaches they promote.
Standards are developed to deal with cases where the goods
or services being produced are so complex that the users can-
not fully evaluate the product for themselves. The objective of
standards, such as the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank-
ing Supervision and the Bank of International Settlements Prin-
ciples on Payment and Settlement Systems, is to specify what
must be done at a minimum to achieve objectives held by those
who use, and those who are affected by, the standards. 
However, there are frequent differences of opinion among re-
spected professionals about particular standards, which can
have large consequences for development. For example, Wil-
son and Otsuki (2002) find that, if the world were to adopt the more
stringent European Union standard on the use of pesticides in
the production of bananas rather than the less stringent one sug-
gested by Codex (the body charged with setting global standards
in this area), world exports of bananas could be reduced by $5.3
billion annually. 
Approaches refer to strategies such as the commercializa-
tion and privatization of energy, community-based management
of natural resources, integrated water management, and inte-
grated pest management. But approaches are not silver bullets
for solving particular development problems. To implement them
effectively requires considerable multisectoral and contextual
information and knowledge on policies, institutions, and human
resource capacities, combined with the ability to adapt ap-
proaches to specific circumstances.
B o t h  “ A p p r o a c h e s ”  a n d  “ S t a n d a r d s ”  
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country-level capacity for macroeconomic
management; the banking system; and the
securities, insurance, and other financial
markets—FSAP by diagnosing strengths and
weaknesses in these financial systems, and
FIRST by providing technical assistance to
strengthen them.
Governance and Management
The programs are complex partnerships with
multiple partners at both the governance and
activity levels—international and regional
organizations, bilateral donors, private founda-
tions, developing countries, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other civil society
organizations, and the private sector.14 While
most programs have now evolved to include
stakeholders beyond the traditional donors on
their governing bodies, international organiza-
tions and donors still have large roles and an
overwhelming share of the responsibility to
ensure effective partnerships—issues discussed
in chapter 5.
Where programs are located and how they
are governed and managed influence
incentives for performance and accountability
for results. The pros and cons of an arm’s-
length relationship with the Bank, specifically
its effects on program independence, account-
ability, and performance, have been debated in
the Bank since OED’s 1998 process review
(OED 2002a). OED argued that the lack of an
arm’s-length relationship creates potential
conflicts of interest that could hurt program
performance. (This is also an issue for
programs housed in other international organi-
zations.) The review emphasized the
importance of maintaining such distance. Since
then, the number of in-house programs has
increased, though recently the Bank has also
begun to implement program exit strategies—
issues discussed in chapter 7. 
Twelve programs are located inside the Bank
or shared between the Bank and other organi-
zations; eight are located in other organiza-
tions; and six are independent legal entities
(table 2.3 and table H.3). Two programs—the
Post-conflict Fund and FSAP—do not have a
formal governing body, so that the Bank’s
Executive Board is the effective governing body
of both programs. (Indeed, the Bank’s
Executive Board approved both.) They are
managed by Bank program managers who
report to their line managers within the Bank’s
management chain. 
For the Post-conflict Fund, the Bank is the
only partner at the governance level, though
the program does have
some partners who
have contributed trust
funds and others (such
as UNHCR and UNICEF)
who have had responsi-
bility for implementing
particular activities.
Both the U.N. High
Commission on Refugees and the U.N.
Children’s Fund raised the issue with OED of
whether there should be a global program in
post-conflict reconstruction, involving external
partners, rather than just an internal Bank
program. The Steering Committee of the Post-
conflict Fund, chaired by the director of the
Bank’s Social Development Department and
composed entirely of Bank staff, is responsible
for approving applications for grants for activi-
ties in conflict-affected countries. The Fund is
in many respects similar to some other Bank-
managed programs that are supported by
multidonor trust funds, but the Bank classified
it as a global program in April 2000 because it
receives DGF funding (after the CGIAR, the
second-largest DGF grant to a global program). 
The Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) is a closely coordinated parallel activity
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The Financial Sector Liaison Committee is co-
chaired by the Bank and the IMF and is
composed of three staff members from each
organization. The two program managers for
the Bank and the IMF report to their respective
line managers. The two organizations
contribute their own financial and human
resources to the program without pooling
these resources into a common fund.
The Bank chairs or co-chairs all but two of
the programs that have secretariats located
inside the Bank (table 2.4). These secretariats
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Where programs are
located and how they are
governed and managed
influence incentives for
performance and
accountability for results.
report to governing bodies composed of
donors and other partners. Most were
designed as such or were modified, typically in
a period of financial crisis, to give more voice
and accountability to the donors and other
external partners. The Bank’s vice president of
infrastructure (INF) is the chair or co-chair of
the six infrastructure programs’ governing
bodies, and the respective program managers
are managers or directors of units in the INF
vice presidency (table 2.4). The program
manager thus reports to the Bank INF vice
president, both as his Bank manager and as
chair of the governing body. This sets up a
potential “two masters” problem (Davis and
Stark 2001), which has implications for
program performance, accountability, and risk
management, as discussed in chapter 5. 
While the six infrastructure programs have
many common features, the Prototype Carbon
Fund and the GEF are more idiosyncratic. The
Prototype Carbon Fund’s program manager
and head of the fund management unit (the
secretariat) chairs the Fund Management
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Major Number of 
classification Subclassification programs Programsa
Line management Standard multidonor trust fund 1 PostConFund
within the Bank Programmatic trust fundb 0
Carefully coordinated parallel partner activities 1 FSAP (with IMF)
Secretariat inside Bank as lead partner 7 ProCarbFund, WSP, ESMAP, 
the Bank CGAP, infoDev, PPIAF, CA
Independent governance structure 1 GEF
Secretariat functions 2 CGIAR (with FAO) c
shared between FIRST (with DFID) d
Bank and an 
external 
organization
Secretariat inside External organization as lead partner 6 CEPF (Conservation International), 
an external GIF (FAO), RBM (WHO), 
organization Stop TB (WHO), 
UCW (UNICEF in Florence), IF (WTO)
Independent governance structure 2 GAVI (UNICEF), TDR (WHO) 
Independent external Not a legal entityb 0
entity Legal entity 4 MLF (Montreal), GWP (Stockholm), 
Global Forum (Geneva), UNAIDS 
(Geneva)
Legal entity with close identification 2 GDN (Washington, moving to 
with the Bank New Delhi), World Links 
(Washington)
Note: This classification scheme follows work on governance and management arrangements done in the Legal Department of the World Bank. GDN = Global Development Network.
a. Location of program in parentheses—organization or city—if not located in the World Bank. 
b. Although none of the case study programs falls into these two categories, some other Bank-supported global programs do.
c. The CGIAR Secretariat is located in the Bank, and the Science Council (previously TAC) Secretariat is located in the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
d. The Management Unit (under management contract with DFID) is located in London, and the Coordination Unit is located in the World Bank in Washington.
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Committee, which prepares projects for
approval. The Participants’ Committee
approves the projects, and its chair rotates
annually among the 6 public sector and 17
private sector participants in the program.
Although the GEF Secretariat is housed in
the Bank, and although the Bank is both the
trustee and one of the three implementing
agencies, the program has a completely
independent governing structure separate
from the Bank (box 5.1 below). Of the 12
programs that are fully or partially housed
inside the Bank, the GEF has perhaps the
clearest responsibility and accountability
structure. However, the reasons why accounta-
bility for performance remains a challenge for
GEF are discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
The two programs partially housed in the
Bank—CGIAR and FIRST—have even greater
ambiguity on responsibilities and accountabili-
ties, since a Bank vice president chairs the CGIAR
and a managing director currently chairs FIRST,
while the Bank shares the secretariat functions
with an external entity. The CGIAR Secretariat is
located in the Bank and the Technical Advisory
Council (TAC)/Science Council Secretariat is
located in the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) of the United Nations. Nonetheless, OED’s
meta-evaluation of the CGIAR concluded that
responsibility for managing the CGIAR system
has accrued over time to the Bank—an issue
discussed further in chapter 5.
For FIRST, the Coordinating Unit is located in
the Bank, and the management unit is
contracted out by the U.K. Department for
International Development (DFID) to a private
entity in London. The Coordination Unit is
responsible for non-private-sector-implemented
projects, helping to generate projects from the
Bank and IMF, the Information Exchange, 
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Chaired or Chaired by Rotating chair 
co-chaired by other among member Independent 
Governance model the World Bank organization partners chaira
Line management within the Bank Post-conflict Fund, 
FSAPb
Secretariat inside the Bank WSP, ESMAP, CGAP,c Prototype Carbon GEF
infoDev, PPIAF, Funde
Cities Allianced
Shared secretariat between Bank and CGIAR, FIRST
external organization
Secretariat inside external organization CEPFf GIF (FAO) RBM, Stop TB, GWP,
UCW (UNICEF) g GAVI, TDR, IFh Global Forum
Independent external entity MLF, UNAIDS, 
GDN, World Links
Number of programs 11 2 10 3
a. The chair, selected specifically for the position, is an eminent person who does not represent one of the members of the program.
b. World Bank and IMF co-chair the Financial Sector Liaison Committee.
c. World Bank chairs the Council of Governors. Chair of the Executive Committee rotates among bilateral member donors.
d. World Bank and UN-Habitat co-chair both the Consultative Group and the Steering Committee.
e. The chair of the Participants’ Committee rotates annually among the public and private sector participants. World Bank chairs the Fund Management Committee.
f. The World Bank chairs the Donor Council. Conservation International chairs the Working Group.
g. Unclear protocol on chair of the GIF Governing Group and UCW Steering Committee.
h. Chair of the Steering Committee rotates. WTO chairs the Working Group.
U n l i k e  P r o g r a m s  H o u s e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  B a n k ,
T h o s e  H o u s e d  i n s i d e  t h e  B a n k  T e n d  t o  B e
C h a i r e d  b y  t h e  B a n k
T a b l e  2 . 4
and the due diligence
process. The Manage-
ment Unit processes 
and classifies all projects,
recruits private sec-
tor consultants, and
manages other projects.
Most programs lo-
cated in external part-
ner organizations have
chairs that rotate among
member partners, thus
distancing them some-
what from the organizations that house them. A
notable exception is CEPF, which is housed in
Conservation International (an NGO) and
chaired by the World Bank President. This is the
only case among the 26 programs in which an
organization that does not house the secretariat
is designated the chair of the governing body.
Few programs are independent legal entities.
Of the six cases that are, the chair rotates among
members in four cases
and is an eminent person
specifically selected for
the purpose in two cases.
Two of these programs—
GDN and World Links—
have been spun off from,
but remain financially
dependent on, the Bank.
How and how well the
Bank has applied exit
strategies is discussed in
chapter 7.
The Bank’s Roles
The Bank plays 11 different roles in these
programs (table 2.5 and table H.4). Noteworthy
among the various roles, discussed in chapter 7, is
that of a lender to activities related to the
objectives of all 26 programs, and that of a founder
or co-founder of 25 of the programs. Further-
more, the Bank is on the governing bodies of 23
of the programs. Unlike other international
organizations where global programs are housed,
the Bank chairs all but two of the programs
housed in the Bank. In addition, 12 of the 26
global programs brought in almost $90 million in
FY03 that supplemented the Bank’s administra-
tive budget (table 2.6). The infrastructure vice
presidency is the largest beneficiary of these
supplementary resources. This can itself become
an unstated incentive for partnerships. As stated
in chapter 1, the Bank is the largest manager of
trust funds among international organizations. It
currently manages a stock of more than $7 billion
in trust funds, almost two-thirds of which is
devoted to global and regional programs.
Given this substantial demonstrated potential
for Bank influence, how successful has the Bank
been in contributing to the programs’ strategic
direction and oversight; in promoting synergy
between global and country activities; and in
ensuring their accountability, value added to the
Bank’s operations, and impacts in client
countries? Are the incentives for program
selectivity distorted by the fact that some
programs clearly bring in considerable additional
funds for program implementation? These issues
are discussed in chapters 4 through 7.
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Most programs located in
external partner
organizations have chairs
that rotate among
member partners, thus
distancing them
somewhat from the
organizations that house
them.
Twelve of the 26 global
programs brought in
almost $90 million in
FY03 that supplemented
the Bank’s administrative
budget. This can itself
become an unstated
incentive for
partnerships.
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Number of 
programs
Role Yes No Programs where applicable
Lender to the sectora 26 0
Founder or co-founder 25 1 All except MLF
Member of governing body 23 3 All except GEF, MLF,b ProCarbFund
Convener of initiatives in the sectorc 23 3 All except MLF, GIF, UCW
Financial contributor (DGF or Bank budget)d 22 4 All except GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund 
Trust-fund trustee 18 10 CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, UNAIDS, Stop TB, WSP, ESMAP, 
CGAP, infoDev, PPIAF, CA, PostConFund, IF, FSAP, FIRST, GDN, 
World Links
Houses secretariat 12 14 CGIAR, GEF, ProCarbFund, WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, PPIAF, CA, 
PostConFund, FSAP, FIRST
Implementing agencye 12 14 GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, ESMAP, infoDev, PPIAF, CA, PostConFund, 
UCW, IF, FSAP, FIRST
Chair or co-chair of governing bodyf 11 15 CGIAR, CEPF, WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, PPIAF, CA, 
PostConFund, FSAP, FIRST 
Trust-fund managerg 10 16 ProCarbFund, WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, PPIAF, CA, 
PostConFund, IF, FIRST 
Co-sponsor 6 20 CGIAR, GWP, GIF, TDR, UNAIDS, ESMAP
a. “Lending” in this context includes all aspects of Regional operations, including PRSPs, CASs, economic and sector work, policy dialogue, and lending.
b. World Bank attends GEF and MLF meetings as an implementing agency.
c. The Bank takes the initiative to organize meetings and conferences in the sector on issues related to, but outside the scope of, the program in order to advocate change, reach con-
sensus, or mobilize resources with respect to emerging issues in the sector.
d. Financial contributions to the program itself, not including Bank Budget resources spent on oversight and liaison activities. 
e. The Bank’s operational staff, not including the staff of in-house secretariats, is involved in either the supervision or the implementation of program activities.
f.  While the Bank chairs the Fund Management Committee of the Prototype Carbon Fund, the chair of the higher-level Participants Committee rotates annually among public and pri-
vate sector partners. 
g. Involves responsibility for oversight and management of how the trust fund resources are used.
W o r l d  B a n k  P l a y s  M u l t i p l e  R o l e s  i n  G l o b a l
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FY03 contribution 
Sector Program (US$ millions) Comments
Environment GEF 25.1 Administrative budget provided by GEF to the Bank for project-related expenses, pro-
gram coordination, and trusteeship
MLF 4.77 Administrative budget provided by MLF to the Bank for project-related expenses and 
program coordination
Prototype 
Carbon Fund 4.09 Administrative expenses of the Prototype Carbon Fund, not including grant 
disbursements
Health UNAIDS 2.47 Funds disbursed from UNAIDS trust fund (received from UNAIDS) for monitoring and 
evaluation activities
GAVI 1.47 Funds disbursed from Gates and other trust funds for GAVI and child vaccination 
activities 
Infrastructure WSP 11.4 Total program expenditures, less Bank’s administrative budget contribution
ESMAP 5.46 Total program expenditures, less Bank’s administrative budget contribution
CGAP 3.90 Program expenditures funded from donor trust funds
infoDev 5.81 Total program expenditures, less Bank’s DGF and administrative budget contributions
PPIAF 12.5 Total program expenditures, less Bank’s DGF contribution
Cities Alliance 7.97 Total program expenditures, less Bank’s DGF contribution
Trade Integrated  1.29 Funds disbursed from UNDP trust fund (received from UNDP) for IF studies 
Framework implemented by the Bank
Total 86.3
M a n y  P r o g r a m s  C o n t r i b u t e  F i n a n c i a l  
R e s o u r c e s  T h a t  S u p p l e m e n t  t h e  B a n k ’ s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  B u d g e t
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Program Relevance to
Global Challenges, 
Bank Priorities, and 
Country Priorities
Assessing relevance is by far the most challenging task in evaluating globalprograms, since resources, comparative advantages, benefits, costs, andpriorities at the global and country levels do not always coincide. In-
deed, the divergence of benefits and costs between the global and country
levels is often a fundamental reason for the need for global public goods. 
Evaluating the relevance of global programs to
the Bank’s client countries is nonetheless
important, because the global development
agenda has become congested and, with the
few exceptions highlighted below, global
programs have brought few extra resources to
overall ODA. This is why being more selective
among programs is important. 
The Bank has established four major criteria
for assessing the relevance of global programs
at entry/approval and during implementation:
• International consensus: The program reflects
an emerging international consensus that global
action is required (endorsed by the Develop-
ment Committee on September 25, 2000).
• Clear link to the Bank’s core institutional ob-
jectives and, above all, to the Bank’s country
operational work: In its presentation to the
Board on January 30, 2001, Bank management
added that each program should have a clear
strategic rationale consistent with the relevant
sector strategy paper (established by Bank
management in November 2000).
• Subsidiarity: The program does not compete
with, or substitute for, regular Bank instru-
ments (established by the DGF Council on
October 28, 1998). Bank management also in-
dicated in its March 2003 update to the Board
that it would henceforth apply this criterion rig-
orously to all global programs.
• Strategic focus: Management also indicated
(in its March 2003 update) that it would ensure
that global programs comprise activities that (1)
provide global public goods, (2) support in-
ternational advocacy for reform agendas that
significantly address policy frameworks relevant
for developing countries, (3) are multicountry
activities that crucially depend on highly co-
ordinated approaches, and/or (4) mobilize
substantial incremental resources that can be
effectively used for development.1
3
Given the breadth of these criteria, it is
possible for a wide range of partnership
programs to claim eligibility to receive Bank
support. In addition, these criteria are not
appropriately applied either ex ante, to assess
the initial relevance of new global programs, or
ex post, during oversight of implementation, to
ensure their continuing relevance.
First, even though many—but not all—
global programs can provide evidence for
consensus on what they are trying to achieve
and how, this is typically a consensus among
donors and international agencies. The Bank’s
developing-country clients have emphasized to
OED that they have little voice in the consen-
sus-building process about what objectives the
programs should pursue or how to pursue
them effectively.
Second, with rapid changes at the global
level, the process of articulating sector strate-
gies as consensus documents has become long
and costly. Moreover, sector strategies have
been weak in articulating global concerns, in
providing strategic links between global
programs and country operations, and in
establishing clear principles for selectivity with
respect to global programs of greatest
operational relevance to the Bank’s clients.
Third, while the subsidiarity criterion could,
in principle, be applied strictly to limit global
programs to those that do not compete or
substitute for regular Bank instruments, the
relationship between the provision of global
and national public and private goods has
rarely been adequately explored before a
program is formed. 
Fourth, by including both global public
goods and corporate advocacy among the
Bank’s four strategic foci for global programs,
the potential topics for a global program are
essentially made limitless. Besides, manage-
ment has indicated that they view the strategic
foci only as descriptors
to identify global
programs that should
be overseen during
implementation.
Fifth, alleviating pov-
erty is not an explicit
criterion among the selectivity and oversight
criteria for global programs. It is simply implied
in the second Development Committee
criterion (a clear value added to the Bank’s
development objectives), in the first approval
criterion (a clear linkage to the Bank’s core
institutional objectives), and in the definition of
corporate advocacy as “the critical enablers of
poverty reduction that the Bank is particularly
well-qualified to champion by sharing
knowledge (both research and experience) and
building awareness with clients, development
partners, and other stakeholders.” The links of
each program’s objectives and activities to
sustainable growth and poverty reduction need
to be well defined at the outset and monitored
during implementation, from inputs through
outputs to outcomes and impacts.
Sixth, the Bank is still essentially following a
one-stage approval process for new global
programs (box 1.1). This approval process does
not provide an adequate assessment of
operational relevance. To supplement this,
OED recommended in its Phase 1 report that
the Bank institute a transparent identification,
preparation, and appraisal process, with Board
approval for global programs above a threshold
size and an independent external review in the
DGF for programs below that size. In addition,
OED suggested an appraisal template for global
programs above the threshold size.2 These
recommendations have not yet been
implemented, although in FY03 the DGF did
institute an ex ante review by peers outside the
Bank for new global programs seeking DGF
funding.
Evidence of International Consensus
International consensus is articulated by
stakeholders in the “global community” and is
reflected in as many ways. The Millennium
Declaration in September 2000 and the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) are the most
recent manifestations of a formally endorsed,
broad-based international consensus on
economic and social development that also has
a strong poverty focus. 
OED has classified the case study programs by
how their creation reflects an international
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Alleviating poverty is not
an explicit criterion
among the selectivity and
oversight criteria for
global programs.
consensus (tables 3.1 and H.6). For example, two
programs are formally responsible for
implementing international conventions to
which both industrial and developing countries
are signatories—the Global Environment Facility
(GEF)3 and the Multilateral Fund for the
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
(MLF).4 These convention-based programs enjoy
strong legitimacy thanks to their formal authoriz-
ing environments, strong participation of
developing countries in their design and
implementation, and equitable governance
arrangements. These
programs are unique in
their acknowledgment
of the differing priorities
of developing and
industrial countries.
Developing countries
sought and achieved
financing mechanisms for the incremental
compliance costs of achieving global environ-
mental benefits.5 Compared with the other
programs OED has reviewed, these two
P R O G R A M  R E L E VA N C E  T O  G L O B A L  C H A L L E N G E S ,  B A N K  P R I O R I T I E S ,  A N D  C O U N T R Y  P R I O R I T I E S
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The GEF and the MLF are
unique in their
acknowledgment of the
differing priorities of
developing and industrial
countries.
Number of 
Category programs Programs Convention, agreement, conference, or standards
A. The program is formally 2 GEF 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992 Con-
responsible for vention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1994 U.N. Convention on Combating 
implementing an inter- Desertification (CCD), and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
national convention Organic Pollutants (POPs)
MLF 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer
B. The program arose out 5 UNAIDS 1994 Resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
of an international IF 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference, Singapore
conference WSP 1977 World Water Conference and Declaration, Mar del Plata, Argentina
Cities Alliance 1996 Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) and Istanbul Declaration
UCW 1997 International Conference on Child Labor and Oslo Agenda for Action
C. The program is facilitating 5 FSAP, FIRST Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IOSCO Principles of 
the implementation of Securities Regulation, IAIS Insurance Core Principles, Bank of International 
formal standards, Settlements Principles on Payment and Settlement Systems, IMF Principles
international agreements, on Transparency in Monetary and Fiscal Policies
or formally agreed-upon ProCarbFund 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
approaches GWP 1992 Dublin Conference on Water and Environment and 1992 U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro
GIF Agenda 21 and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
D. Donor partners 9 CGIAR, TDR, 
collectively agreed to Global Forum, 
establish the program RBM, Stop TB, 
GAVI, ESMAP, 
CGAP, PPIAF
E. World Bank sought other 5 CEPF, infoDev, 
partners after initially PostConFund, 
founding the program GDN, World Links
Note: Each program is assigned to only one category.
G e n e s i s  I s  O n e  I n d i c a t o r  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
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T a b l e  3 . 1
programs are large, significant, well conceived,
and well organized, given the magnitude of the
challenges they address.
Ten programs arose out of international
conferences or are facilitating the implementa-
tion of formal standards and approaches
(categories B and C in table 3.1). While these
programs also focus on some of today’s most
important global challenges, they have not
been directly formed by parties to implement
an agreement. They represent a less explicit
form of international consensus. None of these
programs except the Prototype Carbon Fund
has an attached financing mechanism. When
programs are largely oriented toward advocacy
and not complemented by financing for invest-
ments, they lack credibility and ownership in
developing countries. Their objectives, even
when broadly defined to include technical
assistance, training, and capacity building, as
well as their results, tend to be harder to assess.
Even when financing arrangements are
subsequently established in response to the
expressed needs and concerns of developing
countries and the experience of trying to do
program activities, the funds tend to be insuffi-
cient, and the organizational arrangements
tend to be weak. 
The global programmatic responses to
developing-country priorities in trade, finance,
and infrastructure illustrate the problems of an
inadequate response. Most programs remain
small relative to the needs and demands of
developing countries, and some involve high
transaction costs.6
The Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance (IF) is an example of a
program with a wide gap between its objectives
and means and the expectations of developing
countries. Its primary goal is to better integrate
trade policy into the domestic planning
process and into Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs). (See table H.2 for details on
program objectives and strategy.) However,
developing countries also seek open and fair
markets for their products in industrial
countries and investment finance from donors
to address internal supply constraints, such as
physical infrastructure, institutional capacity,
and personnel training.7 Programs such as the
IF are inadequate instruments either for
widening external market access or for loosen-
ing domestic supply constraints. Indeed, the IF
seems to lack enough funds even to meet its
more limited objectives. As an interim measure,
the IF has begun providing a small amount of
technical assistance as “bridging finance”—
with a cap of $1 million per country—to follow
up on the diagnostic studies, with the expecta-
tion that follow-up resources for technical
assistance and investments will be provided
through the PRSP process.8
Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) was
conceived in response to the need for strength-
ened cooperation and coordination between
the Bank, the International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO), and UNICEF, articulated at the 1997
International Conference on Child Labor and
the Oslo Agenda for Action. There was a
general recognition in Oslo that, despite a
common policy framework in the form of ILO
Conventions No. 138 and No. 182, and the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
action on child labor was poorly coordinated
across the three agencies. The program has
provided significant support for informal,
interagency technical coordination and has
begun to address the lack of comparable data
on child labor. To date, though, there remain
varying definitions of child work and varying
approaches stemming from the different
institutional cultures and mandates of the three
agencies.
Advocacy programs can direct attention and
resources to daunting country realities.
UNAIDS, for example, which arose from a 1994
U.N. Economic and Social Council resolution,
is cosponsored by eight U.N. agencies and the
Bank. UNAIDS has convinced the Bank and
donors to pursue policy dialogue, increase
their own financial commitments to communi-
cable diseases, and contribute to the creation
of GFATM in 2002. The new agreement on anti-
retroviral drugs among the Clinton Founda-
tion, the World Bank, UNICEF, and the Global
Fund demonstrates the power of global
partnerships to achieve a global policy consen-
sus. Bank partners have stressed to OED that
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no single actor, particularly the existing
international agencies, could have done this
alone. The agreement holds the potential for
increasing the supply of affordable, quality
drugs for poor countries, although operational-
izing this agreement will be a major challenge
and will take time. Having made considerable
progress, AIDS programs face new challenges
(box 3.1).
The remaining 14 programs (categories D
and E in table 3.1) were established by groups
of donors coming together to address a major
global challenge or by the Bank, which then
sought partner support. While “supply-led,”
some of these programs have acquired
ownership among developing countries by
demonstrating substantial impacts. Both CGIAR
and TDR started as donor initiatives, but
acquired considerable ownership by delivering
new products, technologies, and knowledge
that complemented the countries’ own efforts.
These programs illustrate that, if well conceived
and implemented with appropriate partner-
ships, externally driven programs can deliver
results and develop ownership (OED 2003b).
The global program agenda involves many
donors (figure 3.1). Donors are using “interna-
tional consensus” to deliver technical
assistance and approaches to solving problems
they consider important. Many donors have
become disenchanted
with traditional means
of delivering develop-
ment assistance. Driven
by the need to be
accountable to their own
domestic constituencies
in order to maintain
support for aid programs, they are less well
focused on linking global agendas to develop-
ing-country objectives, while developing-
country governments are often unaware of
many programs’ objectives, scope, and means
of operation.
Since the capacity of donors and interna-
tional agencies has not kept up with the expand-
ing global agenda, they often look to global
programs to help build their own capacities—as
in the cases of IF, UCW, and the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP). The programs
are often intended to
improve aid coordina-
tion among donors and
international agencies. A
related objective is to
mobilize resources for
individual organizations
through global aid
programming. Yet these
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The new agreement on
anti-retroviral drugs
demonstrates the power
of global partnerships to
achieve a global policy
consensus.
Since the capacity of
donors and international
agencies has not kept up
with the expanding global
agenda, they often look to
global programs to help
build their own
capacities.
Recent progress has prompted new challenges for the imple-
mentation of HIV/AIDS programs:
At the global level:
• How to deliver tools to political leaders to help achieve the
necessary behavioral changes to prevent further spread of
the disease
• How to deal with the different priorities of developing- and
industrial-country governments for the containment of
HIV/AIDS and communicable diseases, relative to other de-
velopment priorities in health and other sectors
• How to address the inadequate, albeit increased, amounts
of funding.
At the country level:
• How to address health-system capacity constraints, even with
the support of private vendors, community organizations,
and NGOs, to better assess needs and improve delivery in
under-funded and overstretched health-delivery systems 
• How to reduce the stigma of infection and increase the will-
ingness and means of households to pursue testing or treat-
ment
• How to address the information gaps on a variety of fronts,
including monitoring and evaluation.
Source: UNAIDS 2003.
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programs rarely diagnose their partners’
capacity to participate in program activities or to
link the program activities to their own country
work. The objectives and activities focus largely
on improving the behavior of developing
countries and less on improving the internal
workings of the donor countries, donor
agencies, or international organizations. For
example, donor coordination is one of the four
specific activities CGAP is supposed to pursue
under its Phase III, and was also an explicit
objective under Phases I and II. Yet the
program’s own Phase II evaluation cited weak
achievement on this front, specifically with
regard to program financing, information-
sharing, and mainstreaming microfinance in
donor agencies, even though these are explicit
requirements of the participating donors (Fox,
Havers, and Maurer 2002).
The Millennium Declaration in September
2000 and the resulting Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) reflect international
consensus, have a strong poverty focus, and
provide concrete targets for assessing
progress. Not surprisingly, virtually all
programs assert their alignment with the
MDGs to enhance their own legitimacy. The
objectives of half of the study programs are
directly related to specific MDG targets, but
their outputs are only some of the ingredients
needed to achieve the respective MDGs (table
H.7). The remaining programs’ objectives are
related to the MDGs only insofar as the goods
and services the programs provide are
necessary to achieve particular MDG targets.
Though both industrial and developing
countries have endorsed them, the MDGs
represent a consensus on what needs to be
done, rather than on how to do it. OED’s
consultations with partnering agencies
indicate that the new global programs strain
the limited financial and institutional capacity
of even the partnering international organiza-
tions. The strain is worse in developing
countries, particularly those with the greatest
incidence of poverty and the least institutional
and financial capacity.9 This poses a risk of
dashed expectations and cynicism.10
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Overall, the voice of developing countries in
determining what constitutes international
consensus is weak, and needs to be reflected
through links to Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs) and Country Assistance Strate-
gies (CASs). OED has traditionally defined
relevance in the context of investment projects
as “the extent to which the project’s objectives
are consistent with the country’s current
development priorities and with current Bank
country and sectoral assistance strategies and
corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies,
Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies).”11
In specific country PRSPs and CASs, OED evalua-
tors found few mentions of the issues that the
global programs address.12 The relationship of
global programs to PRSPs and CASs needs to be
strengthened to reflect genuine international
consensus and introduced as a criterion for
Bank support of global programs.
Consistency with the Bank’s Sector
Strategies 
As part of the approval process for involvement
in new partnerships, Bank management
requires that all partnerships should have a
clear strategic rationale consistent with the
relevant sector strategy paper. “If such strate-
gies are not available in advance, a clear
explanation should be provided about the
relationship of a proposed partnership to an
agreed upon work program.”13 As part of the
annual DGF vetting and prioritization process,
the Bank’s sector boards are also expected to
indicate how grant proposals are prioritized
and coordinated within the context of their
sector strategies. 
These criteria and procedures do not provide
a basis for selectivity, for four reasons. First,
management has acknowledged that sector
strategies have mostly become advocacy
documents that are poorly aligned with country
programs. Based on a review of 16 sector strate-
gies, that paper concluded that, while they were
strong on strategic relevance and analytic quality,
they were weak on business focus (such as
guidance to staff on priorities, choice of instru-
ments, and business planning) and on monitor-
ing of implementation
(including establishing
indicators of outcomes
and clear monitoring
responsibilities). Thus,
even if global programs
were aligned with the
sector strategies, this would not guarantee
alignment with the needs and priorities of the
Bank’s client countries. Given the challenges of
matrix management, global programs managed
by networks have weak links with Bank
operations.
Second, networks have little incentive or
capacity to review and prioritize their annual
grant proposals to the DGF Council across
networks. Rather, their incentive is to retain as
large a share of the DGF funds within their
respective sectors as possible, even if several
networks offer proposals on closely related
topics. Their capacity to address the global-
policy and country-capacity challenges facing
the global programs and to explore their
relationship to other proposals is limited and
declining (as OED demonstrated in its CGIAR
meta-evaluation). If Regional managers serving
on the sector boards see no benefit in these
global programs for their Regional operations,
they dismiss them as the business of the sector
and network anchors.
Third, global programs would serve the Bank
and its clients better if they were more independent
of the Bank and if they mobilized global knowledge
and ground-level experience in developing
countries so as to inform, not reflect, the Bank’s
investments and approaches. While alignment with
the Bank’s prevailing approach may prevent client
countries from developing alternative viewpoints, it
also reduces the programs’ supposed value of
marshalling independent thinking and knowledge.
As the CGIAR meta-evaluation showed with respect
to policy research, what developing countries need
from global programs are
proven options in poli-
cies, technologies and in-
stitutional arrangements,
whether or not those
options reflect the Bank’s
alignments.
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The voice of developing
countries in determining
what constitutes
international consensus
is weak.
Global programs would
serve the Bank and its
clients better if they were
more independent of the
Bank.
The infrastructure programs and the Global
Development Network also illustrate this point.
According to its 2000 evaluation, ESMAP has had
a major impact on Bank thinking.14 WSP, ESMAP,
and infoDev staff contributed to the most recent
water and sanitation business strategy (Septem-
ber 2003) and to the information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) and energy sector
strategies (January 2001 and December 2001).
Yet respondents to OED’s survey of stakeholders
involved in the governance of these programs
expressed concerns about the Bank’s domina-
tion of the programs and the difficulty of advocat-
ing viewpoints different from the Bank’s. 
Recent OED reports on the electric power and
the water and sanitation sectors found that in both
sectors the approaches that the Bank has
advocated since the early 1990s to encourage
private sector development have performed
poorly, and that Bank lending commitments have
declined precipitously (OED, OEG, and OEU
2003; OED 2003a). It is unclear to what extent
ESMAP and WSP contributed global knowledge
and best practices during this period that were
independent of the prevailing Bank views on
private-sector development—either to the Bank’s
own operational policy dialogue and advice to its
client countries, or directly to the Bank’s clients
who faced the challenges
of declining private
investment (especially
after 1997), disappearing
donor aid flows, poor
public sector perform-
ance, and mounting
NGO criticism of the
Bank’s advice.
In the case of the
GDN, external stake-
holders view both the
reality and the percep-
tion of independence
from the Bank as
essential to promote
policy research that
developing countries
need, rather than what is
aligned with the so-called
Washington Consensus.
Members of its governing board consider GDN’s
relocation, first outside the Bank and then
outside Washington, to be one of several essential
steps to provide it the independence needed for
setting relevant research agendas for the Bank’s
clients. One of GDN’s regional networks, the
African Economic Research Consortium,
established a governance structure, research
priority-setting processes, and financing to
ensure that it was not driven by donors (includ-
ing the Bank and IMF) and was truly responsive,
and seen to be so, to Africa’s analytical needs.15
Fourth, the lack of coordination of the content
of global programs within a sector, the poor
integration of their content into Bank country
operations within a sector, and the lack of
evidence of the Bank benefiting from independ-
ent thinking have led to lack of coherence across
sectors in the messages emanating from Bank-
supported global programs. Thus, whereas the
health programs promote broad access to
pharmaceuticals, the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) promotes adherence to interna-
tional financial management standards that, in
practice, preclude sufficient spending on health
and other social sector ministries.16 OED’s report
on the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
Initiative points out the incoherence between
debt management and social spending promoted
by donors.17
Consistency with the Subsidiarity
Principle and the Bank’s Strategic Foci
for Global Programs
The subsidiarity principle (box 2.1) and the
Bank’s strategic foci for global programs are
closely related. Corporate advocacy programs
(the second strategic focus) that do not
provide global public goods may violate the
subsidiarity principle by competing with or
substituting for regular Bank instruments. Such
programs need to justify the Bank’s involve-
ment in the global partnership based on the
program’s ability to do something more
efficiently or effectively than the Bank can do
acting through country-level partnerships. 
The prime candidates for adding value are
activities associated with the third and fourth
strategic foci; that is, activities with substantial
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The lack of coordination
of the content of global
programs within a sector,
the poor integration of
their content into Bank
country operations within
a sector, and the lack of
evidence of the Bank
benefiting from
independent thinking
have led to lack of
coherence across sectors
in the messages
emanating from Bank-
supported global
programs.
economies of scale and scope, such as
knowledge creation and dissemination, capacity
building, improving donor coordination, and
mobilizing incremental resources. Advocacy
programs that are truly “multicountry…that
crucially depend on highly coordinated
approaches” may add value, among other things,
through mutual learning across developing
countries or through the availability of increased
global expertise based on comparative
advantage. But the criterion does not explain
what is meant by “multicountry programs that
crucially depend on highly coordinated
approaches.” Does it mean coordination among
donors, among developing countries, or among
sectors within a developing country? 
To assess the consistency of the activities of
the case study programs with the Bank’s four
strategic foci, OED has expanded each strategic
focus, as follows:
(1) Providing global public goods:
• Implementing conventions, rules, or formal
and informal standards and norms 
• Financing research and development for
new products and technologies 
• Financing country-level investments to 
deliver global public goods
• Promoting common approaches to miti-
gating communicable diseases.
(2) Supporting international advocacy for re-
form agendas that in a significant way ad-
dress policy framework conditions for
developing countries:
• Advocacy 
• Supporting national-level policy, institu-
tional, and technical reforms 
• Financing country-level investments to
deliver national public goods.
(3) Multicountry programs that crucially depend
on highly coordinated approaches:
• Generation and dissemination of infor-
mation and knowledge 
• Capacity building and training
• Improving donor coordination. 
(4) Mobilizing substantial incremental resources
that can be effectively used for development:
• Directly
• Indirectly.
OED found that all 26
programs are multi-
country efforts that
support international
advocacy in one way or
another (table H.8). As
stated in chapter 2, 10
programs and part of
GAVI’s Vaccine Fund
provide global public
goods (not including
knowledge creation and
dissemination, whose
global public-goods
characteristics must be
verified through empirical research, since useful
knowledge tends to be contextual). Two
financial-sector programs—FSAP and FIRST—
also support national implementation of
international standards relating to macroeco-
nomic management; the banking system; and
securities, insurance, and other financial
markets. The goal of both programs is to
strengthen countries’ financial systems to help
mitigate the risks and costs of global financial
crises—a genuine global public good.18
Only five programs—CGIAR, GEF, MLF, the
Prototype Carbon Fund, and GAVI—mobilize
substantial incremental resources. Only two
programs provide new money from nonofficial
sources—the Prototype Carbon Fund from
private commercial sources and GAVI from the
Gates Foundation. While the GEF and MLF
have been incremental to ODA resources, it has
been difficult to demonstrate any such
increment to overall development assistance.
Thus, the growth of global programs appears
to be coming at the cost of country-level
assistance.
OED supports management in extending the
subsidiarity principle to all (including non-DGF)
programs, because the inclusion of corporate
advocacy among the criteria for global programs
stemmed from the
interest of the Bank
networks in ensuring
that “their” activities are
inside the global tent.
However, management
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Prime candidates for
adding value are
activities with substantial
economies of scale and
scope, such as knowledge
creation and
dissemination, capacity
building, improving
donor coordination, and
mobilizing incremental
resources.
The growth of global
programs appears to be
coming at the cost of
country-level assistance.
has not yet established the capacity in the GPP
Council or Group to do this. Applying the
subsidiarity principle effectively is a complex
and difficult issue for at least four reasons.
First, there is the sheer empirical difficulty
of assessing whether the value added in
organizing a multicountry global partnership to
provide national or local public or private
goods outweighs the costs, compared with
using the Bank’s regular operational instru-
ments.
Second, the Bank’s own financial and human
resources to do economic and sector work
have declined, while the range and complexity
of country issues needing Bank involvement
have increased. Corporate advocacy programs
add value of a financial or technical nature,
such as budgetary or trust fund resources or in-
kind technical assistance on a scale that the
Bank could not provide from its own adminis-
trative budget. Some programs may also help
donors improve their own bilateral operations.
CGAP, for example, is called upon frequently by
donors to provide technical assistance for their
operations.
Third, global programs may also add intangi-
ble value to the Bank, such as a presence in
major global forums, interaction with opinion-
makers in specific areas, and membership in
the global development community. The last
includes participating in conventions such as
the GEF and MLF, improving the consensus and
donor coordination on controversial global
issues such as HIV/AIDS and trade, improving
the understanding of its partners, and increas-
ing the relevance of a program’s content based
on the Bank’s knowledge of its client countries.
Fourth, global and local agendas have
merged, and a variety of stakeholders want to
have a voice and to influence the Bank to pursue
their agendas. Accord-
ing to their proponents,
global programs help to
maintain aid levels 
(or even increase them
in the case of AIDS) 
that would otherwise
dwindle by demonstrat-
ing to the issues-
oriented aid constituencies that their concerns
are being addressed. They also create awareness
and constituencies for reform—as in the cases
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) agricultural trade
subsidies and intellectual property rights for
pharmaceuticals. 
Conclusions
The 26 global programs reviewed in this report,
while diverse in their origins, relevance, and
ownership in developing countries, generally
meet the Bank’s selectivity criteria for global
programs. But this is not difficult: the existing
criteria are sufficiently broad to permit the
approval of almost any global program that is
engaged in activities within the Bank’s develop-
ment mandate. It is time to adapt, modify, and
apply many of the processes and tools that the
Bank has developed for its country operations
to global programs, including a two-stage
approval process—at the concept and appraisal
stages—based on a deeper understanding of
the difficulty of applying the current criteria.
While OED recommended this in its Phase 1
report (OED 2002c, Annex A), this has not yet
been implemented by Bank management.
Other than those promoting information
and knowledge, only a third of the programs
provide global public goods. The remaining
programs address one or more global concerns
through corporate advocacy at the country
level. They do so by providing country-level
technical assistance, conducting country-level
studies, and fostering country-level capacity
building closely aligned with the Bank. Such
work largely produces national public or
private goods rather than bringing global
knowledge to bear on countries or Bank
operations in the countries. The programs in
this latter category raise subsidiarity issues.
What value (beyond budgetary resources) is
the global program adding that the Bank
cannot achieve through partnerships at the
country level? Are the programs raising
substantial additional resources? 
Global public policy issues that will affect
program outcomes get little attention in most
programs. This poses a major challenge: Where
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Global public policy
issues that will affect
program outcomes get
little attention in most
programs. This poses a
major challenge.
and how to address such policy issues, which
usually require agreements among sovereign
nations, and what if any role global programs can
play in this process, beyond advocacy. When
there are policy failures at the country level, the
Bank can shift its support from investments to
policy reforms. When there are global policy
failures, such a shift is more difficult, because the
forums in which such reforms occur are not those
in which decisions on global programs are made.
P R O G R A M  R E L E VA N C E  T O  G L O B A L  C H A L L E N G E S ,  B A N K  P R I O R I T I E S ,  A N D  C O U N T R Y  P R I O R I T I E S
3 1

3 3
Striving for Results: 
Assessing the Outcomes
and Impacts of 
Global Programs
This chapter assesses three aspects of the case study programs’ per-formance: (1) the quality of their monitoring and evaluation activities,(2) their links to country-level activities and the Bank’s country oper-
ations, and (3) their value added to the Bank’s clients and to the Bank. 
There are huge variations across the programs
in the availability of independently validated
outcomes and impacts, summarized at the end
of this chapter in table 4.3 and in Annex E. The
variation in performance is partly a function of
age (figure 2.1) and the extent to which
program activities have direct outcomes on the
ground. 
Though the absence of evidence of impact
does not imply the absence of impact, absence
of evidence is often due to the lack of a results-
oriented culture. In some programs, it also
results from a combination of poorly defined
objectives, weak monitoring and evaluation
processes, and poor links to country-level
activities.
Demonstrating program impacts is compli-
cated by the number of partners, the range of
objectives, the levels and interconnectedness
of activities, and externalities and cross-border
spillovers. Accurate financial information is
often unavailable for program activities and for
the partner and country activities that the
programs influence. The concept of the
opportunity cost of resources is rarely used in
assessing global programs. 
Assessing the outcomes and impacts of
corporate advocacy program activities (techni-
cal assistance, studies, capacity building and
policy, institutional or technical reforms) is
inherently more difficult. Outcomes are difficult
to track and costly to monitor. Within the Bank,
country priorities are increasingly determined
at the national level, which further complicates
monitoring. In any case, country priorities do
not always coincide with the industrial
countries’ perception of
country needs.
Despite these chal-
lenges, the number and
quality of program-level
evaluations have both
improved during the
past few years (table
4.1). Twenty-one of the
case study programs
4
Though the absence of
evidence of impact does
not imply the absence of
impact, absence of
evidence is often due to
the lack of a results-
oriented culture.
have now had at least one program-level
evaluation. The DGF requirement (instituted
in June 2000) for programs receiving more than
$300,000 annually to be evaluated every three
to five years and the issuance of guidelines for
such evaluations1 have encouraged these
trends. The challenges in improving the quality
of evaluations and their impacts are both
procedural and methodological.
Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation
Activities
OED assessed monitoring and evaluation
according to the following five criteria:2
• Clear and coherent program objectives and
strategies that give focus and direction to the
program and provide a basis for evaluating the
performance of the program
• The use of a results-based management frame-
work with a structured set of (quantitative or
qualitative) output, outcome, and impact in-
dicators
•Systematic and regular
processes for data col-
lection and management
•Independence of pro-
gram-level evaluations
•Effective feedback mech-
anisms to reflect evalua-
tion findings on strategic focus, organization,
management, and financing of the programs.
Clear and Coherent Objectives and Strategies
A number of programs have process objectives
rather than outcome objectives—objectives
such as “to assist,” “to help,” “to support,” and
“to promote” are very common (table H.2). For
instance, one objective of the GEF is to assist
developing countries in meeting their obliga-
tions to international environmental conven-
tions, yet donors increasingly seek evidence of
impacts on global environmental outcomes.3
There is more agreement on the need for
action than on what the action should be.
Governing board members and program
managers have indicated that programs are
often established to achieve consensus and
harmonize partner approaches to develop-
ment in a sector. Examples include addressing
water resources management, HIV/AIDS,
private participation in infrastructure, microfi-
nance, financial sector reforms, and informa-
tion and communications technology. But
partners often weigh objectives differently and
have different expectations of what the
program should deliver. Donor-related
objectives are often unstated and harder to
evaluate. There are no indicators to assess
“harmonization” (box 4.1).4
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Year Number of 
completed programs Programs
1998 2 CGIAR, TDR
1999 0
2000 1 ESMAP
2001 2 GIF, Global Forum
2002 6 UNAIDS, RBM, CGAP, infoDev, Cities Alliance, Post-conflict Fund
2003 5 CEPF, GWP, Stop TB, UCW, IF
Taking place 
in 2004 4 WSP, GDN, MLF, GEF
Programs not 
yet evaluateda 6 World Links (1998), GAVIb (1999), PPIAFb (1999), FSAP (1999), ProCarbFund (2000), FIRST (2002)
a. Program starting dates in parentheses.
b. The GAVI Board has commissioned a number of evaluations of specific aspects of its program, and PPIAF’s Technical Advisory Panel has conducted ex post evaluations of selected
program activities.
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Partners often weigh
objectives differently and
have different
expectations of what the
program should deliver.
Program objectives and activities evolve over
time, some in response to the changing
external environment, some based on lessons
learned, and others simply to maintain donor
support. CGIAR’s original objective was to
develop technologies that would reduce
hunger, WSP’s was to develop appropriate
small-scale technology, ESMAP’s was to assist
developing countries hurt by the second OPEC
oil crisis, and CGAP’s was to establish a $100
million multidonor microfinance facility. CGIAR
has since shifted its focus toward policy, social
science, and natural resource management
research; WSP and ESMAP toward improving
sector policies and institutions in developing
countries; and CGAP toward establishing
standards for microfinance and disseminating
best practices. 
Frequent changes in a program’s goals and
objectives, such as with the Global IPM Facility,
make it difficult to determine what should and
can be evaluated. A good evaluation should
assess whether the new objectives reflect the
program’s comparative advantage and core
competence. OED’s meta-evaluation of CGIAR
concluded that its increased focus on policy,
social science, and natural resource manage-
ment research relative to productivity-enhance-
ment research did not reflect the group’s
comparative advantage, which lay in mobilizing
global scientific work on global public goods
that would help reduce poverty. Developing
countries can rarely mobilize global science on
their own, but they can do cost-effective, locally
relevant research on policy and national
resource management.
When program objectives are unclear, strate-
gies and activities may reveal more about program
intentions than the stated objectives do. Evalua-
tion needs to explore whether global programs
focus on the right issues or whether other instru-
ments are more appropriate to achieve the stated
(country-level) objectives. Underlying each
program’s interventions are analytical and
interdisciplinary issues requiring diagnosis of the
problem at hand and the choice of appropriate
instruments, including whether a global pro-gram
is needed and, if so, what net value the program
adds (box 4.2).5
Use of a Results-Based Framework
As a management strategy, focusing on perform-
ance and achievement of outputs, outcomes,
and impacts; results-
based management; and
results-based evaluation
(box 4.3) are all
relatively new ideas that
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UNAIDS formed the Global HIV/AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation
Support Team (GAMET) at the World Bank to facilitate efforts to
build country monitoring and evaluation capacities. GAMET
has made progress in its first year of operation, including the es-
tablishment of an advisory board to offer guidance across agen-
cies. Also put in place are country support teams, a network of
consultant experts (most from Africa) in building capacity for
monitoring and evaluation, and training in several countries for
the design and implementation of a new management develop-
ment intervention to provide an accountability framework. Yet
a recent Bank report on the MDGs in health notes that all of the
agencies participating in the GAMET initiative face tensions be-
tween their internal requirements for monitoring and evaluation
and their desire for a coordinated approach at the country level.
The donors are under pressure to show impacts in the short term,
which can undercut even the best intentions to rely on country-
based systems. The tradeoff between donors spending staff
time working on coordinating approaches and building coun-
try capacity and on fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities to mon-
itor their own programs generates additional problems.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, GAMET is a worthy experi-
ment. It is worth watching whether the donors will be willing
to put nationals in the driver’s seats of these coordinated mon-
itoring and evaluation approaches. 
Sources: Human Development Network, staff and country interviews.
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Frequent changes in
objectives make it difficult
to determine what should
and can be evaluated.
have only recently been fully incorporated into
the Bank’s business practices. Their limited use
in global programs is thus not surprising.
Programs financing investments at the global or
national levels have a longer record of results-
based management.6 A growing number of
program-level evaluations—such as the recent
RBM, Stop TB Partnership, Cities Alliance,7
UCW,8 and IF evaluations—are also using
results-based frameworks that recommend that
the programs adopt results-based management
practices, develop performance indicators
related to outcomes rather than outputs alone,
and generally adopt more businesslike manage-
ment practices, including better accounting.
These are positive developments.
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While much of the growing program activity at the global level
is justified on the basis of cross-border spillovers and cross-bor-
der benefits, it has lacked strong analytical foundations and well-
thought-out results chains in programs’ strategies. Global
programs in agriculture, health, trade, and child work illustrate
the complexity. 
In the agricultural and environment sectors, the CGIAR must
weigh its research priorities between mitigating the effects of
climate change and adapting to climate change. The latter has
more potential to help the poor in the Bank’s client countries to
tackle shifts in rainfall variability, higher temperatures, new or
more threatening pests and diseases, and higher atmospheric
carbon dioxide (CO2) levels. Of course, win-win strategies for
both developing and industrial countries are desirable. When
this is not possible, CGIAR needs to focus on research that ben-
efits the world’s poor more than the global community. 
In the health sector, developing countries’ timely access to
drugs at affordable prices has been a major thrust of global
program advocacy. Access depends on the quality and quantity
of drugs available, intellectual property rights, production and
trade issues, and a variety of domestic diagnostic- and delivery-
capacity issues. What constitutes a global or national, public
or private health sector good is situation-specific. Access to
drugs, ostensibly a private good, has become an issue of global
public policy at the WTO because of the inability of developing
countries to develop and produce new drugs and vaccines af-
fordably or on a large enough scale. Whether drug access
should be a publicly or privately supplied good—and the pol-
icy and the operational implications of these options for the
strategies that individual developing countries should pursue—
calls for both policy and empirical analysis on a country and
global level to draw implications for advocacy and advice. Such
analysis has often been weak.
With respect to trade, the focus of the Integrated Frame-
work for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF) has been on
mainstreaming trade in the countries’ overall development strat-
egy by its inclusion in the national plans and PRSPs. Diagnos-
tic trade integration studies of least-developed countries’ trade
have identified both domestic and external constraints. Do-
mestically, these include the regulatory environment, access to
competitively priced transport and communication services,
functioning of the labor market, labor-force skills, legal services,
management of import procedures, and customs. Externally,
these include general and commodity-specific tariff and non-tar-
iff barriers that limit trade options in specific export markets.
Mauritania faces barriers to potential exports such as camel
cheese. Malawi’s sugar exports are excluded from American and
EU trade initiatives for Africa. Senegal’s phosphate fertilizers face
significant tariffs in India, the major importing country. The U.S.
tariff barrier on tobacco amounts to 88 percent, Canada’s on
liver preparations 65 percent, and Japan’s on boneless beef 40
percent. 
In the cases of child labor and pesticide use, what may ap-
pear to be universally desirable values become the basis for
erecting barriers to trade with developing countries. The child
labor issue is driven by the universalization of norms and val-
ues. Restricting the use of pesticides involves a complex trade-
off between farm productivity and developing-country
competitiveness vis-à-vis the safe handling of pesticides to min-
imize adverse health and environmental impacts. The way in
which both issues are currently addressed in the global pro-
grams focuses too little on arriving at effective operational so-
lutions to achieve measurable (quantitative or qualitative)
poverty reduction, health, or environmental indicators, and
demands too much of the poorest and too little of industrial
countries.
T o  D e l i v e r  G l o b a l  P u b l i c  G o o d s  o f  B e n e f i t
t o  t h e  P o o r ,  G l o b a l  P r o g r a m s  N e e d  
A n a l y t i c a l  F o u n d a t i o n s  w i t h  a  
R e s u l t s - B a s e d  O r i e n t a t i o n  
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Systematic and Regular Processes for Data
Collection and Management
Data collection and monitoring vary widely
across programs. At one extreme, CGIAR has
been exemplary in regularly assessing the
impacts of its research on increasing agricul-
tural productivity (mostly germplasm and crop
improvement research) and contributing to
methodological advances. The number,
frequency, and quality of its independent
external impact evaluations are unmatched by
the agricultural research systems of even the
most advanced countries (Gardner 2002).
Following the OED meta-evaluation, CGIAR is
also moving rapidly to do impact assessments
in the more difficult to evaluate areas of policy
research, natural resource management
research, and capacity building.9 TDR and MLF
have assessed and demonstrated clear and
substantial impacts, as described in table 4.3.
At the other extreme, a lack of clarity and
consensus on program objectives and the lack
of a results-based framework mean that per-
formance indicators, when they are available,
are not well focused, appropriate, or tracked.
There is often an implicit assumption that the
program’s outputs (such as studies) will lead to
outcomes (such as policy and institutional
reforms) and that these, in turn, will automati-
cally expand the poor’s access to technologies,
information, or finance and improve their
incomes and livelihoods. Assessment of
whether this will occur or what follow-up steps
are needed to achieve this is rarely part of
program design or implementation. Related
partner activities are insufficiently ranked. For
example, IF assumed that the program’s
diagnostic trade integration studies (DTISs)
would help integrate least-developed countries
into the multilateral
trading system, enhance
their ability to partici-
pate in and benefit from
the system, and improve
their export perform-
ance. The DTISs would
also incorporate trade in
the PRSPs. But all of this
has been a challenge.
GWP assumed that
promoting partnerships
at the country and
regional levels would
support countries in the
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Focusing on performance
and achievement of
outputs, outcomes, and
impacts; results-based
management; and results-
based evaluation  are all
relatively new ideas that
have only recently been
fully incorporated into
the Bank’s business
practices.
Results-based management: A management strategy focusing
on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts.
Results chain: The causal sequence for a development inter-
vention that stipulates the necessary sequence to achieve de-
sired objectives—beginning with inputs; moving through
activities and outputs; and culminating in outcomes, impacts, and
feedback. In some agencies, reach is a part of the results chain.
Inputs: The financial, human, and material resources used for
the development intervention.
Outputs: The products, capital goods, and services that result from
a development intervention. This may also include changes re-
sulting from the intervention that are relevant to the achievement
of outcomes.
Outcomes: The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term
effects of an intervention’s outputs.
Impacts: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term
effects produced by a development intervention, directly or in-
directly, intended or unintended.
Indicator: Quantitative or qualitative variable that provides a sim-
ple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the
changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess an
actor’s performance. 
Performance monitoring: A continuous process of collecting
and analyzing data to compare how well a project, program, or
policy is being implemented against expected results.
Source: OECD 2002.
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sustainable development of their water
resources. UCW assumed that reconciling data
sources from three different international
organizations will speed the elimination of child
labor. CGAP assumed that developing
guidelines for financial sustainability of microfi-
nance institutions would help build financial
systems that work for the poor. Yet CGAP’s
partners do not even agree on whether an
impact assessment of the ultimate beneficiaries
is needed (box 4.4).10
It is admittedly more difficult to assess the
ultimate impacts of technical assistance of a
policy or strategic nature that is upstream of
project preparation and investments. However,
PPIAF has demonstrated that it is possible to
systematically assess outcomes. PPIAF appears to
have the most advanced monitoring processes
among the technical assistance programs, which
includes the involvement of the members of its
Technical Advisory Panel in ex post, on-site
reviews of a range of its activities.11
Program efficacy is enhanced when
incentives to measure and deliver results are
embedded in the program design—for
example, through accountability to sharehold-
ers. The Prototype Carbon Fund has been
highly attentive to project design and measur-
ing results precisely because it has to provide
internationally certifiable results to its private
sector shareholders. Good design is also a
feature of GAVI, financed primarily by the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation. Incentive
structures can be complex, affecting the Bank
as well as partners and beneficiaries.
Methodological Challenges
Impact measurement needs more methodolog-
ical and empirical attention. In the health
sector, for example, the impacts of TDR
research have been thoroughly assessed and
found to be enormous, even if they have not
been quantitatively measured (box 4.5).
Although this makes comparisons of ex ante
benefits across programs difficult, leading
programs such as the CGIAR to claim a large
share of DGF resources, to obtain a fair share
of the resources, all program appraisals should
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The U.S. Microenterprise for Self-Reliance Act of 2000 made
available $310 million over a two-year period for grants to mi-
crofinance institutions. The 2002 reauthorization of the Act al-
locates an additional $176 million for FY03 and stipulates that
USAID, in consultation with microfinance institutions and other
organizations, should develop and certify at least two methods
for measuring the poverty levels of microfinance clients served
by microfinance institutions that receive USAID grants. These
methods are meant to ensure that at least 50 percent of USAID
microenterprise assistance is set aside for the “very poor,” de-
fined as those who either live on less than $1 a day or who are
in the bottom half of those below a country’s poverty line.
Prior to the reauthorization, an Internet-based forum for mi-
crofinance professionals (the Microfinance Gateway) hosted a
virtual discussion. The goal was to “better inform [the microfi-
nance community] on ground-level realities and thus enable
us to take well-reasoned positions to promote a financial sec-
tor that serves the needs of the poor.” 
Six members of the CGAP Executive Committee, represent-
ing the partners, participated and offered their views on the
subject. Five voiced opposition to the required outreach verifi-
cation, saying it would “stifle [microfinance institution] freedom
and growth,” “increase compliance costs, deter investments,”
and result in “formulaic restrictions (to) choke private sector in-
centives to serve the poor.” 
The remaining discussant noted that this is not regulation,
but rather an investment target for subsidies paid for by U.S. tax-
payers and added, “Is there a cost to getting to know your
clients? Yes. Is investing in that knowledge bad for business?
Absolutely not! . . . That’s the nature of the market for sourcing
funds (both publicly and privately). If you need a subsidy and can
provide some informed analysis about the wealth of your clients,
go to USAID. If you don’t feel knowing the wealth of your clients
is worth the effort, go somewhere else.”
P a r t n e r s  i n  P o v e r t y - F o c u s e d  C G A P  
D i s a g r e e  o n  N e e d  t o  V e r i f y  P r o g r a m  
I m p a c t  o n  t h e  P o o r
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try to systematically assess expected benefits.
Counterfactuals to assess outcomes and
impacts are not explored enough in evalua-
tions. Most CGIAR impact studies of its produc-
tivity-enhancement research have researched
the counterfactual of what would have
happened to agricultural productivity had
there been no CGIAR research. They have
explored less well whether productivity growth
would occur without investments in national
agricultural research systems (Gardner 2003).
OED’s meta-evaluation of the CGIAR explored
this issue more fully by contrasting the CGIAR
impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa with those in
Brazil and India (Eicher and Rukuni 2003;
Macedo and others 2003; Katyal and Mruthyun-
jaya 2003).
Measuring results is a challenge in some of
GEF’s focal areas, such as biodiversity conser-
vation (also being addressed by CEPF).12
Methodological challenges in assessing
biodiversity loss loom large, because both the
sources and the beneficiaries of loss tend to be
external to the protected area. Baselines and
outcomes require sophisticated assessment,
involving several levels of aggregation, to
demonstrate impact. 
GEF and its implementing agencies, includ-
ing the Bank, are under increasing pressure
from donors to develop outcome and impact
indicators for biodiversity conservation.
Questions being posed are: Is GEF developing
better models for biodiversity conservation
than are developing countries? Is GEF funding
increasing the quantity or quality of global
investments in biodiversity conservation and
achieving significant global-level impacts? Are
implementing agencies monitoring and
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CGIAR: Expenditures of $395 million in 2003; TDR: Expenditures
of $47.5 million in 2003.
CGIAR impact studies suggest that an investment of $150 million
a year in germplasm improvement generates more than $1 bil-
lion yearly in output that is attributable to the CGIAR. OED con-
cluded that the social rates of return to investment in improved
cereal crop varieties derived from CGIAR centers are very large.
This research has had huge poverty-reducing impacts through
an increased and more secure food supply, increased employ-
ment, reduced prices, and environmental impacts through more
diversified and efficient land use. Having now trained nearly
50,000 agricultural scientists in developing countries (a third of
the total), CGIAR has played a key role in the development of the
scientific capabilities of developing countries’ agricultural sys-
tems. CGIAR’s work on environmental protection—countering
global warming, fostering biodiversity, and improving policies
through social science research—is more recent, and assess-
ment of its impacts, even quantification of the baseline situation,
is often very difficult. Uncertainty of returns to these new ac-
tivities would be acceptable if the expanded agenda were cost-
less, but not if it diverts resources from activities with higher
expected returns.
TDR’s evaluations, while not estimating rates of return, have
identified three known impacts on diseases of the poor: (a) de-
velopment of new tools, (b) product development, and (c) strength-
ening of developing-country research capacity. TDR has con-
tributed to the use of Ivermectin for the treatment of
onchocerciasis, to multidrug therapy for leprosy, and to the use
of fumigant canisters for the vector control of Chagas disease.
TDR’s efforts have fostered the development of candidate vaccines
for malaria, leishmaniasis, and schistosomiasis. As the fourth-
largest financer of malaria research, TDR has had 85 percent of
its papers cited at least once—the highest number of acknowl-
edgments per million dollars invested. TDR provides unique ac-
cess to an international network of experts and institutions for
increased collaboration in large-scale field trials and product de-
velopment through increased networking between researchers
in the industrial and developing world. It has strengthened de-
veloping-country research capacity through the training of in-
dividual scientists, the establishment of independent research
units, the transfer of technology and methods to research groups
in developing countries, and its wider contributions to disease
control. However, its funding has declined in real terms over the
past decade and has become more restricted, while the program’s
research mandate has expanded (from 8 tropical diseases to 10)
and expectations have grown. The greatest pressures facing
TDR are the unavailability of untied resources, the growing trend
of public-private partnerships, and donor pressure to deliver re-
sults on a short schedule.
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evaluating project performance to know if
global outcomes are being achieved?13 GEF has
begun to address these evaluation challenges
jointly with the Bank. The task of aggregating
outcome data to demonstrate global impacts
remains.14 GEF and its implementing agencies
need to invest the kind of intellectual capital in
global impact assessments of the GEF portfolio
that the CGIAR partnership initiated, soon after
its formation, on germplasm impacts.
Evaluation Processes: Independence of
Program-Level Evaluations
Ideally, both evaluation and audit should be
functions of a program’s governing body, not
its managers. They should be commissioned
and managed by the governing body as an
input into improving the program’s objectives,
strategy, design, and implementation. At initial
stages, until the program is well established
and the governing body has developed the
capacity to do so, the founders, co-sponsors,
lead donors, and financiers often manage the
first generation of evaluations.
Evaluation documents do not always
indicate who commissioned and managed the
evaluation, who financed it, how much it cost,
how the external evaluation team was selected,
to whom the evaluation team reported, or how
the initial drafts were reviewed. All these
aspects influence the independence of the
evaluations. When external evaluations are
managed by program secretariats and do not
report to the board chairs, independence and
coverage of issues is compromised. 
Evaluations tend to be relatively strong on
process and weak on the substantive issues
relating to program objectives, strategies,
allocation of resources, the program’s compar-
ative advantage, and implications for develop-
ment impact.15 Given the breadth and
complexity of coverage in most evaluations, the
evaluation teams need
the triple complement
of technical expertise,
knowledge of develop-
ment, and knowledge of
how donor agencies
function and partner.
When such a combination is lacking, evaluation
findings tend to focus on the team’s area of
expertise.
OED has concluded that that 5 of the 20
recent program-level evaluations were highly
independent of management. The health
sector global programs have had the strongest
tradition of independent external evaluations.
UNAIDS, the largest of the six health programs,
established a donor-appointed secretariat to
manage its recent evaluation.
Whether independent or not, recent
external evaluations have had significant
influence on programs in helping to improve
objectives, strategy, focus, governance, and
management arrangements. An important
evaluative issue highlighted in the UNAIDS
evaluation is to determine what constitutes a
“program.” Is it simply the activities of the
secretariat or the activities of the key partners
in the areas related to the program? The
independent external evaluation of RBM in
2002 was perhaps one of the strongest in
identifying the realism of goals and objectives;
clarity in the responsibilities of the partners;
and progress in achieving country-level buy-in,
political mobilization, and quality of technical
advice. The RBM program has been restruc-
tured substantially on the basis of the 2002
evaluation. Yet, as in several other programs,
there is more agreement on what strategy to
follow than on how to apply the instruments
that RBM promotes.
Overall Assessment of Monitoring and
Evaluation
Figure 4.1 summarizes OED’s ratings of the
monitoring and evaluation activities of the case
study programs. Overall, fewer than a third of
the programs have clear objectives, systematic
and regular processes of data collection, and
management and systems for feedback on
control systems, finances, and strategic focus.
An additional third could be rated as substan-
tial on these scores.
Variations in the programs’ age, size,
objectives, scope, design, financing, and
implementation make it difficult to compare
outcomes and impacts across programs.
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Ideally, both evaluation
and audit should be
functions of a program’s
governing body, not its
managers.
However, it is easy to determine which
programs are being managed for results, once
the objectives and desired results are clear and
measures for evaluating them are in place.
Links Between Global Programs and
Country Operations
As the preceding discussion indicates, value
added on the ground in client countries is
generally a joint product of global and country-
level activities, but the desired nature of these
links varies greatly according to the objectives,
design, and implementation of the programs.
As reported in OED’s Phase 1 report, the
Bank’s operational task managers viewed
enhancing the effectiveness of the Bank’s
country operations as potentially the most
important value global programs can add to the
Bank and its clients.
For the purpose of assessing the strength
and value of global-country links, OED classi-
fied the 26 programs into three categories: (1)
research programs, (2) programs for which the
Bank is an implementing agency, and (3)
programs for which the Bank is not an
implementing agency (table 4.2).
Links are important in both directions. First,
countries can add value to global programs,
particularly for the technical assistance,
advocacy, and capacity building programs that
do not provide financing for investments. They
can do this by identifying their constraints,
needs, and priorities, thereby increasing
relevance, focus, ownership, and impacts.
Second, global programs can bring globally
improved technologies and global best
practices to the Bank’s country operations and
to the countries’ own activities. They can also
help mobilize additional investment resources. 
Research Programs
While research programs do not require links
to the Bank’s country operations to achieve
their objectives, complementary investments
by the Bank and other donors in developing
countries increase the programs’ impacts. In
the case of CGIAR, the Bank used its convening
power well to mobilize substantial resources
at the global level to establish a large global
network of agricultural research centers with a
clear poverty focus, and invested substantially
at the national level to build developing-
country capacity. CGIAR’s capacity building
activities have also strengthened national
systems and increased the productivity of both
the Bank’s and the countries’ own investments,
leading to substantial and well-documented
poverty-reducing impacts. 
S T R I V I N G  F O R  R E S U LT S :  A S S E S S I N G  T H E  O U T C O M E S  A N D  I M PA C T S  O F  G L O B A L  P R O G R A M S
4 1
O v e r a l l  O E D  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  M o n i t o r i n g  
a n d  E v a l u a t i o n
F i g u r e  4 . 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Clear and coherent program
objectives and strategies
Systematic and regular processes
for data collection and management
A structured set of quantitative or
qualitative indicators
Independence of program-level
evaluations
Effective feedback on strategic
focus of program
Effective feedback on organization,
management, financing
Percentage of case study programs
High Substantial Modest Negligible Too early to rate Not yet evaluated  
Bank leadership is crucial to mobilize
funding for health research, surveillance, and
epidemiology, areas in which investments are
low at both the global and the country levels.
In part because of the efforts of the Global
Forum, policymakers and donors are said to be
more aware of the 10/90 gap in health research
(only 10 percent of the world’s funding for
health research has been estimated to be
devoted to the conditions responsible for 90
percent of the global disease burden).16 Public-
private partnerships have added about $200
million of health research for the development
of drugs and vaccines over a 10-year period. A
large share comes from the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, and some from pharmaceu-
tical companies. Health experts stress that
health-related MDGs cannot be realized
without substantial, long-term, and predictable
funding for research on the health problems of
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Number of OED rating of current 
Classification programs Programs extent of country linkages
Research programs that do not require links to the Bank’s country 5 CGIARa Not applicable
operations to achieve their objectives, but for which complementary TDRa 
investments by the Bank in developing countries would increase Global Forum
the effectiveness of the programs. UCW
GDN
Programs for which the Bank is an implementing agency. 11 GEFa,b High
The Bank’s operational staff are involved in the supervision or ESMAPb High
implementation of program activities. PPIAFb High
MLFa,b Substantial
ProCarbFunda,b Substantial
Cities Allianceb Substantial
PostConFunda Substantial
IFa Modest, but improving
infoDevb Modest
FSAP Too early to rate
FIRSTb Too early to rate
Programs for which the Bank is not an implementing agency. 10 UNAIDSb Substantial
The Bank’s operational staff are not involved in supervision or WSPb Substantial
implementation of program activities. RBM Modest-substantial
The Stop TB 
Partnership Modest-substantial
CEPFa Modest
GWP Modest
GIF Modest
GAVIa,b Modest
CGAPa Modest
World Links Modest
a. The program finances investments in developing countries (table 2.2).
b. The program provides resources that supplement the Bank’s administrative budget (table 2.6)
T h e  B a n k  H a s  D i f f i c u l t y  L i n k i n g  G l o b a l
P r o g r a m s  w i t h  C o u n t r y  O p e r a t i o n s  W h e r e
B a n k  S t a f f  A r e  N o t  I m p l e m e n t i n g  G l o b a l
P r o g r a m  A c t i v i t i e s
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the poor. Most experts consulted by OED
considered the annual allocation of $3 billion
that the Report of the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health (WHO 2001)
recommended in support of health research to
be unachievable in the present climate, but
most nonetheless stressed the huge funding
gap and the need for more investments. 
The Bank has not used its considerable
convening power beyond the small level of
DGF resources devoted to TDR and the Global
Forum and occasional convening of stakehold-
ers to help establish a global health research
network. This will require working in partner-
ship with the Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion, WHO, UNICEF, and others, as the Bank
did so well in the past with the Rockefeller and
Ford Foundations. Partners suggested that, to
set an example to donors and governments,
the Bank should allocate between 2 and
5 percent of all health sector loans to clients to
build their national research capacity. 
Programs Where the Bank Is an 
Implementing Agency
In 11 cases, Bank operational staff—beyond the
secretariat staff of the programs that are located
in the Bank—are involved in the supervision or
implementation of program activities. For the
three programs—GEF, MLF, and the Prototype
Carbon Fund—that are financing country-level
investments to deliver global public goods, the
programs bring substantial additional invest-
ment resources beyond what the Bank can offer.
However, mainstreaming these environmental
programs in the Bank and its client countries
remains an issue.17 Their goals are not yet well
reflected in the PRSPs or the CASs of specific
countries, in part because country priorities are
not the same as global priorities. The countries
are nonetheless implementing these programs
successfully because funding for investments is
available.18
In the case of the Post-conflict Fund,
Regional operational staff supervise the
implementation by partners such as UNHCR,
UNICEF, national governments, and NGOs of
small-scale pilot reconstruction activities. More
than half of the Fund’s grants have been
awarded to eight of 
the most conflict-
affected areas.19 The
Post-conflict Fund’s
external evaluation
observed that in many
cases the watching
briefs and pilot-scale
grants established an
effective basis for
follow-on financing.
Nevertheless, the evaluation stressed the need
to (1) attract donor support, (2) become more
proactive about funding projects, (3) improve
implementation monitoring, and (4)
strengthen knowledge generation and manage-
ment. The PostConFund evaluation found that
on project outcomes, the Fund’s grants rated
similarly to the Bank’s 1990s norm. While Post-
conflict Fund grants have been designed to be
catalytic and support a larger international
response in post-conflict situations, a lack of
information about exactly how many individual
projects actually secured additional follow-on
financing makes it difficult to assess the
program’s overall impact.20
Among the technical assistance and capacity
building programs, ESMAP, PPIAF, and Cities
Alliance have developed synergy with the Bank’s
Regional operations. ESMAP requires the Bank’s
Regional operational team to contribute from 10
to 25 percent of the cost of country-level activi-
ties in order to ensure that the results are
integrated into the country program and/or
dialogue. PPIAF requires both the Bank’s country
director and the recipient government to sign off
on all funding proposals to ensure alignment
with the priorities of both the Bank and the client
country. The Cities Alliance requires each
funding request to be
sponsored by at least
one Cities Alliance
member, with sign-off by
the recipient country.
The program gives
priority to proposals
with clearly documented
links to follow-up invest-
ments in urban areas,
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Bank leadership is crucial
to mobilize funding for
health research,
surveillance, and
epidemiology, areas in
which investments are
low at both the global
and the country levels.
Health-related MDGs
cannot be realized
without substantial, long-
term, and predictable
funding for research on
the health problems of the
poor.
including the identifica-
tion of the expected
investment partners.21
An issue for these
programs is what value
they add for the Bank
and its clients beyond
the resources to finance
technical assistance—
which, in principle, could
be financed from the
Bank’s administrative
budget or lending as part
of its regular country
operations. The pro-grams do not finance project
preparation activities. ESMAP, for instance, rations
its support to upstream (ex ante) activities where
there is a potential for policy formulation and
strategy development, or to downstream (ex
post) evaluation and dissemination of emerging
best practice. The programs claim to have
developed specialized expertise in their respec-
tive areas. According to the 2003 report of its
Technical Advisory Panel, PPIAF has established
itself as a niche player in private sector infrastruc-
ture participation through its ability to identify,
disseminate, and customize emerging global
good practices to country-specific situations.
infoDev, however, has had weak links to the
Bank’s country operations and little impact at the
country level beyond the direct beneficiaries,
even though it is dominated by the Bank.22
A second issue for these programs is
unclear responsibility for the quality 
of technical assistance and unclear accounta-
bility for performance.
During OED field
visits, developing-
country representa-
tives spoke of growing
confusion and frustra-
tion in the eyes of the
Bank’s clients in differ-
entiating among global
program activities,
Bank activities, and
Bank borrower activi-
ties, particularly for
programs that are
housed in the Bank. International consult-
ants working for in-house programs, who
have Bank contracts, typically say that they
are working for the World Bank, often expect
the Bank’s country offices to line up appoint-
ments for them, and write reports with the
World Bank’s logo on them. This blurring of
the line between the Bank and its partners,
and between Bank activities and global-
program activities, entails potential liabilities
and reputational risks for the Bank.23 There
is also the risk of the Bank’s technical
assistance being driven by what donors want
to finance. 
Programs for which the Bank Is Not an
Implementing Agency
The links between externally implemented
global programs and the Bank’s Regional
operations tend to be weaker than for programs
either housed in the Bank or managed by the
Bank. This is natural. Among the externally
housed and externally managed programs,
however, links have been stronger for some
programs, such as UNAIDS, than for others,
demonstrating the scope for bringing external
know-how and approaches into the Bank. 
Although causality between advocacy and
responses is difficult to establish, consistent
with the UNAIDS advocacy, new commitments
to HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases
have grown by an average of 8.18 percent a year
since 1990 (figure 4.2). The Stop TB Partner-
ship has made important contributions in
developing a global network of professionals,
bringing technical information and (through
the Global Drug Facility) improved access to
drugs at reduced prices, providing 1.9 million
patient treatments to date, and influencing
Bank lending to specific countries. Overall
lending for communicable diseases increased
by 7.5 percent annually. Links on TB have been
strong in some area, particularly China, India,
and Eastern Europe, but countries could not
distinguish the activities of WHO from those of
the Stop TB Partnership. Since malaria control
requires diverse and multisectoral approaches,
links are strong in some African countries, with
respect to the import and subsidization of bed
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What value do these
programs add for the
Bank and its clients
beyond the resources to
finance technical
assistance—which, in
principle, could be
financed as part of the
Bank’s regular country
operations?
Developing-country
representatives spoke of
growing confusion and
frustration in
differentiating among
global program activities,
Bank activities, and Bank
borrower activities,
particularly for programs
that are housed in the Bank.
nets, but weak in others, such as China and
India. Overall Bank lending to the health sector
has fluctuated around $1.4 billion and places
considerable pressure on health system capaci-
ties, because resources are increasingly being
directed to deal with communicable diseases.24
Although a clear link to the Bank’s country
work is a criterion for approving new global
programs, neither the networks nor the DGF
demand that task managers of global programs
provide evidence that global programs have
added value to country and Bank operations.
OED conducted its own investigations and
found a mixed record. Even in those cases
where the programs have had impacts, OED
found little documented and reported
evidence of effective links to Bank country
operations. OED has concluded that the Bank
is not exploiting its unique multisectoral
comparative advantage at the country level. 
Previous OED reviews have stressed the
importance of the Bank’s developing an arm’s-
length relationship with global programs to
ensure their clear
independence, account-
abilities, and responsi-
bilities. Therefore, the
findings in this section
present a challenge. To
bring new knowledge
and technologies to the Bank, programs need
independence from the Bank. Yet externally
implemented programs are as yet only weakly
linked to the Bank.
Conclusions
Although most programs invoke a poverty
focus, only a few have demonstrated impacts on
poverty reduction or on loosening the policy,
institutional, or technological constraints that
developing countries face. Several have the
potential to add value to the poverty-reduction
objective. In general, programs financing invest-
ments have more demonstrable impacts than
other programs. The Bank’s current tracking
system is inadequate for the strategic manage-
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ment of its global
portfolio from the
perspectives of its
ultimate clients.
When programs do
not meet all the
requirements for effec-
tive evaluation—evalu-
able objectives, measur-
able indicators, and
evaluable evidence—and do not have appropri-
ate strategies, governance, or management,
their global impacts remain unclear. CGIAR and
TDR, which finance global-level investments
for the benefit of the poor, have had strong
evaluation cultures and produced evidence of
high returns. But there remain huge invest-
ment gaps in agriculture and health research,
both at the global level and in complementary
investments at the country level.
Some of the programs that finance country-
level investments to produce global public
goods have achieved major global impacts. In
the case of the MLF, Bank management reports
that it has helped to reduce 85 percent of the
ozone-depleting substances globally by using
only 45 percent of the program’s resources.
Measuring results is a bigger challenge in some
of GEF’s focal areas, such as biodiversity
conservation. 
The programs that finance country-level
investments to achieve national public goods,
such as the Post-conflict Fund and GAVI, have
had quite different impacts. The Post-conflict
Fund’s impacts have been small and difficult to
document. GAVI and the Vaccine Fund together
have brought more than $1 billion to 69
countries, with a vast increase in immunization
coverage, but they pose issues of long-term
financial sustainability. By working actively with
the Bank, GAVI and the Vaccine Fund address
health system financing capacity and reforms. 
The programs that finance country-level
technical assistance to stimulate public and
private investments in their respective sectors
provide examples of evolving or unshared
objectives and raise subsidiarity issues. Impacts
beyond the studies conducted, reports
published, or individuals trained are lacking.
But monitoring and evaluation is improving as
programs put in place results-based manage-
ment and evaluation systems. IF places greater
emphasis on the internal policy and institu-
tional constraints to expanded trade than on
external barriers in industrialized countries, and
it expects countries to seek investment funds
from donors through the PRSP process to
finance internal infrastructure improvements.
The impacts of advocacy programs that
promote common approaches to mitigating
communicable diseases are difficult to attribute
to the programs. While they have certainly
persuaded donors to increase investments in
research, prevention, and treatment of these
communicable diseases and contributed to
increased information and knowledge, they
require concrete country-level strategies and
strong links with Bank operations, as well as more
and longer-term investments in developing-
country health system capacity.
The principal outcomes of the programs
that promote approaches and standards to
addressing issues of global concern at the
country level are enhanced institutional and
human-resource capacity with respect to
microfinance, integrated pest management,
water resources management, and child-labor
institutions. Programs face changing or unclear
objectives, insufficient Bank or country involve-
ment, and lack of evidence of impacts on the
intermediaries (such as donors, governments,
and community organizations) or the ultimate
beneficiaries (such as the poor in developing
countries). 
Programs to increase capacity to utilize
information and communications technologies
and to conduct socioeconomic research in
developing countries have not yet
demonstrated impacts beyond the direct
beneficiaries of the programs’ activities. The
programs also raise issues concerning their
objectives and strategies, the efficiency and
scalability of their activities, their links to
country operations (in the case of infoDev),
and their exit strategies (in the cases of World
Links and GDN).
Overall, programs are usually better coordi-
nated at the global level than at the country level.
4 6
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
The Bank’s current
tracking system is
inadequate for the
strategic management of
its global portfolio from
the perspectives of its
ultimate clients. 
Indicators of this include weak links to the Bank’s
country operations and lack of synergy with Bank
country operations in areas where there are
similar activities. A problem for the Bank’s
Regions and its client countries is that there are
too many global programs involving too many
priorities relative to the capacity of many develop-
ing countries and that
most of these priorities
are not based on analysis
of what is needed to
address the most binding
constraints to sustain-
able, poverty-reducing growth.
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Programs are usually
better coordinated at the
global level than at the
country level.
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Activities Programs Beneficiaries
Financing global-level investments to deliver CGIAR Agricultural research systems and poor households in 
global public goods developing countries, donors
TDR Health research systems and poor households in developing 
countries
Financing country-level investments to deliver GEF Global community, environmental institutions, environmental 
global public goods ministries in developing countries, households in developing 
countries
MLF
Prototype Carbon Fund
CEPF
Financing country-level investments to deliver Post-conflict Fund Conflict-affected countries
national public goods
GAVI Health institutions and children in developing countries 
needing immunization
Financing country-level TA to stimulate public WSP, ESMAP, PPIAF, Water and sanitation, energy, other infrastructure, urban, and 
or private investments in the sector Cities Alliance, IF their staff in developing countries
Promoting common approaches to mitigating UNAIDS Health sector institutions and households with communicable 
communicable diseases diseases in the Bank’s client countries
RBM
Stop TB
Global Forum Health research institutions and poor households in 
developing countries
Promoting approaches and standards to CGAP Donors, microfinance institutions, poor households 
addressing global concerns at the country level GIF Agricultural and water resource institutions, farmers, 
other water users
GWP
UCW Child labor institutions
P r o g r a m s  F i n a n c i n g  I n v e s t m e n t s  H a v e  M o r e  
K n o w n  B e n e f i t s  t o  D e v e l o p i n g  C o u n t r i e s  
T a b l e  4 . 3
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Known outcomes and impacts
Increased Bank access to international science and improved donor coordination. Developed a global research system and network. High returns 
to germplasm research. Positive impacts on reducing food prices, food productivity, employment, and incomes. Unknown impacts of policy and 
social science research and research on management of natural resources.
Notable success in mobilizing global science to conduct research and development on the underresearched, neglected tropical diseases.
Reduced ozone-depleting substances (ODS) in transition countries. Some success in promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy, improving 
management of standards for protected areas (to conserve biodiversity), promoting and implementing agreements on fresh water and marine 
ecosystems. Too early to assess results in areas of land degradation. Uncertain sustainability of global environment impacts. 
Expended $1.48 billion to support 4,300 projects in 134 developing countries, which phased out consumption of 74% and production 
of 85% of ODS tons. Funded ozone offices in 129 developing countries, leading to institutional capacity. Qualitative indicators are 
weak but evolving. 
Mobilized new resources to catalyze the market for project-based greenhouse-gas emission reductions, building institutional capacity in host 
countries. Increased knowledge on ER transactions, but grants are too small to exert a large change in greenhouse-gas concentrations.
Small grants focused on “hot spots” are raising awareness of conservation and resulting in positive conservation outcomes in these areas, but 
the cumulative impact of relatively small grants on ultimate conservation of the ecoregion is uncertain. 
Small-scale reconstruction activities in conflict-affected countries. Support for innovative work and some activities have established effective
ground for follow-on projects, but most grants are too small and have few and uncertain (documented) impacts.
Benefits totaling more than $1 billion to immunize children and families in 69 countries. 35.5 million children vaccinated against hepatitis B; 6 
million against Haemophilus influenzae type b; 2.7 million against yellow fever; and an additional 8 million have access to basic vaccines. 
Assistance to develop immunization system delivery capacity. Support for global health research for new vaccines and technologies. 
Diagnostic, policy, and strategic studies. Sector reforms, laws, regulations, and institutions, privatizations and concessions. Increased institu-
tional and human resource capacity. Few and uncertain (documented) impacts. 
Increased strategic information, technologies, and tools, and some formation of multisectoral strategies. Increased capacity of local authorities 
and NGOs through funding for training, policy planning, technical support, and institutional development. Helped develop national strategic AIDS 
plans. Unclear prevention success because of attributional difficulty.
Providing political and technical support. Provision of insecticide-treated nets, Intermittent Prevention Treatment and therapy. Some success in 
advocacy, resource mobilization, and consensus building, but slow progress in achieving objectives and making an impact.
Built and sustained a network of partners, heightened political support. Supported work on diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines and made opera-
tional the Green Light Committee for second-line drugs and the Global Drug Facility for technical aid for first-line drugs, but sustainable impacts 
will depend on adequate funding. 
Networking and development of analytical tools for research and international advocacy, but its resources are insufficient to meet the ambitious 
objective of helping close the 10/90 gap.
Modest donor coordination. Development of materials on best practices in the microfinance sector. Uncertain benefits and impacts. 
Improved country-level donor coordination. Advocate for IPM. Helped shape international norms for IPM and pesticides. Improved application of 
Bank safeguard 4.09, Guidebook, and pest management plans. Increased institutional and human resource capacity. Insufficient evidence of long-
term impacts on farmers. 
Established/strengthened partnerships (25 country-specific, 45 area, and 11 regional). Unclear policy linkages, financial sustainability, and 
impacts on IWRM.
Country studies generating some interest among policymakers. Increased donor coordination. Unclear impact of studies on operational strategies 
to benefit children.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Activities Programs Beneficiaries
Building capacity at the country level infoDev Public and private organizations and their staff
World Links Secondary students, teachers, and education policymakers
GDN Developing country researchers and policymakers
FSAP, FIRST Financial institutions, donors
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Known outcomes and impacts
Increased advocacy and capacity to utilize ICTs and to conduct socioeconomic research, but no demonstrated impact.
Increased student and teacher IT skills and interests and created networks, but unclear impact on capacity building.
Grants for high-quality, policy-relevant research and networking to develop capacity of researchers and institutions, but no evidence of applica-
tion in policymaking.
New laws, regulations, and regulatory institutions. Making standards more operational and relevant, improving analytical tools, and donor 
coordination. While addressing fragilities of financial systems, uncertain impacts on averting financial crises.
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Governance, 
Management, Partnerships,
and Participation
The governance of global partnerships is evolving and often ambiguous.The reviewed global partnerships do not clearly define who is a part-ner and who is a participant, and which ones have moved from share-
holder- to stakeholder-style governance in the face of external challenges. Some
have established executive committees to help with governance. The roles,
responsibilities, and accountabilities of governors and managers tend to be
weakly defined. The roles of the scientific and advisory committees are weak
in several programs. Involving developing countries in program governance
increases program relevance, ownership, and effectiveness, but facilitating their
involvement remains a challenge. Their role too often seems ceremonial, to
ensure legitimacy without addressing their concerns.
The Bank lacks an institutional strategy for
partnering with developing countries or
NGOs or for engaging in public-private
partnerships. Donors and international
agencies still largely govern the programs.
Because they often enjoy permanent member-
ship on the boards, donors and agencies are
also primarily responsible for tracking
program performance. This has raised issues
of ownership and accountability in several
programs.
Governance Functions, Principles, 
and Models
Governance can be defined as the structures,
functions, processes, and organizational
traditions that a board or other decisionmaking
body uses to ensure that the mission of an
organization or program is accomplished.
Governance determines how power is
exercised, how decisions are made, how
stakeholders are included, and how decision-
makers are held accountable (DGF 2001).
Governance can also be viewed as the set of
rules and procedures that enable an organiza-
tion to meet its objectives (Simpson 2002).
Five core functions of governance are:
• Strategic direction, usually exercised by the
governing body
• Oversight of the unit responsible for day-to-day
program management 
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• Consultation with other stakeholders, both
formal and informal; one common formal
method is through a technical, scientific, or pro-
fessional advisory body
• Risk management, including reputational risks,
fiduciary risks, conflict-of-interest risks, unfair-
advantage risks, governance risks, and non-
performance risks
• Evaluation and audit, which is often the least-
developed governance function in many global
programs.
The diversity of governance models makes
assessing the effective
conduct of core
governance functions a
challenge. How gover-
nance is practiced is
rarely understood by
simply looking at organi-
zational charts. Personalities, the quality of
relationships, and path-dependence all matter.
There is no established, empirically tested
method for evaluating global program
governance. As summarized in table 2.3, the 26
programs have 9 different models of governance
and management. The programs have adopted
their particular governance models for reasons
of history and of culture (box 5.1). Eight of the
programs have delegated some governance
functions to an executive body that meets more
often than the governing body.
To assess governance outcomes, OED has
adapted a set of four corporate governance
principles developed by the OECD’s Business
Sector Advisory Group:1
• Clear roles and responsibilities—of the officers
and bodies that govern and manage the pro-
gram and of the mechanisms to modify and
amend the governance
and management of the
program.
• Transparency—the pro-
gram provides both share-
holders and stakeholders
with the information they
need (such as decision-
making responsibilities;
accountabilities; and processes, accounting, 
audit, and material non-financial issues).
• Fairness—the program does not favor some
immediate clients over others (such as Bank
staff, participating agencies, or program sec-
retariats, specific countries or their agencies,
municipal agencies, local authorities, private
service providers, NGOs, or community or-
ganizations).
• Clear accountability—for the exercise of
power over resources to the program’s stake-
holders, including international organizations,
donors, developing countries, the private sec-
tor, and NGOs.
It is difficult to determine who is a partner
and who is a participant. The effectiveness of
a partnership is a function of how clearly the
partnership is defined at each level and how
clearly the responsibilities and accountabilities
are defined for each partner at each level and
within their own organizations. But as noted in
the Phase 1 report, it is often hard to determine
who is a partner, who is a participant, and who
exercises, or is believed to exercise, real
influence (box 5.2) (World Bank 2002c). The
review of the case study programs underlines
this confusion. Global programs generally take
a broad view of partnerships, and the actual
influence of different partners on program
direction is not always visible from a cursory
view of the program organization. These
partners encompass:
• The programmatic partners who are collec-
tively responsible for the program, including
the formal and informal co-sponsors, the fi-
nancial contributors, and others involved in
program governance 
• The members of the organization
• Other program partners at the global level
• Financial partners not involved in governance
• Institutional partners, who are not program
partners, with whom the program conducts
joint or parallel activities at the global level
• Client countries
• Implementing partners of all types, including
other international organizations, government
agencies, and local NGOs.
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There is no established,
empirically tested method
for evaluating global
program governance.
It is often hard to
determine who is a
partner, who is a
participant, and who
exercises, or is believed to
exercise, real influence.
Governance styles are evolving from shareholder to
stakeholder models. Effective governance
requires both efficiency in the allocation of
resources and legitimacy in the exercise of
authority. Both theory and practice support the
view that a shareholder model of corporate
governance promotes efficiency and that a
stakeholder model, while increasing legitimacy,
may face collective action problems when the
number of participants is large and the cost of
organizing diverse interests to pursue a
common goal is high relative to the expected
benefit (box 5.3). Despite efficiency concerns,
stakeholder models are increasingly being
G O V E R N A N C E ,  M A N A G E M E N T,  PA R T N E R S H I P S ,  A N D  PA R T I C I PAT I O N
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Through complex negotiations, GEF developed an independent,
transparent, and equitably representative governing structure that
involved industrial and developing countries, while pioneering
procedures for a global financing mechanism for the environment.
But the structure has design weaknesses. GEF evaluations have
consistently noted the weak role of the Scientific and Technical
Advisory Panel in strategy and investment operations, and the GEF
Secretariat’s unclear role and responsibility relative to the im-
plementing agencies in accountability for global public goods
outcomes. GEF’s transformation from a pilot program to a re-
structured funding mechanism involved extensive negotiations.
The Bank wanted the funds to be additional to IDA; industrial
countries desired that GEF be housed in the Bank with the Bank
as the trustee; and NGOs, U.N. agencies, and developing coun-
tries sought GEF’s independence from the Bank and greater voice
for developing countries. All got some of what they wanted. 
The Bank is the trustee for GEF funds provided by donors
through periodic replenishments. GEF’s Council, composed of
14 industrial, 16 developing, and 2 transition countries, is re-
sponsible for policy, programming, strategies, oversight, and
allocation of GEF funds among the focal areas. The evalua-
tion function now reports to the Council. GEF is supported by
a secretariat housed in the Bank, three main implementing
agencies (the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP), and the Scien-
tific and Technical Advisory Panel. Other executing agencies
include regional development banks and other U.N. agen-
cies. NGOs have observer status at Council meetings, and they
and the private sector participate in the implementation of
GEF-funded programs designed, appraised, and overseen by
each of the three main implementing agencies (who compete
for a share of GEF business). GEF is a financial mechanism for
the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, the U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, the Stockholm Con-
vention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the U.N. Convention
on Desertification, and supporting activities under the Ozone
Protocol, a number of International Waters Conventions, and
the conventions on POPs and desertification. As the number
and roles of the executing agencies have expanded, compe-
tition has increased. 
The CGIAR has prided itself on its informal organizational
structure. Initially, its large pool of unrestricted funds addressed
focused objectives shared by a small number of like-minded
donors. But that informal organization has posed major collec-
tive-action challenges as the number of donors, members, and
research centers has expanded and the research agenda has
grown. Funding has recently declined and become more re-
stricted. The Bank has played a highly visible role as the founder
and the largest donor, with increased responsibility over time for
system-level management of the 15 international research cen-
ters, which are autonomous legal entities with their own gov-
erning boards. Although conceived as science-driven, in order
to mobilize donor resources the CGIAR is chaired by the Bank,
a financial institution with little internal scientific capacity. The
CGIAR Secretariat is housed in the Bank, and its director reports
to a World Bank vice president who chairs the system of 62
members, consisting of countries, international agencies, donors,
multilateral and regional banks, and private foundations. Fol-
lowing a major financial crisis, the influence of the Bank and the
donors in setting research priorities and allocating resources in-
creased relative to the once-powerful scientific advisory com-
mittee. Roles and responsibilities for system-level performance
became increasingly cumbersome and ambiguous among the
Bank, donors, centers, and the technical advisory committee.
CGIAR faces a changing external environment, scientifically,
socioeconomically, and environmentally. In response, in 2000 the
CGIAR launched an “evolutionary” change management process,
established an Executive Council to expedite decisionmaking be-
tween annual general meetings, founded a Science Council,
launched Challenge Programs to attract additional funding, and
established a system office. It is now drafting a charter to clar-
ify roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities for system-level
performance. The centers are consolidating their activities.
These reforms are encouraging, and funding has increased in re-
sponse, but it is too soon to know their effects.
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adopted to improve relevance, ownership,
fairness, and accountability (Etzioni 2001).
Most programs now include stakeholders
beyond the traditional donors on their govern-
ing or executive bodies (table 5.1). A major
change since CGIAR’s financial crisis in the mid-
1990s was the CGIAR chairman’s effort, during
and after the “renewal,” to increase the
membership and ownership of developing
countries. A major change in some of the trust
fund programs housed in the Bank, such as
ESMAP and WSP, which became “global”
programs after a financial crisis, was to give
increased voice to donors and legitimacy and
support to programs by establishing more
formal governing boards.
Six programs—the Post-conflict Fund, FSAP,
infoDev, PPIAF, FIRST, and UCW—have not
adopted the stakeholder model.2 Sixteen
programs now include developing countries on
their governing or executive bodies, 14 include
civil society organizations, and 5 include the
private sector. However, stakeholder and
shareholder influence is not always balanced.
Board membership does not translate into
equal voice and influence for all stakeholders.
By the same token, observer status can
sometimes accord considerable influence on
decisions to powerful stakeholders.
Fewer than a third rely on executive bodies for
conducting business. Eight of the programs have
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• Partnership: An agreement between two or more
parties to work together for a common purpose,
with the parties committing resources (financial,
technical, personnel, or reputational) to agreed ob-
jectives, to be implemented in accordance with
the terms of the agreement.
• Member: Those who in some sense “own” the pro-
gram and who have joint rights and responsibilities
for the program.
• Partner: Members who are entitled to participate in
the governance of the program, either directly or
through a representative governance structure.
• Participant: Intermediaries who help to implement
the program, generally at the country level, and
who are not partners or contributors to the core
program.
• Beneficiaries: The ultimate beneficiaries of the
program at the national or local level.
W h a t  A r e  P a r t n e r s h i p s ?  W h o  A r e
M e m b e r s  a n d  P a r t n e r s ?  
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In a shareholder model, membership on the governing
and executive bodies is limited to organizations that
sponsor or pay for the program—in the case of global
programs, typically international/regional organiza-
tions such as the United Nations and the World Bank,
bilateral donors, and private foundations. In the stake-
holder model, membership is extended to other groups,
such as developing countries, NGOs, and the private
sector, who are potentially affected by the program
and who therefore have a stake in its effective func-
tioning. This means involvement not just in imple-
menting program activities, but also in defining the
program’s strategic direction.
The Bank has moved toward a stakeholder
model—for example, in the country-owned Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers, by inviting broad stake-
holder participation in the formulation of PRSPs. The
Bank’s Board has also begun to give more attention
to the voice of developing and transition countries in
the international financial architecture, including
that of the international financial institutions. For ex-
ample, the Bank has given a more direct voice in IDA
replenishment consultations to IDA recipient coun-
tries, and worked with IDA executive directors and
their domestic constituencies to bring in recipient
perspectives.
S h a r e h o l d e r  a n d  S t a k e h o l d e r  
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had executive bodies that exercise some
governance functions in between the annual
meetings of the governing body (table H.12).
Some others were forming such committees in
response to external evaluations. In six of the
eight, this has been done to improve efficiency
and mitigate the collective action problems
spawned by growth. In four of these six cases—
GEF, MLF, Cities Alliance, and IF—the executive
body is a representative subset of the govern-
ing body, with each membership group having
representatives on the executive body. CGIAR’s
Executive Council includes a private sector and
an NGO member who are not contributing
members of the organization and do not
represent any body. CGAP’s Executive Commit-
tee of the Consultative Group of Member
Donors was restructured in 2003 to create a
nine-member Executive Committee, with four
members appointed by donor constituencies,
four members from the microfinance industry
appointed by a vote of the Council of
Governors, and a permanent World Bank seat.3
In two of the eight cases—CEPF and
FIRST—the programs have established
executive bodies specifically for accountability
reasons. Membership of the executive commit-
tee mirrors that of the governing body; all five
members of CEPF and all six members of FIRST
are represented on both bodies. The Bank’s
representatives on the governing bodies are at
a high level—the World Bank president and the
ESSD vice president in the case of CEPF, and a
managing director as a rotating chair in the case
of FIRST—and its representatives on the
executive bodies are lower-level operational
staff who report to the high-level representa-
tives on the governing body. There is an
assumption in both of these cases, with which
OED does not necessarily agree, that because
the Bank chairs these programs and because
the Bank has both developing and industrial
countries on its own Board, the views of
developing countries are being heard. 
The Post-conflict Fund is the only global
program reviewed that does not have any
partners (other than the World Bank) at the
governance level. While the Fund is in this
regard similar to some other Bank-managed
programs that are supported by multidonor
trust funds, the Bank classified it as a global
program in April 2000 because it receives DGF
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International/regional Plus Plus civil Plus developing Commercial 
organizations, developing society countries and private
bilateral donors, and countries organizations civil society sector 
Governance foundations only only onlyb organizations representatives
model Shareholder model Stakeholder model
Line management within the Bank PostConFund, FSAP
Secretariat inside the Bank infoDev, PPIAF GEF, WSP, ESMAP CGAP Cities Alliance ProCarbFund
Shared secretariat between Bank 
and external organization FIRST CGIARc
Secretariat inside external 
organization UCW TDR, IF CEPF, GIF Stop TB RBM, GAVI
Independent external entity MLF GDN GWP, Global Forum, World Links
UNAIDS
Number of programs 6 6 4 5 5
a. Not including observers on governing and executive bodies.
b. Broadly defined to include NGOs, umbrella organizations, professional and trade associations, and the like that are independent of the state or government and do not have a com-
mercial, for-profit motive.
c. The private sector is represented on the Executive Committee, but not on the Consultative Group.
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funding. While the Bank’s six approval criteria
for Bank involvement in partnership initiatives
beyond the country level call (by implication)
for a partnership in governance and financing,
the DGF eligibility criteria for grant support are
vague with regard to what constitutes a
“partnership”—only that the program and its
activities should promote and reinforce
partnerships. The Post-conflict Fund argues
that its partnerships at the activity level meet
the DGF criterion. The issue of the Bank’s
partnership at the global level related to
conflict is complex, however. While global
peace and security is a global public good, the
Bank has not classified peace and security as
one of its global public-goods priorities. To
complement the Bank’s current country-by-
country approach to conflict, U.N. partners
have suggested a global partnership program
to foster learning on the policy and operational
issues of moving from relief to reconstruction
and development, in the context of a long-term
collaboration between the Bank and U.N.
agencies. As far as this suggestion relates to the
Post-conflict Fund, management has made the
case that involving U.N. agencies in the
governance of the Fund would create a
potential conflict of interest, since U.N.
agencies are the largest recipients of PostCon-
Fund grants. 
Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities
Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities in
Program Governance and Management Tend to
Be Unclear, Resulting in Weak Program
Accountability for Results
A GEF example highlights how many factors can
affect accountability for outcomes. The Conven-
tion on Biodiversity, which was negotiated
between industrial and developing countries, is
one of GEF’s four focal areas. Yet it is ambiguous
on what biodiversity has global value, who should
determine it, and how it should be determined.
Thus definitions of the very things for which the
GEF would be held accountable are vague.
Organizational ambiguities compound the
problem. The chief executive officer reports to
the GEF Council, but the Council’s roles and
responsibilities for portfolio composition and
performance, as distinct from those of the
implementing agencies, are uncertain. It is
unclear whose responsibility it is to track and
monitor incremental progress; the program’s
external evaluations have commented on this.
Those evaluations mention the lack of informa-
tion on global outcomes and how implementing
agencies have been slow to incorporate GEF’s
global environmental concerns into their country
development strategies. Without such integra-
tion, the evaluations assert, GEF-funded activities
are less likely to produce sustainable outcomes or
impacts (GEF 1998, 2002). Yet it is equally unclear
if providing incremental costs for five to ten years
is enough to ensure sustainable conservation.
Who should ultimately be held accountable for
mainstreaming GEF’s global concerns into
national strategies—the GEF Secretariat, the
implementing agencies, or signatories to the
various conventions and treaties? How should
they be held accountable? Will doing so promote
GEF’s outcomes? These and other questions are
actively debated in the GEF community.
The managers of in-house programs that do
not have independent governance structures
report both to the program’s governing body
and to their managers within the housing
organization—a classic “two masters”
problem. There is often a lack of precision
concerning how accountable they are to each,
and for what, or how conflicts between the two
should be resolved.4 When a senior manager
of the housing organization also chairs the
governing body, as happens in most Bank-
housed programs, it creates the perception
that the housing organization stifles other
partners’ views and reduces the program’s
independence.
When governance is weak, secretariats and
housing organizations acquire considerable de
facto power. Evaluations of TDR, Roll Back
Malaria, and Stop TB, all housed in WHO, point
out the different strengths of the programs’
governance mechanisms and the correspond-
ingly different roles WHO plays relative to the
program secretariats and the governance
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boards. The WHO’s different roles are reflected
in varying outcomes. 
Several evaluations have observed that
global program boards do not use effective
business practices and lack enough support to
reasonably be held accountable. In the extreme
case when a partnership becomes dysfunc-
tional, board meetings are not held, agendas
are not discussed with members before they
are fixed, agendas are crowded, and board
members have unequal information and ability
to participate. Much can be done to profes-
sionalize the conduct, transparency, efficiency,
and accountability of board meetings and
board decisions. Internal audits of some of the
Bank’s in-house programs confirm that,
despite being founder, co-sponsor, donor, and
board member, the role of the Bank on the
boards of these programs has been variable on
ensuring fiduciary aspects of the programs.
Some external evaluations do not assess
board governance or the secretariats,5 and
those that do vary in their thoroughness.
Evaluations of UNAIDS, RBM, and Stop TB
have had significant effects on the programs,
both strategically and with respect to
governance and management.6 Evaluations of
IF, UCW, and Stop TB all stressed the need for
more businesslike conduct of board meetings
and the need for transparency and openness,
including agendas developed in consultation
with board members, specialized subcommit-
tees for specific issues, and timely issuance of
the minutes of board meetings.7 The agendas
tend to be crowded, the issues complex, the
relevant expertise of board members variable,
and the time for substantive discussion
limited. Complex substantive issues often get
set aside or glossed over.8 Sometimes board
members lack background or qualifications in
complex subject matter (such as legal issues
or an organization’s international status) or
have been insufficiently briefed on options to
help the board make complex organizational
decisions.9 Several boards have never
reviewed detailed budgets or work programs
or the determination of program managers’
salaries.
There are few
incentives for pro-
grams to devote time
to board functions. 
The time and resources
board members are
given tend to be
limited relative to the
magnitude of their
responsibility. The time
of Bank officials who
serve on boards is un-
or underbudgeted, and
their annual perform-
ance evaluations ignore their role in global
programs. 
Even when programs have an executive
body, its terms of reference and how its seats
should be filled are often left undefined. In
CGIAR’s case, it is not clear if the members of
its executive council represent their con-
stituents or themselves. The council’s function
remains ambiguous: does it make decisions or
just expedite de-cisions made at CGIAR’s
annual meetings?
Roles of Scientific/Technical Advisory
Committees Need Strengthening 
Many programs face analytical challenges.
Hence, scientific advisory committees are
supposed to help decide their strategies. Such
committees can protect the programs’ profes-
sional integrity and weigh the risks of alterna-
tive approaches. Most programs have such
advisory bodies in their formal governance
structures. Others have delegated this respon-
sibility to formal and informal working groups.
Technical bodies can bring cutting-edge
research and other knowledge from industrial
to developing countries. They can share best
practices on standards,
norms, and values for
conducting research or
applying results and can
establish peer review
processes. But the
quality of these advisory
bodies varies consider-
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ably among programs. The MLF’s decisionmak-
ing process has been underscored by regular
scientific and technical assessments. The
program relies on both a standing subsidiary
body, the Technical Economic Assessment
Panel (TEAP) housed in UNEP, and the Bank’s
Ozone Operations Resource Group (OORG) to
help it keep pace with the latest research and
development of alternative technologies.
Developing countries have relied on the result-
ing scientific assessments to formulate country
programs and their phase-out schedules. At the
same time, the gradual decline of CGIAR’s
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) in its
governance has gone hand-in-hand with the
decline of strategic research, the rise in
restricted funding, and the change to a
matching-grant formula for the allocation of
the Bank’s resources.10 These developments
have allowed donor preferences to decouple
resource allocation from TAC’s medium- and
longer-term priority setting. CGIAR recently
appointed a new, independent science council.
It is too early to know how effective this council
will be in improving science quality or allocat-
ing resources back toward strategic research. A
third program, the GEF, features a Scientific
and Advisory Technical Panel that has limited
itself to providing technical advice if and when
requested by the GEF Secretariat.
In the health sector, TDR, GAVI, and the
Stop TB Partnerships enjoy strong technical
inputs. TDR’s Scientific and Technical Advisory
Committee has encouraged the program to
maintain its relevance to the needs of its
developing-country clients. Like CGIAR, it now
faces challenges to maintaining its scientific
excellence.11 The GAVI board has a specialized
agency that is responsible for the program’s
research and technical aspects. Some of its
functions are performed by the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. GAVI also has
a working group to implement the board’s
decisions and task forces to address specific
issues of concern to the board.12 Some staff
commented to OED that GAVI has also
benefited from the long operational experience
that partners such as WHO and UNICEF have in
immunization. 
Partnering with Developing Countries,
Civil Society, and the Private Sector
The Active Participation of Developing
Countries in Governance Increases Program
Relevance, Ownership, and Development
Effectiveness, but Involving Them Remains a
Challenge
Although they are intended to be the principal
beneficiaries of the Bank’s global programs,
developing countries do not always have
influence over the content of global program
strategies. 
First, the programs’ governing bodies
typically meet too infrequently to give useful
input to the programs. Many executive bodies
have several permanent members supple-
mented by rotating members. In interviews,
developing-country members of global
programs indicated that they have limited
support structures back home and do not have
clear terms of reference for their exercise of
board functions or training on their independ-
ent responsibilities and accountabilities.13 By
the time a board member has learned to be
effective, it is often time to be rotated out. 
Second, it is rarely clear whether the board
members are supposed to represent their own
views, the views of their governments, the
views of their regions, or the views of their
constituents. Such expectations are often
implicit. Board members have few resources
with which to solicit inputs from their regions.
The most knowledgeable and informed
persons may not be invited to sit on the govern-
ing bodies. 
Third, many boards require member
organizations to make financial contributions
to the program. Such requirements can signify
the ownership and commitment of board
members to the sustainability of the program,
but they can also bar entry to developing
countries. In the case of FIRST, to maintain
efficiency and cohesion in program
governance, a large middle-income develop-
ing country that was willing to make the
contribution was not invited to the board.14
Some programs waive or reduce this require-
ment for developing countries.15 Unless
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special efforts are made to engage developing
countries, the unequal relationship between
donors and recipients continues, reducing
relevance, ownership, and development
effectiveness.
Developing-country participation in GEF
and MLF drove those two programs to deliver
at least some national benefits, while focusing
on producing global benefits. Although most
of IF’s diagnostic studies are said to be leading
to a pipeline of trade-facilitation operations for
future financing, its 2003 external evaluation
indicates that the program lacks developing-
country ownership. Such countries largely see
IF as run by and for its six international-agency
partners. Moreover, as indicated in chapter 3,
the program does not and cannot address the
issues that matter most to developing
countries: agricultural trade and OECD-
country agricultural subsidies. It is similarly
unclear why UCW does not have qualified
nationals from developing countries on its
steering committee. OED interviews related to
the UCW program in Morocco found that
national stakeholders helped improve the
relevance of the global program’s country-level
studies when they were asked to inform the
studies’ terms of reference. However, key
stakeholders felt that they were consulted only
after the country terms of reference had
largely been drafted.16 The Bank’s country
staff in some Regions were similarly
uninvolved in the program’s country-level
work, even though the involvement and
contribution of Bank operational staff in the
MNA Region and, to some extent, South Asia
has been considerable. Yet because research
related to child work and labor has been
funded by the same set of donors through
other programs in the MNA Region, it is
difficult to distinguish between the effects of
global programs and other trust-fund-financed
Bank activities.
Obtaining informed and thoughtful input
from developing countries is both important
and difficult, not only because the donor-
recipient relationship is so unequal, but also
because programs should benefit from
involving appropriate, relevant, and well-
informed stakehold-
ers. This point was
stressed by develop-
ing-country members
and by other board
members and profes-
sionals from industrial
countries, who are not
closely associated with
international agencies
and the principal
financiers.
Bank Partnerships with
NGOs Could Benefit
from an Institutional
Strategy 
International NGOs have shaped the global
agenda and individual programs, sometimes
directly but often indirectly. Constructive Bank
engagement with NGOs that have relevant
developing-country knowledge and experience
advances the cause of poverty alleviation and
sustainable development. NGOs have been
ahead of international organizations such as
the Bank and WHO in their activism on several
fronts discussed in this review. They have
pushed for affordable access to drugs; raised
awareness about child labor; and fought for
health and environmental standards relating to
pesticide use, ozone depletion, and climate
change. Activism in these areas has energized
support in industrial countries and has
empowered civil society to be more active in
solving problems in their own countries.
However, global interventionist approaches,
when unaccompanied by empowerment or
support of national organizations, raise issues
of legitimacy and may not be the most
appropriate or sustainable solutions from a
development perspective. Appropriately
supported local actors can devise more
effective solutions that
are attuned to develop-
ing countries. 
In the health sector,
international NGOs filled
a void by spearheading a
global campaign to make
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existing drugs for HIV/AIDS, multi-drug-resistant
tuberculosis, and other diseases affordable to the
populations of developing countries. Through
lobbying and court cases, NGOs took up the
issues of preferential pricing for drugs and drug
donations to developing countries. They
confronted the research-based international
pharmaceutical industry by advising developing
countries of the potential to exercise their rights
under international trade and intellectual
property rights (IPR) agreements (such as the
parallel importation of essential medicines, and
invoking the trade-related intellectual property
rights [TRIPS] provisions related to compulsory
licensing). While the Bank and WHO were slow
to take a position on these issues, with declining
process and increased affordability, they have
come to support wider access to drugs. Yet
financial sustainability remains a major
challenge.17
In the environment sector, NGOs have
helped shape the agenda. They have been
strong supporters of the Montreal Protocol, the
Kyoto Protocol, and other Agenda 21 conven-
tions now being implemented by the GEF. At
the same time, some NGOs have opposed
international carbon trading on the grounds
that it detracts from efforts to encourage
countries such as the United States to decrease
their carbon and other greenhouse-gas
emissions. Some NGOs also fear that the
promotion of monoculture tree planting could
lead to deforestation in developing countries. 
NGOs have informed both the Bank’s co-
sponsorship of the Global Integrated Pest
Management Facility and the Bank’s own
pesticide and pest-management policies. Six
years after OP 4.09 was issued in its revised
form, there appears to be no Bankwide
consensus on the development orientation of
this policy. Moreover, evidence is lacking on the
contribution of the policy’s approach toward
sustainably increasing farmers’ yields and
incomes while contributing to increased
environment and health benefits through
reduced pesticide use. 
The reputational and other risks that a
Bank-supported global program faces can be
large if the program is implemented by an
NGO that does not apply the Bank’s
safeguards and practices. Therefore, aside
from operational collaboration, Bank
oversight of CEPF has focused on ensuring the
application of Bank safeguards through
indirect controls, along with fiduciary
management and reporting for increased
emphasis on monitoring and evaluation.
Each of these issues is complex and requires
analysis of short- and long-run winners and
losers. The Bank’s current approach to NGO
partnerships is ad hoc, rather than strategic.
Public-Private Partnerships Present
Opportunities and Risks, and Call for
Harmonized Approaches within and among
International Organizations
Many stakeholders remain skeptical about the
motives of private corporations that engage in
partnerships with international organizations,18
even when their efforts have demonstrated
public-goods benefits, as in the case of the
Onchocerciasis program. Merck’s experience
with pharmaco-philanthropy (through the
Ivermectin donation program) has helped poor
West Africans with river blindness and
burnished its corporate image. Where similar
partnerships have not developed, as in the case
of the schistosomiasis drug Praziquantel,
potential health gains in developing countries
have not been realized. Although public-private
collaboration occurred during the develop-
ment phase of Praziquantel, a partnership for
its donation and distribution did not emerge,
substantially limiting the number of people in
developing countries who could benefit from
the drug. Hence the importance of articulating
goals of a partnership and regularly reporting
on them as the partnership evolves. Partner-
ships require clearly defined public health
goals, as well as a strategic plan for addressing
the problem. The success of the partnership
depends in part on the availability of techno-
logical alternatives, and in part on the collabo-
rative efforts of several partners.19
The complexity of public-private partner-
ships in global programs has increased as the
importance of IPR regimes has grown. Thanks
to the advancement of international discussion
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on universal access to affordable, reliable drugs
and vaccines, there is now potential for public-
private partnerships to bring new products to a
large, untapped market in developing
countries. The same applies to patented
varieties of crops (Lele 2003). 
Five programs—the Prototype Carbon Fund,
CGIAR, RBM, GAVI, and World Links—include
representatives of the private sector on their
governing or executive bodies. To develop
appropriate policies in this regard, it is necessary
to distinguish private sector entities with and
without a direct commercial interest, as that
interest has implications for conflicts of interest.
In the cases of RBM and GAVI, pharmaceutical
conglomerates or vaccine manufacturers with
direct actual or potential interest in the markets
for products and services serve on the govern-
ing bodies. GAVI illustrates some of the costs,
benefits, and risks. GAVI promoted new vaccines
to improve child health, reduce demands on
delivery systems, and stimulate demand. The
long-term financial viability of different vaccine
regimens for developing countries became
evident as they acquired some experience with
both new and old vaccines.20 Some developing
countries indicated that they would be unable to
finance immunization programs after GAVI is
phased out. GAVI may eventually benefit from
the Bank’s leading the effort on sustainable
financing. 
When private sector representation brings
in significant amounts of new money to the
program, as it does in the Prototype Carbon
Fund, that representation presents different
accountability challenges. Because the fund is
housed in the Bank, it answers to two
constituencies: the Bank and the private sector
participants who “own” the fund. The program
faces diverging interests and expectations
between investors and the Bank’s developing-
country clients in project selection and price
setting. OED concluded that continuing Bank
involvement is important, however, because
the program demonstrates a potential win-win
for both investors and developing countries
and because it builds the capacity for interna-
tional carbon trading in developing countries—
a global public good. The Prototype Carbon
Fund provides an
example of why a Bank
Board–approved global-
program strategy for
carbon trading activities
would be desirable.
Most of the private
funding for global
programs is through
private, non-profit
foundations with a
humanitarian interest, such as the Gates
(GAVI), Rockefeller (CGIAR), Ford (CGIAR and
CGAP), and MacArthur (CEPF) foundations.
Some such foundations serve on the governing
bodies of their respective programs. Many
programs, including MLF, GEF, and the six
infrastructure and private sector development
programs, interact with the private sector in
their activities.
The Bank and other partners have begun to
explore private sector partners in designing and
implementing global programs, but have not yet
explored the full implications of public-private
partnerships. International organizations’
policies on public-private partnerships are
generally still being worked out, and are neither
coherent within the Bank nor across partnering
organizations.21 Within the Bank, policy varies
by sector. The private sector sits on the govern-
ing boards of the restructured RBM and GAVI.
While the six infrastructure and private sector
development programs housed in the Bank
work with private sector service providers at the
country level, they generally do not accept
contributions from or welcome private
companies on their governing bodies, precisely
because of the potential
conflicts of interest. TDR
also works with the
private sector at the
activity level. But there is
considerable variation in
the clarity, consistency,
and transparency with
which programs provide
information on public-
private partnerships.22
Balancing public and
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private interests in the agricultural sector has
just begun, with CGIAR becoming more active in
public-private partnerships at the system level.23
WHO guidelines on partnership with
commercial enterprises posit the following
basic criteria: (a) alignment with WHO’s
strategy (the relationship should contribute to
improving public health); (b) relationships
established on the basis of an exchange of clear,
written agreements indicating the contribution
(financial or otherwise) of each party to the
relationship; and (c) public health gains
commensurate with the time and expense
involved in establishing and maintaining the
relationship. 
Partners acknowledge that they face similar
legal, ethical, and reputational risks and would
benefit from collaborating with the Bank on
consistent, coherent guidelines for public-
private partnerships. Sharing such guidelines
and experience would allow the adoption of a
common code of conduct on private sector
partnerships and their monitoring across the
various U.N. organizations and international and
regional banks. This would harmonize many of
the procedures across agencies, increase
accountability, and accelerate progress on
achieving the Millennium Development Goals.
Donors and International Organizations Retain
an Overwhelming Share of Governance
Responsibility 
The Bank and other international organizations
still exercise the major degree of formal and
informal influence over the programs’ strategic
direction and continue to bear a disproportion-
ate share of responsibility for oversight, consul-
tation, risk management, and evaluation. This
reality needs to be explicitly acknowledged,
with clear designation of responsibility and
accountability for performance vested in the
programs’ governing structures, as they would
be in the private sector.
As already pointed out, the Bank continues
to chair all but two of the programs housed
within it. This, together with a high proportion
of Bank financing in some cases, reduces the
incentives for shared program governance and
puts an ambiguous share of responsibility,
accountability, and risk on the Bank. It also
gives rise to real or potential conflicts of
interest that limit the Bank’s capacity to look at
the programs objectively. The same problems
exist in lesser form in programs that are not
housed in the Bank, but for which the Bank
gives most funds. 
Senior Bank managers continue to be
excessively involved in the day-to-day manage-
ment of some programs. The arrangements for
overseeing in-house secretariats and the
Bank’s participation remain fraught with real
or potential conflicts of interest and permit
considerable free-riding by other donors (for
example, in CGAP). As such, the Bank cannot
provide the disinterested leadership needed
for the far-reaching reforms that some
programs need. It is problematic for the Bank
chair of an in-house program to press for
reforms while simultaneously campaigning for
continued funding. Having such a chairperson
compromises the Bank’s ability to press for
reforms and increases the Bank’s exposure
and risks.
These conflicts of interest also distort the
Bank’s allocation of money among programs.
The efforts by network vice presidents to keep
DGF resources within their networks counter
the program’s objective of funding the
programs that add the most value to achieving
the Bank’s institutional mission. The newly
established GPP council should mediate inter-
network resource allocation based on Bank-
level priorities, the quality of proposals, and
the quality of implementation.
Other conflicts of interests are organiza-
tional, in the sense that they arise from the
design of the Bank’s relationships with the
global programs that it supports (Davis and
Stark 2001, p. 220). These include staffing
issues, differential treatment of programs, and
inadequate oversight of programs to which
current or former Bank staff migrate and, in
turn, promote the programs. All have the
potential to damage the Bank’s reputation.
Both the Board and management must address
these issues, particularly for those programs in
which the Bank has the most strategic, fiduci-
ary, and reputational exposure, namely for the
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programs housed inside the Bank and for those
established by the Bank and then spun off. 
Overall Assessment and Lessons 
A key finding of this chapter is that there are
now enough cross-program experiences featur-
ing different governance and management
models that the Bank, in collaboration with its
partners, can begin to determine good
practices for the design and implementation of
global programs. Its aim should be to generate
global public goods that advance the Bank’s
mission.
To this end, OED rated the performance of
each program (high, substantial, modest, or
negligible) in relation to the OECD principles
of corporate governance introduced at the
beginning of this chapter (figure 5.1). Informa-
tion across programs varies, and this is the first
time that such an exercise has been tried.
Hence, this should be seen more as a reflection
of general tendencies and as a guide for future
evaluations. Nevertheless, comparative applica-
tion of the principles provides some useful
insights. 
GEF receives high marks for transparency in
governance. The functions of the GEF Council are
transparent, and GEF program discussions and
decisions are available on the Internet. However,
disseminating information at the country level is
still a challenge, compounded by a confusion of
different agencies’ roles and their uneven capacity
to plan and implement GEF programs. GEF’s
Second Overall Performance Study noted that
posting information on the Internet is insufficient
for full disclosure or complete transparency.
UNAIDS is strong on transparency at the global
level, but faces problems similar to GEF’s at the
country level. Both OED’s and the external evalua-
tions noted a lack of transparency in some
decisions made at GDN. Its Memorandum of
Understanding with the World Bank had not been
seen by the Board members OED interviewed. GIF
was rated negligible, since none of the program’s
governing documents, including those on
governance or management decisions, minutes of
meetings, financial statements, and evaluations, is
available on its Web site. Moreover, GIF does not
produce semiannual or annual reports that are
circulated beyond its
donors. To be fair, though,
GIF has a relatively small
administrative budget and
operates with a skeleton
staff.
TDR has clear roles
and responsibilities in
its Memorandum of
Understanding, which
details the composition,
function, and procedural operations for the
governing body, secretariat, and Scientific and
Technical Advisory Committee. This oldest of
all global health programs faces a dynamic
environment like CGIAR’s and has a budget
one-eighth the size, yet it has confronted
fundamental issues about its scope, strategic
objectives, role in global research, funding and
partnership strategies, method of work,
governance, and management.
Similarly, the charters of PPIAF, Cities Alliance,
and FIRST clearly lay out the functions of their
governing bodies, management units, and
advisory committees, and seem to be working well
in practice. IF received an assessment of modest
since the roles of its member partners and govern-
ing bodies are not clear. While IF does define the
roles of its Steering Committee and its Inter-
Agency Working Group, it does not clearly define
the roles of international organizations, bilateral
donors and least-developed countries. This
reduces the likelihood that the program’s
objectives will be incorporated in PRSPs and that
governments and donors will support follow-up
activities. UCW has an implicit division of labor
among ILO, UNICEF, and the Bank based on their
different institutional mandates, but no memoran-
dum of understanding or formal division 
of responsibility among
the three partners.
Working relationships at
the governance level have
been interrupted, al-
though country-level in-
teraction has been rela-
tively more effective.
ESMAP, PPIAF, and
the Cities Alliance were
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Overseeing in-house
secretariats and the
Bank’s participation
remain fraught with real
or potential conflicts of
interest and permit
considerable free-riding
by other donors.
There are now enough
cross-program experiences
to begin to determine
good practices for the
design and
implementation of global
programs.
rated high with respect to fairness to immedi-
ate clients, since their competitive grant
programs are open, transparent and accessi-
ble to potential developing-country clients.
MLF’s fairness to its immediate clients was
assessed as substantial since it gives priority to
projects with low costs per kilogram of ozone-
depleting substances phased out. The project-
by-project approach employed during the
fund’s first decade helped the implementing
agencies to harvest all of the low-hanging
fruit—in larger enterprises in low-cost
countries that are large-volume consumers of
ozone-depleting substances. WSP was rated
modest, since the program gives little
information on how it chooses its focus
countries or its activities in each country.
While selection criteria exist, it is not evident
how these are applied. CEPF received a
modest rating because, though consistent
with the legal agreement the Bank signed with
the program, a large share of the grants has
gone to Conservation International, where the
program is housed. Program staff project a
change in future funding ratios as regionally
based funding mechanisms, which target
smaller civil-society groups, develop and as
the program begins implementation in
regions where Conservation International has
not previously worked.24
Programs comprised mostly of interna-
tional/regional organizations, bilateral
agencies, and foundations are mainly account-
able to donors. Although the programs that
include developing countries have some
accountability to them, this chapter’s discus-
sion has shown the possibility and the
importance of increasing that accountability.
The same point applies to the private sector
and NGOs. The programs with well-functioning
and effective scientific and technical advisory
committees have helped programs to deliver
outstanding results, but there is still scope for
improvement in this area, too.
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Global Programs Need
Global Strategy
Global programs provide goods and services either directly (in-kind)or through research, technical assistance, and investment grants.From the Bank’s point of view, their financing comes from four prin-
cipal sources: donor trust funds, DGF grants, the Bank’s administrative budget,
and parallel donor financing of program activities.
The case study programs have a variety of
funding mechanisms:
• A triennial replenishment process similar to
that of the International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA) exists for two programs, GEF
and MLF. The Bank is the trustee for the GEF,
and UNEP is the trustee for MLF (table H.13). 
• Annual donor pledges and contributions to
trust funds, typically but not always adminis-
tered by the organization that houses each
program, provide support to all other pro-
grams in accordance with each donor’s an-
nual budget cycle.
• The Bank’s Development Grant Facility (DGF)
is the principal source of the Bank’s financial
contributions to global programs. 
• The Bank’s administrative budget has fully
supported one program, FSAP (in coordination
with the IMF). It partially supports four other
programs—WSP, ESMAP, infoDev, and IF—
mostly from trust fund fees and internal cross-
support; this money is only for the Bank’s
in-kind contributions (such as staff time and
travel) to these programs. 
• No financial support is provided from the
World Bank to four environmental programs:
GEF, MLF, Prototype Carbon Fund, and GWP.
The Bank receives administrative fees for im-
plementing selected GEF and MLF activities
and for managing the Prototype Carbon Fund
(table 2.6).
In aggregate, there is no evidence, based on
the cases reviewed, that global programs have
added significant amounts of new money to
official development assistance, with two
exceptions: funds from private sources for the
Prototype Carbon Fund and funds from the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation for health.1 It
has been hard to show that GEF and MLF
resources have come on top of other develop-
ment assistance. The growth of global
programs appears to have come mostly at the
cost of country-level assistance.2
Although the Bank is the largest manager of
donor trust funds, the Bank does not have an
overarching strategy for financing global programs.
Its existing criteria and processes do not add up to
a strategy, and they are not rigorously applied. The
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following three subsec-
tions review weaknesses
or inconsistencies in
current strategies (1) to
mobilize public resources
for long-term global
public-goods programs of
benefit to the poor, (2) to
foster a more flexible, rational, and informed
approach to funding “venture capital” programs in
which the DGF provides only initial financial
support, and (3) to rationalize the roles and uses
of Bank-administered trust funds for Bank-housed
programs.
Funding Models of Global Programs That
Combine DGF, Trust Funds, and Bank
Budget Need Greater Clarity
OED’s Phase 1 report identified three funding
models for global programs that have evolved
from earlier funding arrangements (OED
2002c, p. 39):
• Long-term development model: Funding is
provided for long periods to support the pro-
gram’s development objectives. Implicit in this
is a close relationship between the donors’
funding and the program’s overall strategy.
• Foundation model: Funding is intended to be
catalytic, to expand or trigger support for prom-
ising economic and social innovations. Donors
maintain an arm’s-length relationship with the
program.
• Venture capital model: Time-bound involve-
ment in the “business” being funded brings
benefits to the program’s donors, through ac-
tivities such as mentoring, monitoring, cor-
porate governance, and recruitment of
management.
Disconnects between program objectives
and their funding arrangements create
problems in at least 10 programs (table 6.1).
Among the environment and agriculture
programs, CGIAR, GEF, and MLF all address
long-term development issues and provide
some assurance of long-term funding, but
CGIAR relies on annual donor contributions for
its long-term research program, and its Bank
funding consumes DGF funds that could be
used for other worthy global initiatives, such as
a global health-research network. CEPF’s
funding may have been justified as a venture-
capital model, but its placement in Window 1
as a long-term development program crowds
out other high-priority investments.
Among the health programs, TDR addresses
the poor’s long-term health-research needs,
but the DGF cannot provide funding on the
scale needed. RBM and Stop TB address long-
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Although the Bank is the
largest manager of donor
trust funds, it does not
have an overarching
strategy for financing
global programs.
Long-term development model
Network/ Financing investments Foundation Venture capital 
sector to produce GPGs Other model model
Environment & CGIAR, GEF, GWP
agriculture MLF, CEPF ProCarbFund, GIF
Health TDR UNAIDS, Global Forum, 
RBM, Stop TB, GAVI
Infrastructure & private WSP, ESMAP, PPIAF, 
sector development CGAP, infoDev Cities Alliance
Other PostConFund, UCW IF, FIRST, 
FSAP, GDN World Links
Note: Programs are classified according to their current funding arrangements. The DGF implicitly views Window 1 programs as “long-term development” programs and Window 2 pro-
grams as “foundation” or “venture capital” programs. Programs in boldface show a disconnect between their actual objectives and their funding arrangements.
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term development issues. DGF made the right
decision to move RBM and Stop TB from
Window 2 to Window 1. By previously assigning
them to Window 2, the DGF Council had
implicitly regarded them as operating on a
venture-capital model.
Among the infrastructure and private sector
development programs, CGAP and infoDev are
justifiable as venture capital programs, while
the Cities Alliance addresses long-term urban
development issues. Having placed CGAP and
infoDev in Window 1, and Cities Alliance in
Window 2, the DGF Council has implicitly
classified them as the opposite.
Among the other programs, DGF is unable
to fund several programs on the scale they
need. The DGF Council put GDN in Window 1
as a long-term development program. Having
spun off the program in a venture-capital
mode, though, the Bank had no exit strategy to
ensure GDN’s development as a soundly
financed, independent identity. Nor has the
GDN board established clear roles and respon-
sibilities for itself, its secretariat, and the Bank
or fostered the development of an identity and
governance structure separate from the Bank.
UCW and IF address long-term development
issues. By putting them in Window 2, the DGF
Council has implied that they are foundation
and venture-capital models, respectively.
In many cases, funding drives programs. This
is especially evident when donors give restricted
rather than core funding, as in the case of
CGIAR. Some lower-priority programs also
crowd out other high-return, long-term invest-
ments in global public goods. The Bank could
use its convening power to mobilize substan-
tially more public resources for programs, such
as a much-needed global health research
network for the diseases of the poor or a
mechanism for producing drugs at prices afford-
able to developing countries. The procedure
should be to identify potential benefits to the
poor that require global collective action and
long-term funding, but that are un- or under-
funded, rather than substituting for, or compet-
ing with, existing aid instruments. Without such
an approach, global programs impinge on
limited country capacity without bringing new
funding (except as an
extension of Bank
activity) or new ideas. 
The share of the
Bank’s income allocated
to grant making is too
small to support large-
scale investments in global public goods on its
own. DGF funding should be used to stimulate
the establishment of key programs, such as a
global health-research network. Meanwhile, other
donors should take on a greater burden and role
in other DGF-supported programs. The Bank’s
health sector partners have emphasized the
importance of long-term investment in public-
health research. They stress the importance of the
Bank allocating 2 to 5 percent of its health-sector
lending to health research.3 This would set an
example for other donors and governments to
contribute toward the much-needed financing of
national health-research systems, as a comple-
ment to global health research. 
The Bank’s involvement in programs with
important goals but little independently verified
impact, such as CEPF and infoDev, has also
diverted Bank resources and attention from
higher-priority, more demonstrably effective
programs. In some cases, such as CGAP and
GDN, the Bank’s willingness to provide most of
the initial funding hampered the mobilization
of funding from others. In the case of CGAP, the
Bank made its initial $30 million available before
other member donors had rounded up their
expected $70 million. Had the Bank waited for
its partners, other donors might have
developed stronger ownership of CGAP.
Inconsistent
Application of DGF
Funding Rules
Causes Confusion
and Poses
Reputational Risks
The Bank has not
applied the eight
criteria for DGF grant
support consistently
(box 6.1). Most notice-
able has been the differ-
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In many cases, funding
drives programs when
donors give restricted
rather than core funding,
as in the case of CGIAR.
DGF funding should be
used to stimulate the
establishment of key
programs, such as a
global health-research
network. Other donors
should take on a greater
burden and role in other
DGF-supported programs.
ent application of these
criteria between those
programs that started
before and after the
DGF was established,
with little indication of
when the grandfa-
thered programs will be
expected to comply
with the criteria. DGF
decisions to support
particular programs
represent important signals to current and
prospective donors and clients concerning the
Bank’s strategy and priorities with regard to
global programs. How the eight criteria for
DGF grant support for global programs are
adhered to is thus important for the Bank’s
credibility, since these criteria are well known
to the Bank’s partners who seek DGF support.
That the rules seem to be applied differently to
different programs and that DGF decisions
seem to be more the result of lobbying and
negotiation send a message that is potentially
damaging to the Bank’s reputation.
Particularly for the programs grandfathered
into the DGF, the criterion that “grants should
not generally exceed 15 percent of expected
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DGF decisions to support
particular programs
represent important
signals to current and
prospective donors and
clients concerning the
Bank’s strategy and
priorities with regard to
global programs.
• Subsidiarity: Some in-house programs have activities simi-
lar to the Bank’s country operations, such as economic and
sector work and technical assistance (PPIAF and the Cities
Alliance) and country-level investments (the Post-conflict
Fund). Other in-house programs (CGAP and infoDev) have sig-
nificantly scaled back their grant-making activities. All are
justified on grounds of their global knowledge creation and
dissemination activities. The incremental value added by
the partnership, beyond what the Bank could do through
partnerships at the country level, needs to be determined.
• Comparative advantage: As the only multisectoral develop-
ment-finance institution with global reach, the Bank has a
strong advantage at the global and country levels relative to
its often more specialized partners. Its comparative advan-
tage should be in linking the global-level activities of global
programs with developing countries’ own needs and prior-
ities. Yet such links are generally weak within and among
networks.
• Multicountry benefits: All the case studies are multicountry
programs. They are engaged in activities with apparent
economies of scale and scope, such as global knowledge cre-
ation and dissemination, capacity building, and donor coor-
dination, but many seem to operate on a country-by-country
basis and do not seem to have been “required” to develop
cross-country and cross-regional networks. 
• Leverage: The 15 percent rule has not been enforced, neither
for some programs that preceded the DGF’s formation in 1998
(CGAP, infoDev, Post-conflict Fund and World Links) nor for
programs that started afterward (GDN, CEPF). Enforcing com-
pliance has been hampered by incomplete information on pro-
gram budgets and inadequate definitions of what consti-
tutes “program funding.”
• Managerial competence: When the CEPF, GDN, and World
Links were established, and when GDN and World Links
were moved outside the Bank, there was no exploration to
see whether other providers could have served the same ob-
jectives more cost-effectively.
• Arm’s-length relationship: Except in the case of CGAP, there
has been no independent oversight of in-house programs. For
both in-house and externally managed programs, there have
been few budget allocations for oversight and no standard
terms of reference outlining the responsibilities and ac-
countabilities for Bank staff serving on the programs’ gov-
erning bodies.
• Disengagement strategy: Disengagement has been poorly
articulated and managed in three cases (GWP, GDN, and
World Links). Some Window 1 programs (such as CGAP
and infoDev), which predate the DGF, appear to enjoy “squat-
ters’ rights” compared to Window 2 programs (such as
PPIAF and Cities Alliance), which started later. The DGF has
had some external reviews, but it lacks the means to make
informed decisions about moving programs between Win-
dows 1 and 2.
• Promoting partnerships: The criterion is too vague. It does not
say what kind (programmatic or institutional) or level (global
or country) of partnership is expected. The term “partnership”
has become all-encompassing. It even includes parties who
are implementing program activities under contracts.
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funding over the life of Bank funding to a given
program, or over the rolling three-year plan
period, whichever is shorter,” has not been
met. Eight of the 18 case study programs that
received DGF grants in FY04 violated this
criterion (table 6.2).4 For three programs—the
Post-conflict Fund,5 CGAP, and GDN—the
Bank’s contribution has greatly exceeded the
DGF criterion since 1998. 
On a related matter, the Bank recently
clarified its rules on the use of DGF grants and
administrative budget for the program activi-
ties and secretariat costs of in-house and
externally managed programs (Annex B, table
B.1). These rules require all DGF grants to in-
house programs “to flow to entities outside the
Bank for funding costs of externally managed
activities,” and to restrict the use of the Bank’s
administrative budget to funding in-house
secretariat costs. Trust funds may be used to
fund either program activities or secretariat
costs. This clarification is a welcome develop-
ment, but it still leaves some unanswered
questions, both short term and long term. 
In the short term, can a proportion of the
DGF grants (typically around 10 percent) still
be used to fund the in-house secretariat costs
of CGIAR and the Post-conflict Fund, or will
these now have to come from a combination of
the Bank’s administrative budget and donor
trust funds?6 Can PPIAF and Cities Alliance still
use some of their DGF grant to pay Regional
operational staff to supervise grants to external
entities? Will CGAP and infoDev have to discon-
tinue using DGF funding for their in-kind
technical assistance and global knowledge
activities—in effect scaling back these activities
to the amounts available from the Bank’s
administrative budget and donor trust funds?
Will these rules be applied equally to the pre-
1998 and post-1998 programs?7 Will there be a
phase-in period for the new rules for adversely
affected programs? 
In the long term, this means that vice-presiden-
tial units can once again allocate Bank budget for
the secretariat costs of non-DGF in-house
programs like WSP and ESMAP, and even, one
presumes, for DGF-supported programs. This
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Window 2
Considered for more 
than 3 years of support Other 
World Bank during grant allocation (exit year in 
share (%) Window 1 process for FY05 parentheses) Non-DGF
Greater than 50 Post-conflict Fund, 
CGAP, GDN
25–50 CEPF, Global Forum World Links (FY06) FSAP 
for Health Research
15–25 infoDev IF (FY04)
10–15 CGIAR RBM
1–10 TDR, UNAIDS, GAVI Cities Alliance, PPIAF, Stop TB FIRST (FY05), UCW (FY06)b ESMAP, WSP, GIF
Less than 1 GEF, MF, GWP,c
Prototype Carbon 
Fund
a. Based on FY04/CY03 data.
b. UCW received DGF funding as a Window 2 program for the first time in FY04.
c. The Global Water Partnership exited DGF funding in FY02.
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may create some perverse incentives; for
example, to locate inside the Bank those
programs that do not successfully compete for
DGF funds. The use of the Bank’s administrative
budget for global programs needs to be
monitored carefully and assessed for develop-
ment effectiveness.
Bank-Administered Trust Funds for
Global Programs Could Be Deployed
More Strategically
Several global programs, such as WSP and
ESMAP, began with support from Bank-adminis-
tered donor trust funds and only subsequently
established formal collaborative processes to
give donors an increased share in program
governance and to mobilize additional trust
funds. Indeed, global programs are often
referred to as “programmatic trust funds” within
the Bank. Such approaches have certainly
mobilized more resources, as indicated by the
proliferation of Bank-administered trust funds.
Yet this strategy raises several issues.
The overlap between Bank operations and
global program activities confuses borrowers.
Where programs do studies or provide techni-
cal assistance similar to the Bank’s economic
and sector work, it is unclear whether the
program adds value beyond the trust fund
resources. Are the transaction costs of such
partnerships commen-
surate with the benefits
to the Bank’s develop-
ment objectives? Also,
while some programs
bring resources into the
Bank, others such as
CGAP receive most of
their resources from the
Bank.8
The lack of synergy
between trust fund–related Bank activities and
trust fund–supported global program activities
is also an issue. For example, the Bank’s trade
and capacity building work in the Development
Economics Vice Presidency (DEC) is supported
by trust funds, and DEC and the Poverty
Reduction and Environmental Management
Vice Presidency (PREM) are actively involved in
IF. DEC also does its own work on thematic
issues, such as trade prospects for commodity-
dependent countries or impacts of food safety-
related non-tariff barriers on the poor. IF works
on similar themes in some countries. There
seems to be little synergy among these activi-
ties, even though the Bank has advocated
OECD trade reforms since the Doha round.
Proliferation of trust fund activity means
program managers have insufficient experience
and support for fiduciary management. The
Bank’s Internal Audit Department has identified
the problem of different donor reporting
requirements and insufficient Bank support,
particularly to the small programs, for reporting
and fiduciary management. Relating expendi-
tures to activities is thus a challenge, particu-
larly since the programs’ expenditures do not
always coincide with the Bank’s accounting
when DGF, trust fund and Bank budget
resources are commingled. The Bank’s global
strategy would benefit from a procedure to
distinguish between activities that are clearly
adding value to the Bank’s operations and those
that substitute for, or compete with, them.
Trust fund–financed staff and expenditures
do not maximize institutional effectiveness.
Bank budget constraints have resulted in the
use of trust fund–financed staff to do activities
that normally would be done by Bank staff.
Shortages of travel funds have also encouraged
the use of trust fund–financed consultants on
the working groups of global program partner-
ships to do what would normally be Bank-staff
work. When a busy senior Bank manager, who
serves on the board of an external global
program, is supported by trust fund–financed
consultants who have no institutional Bank
perspective, there is a risk that the Bank’s
concerns will not be represented in the
program.
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World Bank Performance
in Global Programs
This chapter assesses the Bank’s performance as a partner in individual globalprograms and draws additional lessons from the case studies for theBank’s strategic and programmatic management of its global portfolio.
Performance is assessed using four criteria:
• Comparative advantage: Whether the Bank
is employing its comparative advantages in the
programs (endorsed by the Development Com-
mittee in September 2000)1
• Global-country links: Whether the global
program has operational links, where appro-
priate, to the Bank’s country work (one of the
six approval criteria established by Bank Man-
agement in April 2000)
• Oversight: Whether the Bank exercises in-
dependent oversight of its involvement in the
program, as appropriate, for in-house and ex-
ternally managed programs 
• Exit strategy: Whether the Bank is facilitating
flexible and transparent disengagement strate-
gies, as appropriate (established by the DGF
Council in October 1998).
The Bank’s performance suffers from some
systemic weaknesses. The Bank employs its
comparative advantage at the country level less
well and less often than it does at the global
level, particularly as the premier multisectoral
development finance institution with policy
analysis capacity and lending ability at the
country level. The Bank’s matrix management
system does not work well to link its global
program activities to the Bank’s Regional and
country operations, the priorities of developing
countries, or the Poverty Reduction Strategy
process. Both the Bank and its partners have
overlooked the internal budgetary and staffing
implications of global programs. There are
almost no resources for the network anchors
and Regional staff to operationalize global
knowledge and approaches at the country level.
There are also no terms
of reference for Bank
staff serving on the
governing bodies of
global programs. In only
two cases have budget-
ary resources been
allocated for independ-
ent oversight. In only one case has there been
independent oversight of in-house programs.
Exits from DGF financing (in the case of GWP)
and from Bank financing (in the case of GDN
and World Links) were poorly conceived and
managed.
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Comparative Advantage
The Bank’s Strategic Directions Paper for fiscal
2002–04 described the Bank’s comparative
advantage at the global level as its (1) global
mandate and reach, (2) convening power and
(3) ability to mobilize financial resources; and
at the country level as its (4) multisectoral
capacity, (5) expertise in country- and sector-
level analysis, and (6) in-depth country
knowledge. This review confirms the findings
of the Phase 1 report that the Bank uses its
country comparative advantages better than its
global ones, particularly for programs chaired
by and/or housed in the Bank. 
Other donors view the Bank’s leadership
role, its financial contributions, its operational
support, and its fiduciary oversight as a seal of
approval, giving them confidence to invest in a
program. The Bank is sought as a partner for
externally managed programs less for its
financial contributions than for its activities as
the largest lender and policy advisor to
developing countries and for its potential to
mobilize specialized knowledge of interna-
tional organizations, donors, and the profes-
sional community to add value to the activities
of client countries. Consider for example the
Bank’s role as a co-sponsor of UNAIDS, to
which it contributes $4 million annually
(UNAIDS receives $95 million in total
annually). The Bank’s greatest value to UNAIDS
is as the largest lender (more than $18 billion
between 1992 and 2002) to the health sector in
developing countries. The Bank’s value also
lies in its potential to complement investments
in communicable disease programs (being
promoted by global programs) with support for
health-system capacity building (box 7.1). 
These examples show that the Bank’s compar-
ative advantage and global responsibilities go
well beyond its roles in
individual programs.
The Bank has a responsi-
bility to work with its
global partners (includ-
ing particularly the
permanent members of
the programs’ governing
boards) to raise the
standards of priority setting, coordination,
governance, management, and evaluation in
global programs. These include links to country
operations. 
Global-Country Links
Synergies between and among activities at the
global and country levels are crucial for the
Bank’s developing-country clients, both to
ensure development impacts and to ensure that
the clients’ views are heard at the global level.
The links needed in various sectors at the
country level, and even among countries within
global programs, tend to be very different. They
depend on whether the programs try to address
country-level or global-level constraints; bring
in new financial resources for investment (such
as MLF, GEF, or GAVI), new knowledge about
approaches (as in Stop TB), or technical
assistance at the country level (as in WSP); or
promote an approach with implications for
domestic priorities and resource allocation
(UNAIDS). A direct link may be unnecessary, at
least at first, where the global program can
achieve its goals without country-level support
from the Bank, as for example researching
drugs or vaccines. But where complementary
investments are needed—for example, in
surveillance or in epidemiological research at
the country level—where country capacity is
insufficient, and where economies of scale
matter, the Bank needs to attend to the links
between its global and country activities.
Ensuring the appropriate synergy between
global programs and Bank operations requires
a clear global strategy in which a better matrix
management is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for global priorities and strategies to
emerge from the bottom up. To develop such a
strategy, the Bank must address five issues:
• Integrating global opportunities and concerns
into sector strategies—distinguishing between
the need for investments in global public goods
and complementary national goods 
• Testing global program goals in country oper-
ations
• Providing complementary investments and
helping countries benefit from global pro-
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developing-country
clients.
grams by linking global programs more effec-
tively to the PRSP and CAS processes
• Ensuring coherence among various global pro-
gram goals at the global and country levels
• Linking overarching resource mobilization
strategies and global strategy with trust funds
and the subsidiarity principle.
Integrating global issues into the Bank’s sector strate-
gies. For sector strategies to better link country
realities with global programs, they need to
confront the business-planning implications of
different industrial- and developing-country
priorities in the existing strategies. This would
help the Bank to explore gaps at the global level,
distinguish them from gaps at the country level,
and draw the implications for sector strategies
on both levels. Global programs too often try to
achieve country-level objectives that others have
seemingly ignored. This has happened with
CGIAR, because of the lack of national-level
investments in agricultural research; with GAVI’s
child-immunization programs, due to insuffi-
cient donor investments in immunization; and
elsewhere. At the same time, many global-level
issues on trade, aid, finance, and intellectual
property, which developing countries and the
Bank’s country and Regional operations cannot
address on their own, receive less attention. In
addition, global program activity is intensifying
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The Bank’s cosponsorship of seven programs—CGIAR, TDR,
ESMAP, UNAIDS, Stop TB, GIF, and GWP—is a good reflection
of the deployment of its global mandate and reach, convening
power, and capacity to mobilize resources. The Bank has
“cosponsored” programs, usually with specialized U.N. organ-
izations. Cosponsorship provides an imprimatur of legitimacy for
programs that are not based on formal international conventions. 
The CGIAR was the first such program, with the CGIAR Sec-
retariat based in the Bank and the Technical Advisory Commit-
tee Secretariat based in the FAO. The co-sponsorship with FAO
was intended to increase the CGIAR’s legitimacy in developing
countries at a time when they had little voice. FAO’s technical input
was also considered necessary. UNAIDS was similarly formed
with 6 co-sponsors (now 9, and likely 10 with the inclusion of
UNHCR) to develop a U.N. systemwide coordinated response to
HIV/AIDS, because individual agencies had not responded rap-
idly enough to the crisis, either individually or collectively.
The roles, responsibilities, and functions of co-sponsors
vary among programs and have evolved over time. Traditionally,
they have been assigned a mix of governance and management
responsibilities—for example, for the selection of key office-
holders, management and oversight of secretariats, mobilization
and management of trust funds, management of technical advi-
sory committees, and evaluation. Some cosponsors have had
more staying power than others. There is a growing ambiguity
in the functions of the co-sponsors in relation to donors and other
partners (for example, the diminishing role of cosponsors in
the older programs such as CGIAR, TDR, and GIF), compared with
the strong role of co-sponsors in relation to the governance
structures (such as the Program Coordinating Board of UN-
AIDS). These roles have been debated as the governance struc-
tures themselves have evolved, and competition for influence
among agencies and partners has been considerable. Experi-
ence has raised issues about the role of co-sponsors in relation
to the governance structures in giving strategic direction to the
program. The issues are sharpened in cases where the co-
sponsors also have implementing responsibilities that others
think they have not fulfilled. 
This review only found clear terms of reference for cospon-
sors in UNAIDS. Even in this case, the external evaluation raised
questions about the roles of the Programme Coordinating Board
in relation to the co-sponsors. In other programs, the Bank’s re-
sponsibilities as a cosponsor are unclear or unarticulated, have
evolved over time and, even in the case of DGF-supported pro-
grams, were unknown to the DGF secretariat or the Bank’s legal
department. 
Within the Bank, the sector boards are responsible for con-
ducting and monitoring co-sponsorships. Institutional cultures
and resources vary considerably between the Bank and the
U.N. agencies. Though the Bank is the largest trustee of trust
funds, its networks often lack the budgetary and staff resources
to meet their cosponsor duties. The U.N. agencies have similar
issues. The sector boards and anchors are often understaffed and
overcommitted to partnerships. They lack the experience to ad-
dress dysfunctions involving themselves or the other partners.
The Bank needs to work with its partners to clarify these roles
and to determine its strategic role in partnerships. The GPP
Council should support the networks in these efforts. 
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at the country level,
duplicating effort and
tying up Bank resources
better used in direct
country work.
Testing individual global-program goals in country
operations and establishing a feedback loop in
continued program funding. Only when the Bank
begins to use its comparative advantage, by
testing and documenting the feasibility of
global-program goals at the country level, will it
be able to advance the global debate. On-the-
ground knowledge will improve global
programs’ focus. Currently it is unclear, given
the limited evidence, how much real value,
beyond extra funds, global programs bring to
country operations. The few notable exceptions
include increased awareness of UNAIDS and the
approaches of Stop TB. If each global program
had to demonstrate in its DGF applications how
it helped or would help a specific country and
had to report results in the following years, the
incentive to integrate the global-program
portfolio into country operations would be
established. As it is, task managers do not
provide this information consistently because
the DGF does not expect it.
Providing complementary investments and helping
countries benefit from global programs. Comple-
mentary investments in agricultural research at
the national level, along with investments at the
global level, have helped some large develop-
ing countries to graduate from IDA. For
programs without complementary invest-
ments, there is a risk
that global programs
are just wishful
thinking. In China, the
Stop TB program
worked closely with the
health task manager to
help bring in grant
funds to make Bank
investments in tuberculosis treatment and
prevention attractive to the government. On
the other hand, following the excellent support
the Integrated Framework received from
Cambodia and discussion of its country case
study at the consultative group meeting, the
responsibility for mobilizing the much-needed
follow-up investments has rested largely with
the country. WHO has emphasized the
importance of investment in surveillance and
epidemiological research, but few of the Bank’s
health sector programs have included much
investment in research or monitoring. The
Bank’s recent efforts to develop long-overdue
investments in agricultural research in Africa
are an encouraging sign.
Ensuring coherence among various global-program
goals at the global and country levels. The goals of
different global programs sometimes conflict—
for example, the Global IPM Facility’s goal to
reduce the use of pesticides, IF’s to increase
agricultural exports, and UCW’s to reduce child
labor. The Bank’s multisectoral presence and
global reach can help improve coherence
among these goals and the needs of develop-
ing countries. This calls for stronger links
between the global agenda, economic and
sector work, and the PRSPs and CASs.
Linking overarching resource-mobilization strate-
gies and global strategy through trust funds and
subsidiarity. In place of the current proliferation
of global programs, some of the $7.1 billion in
trust funds that the Bank is mobilizing could be
used to establish a few long-term global public-
goods programs that are big enough to reflect
developing-country needs or priorities, and
thus to make a difference.2 For example, long-
term investments in health research, on a scale
similar to that of CGIAR in agriculture, are
needed to mobilize the best science at the
global level to address diseases of the poor.
Clarity is needed about which activities are
done through global programs, because they
would add more value than if the Bank were
acting alone through its country and Regional
operations. While some overlap in activities will
still probably occur, confusion among the
Bank’s clients arises more from the overlap in
responsibilities and accountabilities of the
programs and the Bank’s regular operations—
particularly when the programs provide
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The Bank’s multisectoral
presence and global reach
can help improve
coherence among these
goals and the needs of
developing countries.
additional (sometimes including budgetary)
resources for technical assistance, training, or
studies. 
Linking global programs to country
operations has budget implications for
networks and Regions. For network anchor and
Regional staff to operationalize the content of
global programs, they need money. 
Oversight
OED views the Bank’s oversight of global
program management as analogous to its
supervision of borrower implementation of
Bank-financed projects. The OPCS “Guidelines
to Staff on Project Supervision” define and
distinguish supervision from implementation
and provide two reasons for supervision, which
also apply to global programs: 
• “To ensure that financing is used only for the
purposes intended, with due regard to effi-
ciency and economy”
• “[To see] that the projects [the Bank] sup-
ports achieve their development objectives.”
Management also indicated, in its March
2003 update to the Board on the management
of global programs and partnerships, that it
would strengthen oversight to ensure that
global programs (1) provide global public
goods, (2) support international advocacy, (3)
are coordinated multicountry programs and/or
(4) mobilize substantial incremental resources. 
Overall, despite management’s emphasis on
oversight as well as selectivity in its presentations
to the Board between April 2000 and March 2003,
OED finds independent oversight to be among
the weakest aspects, if not the weakest aspect, of
the Bank’s management of its global-program
portfolio. First, the Bank needs a global strategy
that addresses global public policies that hurt
developing countries’ prospects for poverty-
reducing growth and that fosters stronger links
between global programs and country operations.
Without this, increased oversight could just mean
micro-management. Second, the Bank needs to
apply the routine, Bankwide procedures of quality
assurance, internal audits, risk assessment and
risk management to its global program activities.
Independent oversight
and controls of this
nature are particularly
important in the early
stages of each program.
Exercising independ-
ent oversight is more
straightforward in princi-
ple for the 12 programs that the Bank neither
chairs nor manages than for the 12 programs that
it chairs, co-chairs or manages (table 7.1). Even
in the former case, independent oversight
requires clear terms of reference and budgetary
allocations for those Bank staff/managers who
serve on the boards. In interviews, OED noted
considerable confusion among those serving on
the boards about their functions. Many indicated
that they would welcome clear terms of
reference, training on board-member functions,
and periodic meetings among board members to
share experiences and learn from one another.
OED was unable to assess precisely where the
budgetary constraints lie. Network leaders
emphasized the importance of the Bank allocat-
ing enough budgetary resources to networks
and Regions to fund oversight and the linking of
global programs to Bank operations. Others felt
that the lack of budgetary resources was less of a
problem than the low priority the networks and
Regions give these tasks.
Exercising Bank oversight is particularly
important for programs that the Bank has
founded and spun off, such as GWP, World
Links, and GDN. The Bank has a responsibility
to ensure that these programs get a good start,
establish their own identity, and begin to add
value from their new external and independent
perspective. This review found an understand-
able desire on the part of partners to establish a
broader intellectual space, where new perspec-
tives and approaches from outside the Bank can
be brought to bear in spun-off programs. Yet
weak strategies, governance, and financing
plague all three programs, together with little
or no independent Bank oversight.3
Of the 12 programs that the Bank chairs or
houses, line management provides independ-
ent oversight for two programs managed inside
the Bank: the Post-conflict Fund and FSAP. Only
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OED finds independent
oversight to be among the
weakest aspects, if not the
weakest aspect, of the
Bank’s management of its
global-program portfolio.
2 of the other 10 programs, CGAP and CGIAR,
have the potential for independent oversight.
For CGAP, the Bank’s representative on the
Council of Governors and the Executive
Committee is located in the Financial Sector
Vice Presidency, and therefore outside the
management chain of the Infrastructure vice
presidency responsible for CGAP’s implemen-
tation. For the CGIAR, the Bank’s Committee
on Development Effectiveness (CODE)
supported OED’s recommendation in the
CGIAR meta-evaluation to separate oversight
and management functions within the Bank.
Management has since given oversight respon-
sibility to the Chief Economist.
Six of the remaining eight programs—WSP,
ESMAP, infoDev, PPIAF, Cities Alliance, and
FIRST—are housed in the Bank and the Bank’s
representative on the governing body reports
to the vice president (or managing director in
the case of FIRST4) who chairs the governing
body. As OED pointed out in the CGIAR meta-
evaluation, this creates potential for conflicts of
interests.
In the case of the Prototype Carbon Fund,
housed in the ESSD vice presidency, the Bank
manager who heads the Fund Management Unit
(the secretariat) also chairs the Fund Manage-
ment Committee, which reports to the Partici-
pants Committee of public and private sector
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Potential for 
Lack of independent oversight
independent Housed in Externally Not 
Governance model oversight a the Bank managed b applicable c
Line management within the Bank PostConFund, FSAP d
Secretariat inside the Bank ProCarbFund, WSP, CGAP e GEF
ESMAP, infoDev, PPIAF, 
Cities Alliance 
Shared secretariat between Bank FIRST CGIAR f
and external organization
Secretariat inside external CEPF g GIF, RBM, Stop TB, 
organization GAVI, TDR, 
UCW, IF
Independent external entity GWP, Global Forum, MLF
UNAIDS, GDN, World Links
Number of programs 8 4 12 2
a. The Bank’s representative on the governing (and executive) bodies is inside the vice presidency responsible for managing the program, which poses potential conflicts of interest.
b. These programs are located outside the Bank, the Bank does not chair the governing body, and the Bank’s representative is a member of the governing body. 
c. The Bank is an implementing agency for GEF and MLF; it does not have responsibility for overall direction and oversight. The Bank attends the meeting of the governing and executive
bodies as an observer, and is responsible for that part of each program that is being implemented by the Bank. Individual GEF and MLF operations are appraised by the Bank, much like
its own investment operations. 
d. There is no governing body or arm’s-length secretariat for the Post-conflict Fund and FSAP, and oversight is exercised within the management chain of the Bank. Regional operational
staff outside the ESSD vice presidency are members of the Post-conflict Fund Steering Committee. Both Bank and IMF staff are members of the Financial Sector Liaison Committee, which
coordinates FSAP activities.
e. The Bank’s representative on the CG and Executive Committee is located in FSE and therefore outside the INF vice presidency, which is responsible for chairing the CG and managing
the Secretariat.
f. Pursuant to OED’s meta-evaluation, the Bank’s Chief Economist will now exercise oversight of CGIAR. The financing and terms of reference are still being put in place.
g. In the case of CEPF, although the Bank’s representative on the CEPF working group is located in the LCR Region, he reports to the Environment Director in the ESSD vice presidency for
the purposes of this program. The Bank’s President chairs the CEPF Donor Council, and the Environment Department provides the financial resources for oversight.
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contributors. While there is some independent
oversight on the Fund Management Committee
(which is composed of Bank staff from various
network and Regional vice presidencies), there
is no independent oversight from the Bank on
the crucial Participants Committee, because the
Bank is not a member of the committee. In view
of the various conflict-of-interest issues, one
option might be for a Bank manager outside the
ESSD vice presidency to sit on the Participants
Committee (as in CGAP and CGIAR). For such
external oversight to work well, however, the
Bank should develop a Board-approved strategy
before it involves itself further in the develop-
ment of carbon markets. Without an overall
Bank Group carbon finance strategy (including
delineation of the Bank’s and the IFC’s roles, an
issue currently under discussion), the external
overseer would have no standard against which
to compare performance.
For CEPF, which is housed in Conservation
International, the World Bank president
chairs the Donor Council (governing body),
and the program’s executive director, a
Conservation International staff member,
heads the secretariat and chairs the Working
Group (executive body). The Environment
Department has designated a staff member
located in the Latin America and Caribbean
Region to serve on the Working Group and
exercise fiduciary oversight and allocated
budget accordingly. While this oversight has
served the program well so far, having even a
senior staff member oversee a program
chaired by the Bank’s senior management can
compromise the independence of such
oversight.
What should oversight entail? In its global
programs, the Bank should “exercise a degree
of oversight consistent with the major roles
that it plays in the program” (OED 2003b, p.
29). For example, in the case of CGIAR, where
the Bank has been the “guardian” of the
program and gives donors continuing
confidence to invest in the program, independ-
ent oversight should not be limited to the
Bank’s financial contribution. Oversight should
also encompass the Bank’s stewardship of the
program; the allocation rules for the Bank’s
contribution (which have important signaling
effects for other donors); the progress in
implementation, including mobilizing funding;
and reporting this progress to the Bank’s
Board. 
Who should exercise oversight? Oversight
should involve someone experienced, with the
appropriate level of seniority and
demonstrated professional qualities and, in the
case of in-house programs, from outside the
implementing management chain.5 He or she
should provide an independent assessment of
the program’s performance to his or her own
vice president and to the GPP Council. The
Bank should develop standard terms of
references outlining responsibilities and
accountabilities, institute training for Bank staff
serving on governing bodies of global
programs, and routinely review whether
oversight is performed satisfactorily (based on
the terms of reference). The selection process
should be transparent, and accountability
should be well-defined. 
How much might oversight cost? The
budgetary resources allocated for oversight
should be commensurate with the tasks and
may change over time. The OPCS Project
Supervision Guidelines (BP 1305) state that: 
• Bank managers “should ensure that sufficient
supervision resources are provided for each
project, taking into account the nature, com-
plexity, and size of the operation.” 
• “Good supervision responds flexibly and de-
cisively to the changing environment and needs
of a project. Therefore supervision require-
ments…change over the life of the project be-
cause project priorities and circumstances
change.”
Presently, FSE allocates $30,000 out of its
own administrative budget for supervision of
CGAP, a $14 million program, half of the funds
for which come from the DGF. ESSD/ENV
allocates $100,000 a year for supervision of
CEPF, a $24 million program, $4 million of
which comes from the DGF (although the Bank
is also exercising supervision on behalf of the
GEF and Japan). 
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Exit Strategy
This review distinguishes exit strategies from
three perspectives: (1) the program declares
“mission accomplished” and closes; (2) the
program continues, but the Bank withdraws
from all aspects of its participation; (3) the
program continues and the Bank remains
engaged, though the degree of engagement
declines over time. Among the case study
programs, the Prototype Carbon Fund, funded
completely by the private sector, is the only
program with a defined exit strategy from the
first point of view. It was established as a pilot
program and is scheduled to end by 2012
(Annex H, table H.13).6
There are no examples of the second
perspective and three examples of the third. In
the case of GWP, although the Bank co-founded
the program in 1997, housed the secretariat for
the first few years, facilitated its move to
Stockholm in 2000, and terminated its DGF
support in FY03, the Bank remains engaged as
a co-sponsor and member of the Steering
Committee (although the Bank’s engagement
at the operational level has been minimal). In
the cases of World Links and GDN, the Bank
founded both programs, housed their
secretariats inside the Bank, and then spun
them off as independent legal entities, while
continuing to provide DGF support. 
The latter three are
the types of exits that
have been most
discussed within the
Bank since the DGF
established its arm’s-
length and exit-strategy
criteria in 1998. The
DGF issued guidelines
for the arm’s-length
criterion in June 2000
and instituted the “two-
window” approach, beginning with the FY02
DGF budget allocation, to facilitate the orderly
exit of those programs—called Window 2—that
did not qualify for long-term funding. OED’s
1998 process review (OED 2002a) concluded,
and the CGIAR meta-evaluation has
subsequently confirmed, that in-house
secretariats pose problems, including potential
conflicts of interest, excessive dependence on
the Bank, and heightened expectations of
continuing Bank support. Donors say they
prefer to house certain programs in the Bank
to ensure ready access to the Bank’s technical
expertise and country operations. In reality,
housing programs in the Bank has other,
unstated advantages, related to the Bank’s
substantial infrastructure, recruitment, staffing,
procurement and disbursement procedures,
visa and travel facilities, and the tax-free status
of an international organization.
Many programs, once created, are easily
perpetuated. Some, like WSP, ESMAP, and CGAP,
have reinvented themselves to pursue their
objectives in different ways or even to pursue
different objectives. This experience gives
strong caution to the “venture capital”
approach to public sector financing. While the
public sector will need to continue to finance
public-goods activities, the Bank’s grant
resources are limited and need continually to
be reallocated to address new global issues as
they arise. Encouraging in-house programs to
move outside the Bank and facilitating an
orderly exit from DGF support are seen as ways
of reducing the programs’ dependency on the
Bank and letting them “sink or swim,” depend-
ing on how much support they can garner from
other donors.
While spinning off programs is a good idea,
the Bank has not managed spin-offs well,
particularly in terms of oversight. The financing
strategies for GDN and World Links were poorly
worked out.7 World Links’ governance
structure is inappropriate for mobilizing long-
term funding from the private sector, particu-
larly for overhead costs and for regions such as
Africa. The Bank’s abrupt withdrawal in 2004
might reduce some of its matching-grant
funding. GDN has had a weak governance
structure, weak business management, weak
Bank oversight, and, paradoxically, a percep-
tion of too close an identification with the
Bank, because of its overwhelming financial
dependence on the Bank. While some
observers have criticized the Bank for not
ensuring that the programs it has created
8 0
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
In-house secretariats pose
problems, including
potential conflicts of
interest, excessive
dependence on the Bank,
and heightened
expectations of
continuing Bank support.
establish independent identities and exhibit
sound growth, there remains a strong
sentiment on the GDN board that the Bank
should fund this program over the long haul.
How GDN’s move to international organization
status would affect its funding and governance
arrangements remains unclear. GDN manage-
ment believes that funding prospects will be no
worse and probably better with IO status than
under the alternative status of a not-for-profit
organization incorporated in India. GDN
management has also indicated that it will
undertake the move to IO status only if the final
version of the program’s charter preserves
GDN’s independence as a research network.
Bank membership on the GDN board would
require endorsement of the Bank’s Board—
before this, a number of risks and uncertainties
need to be resolved.8
The Bank has managed exit from DGF grant
support better. But the DGF’s two-window
approach, while a useful stopgap, does not fully
address program exit. Window 1 contains some
programs (CGIAR, TDR, UNAIDS, CGAP,
infoDev and the Post-conflict Fund) that were
“grandfathered” when the Special Grants Facility
was transformed into the DGF in 1998, as well as
some new programs (GDN and CEPF) that
started afterward. The grandfathered programs,
particularly the CGIAR, claim a large share of
DGF support, while internal mechanisms to
independently monitor systemic reforms are
still being put in place. At the same time,
competition for DGF resources has increased,
and some areas (such as health-research
support for the poor, where returns to Bank
investment may be higher) remain grossly
underfunded.
Some Window 2 programs (RBM, Stop TB,
PPIAF, and Cities Alliance) seem deserving of
longer-term support either because they are
being restructured or because they appear well
run and could add considerable value to the
Bank’s long-term development objectives.9 On
the other hand, some Window 1 programs
(infoDev and CEPF) hold less promise of long-
term sustainable impacts and have potential
alternative sources of financing. The DGF has
no process for independent appraisal of
existing programs. It therefore has no means to
make informed decisions about promoting
programs from Window 2 to Window 1 or
relegating Window 1 programs to Window 2 (as
a first step toward financial exit, if they fail to
turn themselves around). The DGF’s three-year
rule for Window 2 programs is too rigid. It
needs to be more flexible and to eliminate
programs that either are not performing or are
marginal to the Bank’s mission. The Bank
needs to improve the criteria and procedures
for the DGF’s Window 2 to foster a more
flexible, rational, and informed approach to
funding “venture capital” programs.10
Programs not receiving DGF support
require similar scrutiny and an exit option. For
example, the Bank’s involvement in GIF calls
for an independent assessment and redefini-
tion of the objectives, governance, and
management. The Bank should also rationalize
its support for GWP and the various other
donor-supported water initiatives, including
the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and
Food, to help establish a cohesive set of global
programs that will help the Bank reenter and
add value through its lending to the water
sector.
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Findings and 
Recommendations
The findings and recommendations of this report build on three previ-ous OED reports on the Bank’s involvement in global programs—the1998 process review of the Bank’s grant programs, the 2002 Phase 1 re-
port, and the 2003 CGIAR meta-evaluation—and on case studies of 25 other
global programs. The report draws on extensive consultations internally and
with partners. This cumulative approach has enabled OED to comprehensively
assess the Bank’s evolving approach to global programs, including the appli-
cation of existing criteria and processes for selectivity, grant support, gover-
nance, management, and evaluation.
This final chapter summarizes the crosscutting
lessons for selectivity, design, implementation,
governance, management, financing, and
evaluation of individual global programs;
assesses the case studies’ performance on the
criteria endorsed by the Development Commit-
tee in September 2000 for the Bank’s involve-
ment in global programs; and recommends
further actions that the Bank should take to
improve the strategic and programmatic
management of its portfolio of global
programs.
OED Findings
Selectivity
“Letting a thousand flowers bloom” and experi-
menting with many new programs has helped
the Bank to understand the diversity and
complexity of global challenges in general and
the intricacy of global-country links in particu-
lar. This has informed the formulation and the
refinement of the Bank’s selectivity criteria.
Global public-goods programs meet most criteria.
While largely supply-driven, most Bank-
supported global public-goods programs (MLF,
GEF, ProCarbFund and CEPF, CGIAR, TDR,
UNAIDS, Stop TB, Roll Back Malaria, Global
Forum for Health Research, and GAVI’s Global
Research Funding) largely meet the four
Development Committee criteria for selectiv-
ity. Most global programs also largely meet the
approval and eligibility criteria for Bank
involvement. CGIAR does not meet the arm’s-
length criterion; the Bank did not involve
developing-country stakeholders in CEPF’s
establishment or its global-level governance;
8
the Bank did not do a
thorough analysis of the
expected level of Bank
resources required for
the health programs, or
of how to implement
and manage this new
commitment. These are exceptions to the
general rule, however.
The corporate advocacy programs meet the Develop-
ment Committee selectivity criteria. This is largely
because the criteria are broad and difficult to
apply precisely. For example, the first
criterion—“an international consensus that
global action is required,” which all programs
claim as their raison d’être—provides no basis
for selectivity because the concept of interna-
tional consensus is amorphous and loosely
applied. The case studies illustrate that the
consensus is often driven by constituencies in
donor countries and the staff of international
agencies. At the same time, few of the networks
demand links to country operations, one of the
most important criteria, before approval, nor
do they track them during implementation.
The Bank deploys its comparative advantages more
at the global level than at the country level. Financial
and reputational risks and budgetary and
staffing implications are rarely sufficiently
assessed. The international consensus on the
existence of a problem is usually strong;
consensus on what collective action is required
is often weak. Many
global programs are
implicitly (sometimes
explicitly) established
to promote consensus,
to “harmonize” donor
approaches to specific
problems, to delineate
donor comparative
advantages in address-
ing those problems,
and to give the donors specialized knowledge
to use on the problems. Capacity building in
the recipient countries is secondary in such
projects.
Evidence is lacking that the programs are exploiting
economies of scale and scope in such activities as
knowledge creation and dissemination, capacity
building, technical assistance, and donor coordina-
tion. It is also not clear whether the knowledge
they disseminate is sufficiently evidence-based,
quality-tested, and contextual to add value to
what the Bank’s client countries themselves do,
need, or want or what the Bank can achieve
working through country-level partnerships.
Performance indicators to assess changed
donor or international agency behavior do not
exist. Performance indicators, when they exist
at all, are focused on the behavior of develop-
ing countries. OED was able to identify only a
few program-specific indicators of changed
Bank and donor practices, procedures, and
actions in response to the advocacy of global
programs. In the case of corporate advocacy
programs, the needs of the Bank’s client
countries should be the prime consideration
for Bank involvement.
The voices of developing countries, or even those of
the Bank’s operational Regions, are inadequately
represented in the international consensus. The
case studies of corporate advocacy programs
show that including developing-country voices
at the concept stage enhances program
ownership, makes the organizational design
more effective, and increases program impacts.
Based on the evidence OED has provided so
far, management has acknowledged the need
to strengthen the role of developing countries
and the Bank’s operational Regions in global
programs.
Value Added to the Bank’s Development
Objectives
Evidence on value added to the Bank’s development
objectives varies, but is increasing. Some
programs lack clearly defined objectives, and
others have many unstated objectives; this
makes it hard to judge what value they have
added. It is hard to assess many young
programs that have not had time to
demonstrate impacts. However, evaluations
are increasing, in part prompted by the DGF,
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and are beginning to affect program design
and implementation. When programs do not
meet all three requirements for effective
evaluation—clear, shared, and measurable
objectives; appropriate methodology; and
measurable evidence—their global impacts
remain unclear.
Programs delivering global public goods often add
value. Global public-goods programs (CGIAR,
TDR, MLF, parts of GEF, and even some new
global-health programs) rate well in their
impacts on reducing poverty or on focusing on
the policy, institutional, infrastructural, or
technological constraints developing countries
face in achieving sustainable economic growth.
Adding value on the ground in client countries
is typically a joint product of global and
country-level activities. For example, CGIAR,
like TDR, has demonstrated impressive
poverty-reducing impacts in part because the
Bank, donors and some governments made
complementary investments at the country
level. However, as country-level investments
have shrunk, donors have tried to compensate
by encouraging CGIAR to move downstream.
They have offered restricted funding tied to
research programs that demonstrate immedi-
ate impacts, to push CGIAR toward more
national- and local-level applied and adaptive
work. Management agrees that the activities of
several CGIAR research centers now resemble
those that regular Bank instruments would
support through country-level investments.
Programs close to the Bank currently add more value.
Not surprisingly, the programs for which the
Bank is an implementing agency are more
closely linked with Bank operations. This is in
part because the Bank is better at absorbing
and using information and findings produced
internally or nearby. The Bank needs to devise
ways to increase its links to programs more
distant from it. Keeping the governance of
global programs at arm’s length from the Bank
and maintaining clear accountability for
program performance offer the greatest
potential for bringing new information and
fresh perspectives to Bank operations.
Global programs have revealed major gaps in invest-
ment. Evidence indicates that investments in
health research have substantial poverty-
reducing impacts. The current global policy
and aid environment has huge investment gaps
at the global level in the provision of global
health research, as well as gaps in complemen-
tary investments at the country level. Health
research, like agricultural research, is a long-
term activity unlikely to be addressed by the
private sector on the scale needed.
Global programs have also revealed gaps in global
public policy. Several global programs highlight
the existence of global public-policy gaps—
often involving industrial-country policies in
trade, aid, finance and intellectual-property
rights—that affect developing countries. Few
programs regard it as within their mandate to
address these policy gaps. If changing the
international ground rules is the objective of
the programs and if advocacy is the means to
achieve it, then the programs should be
assessed on their ability to deliver changed
policies or a changed global environment from
the perspective of the poor.
Governance, Management, and Financing
Governance is weak in several programs. While
pure shareholder models of program
governance are being replaced by stakeholder
models, programs are still struggling to balance
legitimacy and accountability for results with
efficiency in achieving
them. The permanent
members of the
programs’ governing
bodies, who tend
typically to be the major
international organiza-
tions and donors, have
greater de facto respon-
sibility, relative to the rotating members, to
ensure that programs are successful. But such
responsibility and accountability are rarely
clearly articulated. Lack of effective governance
and management must be addressed if the
Bank’s financial support is to continue. 
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governance and
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Management arrangements can alter perceived and
actual responsibilities. When the Bank or
another international organization chairs
programs that they house, this reduces the
responsibility for shared governance. When
programs are housed in the Bank or in another
international organization, the program
manager often reports both to the programs’
governing body and to a line manager in the
housing organization. This situation often
places responsibility for both management and
oversight in the same management chain,
which in turn creates real or perceived conflicts
of interest in monitoring performance.
Global programs have increased overall aid very
little. At the aggregate level, the global
programs reviewed have added little new
money to official development assistance.
Exceptions include funds from private sources
for the Prototype Carbon Fund, from the Gates
Foundation for health, and small amounts from
pharmaceutical companies through new
public-private partnerships for drug and
vaccine development. Given the opportunity
cost of ODA funds, the Bank’s involvement in
programs with important goals but little
demonstrated value needs reconsideration. In
some cases, too close an association with the
Bank has hampered mobilization of other
funds for these programs. It is time to move
from “letting a thousand flowers bloom” to
assessing which programs deserve continuing
Bank support and which do not.
World Bank Performance
Bank performance in global programs is better at the
global than at the country level. As a partner in
global programs, the
Bank has managed
programs and mobilized
resources better at the
global level than at the
country level. Other
partners view the Bank’s
leadership role, its
financial clout, its access
to policymakers, its
operational support, and its fiduciary oversight
as a seal of approval, giving them confidence to
invest in global programs, both in-house and
externally managed. Even at the global level,
though, the Bank’s performance can be
improved, particularly with respect to strategy,
independent oversight, and global-country
linkages.
The recent reforms are promising. The establish-
ment of the Global Programs and Partnership
Council, together with the GPP Group, is a
positive development. In line with the Phase 1
report’s recommendation, the GPP Council
could help oversee the development of the
Bank’s global strategy, anticipate changes in the
global environment, and help set priorities and
funding strategies. It can move global programs
from the current network perspective to a
Bankwide perspective and establish Bankwide
standards for global programming and perform-
ance. The Bank still needs to strengthen its
appraisal of new programs and to make its
selectivity, oversight, evaluation, and exit strate-
gies more transparent and results-based. Finally,
assessment and oversight of complex global
partnerships requires expert knowledge and
input, not only from the program managers who
promote them but also from other partners,
developing countries, and experts in the field.
Independent oversight is needed. The Bank needs
to institute independent oversight of all its
programs—in the case of in-house programs,
by senior managers outside the line manage-
ment of the vice presidency handling the
program. Oversight of both externally managed
and in-house programs needs to be guided by
clear terms of reference, have the necessary
budget, and have accountability for perform-
ance. Independent oversight is particularly
important early on to ensure that programs get
off to a good start. Bank management also
needs to institute routine procedures of quality
assurance, internal audits, risk assessment, and
risk management.
Exit strategies of programs are not working well.
The Bank’s record in managing the separation
8 6
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
The Bank still needs to
strengthen its appraisal of
new programs and to make
its selectivity, oversight,
evaluation, and exit
strategies more transparent
and results-based.
of in-house programs from the Bank needs
improvement. For example, the mechanical,
hands-off, three-year rule for DGF Window 2
programs has not facilitated orderly financial
exits. More attention needs to be paid to
strengthening governance and sustainable
financing of programs being spun off.
The Bank’s strategy for global programs is poorly
defined. The Bank has lacked, but clearly needs,
a global strategy that is developed in conjunc-
tion with its key partners and draws on the
capacity that exists in its central vice presiden-
cies, network anchors, and Regions to do so.
The strategy needs to address the coherence,
or lack thereof, between global expectations
(particularly in the donor community) and the
needs of developing countries. At its center, the
global strategy needs a clear focus on sustain-
able, poverty-reducing growth in the Bank’s
client countries; on global policy issues that
prevent such growth; and on mobilizing
incremental, unrestricted funding to address
global issues that are high-priority for develop-
ing countries. Such a strategy will not simply
emerge from improved selectivity or oversight
of individual global programs; it must be
worked out. Furthermore, strengthening
oversight in the absence of an overall strategy
risks micro-managing the global program
portfolio.
Overall Performance of the Case Study
Programs
Taken together, how are the programs
performing, and what lessons do they offer for
adding value to the Bank’s mission? Assessing
the overall performance of the 26 global
programs against the four Development
Committee criteria1 (figure 8.1) confirms this
chapter’s findings: 
• The programs rate highest with respect to in-
ternational consensus. But international con-
sensus is an amorphous concept that, by itself,
provides little basis for selectivity.
• The Bank’s presence catalyzes non-Bank re-
sources for global programs, and the Bank em-
ploys its comparative advantage better at the
global level than at the
country level.
• The programs rate
lowest with respect to
adding value to the
Bank’s development
objectives and em-
ploying the Bank’s
comparative advantage at the country level.
These support the previous findings that the
programs are weak on results-based manage-
ment and evaluation and that the Bank is weak
on country links.
These lessons need to be applied to ensure
more effective consultative processes involving
specialized U.N. agencies, key donors, client
countries and other stakeholders (civil society
and private sector) to determine developing
countries’ needs and priorities and to establish
a global strategy, global program selectivity, and
global-country links. Adjustments are also
needed to improve the Bank’s internal manage-
ment to ensure greater program selectivity,
effective program management, and the use of
operational country capacity.
It is time to adapt and apply to global programs
many of the tools and processes that the Bank
has developed for its country operations. OED
consultations within the Bank and with external
partners indicate that the budget and staff
required to link partnership-based global
programs with country needs are much greater
than originally expected. This partly explains the
often weak links between global programs and
country activities. Furthermore, deciding to
support a global program needs to be based on
an assessment of the entire program life cycle,
from concept, design, and appraisal to implemen-
tation, evaluation, and
exit. The Bank needs 
to support those
programs that can add
value to its poverty allevi-
ation mission by enhanc-
ing the quality and
effectiveness of its own
operations and the activi-
ties of its clients.
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OED Recommendations
Strategic Framework for the Bank’s
Involvement in Global Programs
1. In consultation with U.N. agencies, donors,
developing countries, and other partners, man-
agement should develop a global strategy for
the Bank’s involvement in global programs,
approved by the Board and periodically up-
dated, that:
– Exploits the Bank’s comparative advantage
as a multisectoral development financing
institution with a global reach and strong ca-
pacity in policy analysis
– Gives greater prominence to alleviating
poverty and to addressing global public
policies that limit developing countries’
prospects for rapid, sustainable, poverty-
reducing growth
– Fosters stronger links between global pro-
grams and the Bank’s Regional and country
operations in prioritizing its global pro-
gramming activities 
– Ensures that global programs add value be-
yond what the Bank can accomplish through
partnerships at the country level.
Linking Financing to Priorities 
2. Management should develop a financing plan
for high-priority programs, particularly for
those providing genuine global public goods,
whether in the form of global policies, new
products, technologies, knowledge, or prac-
tices that benefit the poor. This requires:
– Identifying underfunded long-term global
public-goods programs that benefit the
poor—such as a global health research and
product development network for diseases
that disproportionately affect the poor—
and using the Bank’s convening power to
mobilize additional resources for them
– Improving the criteria and procedures re-
lating to the DGF’s Window 2 to create a
more rational and informed approach to
funding “venture capital” programs, in which
the DGF only provides initial support
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– Developing a policy on the use of trust
funds in the context of the overall strategy
for global programs.
Selectivity and Oversight of the Global Program
Portfolio
3. Management should establish approval, over-
sight, evaluation and exit/reauthorization cri-
teria and procedures for Bank-supported global
programs that will help them to add value to
the Bank’s mission. This includes:
– Streamlining and clarifying the eligibility
and approval criteria for Bank selectivity
and grant support and instituting a two-
stage approval process for global programs
at the concept and appraisal stages
– Sharpening and more rigorously applying
the subsidiarity criterion for approval and
grant support
– Separating Bank oversight from the imple-
menting management and, for Bank staff
serving on the governing bodies of global
programs, clarifying their roles, responsi-
bilities, and accountabilities through stan-
dard terms of reference and training
– Allocating money for oversight and money
that the network anchor and Regional staff
can use to operationalize global programs
in the Bank’s Regional operations
– Instituting clear, well-planned, and well-
executed reauthorization/exit processes, and
ensuring that programs that the Bank spins off
have an independent identity, accountability
for results, and a good chance of succeeding.
Governance and Management of Individual
Programs
4. Management should work with its global part-
ners to develop and apply universally ac-
cepted standards of good governance, man-
agement, results-orientation, and evaluation
to all Bank-supported global programs. These
include:
– Legal status and/or written charters, as 
appropriate
– Transparent selection criteria and processes
for board chairs and board members; clar-
ifying their roles, responsibilities, account-
abilities, and constituencies; and giving them
authority to direct and oversee the pro-
gram, its policies, and its budget
– Voice of the Bank’s client countries on the
governing bodies of global programs for
better balance between industrial and de-
veloping countries
– Guidelines on conflicts of interests, on the
roles of NGOs and the private sector in gov-
erning bodies, and on the roles and quality
of advisory boards
– Designation of evaluation and auditing as
functions of the governing body, not the
program management, with results that
should routinely be made available to
program financiers and other stake-
holders.
Evaluation
5. OED should include global programs in its
standard evaluation and reporting processes.
This includes:
– Working with the Bank’s global partners to
develop international standards for the eval-
uation of global programs 
– Reviewing selected program-level evalua-
tions conducted by Bank-supported global
programs (both internally and externally
managed), much as OED reviews other
self-evaluations at the project and country
levels.
F I N D I N G S  A N D  R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
8 9

ANNEXES

9 3
ANNEX A: PREVIOUS OED RECOMMENDATIONS IN RELATION TO 
GLOBAL PROGRAMS
1998 Review
In 1998 OED reviewed the grant process (see
OED 2002a) to inform the Bank’s Executive
Board’s discussion of funding for grant programs
in FY99 and beyond, under the auspices of the
Special Grants Program (SGP) and its succes-
sor, the Development Grants Facility (DGF). The
review focused on three things: the relevance of
the Bank’s grant-making programs to its overall
strategy and developmental role; the quality of
grant-program management; and grant pro-
grams’ development effectiveness. As the largest
and oldest of the Bank’s grant programs, the
Consultative Group on International Agricul-
tural Research (CGIAR) figured significantly in
this review.
OED recommended that the World Bank’s
grant programs be governed by three guiding
principles: subsidiarity, maintaining an arm’s-
length relationship, and following an exit strategy.
Subsidiarity
The Bank should give grants in situations where
lending is inappropriate and where there is no
other source of funds, to ensure that grants do
not compete with the Bank’s other instruments.
IDA 13 enables grant funding for specific coun-
try or Regional activities among the poorest coun-
tries. Still, DGF grant funding is more limited
relative to IDA funding and should be used for ac-
tivities for which countries are unlikely or un-
willing to borrow or receive grants—activities
that have benefits with strong spillovers across na-
tional borders, activities that require long-term
investments before results can materialize, or
those with large-scale economies in production,
and hence activities that individual small coun-
tries will not be willing or able to undertake.
Arm’s-length Relationship
The Bank should maintain an arm’s-length rela-
tionship with grant recipients, because of the po-
tential for conflicts of interest when the grantor
is closely related to the grantee. A de facto de-
pendency arises when the Bank is called upon
to handle fund-raising, fiduciary, and adminis-
trative responsibilities in collaboration with its
grantees. 
Exit Strategy
The Bank needs exit strategies, because of the
risk of dependency when grants continue over
long periods. Grant programs without such
strategies potentially undermine the grantee’s in-
dependence, reduce the sustainability of program
benefits, and impede revisions of the grant port-
folio to reflect new programmatic priorities.
Phase 1 Report
Organization
Management should strengthen the strategic
planning and oversight of global programs and
partnerships. This will make priority setting more
rigorous, improve management, and strengthen
corporate leadership on global issues. While the
networks would continue to have primary re-
sponsibility for task management and partner re-
lations, management should establish a central
vice-presidential unit to:
• Set standards, oversee programming and budg-
eting, assure quality, and report annually to
senior management and the Board on imple-
mentation.
• Ensure that risk-management policies are de-
fined by the appropriate unit and oversee net-
work implementation of risk management, in-
cluding, as appropriate, reporting to the Board.
• Provide intellectual leadership, monitor and an-
ticipate changes and emerging opportunities
in the global environment, and draw partner-
ship implications for the Bank.
• Identify constraints in the global policy envi-
ronment on improving development outcomes
for the Bank’s clients.
Strategy
Management should articulate a strategy for
Bank involvement in global programs that defines
objectives, oversight responsibilities, and the
Bank’s comparative advantage. The strategy
would explain how global programs should be
distinguished from institutional partnerships,
how they contribute to the Bank’s mission, how
strongly they should focus on providing global
public goods, and what specific forms of part-
nership they should involve. The central vice-
presidential unit (VPU) should: 
• Develop and monitor performance indicators
to ensure that networks and Regions link global
programs, country assistance strategies, and
sector strategies.
• Prepare annual reports for the Board based on
information provided by the networks. 
• Develop clear and transparent criteria and
guidelines for resource allocation; budgeting,
accounting, and auditing practices; and infor-
mation systems for global programs. 
Selectivity
The central VPU should establish and monitor
global-program standards for the networks. Such
standards would cover matters such as verifiable
objectives, dedicated Bank resources, appropri-
ate organizational and funding arrangements,
and some form of cost-benefit or other ex ante
criteria for Bankwide prioritization and quality as-
surance. The central VPU should:
• For programs above a threshold size (which
are likely to provide global public goods):
help set up identification, preparation, ap-
praisal, Board-approval, oversight, and evalu-
ation processes. 
• For new, small, merit-goods programs that
are not presented to the Board: help improve
approval, monitoring, and auditing in the DGF.
Management could introduce independent re-
views that are external to the programs—sim-
ilar to those used by the World Bank Research
Committee—for allocating small DGF grants.
• Help adapt the standards and procedures
developed for innovative lending opera-
tions, such as the Learning and Innovation
Loans and Adaptable Program Loans, to
global programs.
Program Implementation
Management should clarify the responsibilities
and accountabilities of the Board, Regions, net-
works, and task managers, and give each the re-
sources they need to fulfill the Bank’s
commitments with its partners. This will re-
quire:
• For all programs:
– Ensure the independence of the DGF’s
three-year evaluation process by extending
the practice to all programs—including on-
going programs, regardless of whether fund-
ing comes from the Bank budget, the DGF,
or Bank-managed trust funds—as a pre-
requisite for continuing support.
– Include global programs in OED’s standard
evaluation and reporting processes, thus
ensuring routine reporting to the Board of
the findings of independent evaluations
and management decisions about continu-
ing program support.
• For programs under implementation: 
– Introduce a more systematic approach for
task-manager monitoring of program per-
formance and provision of audit reports. 
– Introduce independent panels similar to
those used by the Bank’s Quality Assurance
Group to review quality of the ongoing port-
folio.
– Expand DGF audits to cover all programs re-
ceiving medium- to long-term Bank sup-
port (Window 1). 
– Introduce quality assurance and enhance-
ment standards and clear network ac-
countabilities. 
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The CGIAR Meta-Evaluation
Focusing the World Bank’s Responsibilities 
The Bank is a convener and donor to CGIAR
and a lender to developing countries. Conse-
quently, it has responsibilities for CGIAR’s cor-
porate governance. It should exercise a degree
of oversight consistent with its major role. This
will require: 
• A concerted, high-level effort, much as when
CGIAR was established, to fundamentally re-
form CGIAR’s organizational structure, finance,
and management—particularly to encourage
donors to reverse their trend toward restricted
funding and to establish targets for an increased
share of unrestricted funding 
• Separating oversight and management func-
tions within the Bank to resolve the conflicts
of interest faced by the Environmentally and So-
cially Sustainable Development (ESSD) vice
president, the Agriculural and Rural Develop-
ment (ARD) director, the Research Advisor,
and the CGIAR director
• Independent triennial appraisals of CGIAR,
with Board approval as the basis of continuing
Bank support
• Abandoning the matching-grant model 
• Regular reporting to the Board on the impact
of Bank resource allocation on the system’s in-
centive structure.
Such changes should ensure that the Bank’s
resources are allocated strategically, in support
of global and regional public goods that improve
agricultural productivity and reduce poverty,
based on long-term priorities articulated by the
science council. The Bank itself must see that a
strong, qualified, independent science council is
established and vested with the resources to es-
tablish systemwide priorities, policies, and strate-
gies and to report to the membership on CGIAR’s
progress toward fulfilling them.
Reforming the CGIAR
CGIAR’s strategic priorities should give more
prominence to basic plant breeding and
germplasm improvement and to research on
productivity and sustainable use of natural re-
sources for the benefit of developing countries.
This will require the following:
• Postponing approval of new challenge pro-
grams pending the installation of the new sci-
ence council, an assessment of system-level
priorities, and a thorough review of the design
and approval process of the two challenge pro-
grams already approved
• Increasing funding for conventional germplasm
enhancement and plant- and animal-breeding
research, in which the CGIAR possesses a com-
parative advantage 
• Conducting an independent review of natural re-
source management, policy, and social-science
research from a global and regional public-goods
perspective to help address country- and re-
gional-level issues constraining productivity and
the sustainable use of natural resources
• Devolving that portion of the CGIAR’s applied
and adaptive natural resource management
research program that does not involve pub-
lic-goods research to national and regional
agencies, supported by substantially larger
funding for national and regional agricultural
research from developing-country govern-
ments and donors
• Developing systemwide strategies and poli-
cies that facilitate businesslike partnerships
with national agricultural research systems
(NARS), agricultural research institutions,
NGOs, and the private sector
• Strengthening the management and use of in-
tellectual property and genetic resources
• Using new scientific areas like biotechnology
and bioinformatics to complement conven-
tional research
• Enhancing collaborative research as a means
of building capacity and training
• Engaging developing country NARS to provide
similar services to smaller and weaker NARS.
CGIAR governance should be reconfigured
to promote greater efficiency, tougher priority-
setting, and scientific excellence without sacri-
ficing legitimacy and ownership. This will require: 
• Adopting a written charter that delineates the
roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of
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the various officers and bodies that govern
the system, and a mechanism to further reform
system governance
• Analyzing the advantages and disadvantages
of establishing all or part of CGIAR as a sepa-
rate legal entity attuned to deal with today’s re-
alities on partnerships
• Making executive committee (ExCo) members
more fully representative and accountable to
the CGIAR membership
• Having donors share in the costs of the CGIAR
secretariat, the science council and its secre-
tariat, and other central bodies in the CGIAR
system
• Increasing system efficiency in generating
global and regional public goods through ap-
propriate consolidation, decentralization,
streamlining, and absorption of marginally ef-
fective centers, based on a management review
of center organization, programs, and scientific
quality
• Creating a body that reports to ExCo and has
responsibility for annual system-level audits, tri-
ennial or quintennial external reviews in con-
sultation with the science council, and
transparency in reporting the system’s ex-
penditures, all to ensure the strategic public-
goods nature of CGIAR research.
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OED has made three sets of recommendations
with respect to the Bank’s grant and global pro-
grams (Annex A). The Phase 1 report assessed
the progress made in implementing the recom-
mendations of OED’s 1998 process review of
the Bank’s grant programs (box B.1) (OED 2002c,
pp. 39–48). This annex assesses progress in im-
plementing the recommendations of the Phase
1 report and the CGIAR meta-evaluation.
Bank management has systematically re-
viewed, assessed, and implemented the report’s
recommendations in all four areas—organiza-
tion, strategy, selectivity, and program imple-
mentation. Following the June 2002 CODE
meeting, management established a review
group led by the Operations Policy and Country
Services vice presidency (OPCS) to study the
report’s recommendations in depth. That group
issued its report in October 2002. Following dis-
cussions of the review group’s report, which
seconded most of OED’s recommendations, sen-
ior management presented its conclusions and
proposed courses of action to the Board in March
2003. Management then set up a second GPP
Working Group on Implementation, also led by
OPCS, which issued its report in July 2003. At that
time, responsibility for implementing the new
strategic and programmatic framework for global
programs formally shifted from OPCS to the
Concessional Financing and Partnerships (CFP)
vice presidency. 
Organization
Management has established a management
committee, the Global Programs and Partner-
ships (GPP) Council. The Council’s terms of ref-
erence are (1) to set the Bank’s vision and
priorities for engagement in GPPs, (2) to review
VPU portfolios and the Bank’s institutional part-
nerships, and (3) to set and oversee criteria for
selection and evaluation of GPPs, including gov-
ernance structures, risk management, exit strate-
gies, and best practices. Management has also
established the GPP Group in the CFP vice pres-
idency to support the GPP Council. Its roles are
to be an anchor for coordination and analysis
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In October 1998 the Bank adopted subsidiarity, arm’s-length re-
lationship, and exit strategy as three of its eight eligibility cri-
teria for DGF grants.
In June 2000 the DGF issued guidelines for in-house secre-
tariats to comply with the arm’s-length criterion.
In June 2000 the DGF began regular evaluations, on a three-
to-five-year cycle, for each program receiving more than $300,000
annually.
In June 2000 the DGF instituted the “two-window” approach,
to commence with the FY02 DGF budget allocation, to facilitate
orderly exit from programs that did not qualify for long-term
funding.
The Phase 1 report also recommended that the DGF introduce
an independent external review process for the allocation of
grants to small programs that are not presented to the Board for
approval, and that it ensure the independence of global program
evaluations. The Phase 1 report promised further findings based
on the 26 case studies.
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across the Bank and to support network and re-
gional teams involved in GPPs.
OED’s phase 1 report had also recommended
that, while the networks would continue to have
the primary responsibility for task management
and partner relations with respect to global pro-
grams, a central VPU (such as the GPP Council
and Group now established) should:
• Oversee programming and budgeting for global
programs. 
• Perform quality assurance.
• Report annually to the Board on program im-
plementation.
• Oversee network implementation of risk-man-
agement processes.
• Provide intellectual leadership, routinely mon-
itor and anticipate changes and emerging op-
portunities in the global environment, and
draw partnership implications for the Bank.
• Identify constraints in the global policy envi-
ronment on improving development outcomes
for the Bank’s clients.
The GPP Council and Group are still works in
progress, but their terms of reference do not in-
clude the authority to perform the above func-
tions or to see that they are carried out by other
Bank units reporting to the GPP Council. There
is no indication of whether, when, or how the
Council will gain such authority. 
Strategy
OED’s phase 1 report recommendations have
supported several management initiatives with
respect to global programs:
• Global programs are being explicitly incorpo-
rated into the business planning of network an-
chors, DEC, and the World Bank Institute
(WBI).
• The tracking of spending on global programs
is being improved by more uniform use of
business processes and product lines related
to global programs. Yet since VPUs use non-
comparable approaches, it is still impossible to
aggregate the Bank’s budgetary expenditures,
DGF grants, and trust fund expenditures on
global programs.
• Rules for the use of Bank budget and grants for
support of global programs have been clarified.
For in-house programs, Bank budget can only
be used for in-house secretariat costs. DGF
grants must flow to externally managed activ-
ities in entities outside the Bank. Progress still
needs to be made on applying these resources
(table B.1).
The GPP Group has also begun some net-
work-specific portfolio reviews. 
The phase 1 report also recommended that
the Bank articulate a global strategy that uses the
Bank’s comparative advantage. The present re-
port reaffirms the need for a strategy that helps
integrate global programs into the treatment of
public policies that affect poverty and links global
program activities to the Bank’s regional and
country operations, to the priorities of devel-
oping countries, and to the poverty reduction
strategy process. Neither the steps the Bank has
taken thus far nor the current criteria for Bank
involvement in global programs can substitute
for a global strategy.
Selectivity
In FY03, the DGF council instituted an ex ante
review process, by reputable peers outside the
Bank, for new global programs seeking DGF
funding in FY04. Sector boards also played a
more active role in reviewing applications in
FY03 than they had in past. For the first time, sev-
eral sector boards provided detailed written
comments about program issues and concerns
on the PATS forms. This demonstrated more
careful scrutiny of proposals and improved pro-
gram quality at entry. The quality of proposals
reaching the DGF Council has increased no-
ticeably over the past two years.
However, the Bank’s 22 eligibility and ap-
proval criteria and 10 priorities are too numer-
ous and inconsistent to ensure selectivity or
quality at entry. The phase 1 report’s recom-
mendations—that management should (1) in-
stitute transparent identification, preparation,
appraisal, Board approval, oversight, and eval-
uation processes for programs above a certain
size and (2) help adapt the standards and pro-
cedures developed for innovative lending op-
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erations to global programs—have not yet been
implemented. The Bank needs to clarify its cri-
teria, enforce their application more strictly, an-
alyze program budgets more thoroughly, and
appraise program objectives and partners more
carefully before entering into or continuing
partnerships. 
Program Design and Implementation
OED’s Phase 1 report has also improved the
monitoring and evaluation of DGF-supported
programs. There is a deeper appreciation for
the role that evaluation can play in enhancing the
quality and focus of global programs—as a means
both to understand where improvements in pro-
gram performance can be made and to demon-
strate program worth, thereby providing
justification for continued funding. This has led
to increased frequency of program-level evalu-
ations, improved terms of reference, greater in-
dependence, and better conduct of evaluations.
Evaluation and audit are increasingly viewed as
functions of the governing body, not of the pro-
gram management.
The second GPP Working Group on Imple-
mentation (led by OPCS from February to July
2003) analyzed existing GPPs with a view to de-
veloping standardized governance models for
global programs. Based on this work, the GPP
Group is giving global program teams early-stage
advice on governance, management, and fi-
nancing. This demonstrates increasing recogni-
tion of the concerns, raised by OED and others,
about the balance between learning and con-
trol, about the balance between oversight and ac-
countability in partnership, and about potential
conflicts of interest, especially with respect to in-
house secretariats. However, as demonstrated in
chapter 5 of the main report, plenty of work re-
mains to be done.
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Governance All key decisions on program execution are All key decisions are made jointly by All key decisions are made by 
made by the Bank. the Bank and its partners. an entity external to the Bank.
Source of Primary source of funding is Bank adminis- • Use of Bank budget is restricted to DGF is the only source of Bank 
funding trative budget. Trust funds and reimburse- funding of in-house secretariat costs. funding. (World Bank admin-  
ments may be used, but do not affect the • Trust-fund resources may fund both istrative budget [BB] funding
Bank’s role as decisionmaker. program costs and in-house must not be used, because 
secretariat costs. Bank is not accountable 
• DGF grants must flow to entities for outputs.)
outside the Bank for funding costs of 
externally managed activities.
Accountability • Program outputs and outcomes should Where funding is from the Bank budget, Planning and monitoring of 
be approved as part of the budget program outputs and outcomes should results handled as part of DGF 
process. be approved as part of budget process budget process.
• Program outputs and outcomes should and specified in the Unit Compact as 
be specified in the Unit Compact. “partnership outputs.”
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P r o g r a m s  a n d  P a r t n e r s h i p s
T a b l e  B . 1

1 0 1
The Phase 2 report and the case studies follow
a common outline and address 20 evaluation
questions (table C.1) that derive from OED’s
standard evaluation criteria (table C.2), the 14 el-
igibility and approval criteria for global programs
(table C.3), and the 8 eligibility criteria for DGF
grant support (table C.4).
The sheer number of these criteria, some of
which overlap, can be daunting even to an eval-
uator. The OED evaluation team thus reorgan-
ized these criteria into four evaluation issues,
which correspond to the four major sections of
each report (table C.1):
• The overarching global relevance of the pro-
gram
• Outcomes and impacts of the program and
their sustainability
• Governance, management, and financing of
the program
• The World Bank’s performance as a partner in
the program.
While program sponsorship by major inter-
national organizations may enhance the pro-
gram’s legitimacy in the Bank’s client countries,
it ensures neither developing-country owner-
ship nor development effectiveness. “Rele-
vance” and ownership by the Bank’s client
countries are more assured if those countries
demand the program. On the other hand, some
supply-led programs may acquire ownership
over time by demonstrating substantial impacts,
as in the case of the Internet. Assessing rele-
vance is the most challenging task in global
programs, since global and country resources,
comparative advantages, benefit, costs, and pri-
orities do not always coincide. Indeed, the di-
vergence of benefits and costs between the
global and country levels is often the funda-
mental reason why global public goods must be
provided in the first place. Evaluating the rele-
vance of global action to the Bank’s client coun-
tries is nonetheless important, because the
global development agenda is becoming
crowded while finances have stagnated; selec-
tivity has become more important.
For the global programs that have been op-
erating for some time, efficacy can be assessed
not only in terms of program outcomes but also
in terms of impacts in developing countries.
Outcomes and impacts in turn depend on the
clarity and evaluability of each program’s objec-
tives, the quality of the monitoring and evalua-
tion of results, and, where appropriate, the
effectiveness of global program activities’ links
to the country level. 
Since global programs are partnerships, effi-
ciency must include some assessment of whether
the benefits from the partnership, net of its
costs, are superior to what the partners could
achieve by acting alone. The institutional devel-
opment impact and the sustainability of the pro-
gram itself (as opposed to that of the outcomes
and impacts of the program’s activities) are also
addressed in this section of each report.
Finally, these evaluations focus on whether the
Bank uses its comparative advantage in its part-
nerships. The Bank is variously convener, trustee,
and donor to global programs, and lender to
developing countries. The Bank’s financial sup-
port to global programs—including oversight
and liaison activities and links to the Bank’s Re-
gional operations—comes from a combination
of the its net income (for DGF grants), its ad-
ministrative budget, and Bank-administered trust
funds. In the case of the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF), the Bank is a trustee; in the case
ANNEX C: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR PHASE 2 REPORT AND 
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of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria (GFATM), it is a “limited” trustee. The
Bank is also an implementing agency for GEF and
MLF. Thus, assessing Bank performance includes
the use of the Bank’s convening power, the
Bank’s trusteeship, Bank financing and imple-
mentation of global programs, and, where ap-
propriate and necessary, links to country
operations. Bank oversight of this entire set of
activities is an important aspect of the Bank’s
strategic and programmatic management of its
portfolio of global programs.
The first column in table C.1 indicates how the
4 sections and 20 evaluation questions addressed
in the Phase 2 report and case studies relate to
the 8 evaluation issues that the Bank’s Executive
Board raised in the various Board discussions of
global programs during the design of OED’s
global evaluation:1
• Selectivity
• Monitoring and evaluation
• Governance and management
• Partnerships and participation
• Financing
• Risks and risk management
• Links to country operations.
The third column in table C.1 indicates how
the 4 sections and 20 evaluation questions relate
to OED’s standard evaluation criteria for invest-
ment projects (table C.2), the 14 criteria en-
dorsed by the Development Committee and
established by Bank management for approv-
ing the Bank’s involvement in global programs
(table C.3), and the 8 criteria for grant support
from the Development Grant Facility (table C.4).
The 14 eligibility and approval criteria for the
Bank’s involvement in global programs have
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Evaluation issues Evaluation questions Reference
Section I. Overarching global relevance of the program
1. Selectivity 1. Relevance. To what extent are the programs: A modification of OED’s rele-
• Addressing global challenges and concerns in the sector vance criterion (table C.2) for 
• Consistent with client countries’ current development priorities the purpose of global programs.
• Consistent with the Bank’s mission, corporate priorities, and sector and The third bullet also relates to 
country assistance strategies? managing director (MD) ap-
proval criterion #1 regarding a 
“clear linkage to the Bank’s core 
institutional objectives” (table 
C.3).
2. International consensus. To what extent did the programs arise out of an Development Committee (DC) 
international consensus, formal or informal: criterion #1 (table C.3).
• Concerning the main global challenges and concerns in the sector
• That global collective action is required to address these challenges 
and concerns?
3. MD eligibility criteria. To what extent are the programs: The four bullets correspond to 
• Providing global and regional public goods the four MD eligibility criteria 
• Supporting international advocacy to improve policies at the national level (table C.3).
• Producing and delivering cross-country lessons of relevance to client countries
• Mobilizing substantial incremental resources?
4. Subsidiarity. To what extent do the activities of the programs complement, DGF eligibility criterion #1 (table 
substitute for, or compete with regular Bank instruments? C.4). 
K e y  E v a l u a t i o n  I s s u e s  a n d  Q u e s t i o n sT a b l e  C . 1
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Section II. Outcomes, impacts, and their sustainability
2. Monitoring and 5. Efficacy. To what extent have the programs achieved, or are expected to OED’s efficacy criterion (table 
evaluation achieve, their stated objectives, taking into account their relative importance? C.2).
6. Value added. To what extent are the programs adding value to: The first bullet corresponds to 
• What the Bank is doing in the sector to achieve its core mission Bank management criterion #1 
• What developing and transition countries are doing in the sector in (table C.3).
accordance with their own priorities?
7. Monitoring and evaluation. To what extent do the programs have effective MD approval criterion #6 (table 
monitoring and evaluation: C.3), since effective communica-
• Clear program and component objectives verifiable by indicators tions with key stakeholders, in-
• A structured set of quantitative or qualitative indicators cluding the Bank’s Executive 
• Systematic and regular processes for data collection and management Directors, requires good moni-
• Independence of program-level evaluations toring and evaluation practices.
• Effective feedback from monitoring and evaluation to program objectives, 
governance, management, and financing?
8. Sustainability of outcomes and impacts. To what extent are the outcomes OED’s sustainability criterion 
and impacts of the programs resilient to risk over time? (table C.2).
Section III. Organization, management, and financing of the program
3. Governance and 9. Efficiency. To what extent have the programs achieved, or are expected A modification of OED’s efficacy 
management to achieve: criterion for the purpose of 
• Benefits more cost-effectively than providing the same service on a global programs (table C.2).
country-by-country basis The first bullet also relates to 
• Benefits more cost-effectively than if the contributors to the program MD eligibility criterion #3 (table 
acted alone? C.3) and DGF eligibility criterion 
#3 (table C.4).
10. Legitimacy. To what extent is the authorizing environment for the A modification of OED’s evalua-
programs effectively derived from those with a legitimate interest in the tion criteria (table C.2) for the 
program (including donors, developing and transition countries, clients, and purpose of global programs.
other stakeholders), taking into account their relative importance?
11. Governance and management. To what extent are the governance and MD approval of criterion #5
management of the programs: (table C.3) and DGF eligibility 
• Transparent in providing information about the programs criterion #5 (table C.4).
• Clear with respect to roles and responsibilities
• Fair to immediate clients
• Accountable to donors, developing and transition countries, scientists/
professionals, and other stakeholders?
4. Partnerships and 12. Partnerships and participation. To what extent do developing- and DGF eligibility criterion #8 (table 
participation transition-country partners, clients, and beneficiaries participate and exercise C.4).
voice in the various aspects of the program’s:
(Table continues on the following page.)
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• Design
• Governance
• Implementation
• Monitoring and evaluation?
5. Financing 13. Financing. To what extent are the sources of funding for the programs MD approval criterion #4 (table 
affecting, positively or negatively: C.3).
• The strategic focus of the program The third bullet also relates to 
• The governance and management of the program OED’s sustainability criterion 
• The sustainability of the program? (table C.2).
14. Bank action to catalyze. To what extent has the Bank’s presence as a DC criterion #3 (table C.3) and 
partner in the programs catalyzed, or is catalyzing, non-Bank resources for DGF eligibility criterion #4 (table
the programs? C.4).
15. Institutional development impact. To what extent has the program estab- A modification of OED’s institu-
lished effective institutional arrangements to make efficient, equitable, and tional development impact crite-
sustainable use of the collective financial, human, and other resources rion (table C.2) for the purpose of 
contributed to the program? global programs.
6. Risks and risk 16. Risks and risk management. To what extent have the risks associated MD approval criterion #3 (table 
management with the programs been identified and managed? C.3).
Section IV. World Bank’s performance
7. Links to country 17. Comparative advantage. To what extent is the Bank playing up to its DC criterion #3 (table C.3), MD 
operations comparative advantages in relation to other partners in the programs: approval criterion #2 (table C.3), 
• At the global level (global mandate and reach, convening power, and DGF eligibility criterion #2 
mobilizing resources) (table C.4). 
• At the country level (multisector capacity, analytical expertise, 
country-level knowledge)?
18. Links to country operations. To what extent are there effective and MD approval criterion #1 (table 
complementary links, where needed, between global program activities C.3) regarding “linkages to the 
and the Bank’s country operations, to the mutual benefit of each? Bank’s country operational work.”
19. Oversight. To what extent is the Bank exercising effective and This relates to DGF eligibility cri-
independent oversight of its involvement in the programs, as appropriate, terion #6 on “arm’s-length rela-
for in-house and externally managed programs, respectively? tionship” (table C.4). 
Both questions 17 and 18 to-
gether relate to OED’s Bank per-
formance criterion (table C.2).
20. Disengagement strategy. To what extent is the Bank facilitating DGF eligibility criterion #7 (table 
effective, flexible, and transparent disengagement strategies, C.4).
as appropriate?
evolved since April 2000, when Bank manage-
ment first proposed a strategy to the Board for
such involvement. They include the four over-
arching criteria endorsed by the Development
Committee, as well as the four eligibility crite-
ria and the six approval criteria presented by
Bank management to the Board. Each global
program must meet at least one of the eligibil-
ity criteria and all six of the approval criteria.
The first two eligibility criteria relate directly to
the Bank’s global public-goods and corporate-ad-
vocacy priorities (table C.3). Although the six ap-
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Criterion Standard definitions for lending operations Possible ratings
Relevance The extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent (1) with the country’s High, substantial, modest, 
development priorities and (2) with Bank country and sector assistance strategies negligible.
and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country 
Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). 
Efficacy The extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or expected to be High, substantial, modest, 
achieved, taking into account their relative importance. negligible.
Efficiency The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return High, substantial, modest, 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits, at least cost compared negligible.
with alternatives. 
Legitimacy a The extent to which the authority exercised by the program is effectively derived High, substantial, modest, 
from those with a legitimate interest in the program (including donors, developing negligible.
and transition countries, clients, and other stakeholders), taking into account their 
relative importance.
Institutional The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make High, substantial, modest, 
development more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural negligible.
impact resources through (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and 
predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the 
mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from 
these institutional arrangements. IDI includes both intended and unintended 
effects of a project.
Sustainability The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. Highly likely, likely, unlikely, 
highly unlikely. 
Outcome The extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or Highly satisfactory, satisfactory, 
are expected to be achieved, efficiently. moderately satisfactory, moder-
ately unsatisfactory, unsatisfac-
tory, highly unsatisfactory.
Bank performance The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry Highly satisfactory, satisfactory,
and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including unsatisfactory, highly unsatis-
ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). factory. 
Borrower The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to Highly satisfactory, satisfactory, 
performance ensure quality of preparation and implementation and complied with covenants unsatisfactory, highly unsatis-
and agreements, toward the achievement of development objectives and factory.
sustainability.
a. This represents an addition to OED’s standard evaluation criteria in the case of global programs, since effective governance of global programs is concerned with the legitimacy of their
exercise of authority, in addition to efficiency in the use of resources.
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Selectivity Criteria for Bank Involvement in Global Public Goods: 
Endorsed by Development Committee (September 2000)a
1. An emerging international consensus that global action is required
2. A clear value added to the Bank’s development objectives
3. The need for Bank action to catalyze other resources and partnerships
4. A signiﬁcant comparative advantage for the Bank.
Approval Criteria for Bank Involvement in Partnership Initiatives beyond the Country Level, 
Established by Bank Management (November 2000)b
1. A clear link to the Bank’s core institutional objectives and, above all, to the Bank’s country work
2. A strong case for Bank participation based on comparative advantage
3. A clear assessment of the ﬁnancial and reputational risks to the Bank and how these will be managed
4. A thorough analysis of the expected level of Bank resources (both money and time) required and the contribution of other partners
5. A clear delineation of how the new commitment will be implemented, managed, and assessed
6. A clear plan for communicating with and involving key stakeholders and for informing and consulting the Executive Directors.
Global Public-Goods Prioritiesc
Communicable diseases
• HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and  
 childhood communicable diseases,  
 including the relevant link to  
 education
• Vaccines and drug development  
 for major communicable diseases  
 in developing countries
Environmental commons 
• Climate change
• Water 
• Forests 
• Biodiversity, ozone depletion, and  
 land degradation 
• Promoting agricultural research 
Information and knowledge 
• Redressing the digital divide and  
 equipping countries with the  
 capacity to access knowledge 
• Understanding development and  
 poverty reduction
Trade and integration 
• Market access 
• Intellectual property rights  
 and standards  
International ﬁnancial architecture
• Development of international  
 standards
• Financial stability (incl. sound  
 public debt management)
• International accounting and  
 legal framework
Corporate Advocacy Prioritiesc
Empowerment, security, and
social inclusion
• Gender mainstreaming
• Civic engagement and 
 participation
• Social risk management
 (including disaster mitigation)
Investment climate
• Support to both urban and rural 
 development
• Infrastructure services to 
 support private sector development 
• Regulatory reform and 
 competition policy
• Financial sector reform 
Public sector governance 
• Rule of law (including anti- 
 corruption 
• Public administration and civil 
 service reform (including public 
 expenditure accountability)
• Access to, and administration of, 
 justice (judicial reform)
Education 
• Education for all, with emphasis 
 on girls’ education 
• Building human capacity for the 
 knowledge economy 
Health
• Access to potable water, clean 
 air, and sanitation
• Maternal and child health
Strategic Focus for Oversight of 
Global Programs: Established 
by Bank Management (March 2003) 
a. Provide global public goods
b. Support international advo- 
 cacy for reform agendas that in a 
 signiﬁcant way address policy 
 framework conditions relevant 
 for developing countries
c. Are multicountry programs that  
 crucially depend on highly  
 coordinated approaches
d. Mobilize substantial incremental
 resources that can be used for
 development
a. From the Development Committee Communiqué issued on September 25, 2000. Both the Development Committee and Bank management envisaged global programs as being the prin-
cipal instrument for Bank involvement in providing global public goods.
b. The Initiating Concept Memorandum in the Partnership Approval and Tracking System (PATS) was initially organized according to these six criteria. 
c. These are the five corporate advocacy priorities and the five global public-goods priorities (and bulleted subcategories) from World Bank 2001b. Within the Partnership Approval and
Tracking System (PATS), global programs are expected to identify, for tracking purposes, their alignment with at least one of these 10 corporate priorities.
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1. Subsidiarity The program contributes to furthering the Bank’s development and resource mobilization objectives in fields basic to its op-
erations, but it does not compete with, or substitute for, regular Bank instruments. Grants should address new or critical de-
velopment problems and should be clearly distinguishable from the Bank’s regular programs.
2. Comparative The Bank has a distinct comparative advantage in being associated with the program; it does not replicate the role of other 
advantage donors. The relevant operational strengths of the Bank are in economic, policy, sector, and project analysis and manage-
ment of development activities. In administering grants, the Bank has expertise in donor coordination, fundraising, and 
fund management.
3. Multicountry The program encompasses multicountry benefits or activities that it would not be efficient, practical, or appropriate to 
benefits undertake at the country level. For example, informational economies of scale are important for research and technology 
work, and operations to control diseases or address environmental concerns (such as protect fragile ecosystems) might re-
quire a regional or global scope to be effective. In the case of grants directed to a single country, the program will encom-
pass capacity-building activities where this is a significant part of the Country Assistance Strategy and cannot be sup-
ported by other Bank instruments or by other donors. This will include, in particular, programs funded under the Institu-
tional Development Fund and programs related to initial post-conflict reconstruction efforts (e.g., in countries or territories 
emerging from internal strife or instability).
4. Leverage The Bank’s presence provides significant leverage for generating financial support from other donors. Bank involvement 
should provide assurance to other donors of program effectiveness, as well as sound financial management and adminis-
tration. Grants should generally not exceed 15 percent of expected funding over the life of Bank funding to a given pro-
gram or over the rolling 3-year plan period, whichever is shorter. Where grant programs belong to new areas of activities 
(involving, e.g., innovations, pilot projects, or seed capital), some flexibility is allowed for the Bank’s financial leverage to 
build over time, and the target for the Bank grant not to exceed 15 percent of total expected funding will be pursued after 
allowing for an initial start-up phase (maximum 3 years).
5. Managerial The grant is normally given to an institution with a record of achievement in the program area and financial probity. A new 
competence institution may have to be created where no suitable institution exists. The quality of the activities implemented by the re-
cipient institution (existing or new) and the competence of its management are important considerations.
6. Arm’s-length The management of the recipient institution is independent of the Bank Group. While quality and an arm’s-length relation-
relationship ship with the Bank’s regular programs are essential, the Bank may have a role in the governance of the institution through 
membership in its governing board or oversight committee. In cases of highly innovative or experimental programs, Bank 
involvement in supporting the recipient to execute the program will be allowed. This will provide the Bank with an opportu-
nity to benefit from the learning experience and to build operational links to increase its capacity to deliver more efficient 
services to client countries.
7. Disengagement Programs are expected to have an explicit disengagement strategy. In the proposal, monitorable action steps should be 
strategy outlined, indicating milestones and targets for disengagement. The Bank’s withdrawal should cause minimal disruption to 
an ongoing program or activity.
8. Promoting Programs and activities should promote and reinforce partnerships with key players in the development arena (for 
partnerships example, multilateral development banks, U.N. agencies, foundations, bilateral donors, professional associations,  
research institutions, private sector corporations, NGOs, and civil-society organizations).
Source: World Bank, Development Grant Facility documentation.
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proval criteria resemble the topics covered in a
project concept or appraisal document for Bank
lending operations, global programs need ap-
proval only at the concept stage (unlike lending
operations, which also need approval at ap-
praisal). New global programs need approval
only from the managing director responsible for
the network proposing the new program, not
from the Board.
Program approval is logically separate from,
and prior to, financing (whether from the DGF,
trust funds, or other sources). The eight eligibility
criteria for grant support from the DGF (table C.4)
were established in 1998, although the processes
of program approval, trust fund mobilization,
and their relationship to the DGF have evolved
considerably since then. Because each approval
process and each set of criteria were developed
independently, they are not always consistent
with each other. Twenty of the 26 case studies and
about two-thirds of the Bank’s total portfolio of
global programs have received DGF grants.
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ANNEX D: SUGGESTED APPRAISAL TEMPLATE FOR GLOBAL PROGRAMS
Program aspect Appraisal criteria
Global 1. Does the program cover more than one of the Bank’s operational Regions?
The activities of the 2. Does the program demonstrate strong potential for development effectiveness and poverty alleviation, and 
program cut across more hence relevance to developing countries?
than one of the Bank’s 3. Does the proposal demonstrate why the issue the program addresses requires public investments and 
operational Regions. action at the global level?
4. Does the proposal demonstrate the value added from the Bank’s involvement? Does it articulate how the 
program fits with the Bank’s mission, its global public-goods priorities, and its corporate-advocacy priori-
ties? If the program does not meet these criteria, does the proposal explain why the program is still justified 
in addressing an important global issue?
5. Does the proposal either demonstrate the absence of alternative, cheaper sources of supply for addressing 
the issue or make a convincing case for why increased competition in supply entailing Bank involvement 
would be desirable?
6. Does the proposal provide a full accounting of the expected benefits of the program—including expected 
spillovers—to borrowers and donors, as well as to the private and public sectors? Does it explain how the 
realization of those benefits is being ensured in program design?
Partnership 1. Does the proposal demonstrate the value added by using a partnership? Could the Bank working alone ac-
The program involves complish the program goals? Does the proposal demonstrate that the benefits of the partnership outweigh 
partners—who participate the costs?
in the governance of the 2. Does the proposal demonstrate how the program meets the Development Committee criteria for engaging in 
program—in addition to partnerships:
the World Bank. • Evidence for an emerging international consensus that global action is required? Or if the program itself 
is intended to help develop international consensus where none currently exists?
• Why Bank action is needed to catalyze other resources or if others can do it just as well? For example, is 
the Bank’s convening power or potential linkage to country assistance critical in ensuring relevance of 
the global program and its eventual success?
• The Bank’s comparative advantage relative to other partners in relation to this program?b
• The value added to the Bank’s development objectives?
3. Does the proposal demonstrate why the Bank should address this issue as a global program, or regional pro-
gram, rather than through an institutional partnership? c That is, does it have:
• Clearly identified and deliverable new products or services
• Shared objectives
• Shared responsibility for governance
• Shared resources?
4. Does the proposal demonstrate that all potential partners needed to ensure development effectiveness of 
the program were consulted, that the chosen partners are the most appropriate to achieve expeditious and 
cost-effective results and impact, and that the Bank’s role is consistent with its comparative advantage? Are
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Program aspect Appraisal criteria
other partners’ roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities consistent with their comparative advantages and 
clearly spelled out?
Objectives 1. Does the proposal describe the process used to arrive at an agreement on objectives, including consultation 
Either formally or informally, with stakeholders?
the partners reach explicit 2. Are the objectives of the program clearly defined and results-oriented, even if results are intermediate out-
agreements on objectives. comes?
3. Do the objectives:
• Give focus and direction to the program
• Express a development purpose that is realistic, specific, and quantitatively or qualitatively measurable
• Provide a basis for evaluating the performance of the program with specific and realistic schedules? Are 
there clear intermediate performance indicators, or is there a clear indication of how the program will 
develop such indicators? 
Activities Are the program activities clustered into components that can deliver results on the stated objectives? Are the 
The program generates components clearly described, and are the objectives and components internally coherent? Examples:
new products or services. • For global networking activities, the proposal should demonstrate either current or proposed steps to 
ensure that developing countries receive the benefits of the program through ensuring access, building 
capacity, or other means. Similar steps should be evident for regional activities within the global program.
• For country-level technical assistance activities, the proposal should articulate the steps needed to 
build capacity or involve borrowing countries in networking. It should also identify whether and how links 
to subsequent country assistance (including Bank lending) might bring this about.
• For country-level investments, the proposal should argue the case for additionality or complementarity 
to current Bank lending operations.
• For new products and technologies, such as collaborative research or analysis, the proposal should 
clearly demonstrate their global public goods nature and the absence of alternative sources of supply. It 
should justify international public involvement in the provision of these new products and technologies.
Governance and 1. What were the main scope and design options considered, and why were competing alternatives, such as re-
management gional programs, rejected?
Either formally or informally, 2. Were relevant stakeholders consulted in the program design process?
the partners agree to 3. Do relevant stakeholders have access to the program? What steps are being taken to ensure access?
establish a new organization 4. Does the proposed authorizing environment for the program provide adequate balance between ensuring le-
or to vest an existing organi- gitimacy in governance, relevance to developing countries, and efficiency in achieving results?
zation (including one of the 5. Do the governance and management structures include clear responsibilities among partners with respect to 
Bank’s own units or those of resources, risks, and decisionmaking?
other international agencies) 6. Are there clear accountabilities for results, and clearly defined plans and target audiences (or stakeholders) 
with a new and additional for the activities of the program?
function. 7. To what extent are developing countries (including transition countries) actively engaged in the governance 
of the program and in the design and management of program activities?
8. Does the program design ensure recruitment of high-quality advisory committees and clarify their accounta-
bility for ensuring scientific/professional excellence in approaches?
9. Are reporting arrangements of managers and advisors to specific levels clearly spelled out?
Financing 1. Where the Bank is providing DGF grants, do they comply with OP 8.45 for grant making and with the DGF cri-
The partners contribute teria for subsidiarity, arm’s length relationship, and exit strategy? d
dedicated resources to the 2. Where the Bank is administering trust funds that support the program, do they comply with OP 14.40 for trust 
program. funds and address the five issues in the recent Trust Funds Review:
• Alignment with the Bank’s strategic priorities
• Dependency risks
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Program aspect Appraisal criteria
• Cost-effectiveness
• Fiduciary risks
• Reputational risks?
3. Where the Bank is providing resources for the program from its administrative budget (BB)—for program ad-
ministration or program activities—is there a realistic assessment of BB needs, and is it a clearly appropriate
use of BB resources?
4. Is the Bank’s share of the overall resources dedicated to the program appropriate? e
5. Are regional- and central-unit BB needs spelled out?
6. Does the program have an exit strategy? Does it follow the foundation model, the venture capital model, or 
the long-term development assistance model? Is the model used clearly justified? Have steps been taken 
within the context of the model to ensure the long-term sustainability of the program? If the venture capital 
model is used, does it follow best practice on venture financing? Is the form of exit defined clearly (financial 
exit, participation exit, legal exit)? How well is the exit strategy planned?
Risks and risk This category cuts across the previous six, consistent with the way risks are treated in the Bank financing of 
management projects.
1. Have the risks (applying to both the private sector and NGOs) been assessed at the outset? f
• Reputational risks
• Conflict-of-interest risks
• Unfair-advantage risks
• Governance risks
2. Are the risks associated with the program greater than the expected benefits? Have appropriate procedures 
been established to manage these risks during program implementation?
Monitoring and 1. Has a monitoring and independent evaluation system been established for the implementation phase of the 
evaluation program? Does it comply with OED standards for best practice?
• Clear project and component objectives verifiable by indicators
• A structured set of quantitative or qualitative indicators
• Requirements for data collection and management
• Institutional arrangements for capacity-building
• Feedback from monitoring and evaluation to Bank management and the Board?
2. Is there adequate provision for routine Bank oversight of the program?
3. Is the Bank exercising adequate fiduciary responsibility for in-house secretariats and for the management of 
trust funds, with periodic centralized reporting of accounts and audits, which are routinely monitored for 
quality and completeness?
External review Has the program been endorsed by independent external reviewers?
a. The Strategic Directions Paper (World Bank 2001b) mentions six comparative advantages: (1) global mandate and reach, (2) in-depth country-level knowledge, (3) multisector capacity,
(4) convening power, (5) expertise in country and sector analysis, and (6) mobilizing financial resources. Others might include access to borrowing countries’ policymakers and potential
for country assistance.
b. “Institutional partnerships” typically involve information exchange and consultations with a variety of partners in order to improve the Bank’s ability to conduct its traditional country-
and regionally oriented business more effectively. These do not produce a new product or service and do not involve the establishment of a new organization or entity with separate gov-
ernance and management structures.
c. These need to be assessed at the appropriate level. In some cases, the DGF is retailing grants to grantees, and in other cases, the DGF is wholesaling to global programs that are re-
tailing to grantees.
d. This needs to be measured consistently across programs.
e. The following are the risks that are assessed in the private sector partnership assessment and approval process that is administered by PSI. See Annex K for a definition of each of
these risks.
Source: Reproduced from the Phase 1 Report, Appendix 1, pp. 57–59.
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Organized by the classifications used in table
2.2, with the start dates of each program in
parentheses.
Financing Global-Level Investments to
Deliver Global Public Goods for the
Benefit of the Poor
Programs: Consultative Group for Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) (1972), Special Program for Research and Train-
ing in Tropical Diseases (TDR) (1975), Parts of the Global
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) (1999)
The older global programs in this category have
seen high returns to their investments. There
nonetheless is substantial underinvestment in the
provision of global public goods and in the com-
plementary national investments that are needed
to increase developing-country accessibility to
new products, information and technologies
and to increase the speed and scale of sustain-
able poverty alleviation. 
The high rates of return to CGIAR’s
germplasm research and its impacts on food
productivity, food prices, employment, and in-
comes were reported in OED’s meta-evaluation.
At least in large countries in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, the poverty impacts have been sustainable
and have supported broader development.
CGIAR has developed an impressive global agri-
cultural research system and a global network
supported by nearly $400 million annually. 
The $45 million annual expenditures of the
Special Program for Research and Training in
Tropical Diseases have helped mobilize global sci-
ence to conduct research and promote tech-
nologies related to diseases of the poor. The
external evaluation identified three important
program outcomes: contributing to the devel-
opment of new and improved tools for control-
ling several tropical diseases; leveraging support
from other bodies to develop vaccines for malaria,
leishmaniasis, and schistosomiasis; and using
collaborative research to strengthen research ca-
pacity in developing countries. TDR’s research
publications are often cited in scientific journals,
reflecting the high quality of its research. How-
ever, TDR is underfunded and overstretched,
while the program’s research mandate has ex-
panded from 8 tropical diseases to 10, together
with growing expectations among TDR’s donors
for faster results. Faced with this changing ex-
ternal environment, this oldest of global health
programs confronts fundamental questions about
its scope, strategic objectives, role in global re-
search, funding, partnership strategies, methods
of work, governance, and management. Under-
investment in research that would benefit the
poor is far worse in health than in agriculture, de-
spite the recent efforts of the Gates Foundation
and some growth in the last decade in public-pri-
vate partnerships to develop vaccines and drugs.
Where complementary national investments have
been made, such as India and Brazil’s efforts in
epidemiological and other applied and adaptive
research, they have shown rich results. Yet the low
level of investment in health research by the
Bank and by developing countries has limited the
country-level impacts of TDR’s research.
Financing Country-Level Investments to
Deliver Global Public Goods
Programs: Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of
the Montreal Protocol (MLF) (1991), Global Environment
Facility (GEF) (1991), Prototype Carbon Fund (2000),
Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund (CEPF) (2000)
Some country-level investments in this category
of global public goods have achieved major
ANNEX E: OED’S SUMMARY OF THE KNOWN OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS 
OF CASE STUDY GLOBAL PROGRAMS
global impacts, but each raises issues about pro-
gram design and incentives to deliver global re-
sults. The MLF and certain aspects of GEF have
had some concrete impacts. 
The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation
of the Montreal Protocol has reduced con-
sumption of ozone-depleting chemicals by more
than 90 percent over the past decade (UNEP
2002). The Bank has played a crucial role in MLF
activities. The Bank’s MLF activities have report-
edly eliminated a large share of the global targets
of ozone-depleting chemicals, while using only
40 percent of the total international resources
available, through an approach that has built in-
stitutional environmental capacity within the
public and private sectors of its client countries.
The fund’s distinctive composition, governance,
and management structure, characterized by a
balanced representation of industrial and devel-
oping countries and consensus-style decision-
making, has fostered an unprecedented model
of international cooperation and has influenced
the design of the GEF. At the same time, the
fund’s governance system, which includes both
rotating and non-rotating membership, puts an
inequitable burden on many small, developing
countries. The MLF has had only one external
evaluation (1995) in its 13-year existence, al-
though a second review was begun in 2003.
The Global Environment Facility, in addi-
tion to significantly reducing ozone-depleting
substances in transition countries, has had some
success in promoting energy efficiency and re-
newable energy, improving management of stan-
dards in protected areas, and promoting and
implementing global and regional agreements on
fresh water and marine ecosystems. Yet it is dif-
ficult to determine whether GEF-funded activi-
ties in some focal areas, such as biodiversity
conservation, have had sustainable global im-
pacts. There have been some intermediate re-
sults, such as water-basin treaties ratified, water
quality improved, and areas brought under pro-
tection. GEF’s external evaluations note that the
facility has faced numerous challenges: inter-
preting the conventions, ensuring high-quality
investments, creating in-country understanding
of GEF principles, addressing the socioeconomic
and livelihood needs of the affected popula-
tions, defining incremental costs and benefits,
and engaging the private sector. The evaluations
have indicated that GEF’s design does not clearly
delineate the responsibilities and accountabili-
ties of the program’s monitoring and evaluation
unit, nor those of GEF in relation to its imple-
menting agencies. Although the more recent
GEF portfolio (including the Bank-implemented
portion) shows some learning from experience,
the GEF Secretariat and the Bank have had dif-
ferent views about the speed with which the
Bank is able to mainstream GEF’s environmen-
tal objectives in the Bank’s economic and sector
work, policy dialogue, and lending.1
The Prototype Carbon Fund—the only pub-
lic-private partnership to foster an international
market in greenhouse-gas emissions reduction—
is too new to evaluate. The program has many
deals planned in all the Bank’s Regions and is
oversubscribed by private investors. Because it
has to deliver internationally certifiable results,
it has been highly attentive to project design
and the means for measuring results. If the pro-
gram succeeds, it will help the Bank add a new
line of business, help investors in OECD coun-
tries to reduce emissions cheaply, provide a truly
novel source of private sector investment to pro-
duce a public good, create employment, increase
incomes, and potentially mitigate some of the
risks of climate change. But, as a “mini-bank”
within the Bank, the fund has to balance in-
vestor interests with those of the Bank’s client
countries. Therefore, the fund provides market
information, training, and capacity-building—
public goods that private investors would not
necessarily provide. Any fund outcomes will be
jeopardized if the Kyoto Protocol is not ratified,
if the emissions reductions fail to materialize, or
if emissions certificates turn out to be unmar-
ketable. 
The Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund
was established to conserve biodiversity in
hotspots by “providing strategic assistance to
nongovernmental and other private sector or-
ganizations for the protection of selected vital
ecosystems.” As of April 2004, the program had
committed $41.8 million for 293 grants to vari-
ous NGOs. Forty percent of the grant funds were
allocated to Conservation International (CI) and
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60 percent to external partners, including other
international and national NGOs within civil so-
ciety and, to a smaller extent, the private sector.
The initial trend to favor CI in grant approval is
changing, in part because of the establishment
of re-granting funds at the hotspot level, to reach
more grassroots grantees. The program focuses
on areas within hotspots where CEPF funding can
have the greatest incremental value. However,
most hotspots are flush with other conserva-
tion activities. It may thus be difficult to attrib-
ute conservation success (or failure) directly to
the program. The program does have a robust
monitoring and evaluation system in place, with
numerous checks and balances to ensure timely
reporting and critical evaluations. While the pro-
gram is relatively new, the findings from the two
ecosystem-level evaluations completed thus far
suggest that it has contributed to positive con-
servation outcomes. The Bank is committed to
two more fiscal years of funding. It has not yet
defined an exit strategy, nor has it committed to
continued funding. 
Financing Country-Level Investments to
Deliver National Public Goods
Programs: Post-conflict Fund (1998), Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) (1999)
Both programs in this category have provided ad-
ditional resources to countries, but raise issues
of subsidiarity; duplication of, or substitution
for, Bank country operations; and, ultimately,
sustainability.
The Post-conflict Fund was created in 1997 to
improve and expand Bank instruments for deal-
ing with post-conflict issues. The fund has given
grants totaling over $66 million, mostly for small-
scale reconstruction activities, to 34 countries or
jurisdictions. The program’s priority themes are
conflict mitigation, internally displaced persons
and refugees, rehabilitation of social sectors,
start-up support for land-mine clearance, de-
mobilization and reintegration of ex-combat-
ants, economic recovery, governance, and
capacity-building. The grants are awarded for
socioeconomic analyses, watching briefs, tran-
sitional support strategies, and policy studies
and forums. The program’s external evaluation
found that many of the fund’s grants laid a base
for follow-on financing. Yet the evaluation
stressed the need to: (1) attract greater donor
support, (2) become more active about funding
projects, (3) improve implementation monitor-
ing, and (4) strengthen knowledge generation
and management. The evaluation was also cau-
tious about drawing conclusions about the per-
formance of individual activities. Individual
project-level evaluations noted varied progress
with respect to the sustainability of the funded
activities. Apart from citing anecdotal evidence,
the PCF has not tracked exactly how many of its
funded activities managed to attract additional
financing or proved sustainable. A review of proj-
ect-level evaluations indicates that the grants
may have greater success in positioning the Bank
in a particular country than in ensuring sustain-
ability of the particular projects’ benefits. Since
more than half of its funds have gone to eight of
the most urgent conflict areas, the fund has
served as a quick channel for addressing specific
issues through targeted programs. While the
program does what it was designed to do, issues
have arisen with respect to the following DGF cri-
teria: multicountry benefits, record of achieve-
ment and financial probity, disengagement
strategy, and leverage. Since the fund was es-
tablished before the DGF, it was grandfathered
in. The DGF partnership criterion is vague and
does not specify if partnerships are necessary at
the governance or the activity level, making it dif-
ficult to ascertain a program’s compliance with
this criterion. The program meets this criterion
at the activity level, but not at the governance
level. A global partnership on conflict-affected
countries with partners at the governance level
might help the Bank, U.N. agencies, and other
stakeholders to better respond to the transition
from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction
and development. 
As of March 2004, the Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization, supported by
the Vaccine Fund and other donors, had com-
mitted grant funding of over US$1 billion to 69
countries for immunization services covering 6
childhood diseases (diphtheria, polio, tuber-
culosis, pertussis, measles, and tetanus).2 The
Vaccine Fund also finances the development
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of vaccines for rotavirus and pneumococcus.
Each is a significant cause of mortality in de-
veloping countries.
The alliance initially largely promoted the use
of new vaccines for yellow fever, Haemophilus
influenza serotype b (Hib), and hepatitis-B. GAVI
estimates that with its support, countries have
cumulatively vaccinated 35.5 million children
against hepatitis B; 6 million children against
Hib; 2.7 million children against yellow fever; and
8 million more children have access to basic vac-
cines. The long-term sustainability of the GAVI
approach was premised on easy, affordable ac-
cess to patented drugs. In particular, GAVI relied
heavily on new, patented multivalent vaccines,
which cost more per use but require fewer uses
than older types, in the hope that such vaccines
would put less logistical stress on developing
countries’ health-delivery systems. GAVI also
hoped that this approach would increase de-
mand for, and supply of, the new vaccines. How-
ever, some African countries have indicated that
they lack the resources to buy and deliver mul-
tivalent vaccines without GAVI’s support. Some
stakeholders argue that GAVI could have drawn
more on the experience of its partners, such as
UNICEF and the World Bank. Developing and
producing vaccines has taken longer than ex-
pected, their supply has been neither timely nor
reliable, and prices have remained high. 
GAVI has begun to buy vaccines from multi-
ple sources through competitive bidding. It has
also helped governments to improve planning,
implementing, and monitoring capacity to de-
liver immunization services, including staffing,
delivery, supervision, and reporting systems;
the establishment of baselines and data quality
audits; and overall aid coordination. GAVI’s ap-
proach has brought to the forefront the issue of
the availability of new vaccines at affordable
prices. Donors have not yet delivered the money
they pledged to match the Gates Foundation’s
contribution, limiting GAVI’s ability to meet its
declared objective.3 Learning from a combina-
tion of its own experience, board-commissioned
studies, and experts in the field, GAVI has con-
siderably changed its strategy to address long-
term supply, demand, and financial sustainability.
Once it became evident how long it would take
to stimulate demand, production, and the mar-
ket for vaccines in developing countries and
how vaccine choice would affect the long-term
financial viability of these markets, GAVI’s board
began exploring other choices with regard to
program interventions. The program has also of-
fered to pilot the International Financing Facil-
ity (IFF) initiative.
Financing Country-Level Technical
Assistance to Promote Policy and
Institutional Reforms, Public or Private
Investments 
Programs: Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) (1978),
Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
(ESMAP) (1982), Integrated Framework for Trade-
Related Technical Assistance (IF) (1997), Public-Private
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) (1999), Cities
Alliance (1999) 
The programs in this category offer examples of
evolving or unshared objectives and raise sub-
sidiarity issues. The impacts of the two older
programs, WSP and ESMAP, have not been in-
dependently assessed.4 Both monitoring and
evaluation are improving as programs adopt re-
sults-based management and evaluation systems.
The Water and Sanitation Program was
founded in 1978. The program provides free,
in-kind technical assistance to developing-coun-
try governments and agencies. Its objectives
have evolved considerably, from the develop-
ment of appropriate small-scale technology in the
1980s to applying and implementing the Dublin-
Rio principles in the 1990s,5 to the current focus
on improving policies and institutions for water
and sanitation and on capacity-building to stim-
ulate public and private investments in water
supply and sanitation. The partnership’s princi-
pal added value appears to be its extensive field
presence: 76 of its 82 staff are located in 16 focal
countries. Its third (1999) evaluation concluded
that the partnership had provided professional
contributions to the sector in the countries
where it is active, depending on the scope and
duration of its involvement and the response
by different countries. However, there is no sys-
tematic evidence that its ultimate beneficiar-
ies—poor people in developing countries—enjoy
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increased access to safe and affordable water
and sanitation services as a result of the pro-
gram. Only in FY04 did WSP’s business plan in-
corporate a systematic effort, including project
sheets and outcome indicators, to monitor
progress and evaluate the final outcome of pro-
gram activities. WSP’s impact on public and pri-
vate investments, including Bank lending in
support of such investments, is not clear. The sec-
ond (1996) evaluation found little recognition of
the WSP in the Bank’s operational documents,
although the WSP had been associated, up until
that time, with more than $2 billion of Bank-
funded projects. The 1996 evaluation also found
systematic learning and exchange of informa-
tion to be the weakest part of the WSP. The
fourth program-level evaluation, now under way,
also addresses these issues.
The Energy Sector Management Assistance
Program was founded in 1983, following the
second OPEC oil crisis, to assist developing
countries that were facing the dual burden of
higher energy costs and increased debt-service
requirements. It provides Bank-executed tech-
nical assistance and policy advice on sustainable-
energy development to developing and
transition countries. In the 1980s, it focused al-
most exclusively on energy sector assessments.
Today, following two evaluations in 1990 and
2000 and a restructuring in 1999, it focuses on
studies, advisory services, and pilot projects, ei-
ther upstream—where there is a potential for
policy formulation and strategy development—
or downstream—where it concentrates on eval-
uation and disseminating best practices. The
2000 evaluation found that the professional
quality of ESMAP activities is generally high.
The 2003 Report of ESMAP’s Technical Advi-
sory Group (TAG) concluded that ESMAP pro-
vides valuable services to donors, the Bank,
and probably to client countries, though TAG
could not confirm the last. While the 2000 eval-
uation gives examples of ESMAP’s impacts on
Bank operations, there is no systematic track-
ing of ESMAP’s impacts on public and private
investments in the energy sector, including
those supported by Bank lending, nor on the
ultimate beneficiaries—those unserved or un-
derserved—in terms of increased access to
more reliable, efficient, and affordable energy
services. ESMAP’s FY02-04 business plan in-
corporated for the first time a set of indicators
to monitor the outputs and outcomes of its ac-
tivities.
The Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance helps least-developed coun-
tries do diagnostic studies to inform those coun-
tries’ trade-oriented development strategies.
The program originally aimed to help countries
meet their WTO commitments, but lack of own-
ership for this limited objective led to a new
focus on diagnostic studies. A recent inde-
pendent evaluation concludes that IF’s re-
vamping in 2002 and its efforts to mainstream
trade into country development plans have
sharpened its focus. The evaluation also found
that the revamping failed to give the program re-
sults-based management processes, resulting in
variable results across countries. The link with
the PRSPs is beginning to improve: specific
donors now “adopt” countries to help mobilize
investments, and trade-facilitation lending op-
erations are in the Bank’s lending pipeline.6
While links to Bank operations have improved,
interviews revealed continued dissonance among
partners regarding IF objectives, as well as con-
tinued divergence in countries and agencies’
expectations of IF’s proper role. While donors
emphasize IF’s partnership-enhancement value,
developing countries stress the importance of in-
creased market access abroad and more invest-
ment financing to remove export constraints at
home. Now that the diagnostic studies have
been done, countries are increasingly asking for
funds to carry out the trade assistance identified
therein. A greater share of IF expenditures is
now being funneled to Window 2-financed ca-
pacity-building, with a cap of $1 million per
country, as bridging finance. 
An OED review of several IF country studies
suggests that, while quality has improved, the
studies could be more focused and operational
toward promoting investment and facilitating
policy and institutional reform. Another issue is
the unwillingness of OECD countries to pro-
vide additional investment finance to overcome
domestic export constraints or to remove some
barriers to market access, such as restrictive
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agricultural trade policies and food-safety reg-
ulations. Although OED interviews indicate
greater understanding and acceptance of the
developmental aspects of the trade agenda, it is
difficult to establish if such consensus building
in donor countries and agencies is a lasting and
attributable contribution of the program. More-
over, it is too early to know the program’s im-
pacts on ultimate beneficiaries through
increased trade and enhanced development
outcomes.
The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility, founded in 1999, arose out of the 1994
World Development Report on Infrastructure
for Development and the Bank’s Infrastructure
Action Program (which was endorsed by the
Development Committee in 1997). This multi-
sector program provides free, Bank-executed
technical assistance to facilitate private-sector in-
volvement in infrastructure services. In its first
three years, PPIAF funded the drafting of 25
sets of laws and regulations; facilitated the de-
sign of 30 public-private infrastructure transac-
tions, such as management contracts, leases,
auctions of telecom licenses, privatizations, and
concessions; made recommendations leading to
the implementation of 14 different sector-re-
form strategies in 11 countries; funded the cre-
ation or strengthening of 20 regulatory
institutions; and funded training courses, pri-
marily in regulation, attended by more than
1,500 participants. PPIAF has demonstrated that
it is possible to set up an effective monitoring
and evaluation system for a technical-assistance
program. It has the most advanced monitoring
and evaluation processes of the six programs in
this group. Its Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) is
involved in ex post, on-site reviews of many
PPIAF activities. The 2003 TAP report concluded
that three features of PPIAF have established it
as a niche player in promoting private sector par-
ticipation:
• High-quality, effective products
• Ability to identify and disseminate global good
practices and to document experiences from
unsuccessful projects
• Ability to customize global practices to spe-
cific countries.
It is too early to assess the impacts of PPIAF
activities on its ultimate beneficiaries. Building
consensus for policy reform and building im-
plementation capacity both take a long time be-
fore impacts appear. 
The Cities Alliance, also started in 1999,
arose out of the Habitat II Conference and the
Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements in
June 1996. This multisector program provides
free Bank-executed, partner-executed, and re-
cipient-executed technical assistance to sup-
port the development of suitable legal,
regulatory, policy, and implementation prac-
tices in client countries. It focuses on two goals:
“cities without slums” and better strategies for
city development. The first program-level eval-
uation of the Cities Alliance, undertaken in
2002, used a results-based framework and is
one of the best evaluations of Bank-supported
global programs. It assessed the relevance, ef-
ficacy, and efficiency of the Cities Alliance dur-
ing its first three years against the four stated
objectives, the three strategies, and the six
guiding principles laid out in its charter and fol-
lowed a results chain (inputs => outputs =>
outcomes => impacts) as far as practicable
given the short life of the alliance. The evalua-
tion concluded that the alliance performed
strongly in its first three years by:
• Raising awareness of the rapid urbanization
of the developing world
• Leveraging donor commitments and collabo-
ration on urban development
• Increasing the pooling and dissemination of les-
sons of experience
• Increasing the promise of significant action
against urban poverty in the future.
Partial results indicate that more than $4
billion of investments are linked to Alliance-
funded activities. Approximately $1.5 billion
are already committed, and $2.5 billion are in
various stages of preparation or appraisal. More
than $2.3 billion are from World Bank loans and
credits. As for PPIAF, it is too early to assess im-
pacts on the ultimate beneficiaries—the urban
poor and poor cities in developing and transi-
tion countries.
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Common Approaches to Mitigating
Communicable Diseases and Promoting
Research on the Diseases of the Poor
Programs: Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) (1996), Global Forum for Health Research
(1998), Roll Back Malaria (RBM) (1998), Stop TB (1999)
Programs in this category have raised awareness
and persuaded donors to invest in communica-
ble-disease control, but face challenges in achiev-
ing results on the ground.
The Joint United Nations Program on
HIV/AIDS was established to develop stronger po-
litical commitment in U.N. member countries
to address the causes and consequences of the
epidemic and to develop a coherent U.N. re-
sponse. Following an evaluation of its first five
years and faced with changes in various countries’
HIV/AIDS burdens, new actors and increased
global financing for HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS has been
wrestling with issues of its strategic direction
and functions, including particularly its role in im-
proving action on the ground. It monitors coun-
try-level HIV/AIDS strategies and programs. It
gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information
on the epidemic and responses to it and pro-
motes harmonization of monitoring and evalu-
ation efforts. UNAIDS also assesses country and
global HIV/AIDS resource needs and flows and
the information that various agencies use to de-
vise strategies and policies. At the country level,
UNAIDS theme groups support national poli-
cies, identify and disseminate best practices, and
support implementation, monitoring, and eval-
uation. UNAIDS sees its added value as creating
awareness, mobilizing political commitment,
fostering global coordination, and promoting a
three-pronged approach to coordination at the
country level.
A recent evaluation of UNAIDS concluded
that the program had made progress in devel-
oping national strategic plans, many with mon-
itorable indicators and multisector responses, in
consultation with persons living with HIV/AIDS,
civil society, the private sector, and the donor
community. Results have included improved
donor coordination and cooperation and plans
for developing national capacity, especially in
the health system. That HIV/AIDS awareness has
improved is indisputable; UNAIDS has helped
make that happen. Yet attributing success to
UNAIDS is difficult, given the number of actors
involved. Coordination is stronger at the global
level than at the country level.7 There has been
limited research on the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS
interventions. The evaluation observed that UN-
AIDS must strike a new balance between its ad-
vocacy role and its functions in information
provision, capacity-building, and technical sup-
port, particularly at the country level. UNAIDS is
addressing each of these areas. It is working
more with its principal co-sponsors, IFAD, the re-
gional banks, civil society, and the private sector;
it is providing country-level funding for train-
ing, policy planning, technical support, and in-
stitutional development; and it has signed new
mutual-support agreements with GFATM and
WHO. Yet the ongoing human and social fallout
from the epidemic has only increased demands
on UNAIDS to show results on the ground.
On both humanitarian and development
grounds, UNAIDS has promoted a two-pronged
strategy: increased focus on prevention and
broad access to treatment with anti-retroviral
drugs (ARVs). The issues of treatment and care
are complex and controversial. The Bank,
through its multicountry AIDS (MAP) projects,
has increased its lending and focus on HIV/AIDS,
in part because of the advocacy of and support
from UNAIDS. The Bank’s Sub-Saharan Africa
region was at the forefront in providing financ-
ing and retrofitting other projects in other sec-
tors to finance ARVs.8 But the magnitude of
support that national health systems need to
apply the multisector approach is daunting. The
consensus on increased access to drugs is
premised on increased resource mobilization
to offset the costs. Despite donors’ recently in-
creased HIV/AIDS commitments and the dra-
matic decline in drug prices, there is a chasm
between the available money and delivery ca-
pacity and what is needed. The Bank’s MAP proj-
ects grapple with many of these issues. 
The Global Forum for Health Research was
evaluated in 2001. The impact of the forum’s
five core activities was assessed: the annual forum
meetings, analytic work, funding research initia-
tives, communications, and monitoring. The eval-
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uation found that the annual forum meetings, in
which 700 participated (300 as paying partici-
pants), while useful for networking, need to be
more focused. The number of topics should be
reduced and prioritized, and at least 50 percent
more developing-country participants should be
invited. The forum’s analytical work was seen as
having significant impact. The evaluation con-
sidered the range of analytical work impressive,
but questioned its quality, given the paucity of in-
house capacity. It noted the need for a clear link
between research and the annual meetings, and
suggested the need for impact assessment of the
analytical work (e.g. tools for developing health
research priorities to assist policymakers in mak-
ing health sector allocations). The forum has de-
veloped an alliance of health systems and policy
research and fostered several research initiatives
by bringing in new public and private sector part-
ners and mobilizing new sources of money. The
evaluation noted a need for transparency in the
forum’s selection of research initiatives, as well
as in its budget and disengagement processes. Its
communication activities entail a network of
more than 9,000 partners (both institutions and
individuals) that exchange health research in-
formation. Over 10,000 copies of the forum’s
10/90 annual report are printed and distributed,
and the forum’s Web site received more than
40,000 hits per month in 2003. The forum mon-
itors and evaluates research-related materials. As
with other new programs, the lack of formal cri-
teria to assess initiatives’ progress and the sheer
time and resources needed to achieve that
progress seemed to have been an issue. The
forum’s impact on resource allocations could
not be assessed for lack of data. The forum has
a new work program and a strategy to respond
to these findings.
Roll Back Malaria was established to gener-
ate political support and provide training to sup-
port malaria control. RBM’s external independent
evaluation was one of the strongest in its cov-
erage of issues and its recognition of the im-
portance of partners’ roles. It contrasted the
program’s initial, ambitious goal of reducing the
malaria burden by 50 percent by 2010 with the
program’s absence of clear, monitorable, and
realistic objectives. The evaluation found con-
fusion about individual partners’ responsibili-
ties, slow progress in achieving country buy-in,
insufficient political mobilization, mixed-quality
technical advice, and a lack of country strategies
to achieve the program’s goals. The evaluation
also noted that the partnership’s loose initial
governance structure introduced inefficiencies
in decisionmaking and contributed to a lack of
accountability within the partnership. 
Since this evaluation, a major restructuring of
RBM has taken place. The program now has a
clearer strategy and a focus on selected coun-
tries. The program has also put in place a stronger
governance structure, with clearer roles, re-
sponsibilities, and accountabilities among the
board, secretariat, working groups, and regions,
and with more focused participation of “benefi-
ciary countries” in governance. The restructuring
is too recent to assess its impact. Yet the Roll
Back Malaria program nonetheless has some im-
portant accomplishments in advocacy, resource
mobilization, and consensus-building on malaria-
control activities at the global level, including en-
suring its inclusion in the Global Fund for AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The program is also bet-
ter integrated into the Bank’s health sector lend-
ing than the self-standing HIV projects. The link
of RBM with the Bank’s operational work has
been variable, but is improving. Yet there remain
daunting internal issues for the Bank, which needs
to allocate money for the network anchors and re-
gions to link RBM programs to one another and
to the Bank’s lending operations. It also needs to
test and monitor the effectiveness of program
messages in various countries and adjust its global
advocacy accordingly.9
Stop TB was established to ensure effective di-
agnosis, treatment, and cure of patients; to stop
TB transmission; to reduce the inequitable toll
of TB; and to foster development of new pre-
ventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic tools and
strategies (such as the directly observed therapy
short course, or DOTS, used to interrupt TB
transmission). It identifies emerging threats,
such as TB/HIV links and multidrug resistant tu-
berculosis (MDR-TB), and develops technical
guidelines and tools, including monitoring of
program implementation at the country level,
technical support, capacity building, and train-
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ing. Stop TB operates the Global TB Drug Facility,
which finances drug procurement and provides
procurement services with financing from other
sources (including the World Bank). This fi-
nancing mechanism is meant to enable safe and
efficient drug supply to countries facing supply
constraints and to learn about increasing drug
access at competitive prices. There is broader
consensus on Stop TB’s DOTS approach than
there is on malaria prevention. DOTS strategy is
promoted in all Bank-funded health programs. 
In response to the independent external eval-
uation completed in December 2003, Stop TB is
refining its governance and business practices
and building further country partnerships. The
evaluation found that Stop TB is relevant in the
global health scene and that its strategic objec-
tives are clear and well defined and in line with
the United Nations’ Millennium Goals targets
and indicators. The evaluation also concluded
that Stop TB has scored some major achieve-
ments in its three years, including building and
sustaining a broad network of partners, broad-
ening support for the partnership, and securing
political commitment to a detailed Global Plan
to Stop TB. Furthermore, the Stop TB Partner-
ship has made significant progress against TB,
even in difficult environments. The evaluation
also praised Stop TB’s work in the Green Light
Committee for second-line TB drugs and the
continued efforts of the Stop TB Global Drug Fa-
cility for its grant-making, procurement, part-
ner mobilization, and technical assistance. At
the same time, the evaluation observed that
monitoring of coverage is nearly nonexistent
and that the drug facility, instituted to help de-
veloping countries buy drugs at competitive
prices, is grossly underfunded at the global level.
At the country level, internal delivery capacity and
the timely availability of supplies remain chal-
lenges. An important finding of the evaluation
was that changes in donor priorities and the es-
tablishment of new financing mechanisms, such
as the Global Fund, have intensified competition
for already limited resources. Consequently, the
evaluation suggested the need for better finan-
cial planning and more country-based, business-
oriented strategies. The realism of the targets will
depend on the availability of funding. The links
between Bank operations and Stop TB are strong
in China, India, and some Eastern European
countries, but variable overall.10
Advocacy to Promote Approaches to
Addressing Global Concerns at the
Country Level
Programs: Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
CGAP (1995), Global Integrated Pest Management Fa-
cility (GIF) (1996), Global Forum for Health Research
(1997), Global Water Partnership (GWP) (1997), FSAP
(1999), Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) (2000)
Nearly all the programs in this category face
changing or unclear objectives, lack of Bank or
country involvement, and lack of evidence of
impacts (on either donors or countries). The
programs address specific development issues of
global concern—the sustainable management
of microfinance institutions, integrated pest
management, public-private NGO partnerships
in health, integrated water management, finan-
cial sector management, and child work. 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
was created to provide $100 million in microfi-
nance, to increase the poorest households’ ac-
cess to economic activity. Joint or parallel
financing with other donors was posited, with the
Bank contributing $30 million. The objective
then changed to improving the Bank’s and other
donors’ internal capacity to deliver microfinance,
and to the dissemination of best practices to
microfinance institutions. At the same time, the
emphasis changed from the poorest to the poor.
The 2002 external evaluation found that CGAP’s
achievements in donor coordination were “mod-
est and minimal.” While CGAP has produced a
great deal of material on best practice, there is
little independent evidence of benefit to, or im-
pact on, member donors or microfinance insti-
tutions. There is also no evidence of expanded
microfinance provision by the CGAP consortium
of donors, since CGAP has not tracked this. An-
other initially expected added value was the
leveraging of Bank resources ($30 million) to-
ward an additional $70 million from other
donors. Yet over eight years of operation, about
two-thirds ($65.3 million) of the $96 million
CGAP has received has come from the Bank,
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more than twice the level (in percentage and ab-
solute terms) that was agreed at the program’s
inception. The other 27 member donors have
contributed less than half of the $70 million ex-
pected. Under Phase II of CGAP’s operations,
member donors contributed more to the provi-
sion of microfinance services individually than
they did via the CGAP partnership
Despite its extremely limited budget (the sec-
ond-smallest among the programs reviewed),
the Global Integrated Pest Management Facil-
ity has produced a range of outcomes. It has in-
creased global advocacy for integrated pest
management. At the country level, it has pro-
moted aid coordination by facilitating assistance
to governments requesting IPM support (several
pilot projects have led to follow-on financing of
pesticide projects). In one notable case, Kyr-
gyzstan, the program promoted demonstrable
national ownership of the principles (beyond
technical ones) that underlie IPM for cotton and
other crops. Facility staff have contributed to
the growing body of international pesticide reg-
ulations and norms (CODEX). They have as-
sisted the FAO Plant Protection Service and,
through seconded staff, assisted the World Bank
with the development of the Integrated Safe-
guard Policy Datasheet, a draft pest manage-
ment guidebook, pest management plans, and
training. However, the facility’s guidelines, en-
capsulated in its Program Document and agreed
upon by its co-sponsors in 1996, were weak in
assigning criteria to assess impact (beyond out-
puts like increased farmer participation and out-
comes like reduced pesticide use). The facility
has recognized the need to adjust to developing-
country needs in areas related to food safety
and international trade (considering the recent
activation of the Rotterdam and Stockholm con-
ventions). Appropriate impact indicators for this
work could include reductions in pesticide man-
agement costs as a proportion of total crop pro-
duction costs and reductions in EU rejection of
produce for reasons of excessive pesticide
residues.
The most useful contribution of Under-
standing Children’s Work has been the compi-
lation of country-by-country information in
studies of children’s work. Some of these have
generated enthusiasm for the issues among pol-
icymakers. However, the external evaluation ob-
serves that the collaborative process has had an
“informative” rather than “formative” character
and that little progress has been made in devel-
oping a common typology or in operationalizing
key concepts like “child work,” “child labor,”
and “worst forms of child labor.” The use of gen-
eral objectives rather than “specific, measura-
ble, achievable, and time-bound” ones also opens
the door to varied interpretations. The program
has not sought to enhance its appeal beyond the
countries where studies have been done, has
not drawn on the experience of the more suc-
cessful countries in reducing child labor, and
has not sufficiently involved civil-society groups
who can help set societal norms for the tolerance
of child labor. Increased interagency collabora-
tion has been a hallmark of this program (espe-
cially considering the historical inattention given
to child labor in development research). But
differences in viewpoints across co-sponsoring
agencies have disrupted the program’s original
working relationships. A new co-sponsorship
arrangement is being investigated. Meanwhile,
closer involvement of Bank operational staff and
developing-country policymakers is needed to
give the program the more operational bent
necessary to tackle the problem of child labor. 
The Global Water Partnership is a global net-
work of water partnerships focused on imple-
mentation of integrated water resources
management (IWRM), a comprehensive and mul-
tisector approach to water issues. Thus far, it
has established or sponsored 11 regional part-
nerships, 25 country-level partnerships, and 45
area water partnerships. A key rationale behind
GWP is the assumption that water partnerships
can save money by improving resource mobi-
lization and increasing efficiencies in distribution,
delivery, and use. Although a founder and early
financial supporter, the Bank withdrew Devel-
opment Grant Facility financial support for GWP
in 2002. This has left the program’s water part-
nerships facing the formidable challenge of en-
suring their own financial sustainability. Given the
lack of evidence of consistent performance and
cost savings across partnerships, it is unclear
whether most of them will manage on their own.
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Although designed as an implementation mech-
anism for IWRM, GWP has focused more on ad-
vocacy than on on-the-ground activities, raising
the issue of overlap with the World Water Coun-
cil. A persistent problem for GWP has been its
lack of quantitative performance indicators to
show the impact of the program and its part-
nerships on water-use efficiency, equity, quality,
and sustainability.
Country-Level Capacity Building
Programs: Information for Development Program (in-
foDev) (1995), World Links for Development (World
Links) (1998), Global Development Network (GDN)
(1999), Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)
(1999), Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Ini-
tiative (FIRST) (2002)
These five capacity-building programs raise issues
of their objectives and strategies, Bank over-
sight, and exit strategies. They have not yet
demonstrated impacts beyond the direct bene-
ficiaries of their activities.
The Information for Development program
was founded in 1995, based on the realization
that poor countries and poor communities were
not just resource-poor but also information-
poor, lacking access to information and knowl-
edge that could improve lives. Until February
2003, its main activity was to make small capac-
ity-building grants (up to $250,000) to help re-
cipients design, test, and apply innovative uses
of information and communication technology
(ICT) at the country level. Its two program-level
evaluations in 1998 and 2002 are among the
weakest evaluations of global programs. The
evaluations were not independent (since the
evaluators reported to infoDev management),
had no evaluation framework, did not follow a
results-based framework, and did not assess
achievements against stated objectives. The 2002
evaluation concluded that infoDev’s advocacy of
access to ICT as a global public good has been
its biggest success. At the same time, the pro-
gram’s capacity-building grants were found to
have had little impact beyond the direct benefi-
ciaries, and infoDev has made little effort to dis-
till lessons from these grants; until now, the
main source of information and exchange has
been its Web site. The 2001 report of its Technical
Advisory Panel found that infoDev spent a great
deal of its resources screening project propos-
als, and very little on supervision or monitoring
after these were approved. The 2002 evaluation
also pointed out that infoDev now operates in
a crowded field, with many alternative sources
of information. It concluded that infoDev must
reinvent itself and “focus on its knowledge ac-
tivities in order to capitalize on its initial success
and stay ahead of the growing pack of ICT for de-
velopment programs.” Although infoDev is a
Bank-dominated partnership, it appears to add
very little value to the Bank. It has funded coun-
try-level activities through developed-country
NGOs without the knowledge of the Bank’s
country directors. While infoDev has hosted
workshops, symposia, and conferences advo-
cating the importance of ICTs in developing
countries, it has not worked closely with na-
tional policymakers to design policies to increase
connectivity. Responding to the 2002 evaluation,
infoDev management has begun restructuring
programs and priorities, mainstreaming ICT in
the core operational work of donors, and iden-
tifying strategies for scaling up the impact of
ICT on core development goals (including the
Millennium Development Goals).
World Links for Development, a global learn-
ing network linking students and teachers around
the world, is designed to offer a set of education
technology-related services ranging from basic
school connectivity solutions to international
tele-collaborative projects for teachers’ profes-
sional development. The primary value it adds
is though its training program to help teachers
and students apply ICTs to teaching and learn-
ing. The program has been extended to more
than 30 countries in all regions, creating net-
works of teachers and students. OED team vis-
its to a number of countries in Asia found that
the training provided by World Links is of high
quality, but needs to be tailored to specific needs
of client countries. Where private sector invest-
ment is less attractive, as in most of Sub-Saharan
Africa, the program has helped leverage financ-
ing from donors, but those donors are increas-
ingly requiring a match for their funds. Hence the
loss to the program from the Bank’s planned fi-
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nancial disengagement is much greater than the
Bank’s own financial share in the program. It will
be a challenge for World Links to sustain itself
when DGF support dries up in FY04 and the
World Bank Institute also withdraws its support. 
The lack of computers, hardware/software
support, and Internet access continue to be
major challenges. The external evaluation, com-
missioned by, and reported to, the program’s
management, found that student participation
improves computer and other skills. Also, a gen-
der-impact study of participating students in
Africa commissioned by the program manage-
ment found that girls have benefited more in ac-
ademic results and communication skills. An
independent external evaluation of the program
would assist in understanding how the program
could help the application of ICTs to achieve
the Education for All goals, given the program’s
potential for scaling up and replicating success-
ful projects. Given this program’s multisector
links, the Bank can employ its comparative ad-
vantage by lending to client countries for build-
ing the appropriate ICT infrastructure, including
the related hardware, software, and communi-
cation solutions support, while the program im-
proves the effectiveness of the Bank’s lending.
The Bank also can assist in tailoring the pro-
gram content.
The Global Development Network has con-
siderable potential as a tool for fostering high-
quality, policy-relevant economic and social
science research in developing and transition
countries. Its aim is to support the generation
and sharing of knowledge for development;
strengthen the capacity of research and policy in-
stitutions in developing countries and transi-
tion economies to do high-quality, policy-relevant
research; and bridge the gap between the de-
velopment of ideas and their implementation.
Conceived as a network of networks, GDN pro-
vides money for research grants to regional re-
search networks, which are then allocated
through regional competitions. Initially set up by
senior managers in the Bank’s Development
Economics Vice Presidency and the World Bank
Institute, GDN has continued to receive the
Bank’s strong backing, even after moving out of
the Bank and incorporating as an NGO in 2001.
With assured Bank funding for five years, creat-
ing some networks and bringing some estab-
lished networks on board, the program has
gotten started relatively quickly. Researchers
value GDN’s support for global research and
give high ratings to its annual global development
conferences. But the largely North-South con-
ferences account for 20 percent of GDN’s budget,
with high opportunity cost of resources for fund-
ing research, and South-South cooperation. In
the first few years GDN was seen primarily as an
economic research network, an approach the
World Bank, IMF, and the African Economic Re-
search Council favor. But in response to stake-
holder criticism and potential funders, GDN has
moved to broaden its disciplinary scope, gaining
greater acceptability among social scientists. Al-
though its governance structure was built using
a participatory approach, GDN is closely associ-
ated with the Bank and its costs have been high,
albeit declining over time. The Bank provided
scant oversight of the program, notwithstanding
its major role in the GDN’s establishment, po-
tentially exposing the Bank to reputational risks.
These risks are compounded by the fact that 8
of the 18 GDN board members are nominated
by the same regional networks that participate
in allocative decisions related to their regions, po-
tentially posing a conflict of interest on the gov-
erning board. Besides, the board lacked key
information on GDN’s finances, including over-
head and administrative costs, at the time of the
evaluation. 
GDN’s external evaluation viewed GDN as
facing three strategic weaknesses: 1. disagree-
ment among important stakeholders on GDN
mission and objectives; 2. weaknesses in program
governance; 3. poor prospects for the long-term
financial sustainability of the program, and the
need to reexamine the decisions to locate GDN
in India and to adopt an international organiza-
tion (IO) status. It recommended reduced fre-
quency of conferences, increased competition
among regions for fund allocation, and the ap-
pointment of independent consultants with req-
uisite skills to assess the GDN relocation decision
and to determine whether the legal status of
GDN as an international organization is in the
best long-term interest of the network. GDN
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has not accepted all these recommendations. It
is too early to assess its long-term impact. With
its upcoming change in institutional status and
relocation to New Delhi, India, GDN is at-
tempting to establish its own independent iden-
tity, which would depend in part on its reduced
financial dependence and an arm’s-length rela-
tionship with the World Bank.
The Financial Sector Assessment Program,
conceived in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis, was intended to contribute to a global
public good by diagnosing the strengths and
fragilities of member countries’ financial sys-
tems, ensuring better availability of data on those
systems, and providing timely treatment of weak-
nesses to make countries less vulnerable to ex-
ternal shocks. OED interviews suggest that there
is strong demand and commitment to the pro-
gram in the executive boards of the IMF and the
Bank among both part 1 and part 2 countries.
The assessments conducted by the Bank’s Qual-
ity Assurance Group have generally given it good
marks. The program managers indicate that the
program and its interaction with international
standard-setting bodies have made financial stan-
dards more operational and relevant for devel-
oping countries. The program’s assessments are
backed by a range of analytical and assessment
tools, and thus the assessments have helped im-
prove the tools themselves. However, a number
of tensions have emerged between the number
of countries demanding the diagnostic work and
the speed with which countries can be diag-
nosed. The comprehensiveness and the costs of
studies have also been issues relative to the need
for focus. Furthermore, FSAP faces the challenge
of reaching a balance between coverage of “sig-
nificant” countries (those that are a potential
source of financial contagion) and small countries
that nonetheless would benefit from the pro-
gram. Within each country, the attention to the
private and public sector components of the na-
tional financial system is also an issue. There is
clarity on paper about the procedures for co-
operation and the division of labor between the
Bank and the IMF among the global programs
OED has reviewed. But there is a general concern
that the program serves the needs of the IMF
more than those of the Bank, with greater focus
on macroeconomic stability and less on gener-
ating investment funds and improving their al-
location, including how developing countries,
and particularly small countries, could better
access international capital markets. The Bank ex-
pects to address the concern about small-coun-
try coverage in the future.
The Financial Sector Reform and Strength-
ening Initiative was originally intended to follow
up on the findings of FSAP’s diagnostic studies.
This link is now less clear. It provides Bank- or
partner-executed technical assistance to improve
regulatory frameworks, institutional reforms,
and domestic capacity in financial sector man-
agement. The scale at which the program pro-
vides these services could not be achieved either
by the Bank or the IMF out of administrative
budgets alone. The high overhead costs of op-
erating two secretariats (one in Washington and
another in London) are symptomatic of the lack
of an agreed strategy among the major donor
partners. Similarly, there is little balance of the
public and private sector technical assistance
skills that developing countries need and that
partners bring. Fund and Bank staff, whose in-
puts are funded by donor trust funds, bring pub-
lic sector expertise, while DGF contributions go
to London to finance private sector expertise.
FIRST’s shareholder model does not benefit
from the perspectives of developing countries
and is too new for its impacts to be assessed.
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ANNEX F: SOURCE MATERIAL
The World Bank’s Approach To Global Programs: 
Phase 2 Report Case Studies Author(s)
The CGIAR at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Team Leader: Uma Lele
Agricultural Research
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Uma Lele, Saeed Rana, Lauren 
Kelly, & Kirsten Spainhower
The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol Lauren Kelly
The Prototype Carbon Fund Lauren Kelly & Jeffrey Jordan
The Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund (CEPF) Kirsten Spainhower
The Global Integrated Pest Management Facility (GIF) Lauren Kelly
Global Water Partnership (GWP): An Independent Case Study Saeed Rana & Lauren Kelly
Global Health Programs, Millennium Development Goals, and the World Bank’s Role Uma Lele, Naveen Sarna, Ramesh 
• Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) Govindaraj, & Yianni 
• Global Forum for Health Research Konstantopoulos
• UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS)
• Roll Back Malaria (RBM)
• Stop TB
• Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)
Consultative Group for Assistance to the Poor (CGAP) Edward Bresnyan
Global Infrastructure Programs: A Network Synthesis Report on Six Global Programs in Infrastructure Christopher Gerrard
and Private Sector Development
• Water and Sanitation Program (WSP)
• Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
• Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)
• The Information for Development Program (infoDev)
• Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)
• Cities Alliance
The Post-conflict Fund: A Case Study Caroline Bahnson & Jozefina 
Cutura
Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) Program Manmohan Agarwal & Lauren 
Kelly
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF): An Independent Case Study Manmohan Agarwal
(Table continues on the following page.)
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The World Bank’s Approach To Global Programs: 
Phase 2 Report Case Studies Author(s)
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and Financial Sector Reform and Manmohan Agarwal
Strengthening Initiative (FIRST)
The Global Development Network (GDN): An Independent Mini Review Naveen Sarna & Yianni 
Konstantopoulos
World Links: A Mini Review Naveen Sarna & Yianni
Konstantopoulos
Thematic Working Papers 
The CGIAR at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Team leader: Uma Lele
Agricultural Research
Natural Resources Management Research in CGIAR: A Meta-Evaluation Christopher B. Barrett
The CGIAR in Africa: Past, Present, and Future Carl K. Eicher & Mandivamba 
Rukuni
Global Public Goods from the CGIAR: Impact Assessment Bruce Gardner
Review of Biotechnology, Genetic Resource and Intellectual Property Rights Programs William Lesser
CGIAR Effectiveness – A NARS Perspective from India Dr. J. C. Kaytal & Dr. Mruthyunjaya
Brazil Country Paper for the CGIAR Meta-Evaluation Jamil Macedo, Marcio C. M. Porto, 
Elisio Contini, & Antonio F. D. 
Avila
International Agriculture Research and the Role of the Private Sector David J. Spielman
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ANNEX G: PEOPLE CONSULTED
Cities Alliance Case Study
Anwar Ravat, Chief Administrative Officer, Infrastructure Network Core Services; Nigel Twose, Manager, Investment Climate Department
Damyanova, Victoria Head, Foreign Investment Projects Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Djorinski, P. Chairman of Municipal Council Budget Commission Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Kehaiova, Ekaterina Mayor Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Mihaylovitch, Ludmil Chief Coordinator, Sofproject Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Nikolov, Ventseslav Deputy Mayor Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Reffailova, Georgette Expert, Urban Development Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Terziev, Peter Director Sofproject Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Yanov, Stoyan Chief Architect Sofia Municipality Bulgaria
Minis, Hal Program Director USAID - Local Government 
Initiative Bulgaria
Mutter, Michael Sr. Architectural and Urban Planning Adviser DFID United Kingdom
Barbalov, Doncho Energy & Infrastructure Officer The World Bank Bulgaria
de Bruyn Kops, Oscar Country Manager The World Bank Bulgaria
Kondova,Galia Research Assistant The World Bank Bulgaria
Hildebrand, Mark Program Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Milroy, Kevin Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Case Study
For a complete list of people consulted, please refer to The CGIAR at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research.
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) Case Study
Anwar Ravat, Chief Administrative Officer, Infrastructure Network Core Services; Nigel Twose, Manager, Investment Climate Department
Balkenhol, Bernd Director, Social Finance Program ILO Germany
Galusek, Grzegorz Executive Director Microfinance Center Poland
Matul, Michal Researcher Microfinance Center Poland
Szostek, Agata Training Programme Director Microfinance Center Poland
Stanton, David Chief Enterprise Development Officer DFID United Kingdom
Pojarski, Peter Operations Office, ECSHD The World Bank Bulgaria
Barbalov, Doncho Energy & Infrastructure Officer The World Bank Bulgaria
de Bruyn Kops, Oscar Country Manager The World Bank Bulgaria
Kondova, Galia Research Assistant The World Bank Bulgaria
Kourtev, Georgi Communications Associate The World Bank Bulgaria
Cook, Tamara Operations Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Cuevas, Carlos Lead Financial Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Littlefield, Elizabeth Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Rosenberg, Richard Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sananikone, Ousa Sr. Private Sector Development Spec. The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund (CEPF) Case Study
Kevin Cleaver, Sector Director, Agriculture & Rural Development Department; Kristalina Georgieva, Country Director, Russian Federation; Sushma
Ganguly, Sector Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development Department
Thomas, Vinod Country Director The World Bank Brazil
Steer, Andrew Country Director The World Bank Indonesia
Dean, Lisa Director of Financial Management, CEPF Conservation International Washington, D.C.
Martin, Roberto Sr. Director for Portfolio Management, CEPF Conservation International Washington, D.C.
Ocker, Donnell Sr. Director for Program Management, CEPF Conservation International Washington, D.C.
Seligmann, Peter CEO Conservation International Washington, D.C.
Thomsen, Jorgen Executive Director CEPF Conservation International Washington, D.C.
Brylski, Phillip Country Sector Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C
Canby, Kerstin Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Carroll, Michael Sr. Natural Resource Management Spec. The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Cassells, David Sr. Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Castro, Gonzalo Lead Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Douglas, James Lead Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Georgieva, Kristalina Country Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Jansen, Malcolm Sr. Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kiss, Agnes Lead Ecologist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lintner, Stephen Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
MacKinnon, Kathleen Sr. Biodiversity Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Peter, Christian Forestry Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ramirez, Jeanette Operations Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Shen, Susan Lead Ecologist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Spears, John Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Van Nieuwkoop, Martien Lead Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Warner, Chris Sr. Environmental Spec. The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Whitten, Anthony Sr. Biodiversity Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) Case Study
Anwar Ravat, Chief Administrative Officer, Infrastructure Network Core Services; Nigel Twose, Manager, Investment Climate Department
Christov, Christo Executive Director (consultant) Energy Institute Bulgaria
Drumev, Drumi Chairman State Energy Efficiency 
Agency Bulgaria
Ivanov, Teodor Chief Expert, Air Protection Department Ministry of Environment 
& Water Bulgaria
Konstantinoff, Metodi Deputy Chairman State Energy Efficiency 
Agency Bulgaria
Kavachev, Milko Minister Ministry of Energy & 
Resources Bulgaria
Petrov, Julian Chief Secretary State Energy Efficiency 
Agency Bulgaria
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Duda, Miroslaw Acting Director Energy Regulatory Authority Poland
Zaleski, Boguslaw Director, Foreign Cooperation & European Integration Office Energy Regulatory Authority Poland
Jaskolski, Tomasz Director, Development & Production Polish Oil & Gas Company Poland
Nowak, Kazimierz Director, Development & Investment Division Polish Oil & Gas Company Poland
Piwowarski, Andrzej Sr. Advisor for Natural Gas Industry & European 
Union Accession Polish Oil & Gas Company Poland
Rokosz, Wieslaw Deputy Director, Development & Production Polish Oil & Gas Company Poland
Staniewski, Jerzy Vice President Polish Oil & Gas Company Poland
Altas, Burhan Head of Planning & Financing Department Ministry of Energy & 
National Resources Turkey
Altas, Macide Planning Expert, Research, Planning & Coordination Board Ministry of Energy & 
National Resources Turkey
Beba, Ali Consultant R&R Scientific & Technical 
Services Turkey
Cakmak, Osman Deputy Undersecretary Ministry of Environment Turkey
Kulakoglu, Aysen Head of Department Undersecretariat of the 
Treasury Turkey
Ozalp, Camay Senior Associate Undersecretariat of the 
Treasury Turkey
Barbalov, Doncho Energy & Infrastructure Officer The World Bank Bulgaria
de Bruyn Kops, Oscar Country Manager The World Bank Bulgaria
Kondova, Galia Research Assistant The World Bank Bulgaria
Kourtev, Georgi Communications Associate The World Bank Bulgaria
Carter, Michael Country Director The World Bank Poland
Hall, Christopher Chief, Warsaw Office & Sr. Portfolio Manager The World Bank Poland
Wojciechowicz, Jacek External Affairs Officer The World Bank Poland
Ozdora, Gurhan Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Turkey
Feinstein, Charles Lead Energy Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lallement, Dominique Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Saeed, Kazim Operations Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Global Development Network (GDN) Case Study
Gwynne, Beris GDN Governing Board Member The Foundation for 
Development Cooperation Australia
Makdisi, Samir GDN Governing Board Member American University of 
Beirut Beirut
Hanousek, Jan Director CERG-EI Czech Republic
Filer, Randall President CERG-EI Czech Republic
Fiske, Ellen Administrative Director CERG-EI Czech Republic
Jetton, Michael Development & Public Relations Office CERG-EI Czech Republic
Jurajda, Stepan Assistant Professor CERG-EI Czech Republic
Kocenda, Evzen Associate Professor CERG-EI Czech Republic
Lizal, Lubomir GDN Grant Recipient CERG-EI Czech Republic
Kmenta, Jan GDN Governing Board Member Charles University Czech Republic
Hiemenz, Ulrich GDN Governing Board Member Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation & Development France
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Gerlach, Frederick GDN Evaluator
Muth, H. Peter GDN Evaluator
Agarwal, Bina GDN Governing Board Member Institute for Economic
Growth India
Ahluwalia, Isher GDN Governing Board Member International Food Policy 
Research Institute India
Patel, Sujata GDN Governing Board Member University of Pune India
Ray, Subhorota Fellow Indian Council for Research 
in International Economic 
Relations India
Virmani, Arvind Executive Secretary SANEI India
Killick, Tony Board Member AERC Kenya
Lyakurwa, William Executive Secretary AERC Kenya
Petsieau, Caroline Board Chair AERC Kenya
King, Vita Grant Recipient Euro Faculty Latvia
Hernandez, Carolina Director Institute for Strategic & 
Development Studies Philippines
Lamberte, Mario President Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies Philippines
Cukrowski, Jacek Sr. Export CASE Foundation Poland
Jakubiak, Malgorzata Grant recipient CASE Foundation Poland
Wojciechowicz, Grazyna Managing Director CASE Foundation Poland
Wozniak, Przemek Grant Recipient CASE Foundation Poland
Bezbaruah, Supriti Administrator ISEAS Singapore
Yue, Chia Siow Director & Regional Coordinator ISEAS Singapore
Jayawardena, Lal GDN Governing Board Member SSASL Sri Lanka
Jittrapanun, Thawatchai Head, Faculty of Economics Chualongkorn University Thailand
Jivastantikarn, Nirund President Yonok College Thailand
Sussangkarn, Chalongphob GDN Governing Board Member Thailand Development 
Research Institute Thailand
Mintchev, Vesselin Secretary for Economic Affairs Office of the President Turkey
Stone, Diane GDN Governing Board Member University of Warwick United Kingdom
Cooper, Richard Joint Deputy Chair, GDN Governing Board Harvard University United States
McMahon, Gary Principal Economist Global Development 
Network United States
Squire, Lyn Director Global Development 
Network United States
Kaul, Inge GDN Governing Board Member UNDP United States
Mooke, Joyce Vice President The Rockefeller Foundation United States
Schultz, Paul Professor Yale University United States
Khan, Mohsin Director IMF Institute Washington, D.C.
Carter, Michael Country Director The World Bank Poland
Hall, Christopher Chief, Warsaw Office & Sr. Portfolio Manager The World Bank Poland
Wojciechowicz, Jacek External Affairs Officer The World Bank Poland
Bourguignon, Francois Sr. Vice President & Chief Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Collier, Paul Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Diwan, Ishac Country Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Duvall, Thomas Chief Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Garcia-Thoumi, Ines Chief Admin. Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gelb, Alan Chief Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gwin, Catherine Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hubbard, Paul Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kirby-Zaki, Jane Sr. Program Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Leautier, Frannie Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nankani, Gobind Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ndulu, Benno Research Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Perry, Guillermo GDN Governing Board Member The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ramphele, Mamphela Managing Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stern, Nick Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stumpf, Andrea Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Wangwe, Samuel Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Winters, L. Alan Director, Development Research Group The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Case Study
Kevin Cleaver, Sector Director, Agriculture & Rural Development Department; Kristalina Georgieva, Country Director, Russian Federation; Sushma
Ganguly, Sector Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development Department
Hagerman, Ellen CIDA Canada
Carabias, Julia Chair, STAP GEF Mexico
Prouvost, Amedee Director & CFO MIGA Washington, D.C.
Shepardson, Karin Sr. Regional Coordinator The World Bank Croatia
Ahmed, Kuslum Lead Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Aryal, Dinesh Operations Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Broadfield, Robin Sr. Regional Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Castro, Gonzalo Lead Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Crepin, Christophe Program Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
El Ashry, Mohammed Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Georgieva, Kristalina Country Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Good, Len CEO & Chairman The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Harstad, Jarle Lead Monitoring & Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Khanna, Rohit Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
King, Kenneth Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kumar, Kanta Sr. Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
MacKinnon, Kathleen Sr. Biodiversity Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Shen, Susan Lead Ecologist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Wedderburn, Samuel Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Vidaeus, Lars Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Volonte, Claudio Sr. Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Zazueta, Aaron Sr. Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist The World Bank Washington, DC
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Global Health Programs (HNP) Case Study
Jacques Baudoy, Sector Director, Health, Nutrition, and Population; Robert Hecht, Sector Manager, Health, Nutrition and Population; James 
Christopher Lovelace, Senior Manager, Kyrgyz Republic Country Office
Gaere, Elizabeth Representative DFID Accra
Adjei, Sam Director of Medical Services MOH Accra
Melville, George Country Representative WHO Accra
Alemseged, Eskendir Civil Engineer African Development Bank Addis Ababa
Namakando, George Principal Macroeconomist African Development Bank Addis Ababa
Shaaeldin, Elfaith Resident Representative African Development Bank Addis Ababa
Alem, A. Health Worker City Hospital Addis Ababa
Tekle, Ms. Senior Nurse Supervisor City Hospital Addis Ababa
Tekalegne, Agonafer Head CRDA (National NGO 
umbrella organization) Addis Ababa
Herzig, Peter Health Project Advisor GTZ Addis Ababa
Labahn, Thomas Director GTZ Addis Ababa
Seidel, Bjorn Deputy Director GTZ Addis Ababa
Azene, Girma Head of Planning MOH Addis Ababa
Seifu, Yohannes Head, Health Services and Training MOH Addis Ababa
Wit, Klaas First Secretary, Economic Netherlands Embassy Addis Ababa
Broek, Antonius Deputy Resident Representative UNDP Addis Ababa
Nyambi, S. Resident Representative for UNDP UNDP Addis Ababa
Sheth, Mahandra Representative UNICEF Addis Ababa
Jancloes, Michel Executive Director WHO Addis Ababa
Oedi Sr. Health Officer WHO Addis Ababa
Gebreselassie, O. Senior Health Specialist The World Bank Office Addis Ababa
Singh, Surjit Resident Representative The World Bank Office Addis Ababa
Plasai, Valaikanya Faculty and Malaria Expert, College of Public Health Chulalongkorn University Bangkok
Chareonsuk, Sompong Country Program Advisor UNAIDS Bangkok
Melgaard, Bjorn WHO Representative WHO Bangkok
Laruelle, Jacques Belgian Ministry of International Cooperation DGC Belgium
Gaseitsiwe, D.M. Director of Economic Affairs Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, 
Government of Botswana Botswana
Molomo, Batho Director of Strategic and Contingency Planning Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, 
Government of Botswana Botswana
Hutt, Janine Program Advisor CIDA Canada
Rockhold, Pia Technical Advisor on Health MOFA (Danida) Denmark
Rantona, Koketso Executive Director Community Solutions Gabarone
Agizew, Tefera PMO Epidemiology Unit Gabarone
Koosimile, Boitshwarelo Technical Assistant (TB) Epidemiology Unit Gabarone
Moakofni, Kentse Senior Nursing Officer, Malaria Epidemiology Unit Gabarone
Mwansa, R.A. PHS I Epidemiology Unit Gabarone
Phindela, Thandie Principal Health Officer, Malaria Epidemiology Unit Gabarone
Khan, Banu National AIDS Coordinator NACA Gabarone
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Mandevu, Rose Chief Health Officer, AIDS/STD Unit National AIDS Control 
Program, MOH Gabarone
Percy, Fiona AusAID Advisor National AIDS Coordinating 
Agency Gabarone
Rahman, Mafizur STI Program Coordinator and Head National STI Referral 
Training & Research 
Center, MOH Gabarone
Jere, Ackim Project Manager, Statistics Training SADC Gabarone
Odirile, Elliott Statistician SADC Gabarone
Saint-Victor, Rosalind Country Program Adviser UNAIDS Gabarone
Kamau, Macharia Resident Representative UNDP Gabarone
Kalilani, Jean WHO Representative WHO Gabarone
Alnwick, David Program Manager, RBM WHO Geneva
Aitken, Denis Assistant Director-General WHO Geneva
Arnold, Virginia Task Manager for the Global Drug Facility Stop TB Geneva
Asamoa-Baah, Anarfi Assistant Director-General for Communicable Diseases WHO Geneva
Bebhehani, Kazem Assistant Director-General for External Relations and 
Governing Bodies WHO Geneva
Bellah, Ahmed TDR Scientific Officer WHO Geneva
Binh Khanh, Nguyen Planning Officer, Budget and Management Reform WHO Geneva
Blanc, Leopold WHO Coordinator for the Stop TB Department WHO Geneva
Blas, Erik Program Manager WHO Geneva
Brundtland, Gro Harlem Director General WHO Geneva
Carael, Michel Chief, Evaluation Program Development & Coordination UNAIDS Geneva
Clark, John Paul Roll Back Malaria Project WHO Geneva
Coll-Seck, Awa Executive Secretary Roll Back Malaria Geneva
Currat, Louis Executive Secretary Global Forum for Health 
Research Geneva
Defrancisco, Andres Deputy Executive Director Global Forum for Health 
Research Geneva
Dragger, Nick Director, Reproductive Health & Research WHO Geneva
Espinal, Marcos Executive Secretary Stop TB Partnership Geneva
Godal, Tore Executive Director GAVI Geneva
Guindon, Emmanuel Economist (Tobacco), Non-Communicable Diseases WHO Geneva
Hayward, David Head, Finance and Administration Global Forum for Health 
Research Geneva
Heitkamp, Petra Principal Officer Stop TB Partnership Geneva
Herbert, Brad Associate Global Fund for ATM Geneva
Hetschel, Chris CEO MMV Geneva
Heymann, David Executive Director, Communicable Diseases WHO Geneva
Janovsky, Katja Director, Strategies for Cooperation and Partnership WHO Geneva
Karam, Marc Communicable Disease Control Cluster Representative WHO Geneva
Kumaresan, Jacob Executive Secretary, Stop TB WHO Geneva
Kuruneri, Patience Senior Advisor Roll Back Malaria Geneva
Lee, J. W. Director General WHO Geneva
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Matlin, Stephen Executive Director Global Forum for Health 
Research Geneva
Mertens, Theirry Director, the Mediterranean Center for the 
Reduction of Vulnerability WHO Geneva
Morel, Carlos Director, TDR WHO Geneva
Nabarro, David Executive Director GAVI Geneva
Nafo-Traore, Fatoumata Executive Secretary Roll Back Malaria Geneva
Pang, Tikki Director, Evidence for Policy Unit WHO Geneva
Piot, Peter Executive Director UNAIDS Geneva
Pradhan, Namita Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Director General WHO Geneva
Prost, Andre External Relations Dept. WHO Geneva
Rabeneck, Sonya Technical Secretary WHO Geneva
Raviglione, Mario Coordinator, TB Strategy & Operations WHO Geneva
Saxena, Abha Consultant, Evidence for Policy Unit WHO Geneva
Schapira, Allan Coordinator, Policy and Strategy Team Roll Back Malaria Geneva
Sherry, Jim Program Manager UNAIDS Geneva
Smith, Ian Director General WHO Geneva
Souteyrand, Yves Officer at the HIV/AIDS Department WHO Geneva
Stensen, Bo Principal Officer GAVI Geneva
Suzuki, Yasuhiro Executive Director, Health Technology and Medicines WHO Geneva
Tanvir, Mehreen Consultant, TDR WHO Geneva
Thapa, Deepak Internal Oversight Svc WHO Geneva
Tillfors, Lars External Relations WHO Geneva
Van Look, Paul Director, Reproductive Health & Research WHO Geneva
Venugopal, P.V. Director, International Operations MMV Geneva
Widdus, Roy Project Manager Global Forum for Health 
Research Geneva
Korte, Rolf Director of the Health and Education Department GTZ Germany
A. Tung Chairman Nationals AIDS Committee Hanoi
Zessler, Laurent Country Program Advisor UNAIDS Hanoi
Ryan, Jordan Resident Representative UNDP Hanoi
Brudon, Pascale WHO Representative WHO Hanoi
Nguyen, Mai Thi Health Specialist The World Bank Office Hanoi
Rees, Helen Director, RHRU Baragawanath Hospital Johannesburg
Pick, William Head, School of Public Health Witwatersrand University Johannesburg
Price, Max Dean, Medical School Witwatersrand University Johannesburg
Schneider, Helen Director, Center for Health Policy Witwatersrand University Johannesburg
Asquitu, Joanne Evaluation Officer DFID London
Mittal, Onkar Health and Population Department DFID London
Sabey, Steven Health and Population Department DFID London
Bennett,Steve Infectious Disease Epidemiology Unit London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Brugha, Ruairi Health Policy Unit London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
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Cleland, John Head, DFID-funded Safe Passages to Adulthood London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Godfrey-Faussett, Peter Head, DFID-funded TB Program London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Haines, Andy Dean London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Hayes, Richard Professor, Epidemiology & International Health London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Meek, Sylvia Malaria Consortium London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Mills, Anne Professor, International Health Policy London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Timaeus, Ian Center for Population Studies London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Walt, Gill Professor, International Health Policy London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Zaba, Basia Center for Population Studies London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine London
Hemmer, Robert National Service of Infectious Diseases MAE Luxembourg
Palmer, Kevin Regional Adviser in Vector-borne and Parasitic Diseases WHO, WPRO Manila
Schapira, Allan Regional Adviser in Malaria WHO, WPRO Manila
Postma, Sjoerd Representative DANIDA New Delhi
Martineau, Tim Senior Health Adviser DFID New Delhi
Nair, Dinesh Health Adviser DFID New Delhi
Bulusu, Saraswati National Program Officer Global Micronutrient 
Initiative New Delhi
Sankar, Rajan National Program Officer Global Micronutrient 
Initiative New Delhi
Schaetzel, Thomas Regional Coordinator and Senior Program Specialist Global Micronutrient 
Initiative New Delhi
Gupta, Deepak Joint Secretary, MOHFW Government of India New Delhi
Khatri, G.R. Deputy Director General (TB) Government of India New Delhi
Malhotra, S. Asst. Commissioner (CH) Government of India New Delhi
Garg, Subhash Chandra Director of the Bank Fund Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance New Delhi
Kelkar, Vijay Minister Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance New Delhi
Saxena, N.C. Principal Officer Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance New Delhi
Arora, V.K. Director LRS Institute of TB and 
Allied Diseases New Delhi
Nagpaul, Dr. President TB Association of India New Delhi
Bhatnagar, P.C. Senior Coordinator, Community Health and Development VHAI New Delhi
Roy, Taposh Director, Health VHAI New Delhi
Shiva, Meera Chairman VHAI New Delhi
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Heywood, Peter Lead Health Specialist The World Bank Office New Delhi
Ramana, G.N.V. Senior Health Specialist The World Bank Office New Delhi
Singh, Suneeta Senior Public Health Specialist The World Bank Office New Delhi
Sudahakar, K. Senior Health Specialist The World Bank Office New Delhi
Moock, Joyce Lewinger Associate Vice President Rockefeller Foundation New York
Yacoob, May Director of Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Knowledge Management UN Foundation New York
Barbour, Paul Economic Adviser DFID Pretoria
Balfour, Thuthula Director SADC Health Sector 
Coordinating Unit Pretoria
Ijsselmuiden, Carel Director School of Health Systems, 
University of Pretoria Pretoria
Russell, Michele Regional HIV/AIDS Program Coordinator, S. Africa USAID Pretoria
Shasha, Welile WHO Liaison Officer WHO Pretoria
Martin, Gayle Health Specialist The World Bank Office Pretoria
Omar, Fayez Country Director The World Bank Office Pretoria
Sackey, James Economist The World Bank Office Pretoria
Borkar, M.B. Executive Director Serum Institute of India Pune
Dhere, R.M. Director Serum Institute of India Pune
Dodwadkar, S.M. Director Serum Institute of India Pune
Jadhav, S.S. Executive Director Serum Institute of India Pune
Carlsson, Barbro Chief Coordinator SIDA/SAREC Sweden
Svensson, Par Principal Officer SIDA/SAREC Sweden
Berger, Martine Special Adviser SDC Switzerland
Meyers, Richard Senior Operations Officer HD Sector Unit, EAPHD, 
The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Habayeb, Salim Lead Public Health Specialist SASHD, The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ehmer, Paul G. Deputy Officer USAID Washington, D.C.
Barat, Lawrence Technical Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Batson, Amie Sr. Health Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Chow, Jack Assistant Director-General of WHO for HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria U.S. State Department Washington, D.C.
Hoben, Christopher Former Operations Advisor The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nassim, Janet Senior Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nawaz, Tawhid Lead Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Pannenborg, Ok Senior Health Advisor The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ritzen, Jo Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Saxenian, Helen Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stout, Susan Lead Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tannan, Nandita Operations Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tzannatos, Zafiris Advisor The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Upadhyay, Jagadish P. Lead Project Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Weil, Diana Sr. Public Health Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Zewdie, Debrework Program Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Carty, Lisa Manager Gates Foundation Washington, D.C.
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Marsten, Hilary Research Analyst Gates Foundation Washington, D.C.
Carter, Michael Country Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Liese, Bernhard Senior Health Advisor The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Walker, Christopher Lead Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Global Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Case Study
Kevin Cleaver, Sector Director, Agriculture & Rural Development Department; Kristalina Georgieva, Country Director, Russian Federation; Sushma
Ganguly, Sector Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development Department
Fleischer, Gerd Pesticide Policy Project University of Hannover Germany
Waibel, Hermann Institute of Horticultural Economics University of Hannover Germany
Aiazzi, Tulia FAO Italy
Kato, Masa Chief, Evaluation Service FAO Italy
Kenmore, Peter Coordinator FAO Italy
Settle, William FAO Italy
Stemerding, Pieter FAO Italy
Van der Wulp, Harry FAO Italy
Holdernews, Mark CABI Bioscience United Kingdom
Voss, Janny CABI Bioscience United Kingdom
Dinham, Barbara Director PAN-UK United Kingdom
Eisha-Iitman, Marcia PAN-UK United Kingdom
Gopalan, Hiremagalur UNEP
Willis, Jim UNEP
Badiane, Ousmane Lead Rural Development Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Di Leva, Charles Chief Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Feder, Gershon Research Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Forno, Doug Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Freestone, David Chief Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ganguly, Sushma Sector Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gautam, Madhur Sr. Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Granier, Laurent Sr. Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Khokhar, M. Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kiss, Agnes Lead Ecologist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lagnaoui, Aziz Sr. Pest Management Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lintner, Stephen Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
McMahon, Matthew Lead Agriculturalist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nawaz, Tawhid Lead Implementation Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nelson, Ridley Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Pehu, Eija Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Saifullah, Malik Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Schillhorn-Van Veen, Tjaart Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sennhauser, Ethel Sr. Rural Development Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Shen, Susan Lead Ecologist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Wilson, John Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Global Water Partnership (GWP) Case Study
Kevin Cleaver, Sector Director, Agriculture & Rural Development Department; Kristalina Georgieva, Country Director, Russian Federation; Sushma
Ganguly, Sector Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development Department
Astorga, Yamileth Representative Global Water Partnership Costa Rica
Ballestero, Maureen Coordinator Global Water Partnership Costa Rica
Reyes, Virginia Technical Official Global Water Partnership Costa Rica
Zimmer, Daniel President World Water Council France
Bertilsson, Per Deputy Executive Secretary Global Water Partnership Sweden
Gabbrielli, Emilio Executive Secretary Global Water Partnership Sweden
Lenahan, James Global Water Partnership Sweden
Mohtadullah, Khalid Global Water Partnership Sweden
Rogers, Peter Member, Technical Committee Global Water Partnership Sweden
Meinzen-Dick, Ruth IFPRI Washington, D.C.
Ahmad, Masood Lead Water Resources Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Barghouti, Shawki Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Briscoe, John Sr. Water Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Cleaver, Kevin Sector Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Darghouth, Salah Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Eguchi, Yoko Partnership Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Grey, David Sr. Water Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Iyer, Parameswaran Sr. Water & Sanitation Spec. The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kemper, Karin Sr. Water Resources Management Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Pitman, George Keith Sr. Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sadoff, Claudia Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stottman, Walter Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Case Study
Behounek, Jiri Banking Department Ministry of Finance Czech Republic
Birdman, Vojtech Office of State Supervision in Insurance & Pension Funds Ministry of Finance Czech Republic
Kinstva, Pavla International Organizations Department Ministry of Finance Czech Republic
Loula, Dimiitrij Acting Deputy Director General, International 
Organizations Department Ministry of Finance Czech Republic
Novotna, Marta Banking Department Ministry of Finance Czech Republic
Svoboda, Petr Office of State Supervision in Finance and Pension Funds Ministry of Finance Czech Republic
Dedek, Oldrich Vice Governor Czech National Bank Czech Republic
Fencl, Ivan Director, Payment Systems Czech National Bank Czech Republic
Frait, Jan Member of Bank Board Czech National Bank Czech Republic
Racocha, Pavel Member of Bank Board Czech National Bank Czech Republic
Krcmar, Zdenek Justice of the Supreme Court Czech Republic Czech Republic
Seifert, Filip Assistant of Minister Ministry of Justice Czech Republic
Jezek, Tomas Member of the Presidium Czech Securities 
Commission Czech Republic
Valujevs, Guntis Head, Foreign Relations Department Bank of Latvia Latvia
Cerps, Uldis Chairman Financial and Capital 
Markets Commission Latvia
Senderwoicz, Krzysztof Deputy Director, Payment Systems Department National Bank of Poland Poland
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Wyczanski, Pawel Deputy Director, Research Department National Bank of Poland Poland
Knowles, Julie Resource Management Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Promisel, Larry Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tapiero, Dafna Program Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Waxman, Margery Program Director/Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Initiative (FIRST) Case Study
Knowles, Julie Resource Management Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Promisel, Larry Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tapiero, Dafna Program Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Waxman, Margery Program Director/Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Information for Development Program (infoDev) Case Study
Badinsky, Nikolay Technical Director ARC Fund Bulgaria
Dinkova, Dinka Program Director ARC Fund Bulgaria
Shentov, Ognian President Centre for the Study 
of Democracy Bulgaria
Barbalov, Doncho Energy & Infrastructure Officer The World Bank Bulgaria
de Bruyn Kops, Oscar Country Manager The World Bank Bulgaria
Kondova, Galia Research Assistant The World Bank Bulgaria
Kourtev, Georgi Communications Associate The World Bank Bulgaria
Czerniejewski, Borys Director, International Liaison Office Infovide Poland
Fuolewicz, Piotr Adviser to the Board Infovide Poland
Stokalski, Borys President Infovide Poland
Carter, Michael Country Director The World Bank Poland
Hall, Christopher Chief, Warsaw Office & Sr. Portfolio Manager The World Bank Poland
Wojciechowicz, Jacek External Affairs Officer The World Bank Poland
Biochenko, Elmira Deputy Head, Pediatric Oncology Children’s Hospital No. 1 Russia
Korenev, Pavel Medical Director Children’s Hospital No. 1 Russia
Petrova, Eleonora Head, Pediatric Oncology Children’s Hospital No. 1 Russia
Popov, Sergei Chief, Pathology Department Children’s Hospital No. 1 Russia
Blom, Anders Eurofacts Oy, Finland Russia
Lopota, Vitaly Director & Chief Designer State Scientific Centre 
of Russia Russia
Spasski, Boris Head, Marketing & International Contacts Department State Scientific Centre 
of Russia Russia
Zaborovski, Vladimir Deputy Director State Scientific Centre 
of Russia Russia
Ivanova, Elena Chief Expert St. Petersburg 
Administration Russia
Naumenko, Serguei Chief, External Affairs Committee St. Petersburg 
Administration Russia
Frolova, Elena St. Petersburg Rep. Restropovich Foundation Russia
Bretaudeau, Henri Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Chaudhry, Vivek Program Administrator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Dubow, Jacqueline Program Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lanvin, Bruno Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF) Case Study
Belisle, J. Denis Executive Director ITC Geneva
Geoffroy, Francesco Sr. Trade Promotion Officer ITC Geneva
Fortin, Carlos Officer in Charge UNCTAD Geneva
Hamdani, Khalil Chief, Investment Policies & Capacity Building UNCTAD Geneva
Prestigiacomo, Astrid Associate Expert UNCTAD Geneva
Namfua, Marcel Sr. Trade Policy Adviser UNCTAD Geneva
Sahami-Malmberg, Massi Economic Affairs Officer UNCTAD Geneva
Tortora, Manuela Coordinator, Commercial Diplomacy Programme UNCTAD Geneva
Chapelier, Georges Director, Governance and Management Division UNDP Geneva
Quoidbach, Vinciane Jr. Professional Officer UNDP Geneva
Antonakakis, Panos Development Division WTO Geneva
Blank, Annet Head LDC Unit WTO Geneva
Mchumo, Zainab Legal Affairs Officer WTO Geneva
Osakwe, Chiedu Director, Technical Cooperation Division WTO Geneva
Oshikawa, Maika Economics Affairs Officer WTO Geneva
Phongsa, Phouvieng Technical Staff Member WTO Geneva
Werner, Peter Information & Media Relations WTO Geneva
Mohammed, Nadir Country Manager The World Bank Albania
Von Amsberg, Joachim Country Director The World Bank Manila
Benhua, Wei ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Calika, Nur Economist IMF Washington, D.C.
Chauffour, Jean-Pierre WTO Representative IMF Washington, D.C.
Junguito, Roberto ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Kelkar, Vijay Former ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Marquez, Mary Policy Development & Review Department IMF Washington, D.C.
Wijnholds, J. de Beaufort ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Rustomjee, Cyrus ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Aksoy, Attaman Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Benjamin, Nancy Sr. Country Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Bhattacharya, Amar Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Bhattasali, Deepak Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Braga, Carlos Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Dadush, Uri Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Dhar, Sanjay Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Finger, Joseph Michael Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Haddad, Mona Sr. Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hinkle, Lawrence Lead Technical Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hoekman, Bernard Research Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kraus, Christiane Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Martin, William Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nabi, Ijaz Sector Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nehru, Vikram Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ody, Anthony Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Panzer, John Sector Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Peuker, Axel Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Samen, Salomon Sr. Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Saponara, Miguel Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Solleveld, Leendert Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Song, Su Yong Sr. Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stern, Nicholas Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Thirriot, Claire Sr. Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tsikata, Yvonne Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Yagci, Fahrettin Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Mohammed, Nadir Sr. Country Economist The World Bank Yemen
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF) Case Study
Kevin Cleaver, Sector Director, Agriculture & Rural Development Department; Kristalina Georgieva, Country Director, Russian Federation; Sushma
Ganguly, Sector Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development Department
Grof, Tamas UNIDO Austria
Hakizimana, Gabriel Ministry of Land 
& Environment Burundi
Hagerman, Ellen CIDA Canada
El-Arini, Omar MLF Secretariat Canada
Eussner, Ansgar MLF Secretariat Canada
Nolan, Maria Chief Officer MLF Secretariat
Reed, Andrew MLF Secretariat Canada
Chandrasekhar, Usha India
Shende, Rajendra Chief UNEP DTIE’s Energy & 
Ozone Action Unit India
Inomata, Tadanori Japan
Prapasawat, Anat Industrial Finance 
Corporation Thailand
Ataman, Senol Technology Development 
Foundation Turkey
Horwitz, Paul International Advisor EPA United States
Strickland, Mia Environmental Investigation 
Agency Washington, D.C.
Carvalho, Suely UNDP United States
Chan, Helen Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Di Leva, Charles Lead Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Foley, Mary-Ellen Research Analyst The World Bank
Fostvedt, Nils Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Freestone, David Chief Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gorman, Steve Lead Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Liebenthal, Andres Country Sector Coordinator The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Manibog, Fernando Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Newcombe, Kenneth Sr. Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Pedersen, Erik Sr. Environmental Engineer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Prasad, Neeraj Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Rahill, Bilal Lead Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Siles, Sandra Team Assistant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Terraza, Horacio Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tlyaie, Laura Sector Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Post-conflict Fund Case Study
Cartier, Paul Attaché Development Cooperation Embassy of Belgium Belgium
Severe, Stefano Representative UNHCR Burundi
Lambrette, Bernarnd Program Officer UNHCR Burundi
Royer, Arnaud Reintegration Officer UNHCR Burundi
Nahimana, Marie-Goreth Project Officer UNHCR Burundi
Bijojote, Salvatore General Director Ministry of Reinstallation 
and Resettlement 
of Returnees Burundi
Kankindi, Jacqueline Project Coordinator Muyinga Ministry of 
Social Action Burundi
Lazare, Karekezi Governor Muyinga Burundi
Nzayanga, Gratien Advisor to the Governor Ruyigi Burundi
Manirakiza, Deogratias Provincial Health Director Ruyigi Burundi
Ntamahangarizo, Dieudonne Communal Administrator Ruyigi Burundi
Civye, Bernard Provincial Education Director Action Aid Ruyigi Burundi
Lubbers, Ruud High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR Geneva
Doherty, Kolude Special Adviser of the High Commissioner UNHCR Geneva
Crisp, Jeff Senior Policy Research Officer UNHCR Geneva
Bartsch, Dominik Senior Policy Research Officer UNHCR Geneva
Harild, Niels Reintegration and Local Settlement Section UNHCR Geneva
Delgermaa, Arslandbaatar Associate Economist UNHCR Geneva
Date-Bah, Eugenia Director, InFocus Program ILO Geneva
Krishnamurty, J. Sr. Economist ILO Geneva
Specht, Irma Reintegration Specialist ILO Geneva
Pavlovska, Kristina Assistant Head of Department Ministry of Finance Macedonia
Smileviski, Balsko Agency for Sports 
and Youth Macedonia
Burvi, Renata Agency for Sports 
and Youth Macedonia
Lazarevska, Spomenka Program Coordinator Open Society Institute Macedonia
Kreshova, Xhane President Forum of Albanian Women Macedonia
Strackova, Martha Babylon Center in Veles Macedonia
Stojanovska, Biljana Babylon Center in Stip Macedonia
Broughton, Sally Media Officer IOM Macedonia
Misic, Elana Project Officer UNICEF Macedonia
Tall, William Field Coordinator UNHCR Macedonia
Biondi, Aldo Correspondent ECHO Macedonia
Steeghs, Gerard Acting Director, UN and IFI’s Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Netherlands
Cemerska, Rajna Operations Officer The World Bank Macedonia
Bannon, Ian Manager, Conflict Prevention The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Campeau, Lisa Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Collier, Paul Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Eriksson, John Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gilbert, Roy Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Holtzman, Steve Lead Social Development Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hubbard, Paul Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Jorgensen, Steen Sector Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kafka, Barbara Senior Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kantabaze, Pamphile Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Keller, Barbry Operations Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kuroda, Kazhuide Sr. Knowledge Management Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lopes, Ana Paula Knowledge Monitoring Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Meesook, Oey Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Miovic, Peter Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Purcell, Randall Sr. Partnership Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Scott, Colin Sr. Social Development Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sfeir-Younis, Alfredo Sr. Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tassoni Estense, Natalia Operations Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Prototype Carbon Fund Case Study
Kevin Cleaver, Sector Director, Agriculture & Rural Development Department; Kristalina Georgieva, Country Director, Russian Federation; Sushma
Ganguly, Sector Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development Department
Bianchi, Ana Host Country Representative Argentina
Stephens, Jean-Claude Head of European & Industrial Affairs Electrabel Belgium
Searle, Juan Pedro Host Country Representative Chile
Manso, Paulo Host Country Representative Costa Rica
Pretel, Jan Host Country Representative Czechoslovakia
Ayala, Mauricio Host Country Representative El Salvador
Katagiri, Makoto Consultant Mitsubishi International 
Corp. Japan
Koenuma, Akihiko JBIC Japan
Nishimura, Ikuo TEPCO Japan
Akumu, Grace Climate Network Kenya
De Jonge, Lex Ministry of Environment Netherlands
Rathe, Liv Norsk Hydro/Hydro Electric Norway
Gonzales, Alberto Host Country Representative Peru
Bjork, Ole Ministry of Industry, 
Employment & 
Communications Sweden
Apuuli, Bwango Host Country Representative Uganda
Nicholson, Charles British Petroleum United Kingdom
Santos, Luis Host Country Representative Uruguay
Wong, Grace Conservation International Washington, D.C.
Newcombe, Kenneth Sr. Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Heister, Johannes Sr. Environmental Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Bishop, Veronique Sr. Financial Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sinha, Chandra Sr. Environmental Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Lecocq, Franck Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Clarke, Denis Chief Investment Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Freestone, David Chief Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Busz, Henk Sector Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Strek, Charlotte Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Smyth, Sophie Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Duvall, Thomas Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Searle, Juan Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Prasad, Neeraj Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Public Private Partnership Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) Case Study
Anwar Ravat, Chief Administrative Officer, Infrastructure Network Core Services; Nigel Twose, Manager, Investment Climate Department
Vasilev, Grigor Director of Public Works Ministry of Regional 
Development & Public 
Works Bulgaria
Tomeva, Vania Manager, Corporate Finance KPMG Bulgaria
Vatralova, Albena Country Representative Halcrow Group, Ltd. Bulgaria
Buse, Dina Head, Foreign Assistance Coordination Unit Ministry of Economy Latvia
Feldmane, Ieva Public Utilities Commission Latvia
Korna, Karina Public Utilities Commission Latvia
Preimate, Ilga Deputy State Secretary Ministry of Economy Latvia
Steinbuka, Inna Public Utilities Commission Latvia
Vabale, Inese Public Utilities Commission Latvia
Grawe, Roger Country Director The World Bank Poland
Hall, Christopher Chief, Warsaw Office & Sr. Portfolio Manager The World Bank Poland
Wojciechowicz, Jacek External Affairs Officer The World Bank Poland
Akinci, Cahit International Relations and EU Coordination Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Aydin, Ahmet Natural Gas Working Group Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Erenel, Murat Electricity Working Group Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Gunay, Yusuf President Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Harmanci, Mehmet Natural Gas Working Group Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Ozkog, Hasan Natural Gas Working Group Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Ulgen, Seckin Electricity Working Group Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority Turkey
Pike, Tery DFID United Kingdom
Barbalov, Doncho Energy & Infrastructure Officer The World Bank Bulgaria
de Bruyn Kops, Oscar Country Manager The World Bank Bulgaria
Kondova, Galia Research Assistant The World Bank Bulgaria
Kourtev, Georgi Communications Associate The World Bank Bulgaria
Muir, Russel Lead Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Nunez-Ollero, Cynthia Sr. Private Sector Development Spec. The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Schwartz, Jordan Sr. Infrastructure Spec. The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) Case Study
Rosati, Furio Project Coordinator UCW Florence
Hagemann, Frank Sr. Policy Analyst IPEC Geneva
Roselaers, Frans Director IPEC Geneva
Wichmand, Peter Sr. Evaluation Officer IPEC Geneva
Adnane, Abdelaziz Head, Social Sector Division Ministry of Economy Morocco
Bouazzaoui, M. Director Ministry of Education Morocco
Benchekroun, Sabah Deputy Secretary Ministry of Economic Affairs Morocco
Baddou, Yasmine Deputy Secretary Ministry of Labor Morocco
Ayoub, Maie Representative UNICEF Morocco
Berrada, Rajae Representative Child Protection Program Morocco
Benchekroun, Malak Program Administrator IPEC Morocco
Tadili, Mohamed Director of Labor Labor Ministry Morocco
Belhaj, Ferid Country Manager The World Bank Morocco
Allison, Christine Lead Human Development Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Baudouy, Jacques Sector Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Carvalho, Soniya Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Dar, Amit Sr. Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Fallon, Peter Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Fares, Jean Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Harding, David Sr. Education Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Holzmann, Robert Sector Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kim, Bonna Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Solleveld, Leendert Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tzannatos, Zafiris Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) Case Study
Anwar Ravat, Chief Administrative Officer, Infrastructure Network Core Services; Nigel Twose, Manager, Investment Climate Department
Evans, Barbara Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Iyer, Parameswaran Sr. Water & Sanitation Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stottman, Walter Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
World Links Case Study
Bhaskar, T.M. Vijay Commissioner for Public Instruction State Govt. of Karnataka India
Chauhan, Pamela Teacher India
Gill, Balgindar Teacher India
Hemareddy, N. Principal India
Hiremath, Dayanand India
Jha, M.M. Joint Secretary Ministry of Education India
Kapoor, Poornima Head Teacher India
Karadi, R.S. Principal Govt. Boys Jr. College India
Krishnappa, Meera Trainer World Links India
Modle, Shanker Headmaster Govt. High School for Girls India
Mukerjee, Rauni Computer Trainer India
Satyamurthy Deputy Director State Government of 
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Karnataka India
Sharma, Deepika Sr. Manager, Pedagogy Schoolnet India, Ltd. India
Srinivasan, Renu Trainer India
Villas, Ravi Sr. Research Officer State Government of 
Karnataka India
Pascual, Patricia Director for Research & Policy Advocacy Digital Philippines Philippines
Tinio, Victoria Director for E-Learning Foundation for Information 
Technology Philippines
Bay, Ester Manager Nanyan Polytechnic Singapore
Fong, David Manager Nanyan Polytechnic Singapore
Yong, Danils Director, International Program Nanyan Polytechnic Singapore
Clark, Prema Sr. Education Economist The World Bank India
Carlson, Samuel Sr. Human Development Economist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hawkins, Robert Sr. Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Leautier, Frannie Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Drissel, Marie Director, Finance & Human Resources World Links Washington, D.C.
Hoyer, Hans Executive Director World Links
Kante, Cheick Chief Operating Officer World Links
Additional World Bank & IMF Staff Consulted
World Bank Executive Directors and Staff
Agha, Tanwir ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Alyahya, Yaya ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Brookins, Carole ED The World Bank Washington, D..C
Guadagni, Alieto ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kasekende, Louis ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Vasudev, Chander ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Alzetta, Gino Alternate ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Alvarex, Jaime Adviser to ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Olsson, Jonathan Adviser to ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Waslander, Jacob Sr. Adviser to ED The World Bank Washington, D.C.
IMF Executive Directors
Chambrier, Alexander ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Benhua, Wei ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Kelkar, Vijay Former ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Junguito, Roberto ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Rustomjee, Cyrus ED IMF Washington, D.C.
Wijnholds, J. de Beaufort ED IMF Washington, D.C.
World Bank Managing Directors
Goldstein, Jeffrey MD The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ramphele, Mamphela MD The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Zhang, Shengman MD The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sandstrom, Sven Former MD The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sood, Anil Special Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
World Bank Senior VPs
Bourguignon, Francois Sr. VP The World Bank Washington, D.C.
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Sarbib, Jean Louis Sr. VP The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stern, Nicolas Former Sr. VP The World Bank Washington, D.C.
World Bank VPs
Adams, James Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Goldin, Ian Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Johnson, Ian Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kusakabe, Motoo Former VP The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lamb, Geoffrey Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Leautier, Frannie Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Ritzen, Jozef Former VP The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Shafik, Nemat Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Nankani, Gobind Regional Vice President The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Garg, Prem Director, QAG The World Bank Washington, D.C.
World Bank Country Directors
Carter, Michael Country Director The World Bank New Delhi
Grawe, Roger Country Director The World Bank Warsaw
Karlsson, Mats Country Director The World Bank Accra
Lim, Edward Former Country Director The World Bank New Delhi
Steer, Andrew Country Director The World Bank Jakarta
Thomas, Vinod Country Director The World Bank Brasilia
Von Amsberg, Joachim Country Director The World Bank Manila
Wallich, Christine Country Director The World Bank Dhaka
Global Programs and Partnerships & Development Grant Facility Staff
Hubbard, Paul Manager The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Kirby-Zakim, Jane Sr. Program Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Drewnowski, Sophia Sr. Partnership Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Lu, Judy Research Analyst The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Purcell, Randall Sr. Partnership Specialist The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Sharma, Anju Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Trust Fund Quality Assurance & Compliance Staff
Zulfiqar, Arif Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hill, Dale Head, TFO The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Cadario, Paul Sr. Manager, TQC The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Corbin, Diana Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Harper, Caroline Lead Operations Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Operations Evaluation Department Staff
Ainsworth, Martha Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Chu, Lily Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Effron, Laurie Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Eriksson, John Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Galenson, Alice Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gilbert, Roy Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Grasson, Patrick Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Gwin, Catherine Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Manibog, Fernando Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
A N N E X  G :  P E O P L E  C O N S U LT E D
1 4 9
Nelson, Ridley Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Pitman, Keith Sr. Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tsikata, Yvonne Lead Evaluation Officer The World Bank Washington, D.C.
World Bank External Relations Staff
Ingram, Joseph Special Representative The World Bank Geneva
Zarcone, Fabrizio Research Analyst The World Bank Geneva
Taylor, Isabelle Executive Assistant The World Bank Geneva
Bolard, Sophie Consultant The World Bank Geneva
Agerskov, Anders Sr. Policy Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
World Bank Legal and Operations Staff
Duvall, Thomas Chief Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Hartmann, Arna Former Staff The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Jonas, Olga Economic Adviser The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Mikitin, Kathleen Sr. Auditor The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Smyth, Sophie Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Streck, Charlotte Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Stumpf, Andrea Sr. Counsel The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Todd, John Consultant The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Tuluy, Hasan Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
Underwood, John Director The World Bank Washington, D.C.
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
1 5 0
1 5 1
ANNEX H: CASE STUDY SUMMARY INFORMATION
Table H.1: Phase 2 Case Study Programs at a Glance
Table H.2: Goals and Development Objectives of Case Study Programs
Table H.3: Governance and Management Arrangements of Case Study Programs
Table H.4: The World Bank’s Roles in Case Study Programs
Table H.5: Chairs, Program Managers, and Bank Oversight of Case Study Programs
Table H.6: Relationship of Case Study Programs to International Conventions/ 
Conferences/Agreements
Table H.7: Relationship of Case Study Programs to Millennium Development Goals
Table H.8: OED Assessment of Programs’ Actual Activities, Classified According to Bank
Management’s Four Strategic Foci and OED Subcategories
Table H.9: Recent Sector Strategies and OED Sector Studies Relating to Case Study 
Programs
Table H.10: Most Recent Program-Level Evaluations of Case Study Programs
Table H.11: Global TM Statements of Beneficiaries and Benefits of Case Study Programs
Table H.12: OED Assessment of Monitoring and Evaluation of the Case Study Programs
Table H.13: Phase 2 Case Study Programs: Members of the Governing and Executive Bodies
Table H.14: Financing of Case Study Programs
Table H.15: OED Assessment of Governance and Management of Case Study Programs
Table H.16: Stated Exit Strategies of Case Study Programs
Table H.17: OED Assessment of Current Level of Consistency of Case Study Programs with
the Development Committee Criteria for the Bank’s Engagement in Global 
Programs
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
1 5 2
Inde-
Opera- pendent Housed Corporate prioritiesb
tional legal in 
Program start datea entity World Bank Major category
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 1972 Noc Shared with FAO Environmental commons
2. Global Environment Facility 1991 Nod No Environmental commons
3. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 1991 Yes No Environmental commons
Montreal Protocol
4. Prototype Carbon Fund 2000 No Yes Environmental commons
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 2000 No No Environmental commons
6. Global Water Partnership 1997 Yes No Environmental commons
7. Global Integrated Pest Management Facility 1996 No No Environmental commons
Health
8. Special Program for Research and Training in Dec. 1975 No No Communicable diseases
Tropical Diseases (TDR)
9. Global Forum for Health Research Jan. 1997 Yes No Communicable diseases
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) Jan. 1996 Yes No Communicable diseases
11. Roll Back Malaria Nov. 1998 No No Communicable diseases
12. Stop TB July 1999 No No Communicable diseases
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizationl Oct. 1999 No No Communicable diseases
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program March 1978 No Yes Health
15. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program Jan. 1982 No Yes Investment climate
16. Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest Aug. 1995 No Yes Investment climate
17. The Information for Development Program (infoDev) Sept. 1995 No Yes Information & knowledge
18. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility Dec. 1999 No Yes Investment climate
19. Cities Alliance Dec. 1999 No Yes Investment climate
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund 1998 No Yes Empowerment, security and social inclusion
21. Understanding Children’s Work 2000 No No Empowerment, security and social inclusion
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FY04/CY03 FY05 FY04 (CY03)
Corporate prioritiesb Program DGF Bank TF Country-
expenditures DGF grant trust contributions level Retailing 
Subcategory ($million) status ($million) fund ($million) TA grants
Promoting agricultural research 395.0 Window 1 50.0 Yes 110.0 Yes No
Biodiversity, climate change, international 
waters, ozone depletion, land degradation &
persistent organic pollutants 387.53e non-DGF – Yes 136.05 Yes Yes
Biodiversity, ozone depletion 
& land degradation 158.6f non-DGF – Yes – No Yes
Climate change 6.5g non-DGF – Yes 23.18 Yes Yes
Biodiversity, ozone depletion 
& land degradation 20.19 Window 1 4.00 No – Yes Yes
Water 10.3 Exited FY02 – No – Yes No
Biodiversity, ozone depletion 
& land degradation 1.33 non-DGF – No – Yes Yes
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria & childhood diseases 47.5h Window 1 2.00 Yes 0.00i Yes Yes
Vaccines & drug development 3.07 Window 1 No – No Yes
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria & childhood diseases 95.0j Window 1 4.00 No – Yes No
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria & childhood diseases 11.4 Window 2, 1.00 No – Yes No
moving to 
Window 1
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria & childhood diseases 20.8k Window 2, 0.70 Yes – Yes Yes
moving to 
Window 1
Vaccines & drug development 124.1m Window 1 1.50 No – Yes Yes
Access to potable water, clean air & 13.6 non-DGF – Yes 12,12 Yes No
sanitation by poor people
Infrastructure services to support private 7.58 non-DGF – Yes 8.97 Yes Yes
sector development
Financial sector reform 12.67 Window 1 5.52 Yes 6.27 Yes Yes
Redressing the digital divide 6.07 Window 1 2.50 Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Regulatory reform & competition policy 15.61 Window 2 2.00 Yes 17.15 Yes Yes
Support to both urban & rural development 13.25 Window 2 1.70 Yes 13.67 Yes Yes
Social risk management 10.6 Window 1 8.00 Yes 0.30 Yes Yes
Social risk management 0.56 Window 2 .10 No – No No
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Inde-
Opera- pendent Housed Corporate prioritiesb
tional legal in 
Program start datea entity World Bank Major category
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework 1997 No No Trade & integration
23. Financial Sector Assessment Program May 1999 No Shared with IMF International financial architecture
24. Financial Sector Reform & Strengthening July 2002 No Shared with DFID International financial architecture
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network Dec. 1999 Yes No Information & knowledge
26. World Links for Development 1998 Yes No Education
a. Refers to the Bank’s fiscal year (July to June) unless otherwise specified.
b. As indicated on the Partnership Approval and Tracking System (PATS) form. This refers to the five Global Public Good Priorities and the five Corporate Advocacy Priorities that were established in the Strategic Direc
c. While the CGIAR System as a whole is not an independent legal entity, the 16 international agricultural research centers are legal entities.
d. While the GEF is physically housed in a World Bank building, it has its own management structure that is independent of the Bank’s management.
e. Includes GEF administrative expenses, fees to implementing agencies and investment grants to recipient countries.
f. Includes MLF secretariat expenses, fees to implementing agencies and investment grants to recipient countries.
g. Includes administrative expenses plus capital grants (emissions reductions) of $295,000 in FY02 and $918,000 in FY03.
h. $95.2 million for 2002 and 2003.
i. Bank-administered trust fund established in FY03.
j. $190.0 million for 2002 and 2003.
k. Includes $5.6 million disbursed by the Global Drug Facility in 2002 and $15.6 million in 2003.
l. The Vaccine Fund is an independent legal entity – a 501 (29) non-profit corporation under US law.
m. Includes $14.5 million expensed by GAVI and $109.6 million disbursed by the Vaccine Fund.
n. Based on a World Bank share of 45 percent. Precise IMF expenditures on FSAP are not known.
o. The FY03 application was deferred to FY04 and the uncommitted FY02 balance was carried over to FY03.
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FY04/CY03 FY05 FY04 (CY03)
Corporate prioritiesb Program DGF Bank TF Country
expenditures DGF grant trust contributions level Retailing 
Subcategory ($million) status ($million) fund ($million) TA grants
Market access 2.71 Window 2 - No – Yes No
Financial stability 10.46n non-DGF – No – Yes No
Financial stability 4.64 Window 2 0.60o Yes 13.0 Yes Yes
Understanding development & 8.67 Window 1 4.00 Yes ,5 Yes Yes
poverty reduction
Building human capacity for the 6.5 Window 2 1.52 Yes 0.00 Yes No
knowledge economy
gic Directions Paper for FY02-04, March 28, 2001.
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Mission/goal
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research To contribute to food security and poverty eradication in developing countries through 
research, partnership, capacity building and policy support, promoting sustainable 
agricultural development based on the environmentally sound management of natural 
resources.
To achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing countries through 
scientific research and research-related activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, policy and environment.
2. Global Environment Facility To assist the developing countries in meeting their obligation of global environment 
protection, particularly in relation to the various international conventions (e.g., the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, and Convention to Combat Desertification), and other treaties and 
agreements to reach common goals (such as the Montreal Protocol of the Vienna 
Convention on Ozone Layer Depleting Substances) and a mosaic of regional and 
international water agreements.
3. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the To provide a financial mechanism to assist developing countries in meeting the incremental 
Montreal Protocol costs of compliance with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, delivered via grants or on a concessional basis.
4. Prototype Carbon Fund To pioneer the market for project-based greenhouse-gas emission reductions within the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol and to contribute to sustainable development.
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund To prevent species extinction in biodiversity hotspots by advancing conservation of the 
Earth’s biologically richest and most threatened areas.
G o a l s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  C a s e
S t u d y  P r o g r a m s
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Development objectives 
To mobilize cutting-edge science to reduce hunger and poverty, improve human nutrition and health, and protect the environment.
To conduct both strategic and applied research on the entire range of problems affecting agricultural productivity and to link these problems 
to broader concerns about poverty reduction, sustainable management of natural resources, protection of biodiversity, and rural develop-
ment.
To conduct research to improve the productivity of tropical agriculture, focusing on:
• Higher-yielding food crops and more productive livestock, fish, and trees
• Improved farming systems that are environmentally benign
• Better policies
• Enhanced scientific capacities in developing countries.
To advocate science-based approaches to solving some of the world’s most pressing developmental problems.
To establish a mechanism for international cooperation for the purpose of providing new and additional grant and concessional funding to 
meet the agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global benefits in the following focal areas:
• Biodiversity
• Climate change
• Degradation of international waters
• Ozone depletion
• Persistent organic pollutants
• Land degradation
To meet, on a grant or concessional basis as appropriate, and according to criteria to be decided upon by the Parties, the agreed incremental 
costs.
To finance clearinghouse functions to:
• Assist Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, through country-specific studies and other technical cooperation, to identify their 
needs for cooperation
• Facilitate technical cooperation to meet these identified needs
• Distribute, as provided for in Article 9 of the Protocol, information and relevant materials, and hold workshops, training sessions, and 
other related activities for the benefit of Parties that are developing countries
• Facilitate and monitor other multilateral, regional, and bilateral cooperation available to Parties that are developing countries
To finance the secretarial services of the Multilateral Fund and related support costs.
High-quality emission reductions – to show how project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions transactions can promote and contribute 
to sustainable development and lower the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
Knowledge dissemination – to provide the parties to the UNFCCC, the private sector, and other interested parties with an opportunity to 
“learn by doing” in the development of policies, rules, and business processes for the achievement of emission reductions under the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation.
Public-private partnership – to demonstrate how the World Bank can work in partnership with the public and private sectors to mobilize new 
resources for its borrowing member countries while addressing global environmental problems through market-based mechanisms.
To provide strategic coordination and assistance in the form of grants to support in situ conservation.
To address biodiversity loss in targeted areas within each hotspot by:
• Gazetting additional protected areas
• Improving the management of existing protected areas
• Consolidating fragmented ecosystems through the creation of corridors.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Mission/goal
6.  Global Water Partnership To support countries in the sustainable development of their water resources.
7.  Global Integrated Pest Management Facility To assist interested governments and NGOs to initiate, develop, and expand Integrated 
Pest Management (IPM) programs that aim to reduce pesticide use and associated 
negative impact on health and environment, while increasing production and profits 
through improved crop and pest management.
Health, Nutrition, & Population
8.  Special Program for Research and Training To help coordinate, support, and influence global efforts to combat a portfolio of major 
in Tropical Diseases (TDR) diseases that affect the poor and disadvantaged.
9.  Global Forum for Health Research The vision of the Global Forum is a world in which health research is recognized as a 
global public good and a critical input in health system development; where priority is 
given, at the global and national levels, to the study of those factors with the largest 
impact on people’s health and to the effective delivery of research outcomes for the 
benefit of all people, particularly the poor.
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Development objectives 
To achieve global water security as a contribution to eliminating poverty, improving the well-being of mankind, and protecting natural 
resources.
Toward achieving the above main objective:
• To establish partnerships of beneficiaries and the stakeholders 
• To build strategic alliances for action
• To promote good practice in integrated water resource management
• To develop and facilitate actions at the various levels of water partnership (area, basin, country, regional, and global).
To create awareness and an enabling environment for IPM through:
• Study tours to successful ongoing IPM programs
• Exchange visits and briefings among policymakers, development agencies, and NGOs.
To help in the development of pilot field programs by:
• Identifying appropriate IPM expertise
• Preparing IPM curriculum and operational guidelines
• Enhancing national capabilities in IPM training and policy
• Assisting donors and lending institutions
• Facilitating government-potential donor contacts.
To access other programs and information by:
• Facilitating effects of investments in IPM (local/national)
• Strengthening networking and collaboration (local/national/regional)
• Scientific research and strategies.
To establish technical and policy IPM linkages by:
• Facilitating access and information exchange among farmers’ groups, NGOs, governments, international development agencies, etc.
• Studying national and donor policy reform
• Assisting in finding new solutions to field and policy problems
• Promoting demand-driven research
• Carrying out and commissioning analytical studies
• Analyzing pilot projects to improve the quality of IPM.
Research and Development
• To improve existing, and develop new, approaches for preventing, diagnosing, treating, and controlling neglected infectious diseases
• Readily integrating into the health services of countries where these diseases are endemic and focusing on the health problems of the 
poor.
Training and Strengthening
• To strengthen the capacity of countries where these diseases are endemic to undertake the research required for developing and 
implementing these new and improved disease control approaches.
• Contribute to the efforts to measure the 10/90 gap, monitor developments and disseminate pertinent information regarding this gap and 
its causes and consequences.
• Support the development of priority-setting methodologies to identify research priority areas, including in sectors other than health 
which have a crucial role to play in the promotion of health.
• Identify and debate critical, controversial and burning issues affecting the 10/90 gap in health research.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Mission/goal
Its central objective is to help correct the 10/90 gap in health research and focus research 
efforts on the health problems of the poor, by bringing together key actors and creating 
a movement for analysis and debate on health research priorities, the allocation of 
resources, public-private partnerships, and access of all people to the outcomes of 
health research.
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) As the main advocate for global action, UNAIDS leads, strengthens, and supports an 
expanded response to the epidemic. This response has four goals:
• To prevent the spread of HIV
• To provide care and support for those infected and affected by the disease
• To reduce the vulnerability of individuals and communities to HIV/AIDS
• To alleviate the socioeconomic and human impact of the epidemic.
11. Roll Back Malaria To halve the world’s malaria burden by 2010.
12. Stop TB To increase access, security, and support to:
• Ensure that every tuberculosis patient has access to treatment and a cure
• Protect vulnerable populations from tuberculosis
• Reduce the social and economic toll that tuberculosis exerts on families, 
communities, and nations.
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization is a public-private partnership 
committed to one goal: saving children’s lives and people’s health through the widespread 
use of vaccines.
The GAVI partners created the Vaccine Fund to provide long-term financing to the world’s 
poorest countries to strengthen health systems and introduce new and underused vaccines.
Infrastructure & Private Sector Development 
14. Water and Sanitation Program To alleviate poverty by helping the poor in developing countries gain sustained access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation.
To work with partners in the field to seek innovative solutions to the obstacles faced by 
poor communities and to strive to be a valued source of advice in order to achieve 
widespread adoption of these solutions.
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Development objectives 
• Give special consideration to the health problems of the poor.
• Ensure that gender analysis is consistently and systematically applied to all work on the 10/90 gap.
• Be a platform for debate and synthesis review of efforts in the field of research capacity strengthening, paying special attention to the 
needs of the national health research systems.
• Support concerted efforts and the development of networks/partnerships (between public sector, private commercial sector, and civil 
society organizations) in the priority sectors of health research, when appropriate and when the benefits of joint action are larger than 
the sum of individual actions.
The partnership aims to build stronger political commitment in all sectors of society, to promote a sense of urgency among the public and 
create a more supportive environment, while providing the political and strategic guidance to enhance the coherence and coordination of the 
global response to HIV/AIDS by providing:
• Leadership and advocacy for effective action on the epidemic
• Strategic information to guide efforts against AIDS worldwide
• Tracking, monitoring, and evaluation of the epidemic and of responses to it
• Civil society engagement and partnership development
• Mobilization of resources to support an effective response.
Provision of an enabling environment (e.g., political commitment; development and implementation of appropriate recruitment and career 
policies; provision of facilities and resources; strengthened training institutions).
Intensification of training and retraining of personnel.
Technical support mechanisms (e.g., information, communication, and supply systems to support trained personnel, supervision, monitoring 
and evaluation).
To expand the current strategy—DOTS—so that all people with TB have access to effective diagnosis and treatment.
To adapt this strategy to meet the emerging challenges of HIV and TB drug resistance.
To improve existing tools by developing new diagnostics, new drugs, and a new vaccine.
To strengthen the Global Partnership to Stop TB so that proven TB-control strategies are effectively applied.
To fulfill its mission of protecting children of all nations and of all socioeconomic levels against vaccine-preventable diseases, GAVI has 
established six strategies:
• Improve access to sustainable immunization services
• Expand the use of all existing safe and cost-effective vaccines, and promote delivery of other appropriate interventions at immunization 
contacts
• Support the national and international accelerated disease control targets for vaccine-preventable diseases
• Accelerate the development and introduction of new vaccines and technologies
• Accelerate research and development efforts for vaccines needed primarily in developing countries.
• Make immunization coverage a centerpiece in international development efforts.
To impact its direct clients (central governments, municipal agencies, local authorities, NGOs, community organizations, private service 
providers, and external support agencies) through the adoption of improved sector management policies and practices, and creation of more 
capacity to implement these policies and practices for poor people on the ground.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Mission/goal
15. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program To promote the role of energy in poverty reduction and economic growth in an 
environmentally responsible manner.
To contribute to the achievement of internationally agreed development goals in 
low-income, emerging, and transition economies.
16. Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest To help build financial systems that work for the poor, providing large numbers of 
people with diverse financial services through a wide range of organizations.
17. The Information for Development Program (infoDev) To promote innovative projects on the use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) for economic and social development, with a special emphasis on 
the needs of the poor in developing countries.
18. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility To help eliminate poverty and achieve sustainable development in developing countries 
by facilitating private sector involvement in infrastructure.
To help developing countries improve the quality of their infrastructure through private 
sector involvement.
19. Cities Alliance To marshal the resources, experience, and knowledge of its partners to focus on two 
priorities for action:
• Cities Without Slums, through citywide and nationwide upgrading of low-income 
settlements to improve the livelihoods of the urban poor 
• City Development Strategies, aimed at formulating a broad consensus on a vision 
and a set of priorities for city actions.
To foster new tools, practical approaches, and knowledge sharing in these two areas, 
so as to create a new coherence of effort to help realize the rich promise of what 
well-managed cities can achieve.
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund To position the Bank, through constructive engagement, in such countries where normal 
instruments and budget provisions cannot apply.
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Development objectives 
As a global technical assistance agency:
• To help build consensus and provide policy advice on sustainable energy development to governments of developing countries and 
economies in transition.
• To contribute to the transfer of technology and knowledge in energy sector management and the delivery of modern energy services to 
the poor.
To support the development of financial systems that work for the poor, by improving the capacity of microfinance institutions to deliver 
flexible, high-quality financial services to the poor on a sustainable basis.
The five strategic priorities for CGAP III (2003–08) are as follows:
• Fostering a diversity of financial institutions that serve the poor;
• Promoting a broader range of financial services available to the poor;
• Improving the availability and the quality of information on the performance of microfinance providers;
• Promoting a sound policy, legal and regulatory framework for microfinance;
• Improving aid effectiveness in microfinance.
To help developing economies fully benefit from modern information systems.
To encourage policies that increase connectivity, and especially that increase the access of the poor to ICT.
To promote and facilitate strategies that exploit information technologies for poverty alleviation and sustainable development, including 
the preparation and implementation of activities at the sector, subsector and multisector levels.
To build human capacity, consensus and networks of interest needed for the introduction and utilization of new ICT in developing countries.
To pilot, demonstrate and learn from innovative applications of ICT.
Through partnerships with governments, multilateral and bilateral donors, private sector corporations and associations, research institutions, 
and not-for-profit organizations, to coordinate the efforts of parties with relevant interest in fostering information-based services in emerg-
ing economies.
To complement and reinforce donor support to developing countries in the private infrastructure area, and to increase the volume and 
effectiveness of this support by:
• Mobilizing and leveraging donor resources.
• Exploiting the expertise and economies of scale and scope available from an integrated, multi-donor program.
• Promoting the exchange of lessons of experience between sectors, regions and donors.
• Facilitating coordination between bilateral and multilateral programs addressing the same concerns.
As a global partnership, the Cities Alliance aims:
• To improve the quality of urban development cooperation and urban lending
• To strengthen the impact of grant-funded urban development cooperation
• To expand the level of resources reaching the urban poor, by increasing the coherence of effort of existing programs and sharpening the 
focus on scaling up successful approaches
• To provide a structured vehicle for advancing collective know-how.
To provide investment grants that focus on the restoration of the lives and livelihoods of war-affected populations, with a premium on:
• Innovation (new approaches to conflict work)
• Partnership (donors and executing agencies)
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Mission/goal
21. Understanding Children’s Work To help accelerate the elimination of child labor
• In countries where progress in the fight against child labor has been relatively slow 
• In lagging areas in countries that are otherwise successful in reducing the prevalence of 
child labor.
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework To help least-developed countries integrate better into the multilateral trading system 
in order to enhance their ability to participate in and benefit from the system.
To assist least-developed countries to improve their export performance in order to 
accelerate their economic growth and reduce poverty.
23. Financial Sector Assessment Program To promote the soundness of financial systems in member countries in order to contribute 
to national and international financial stability and growth.
To help build stronger and more diversified financial systems capable of absorbing 
increased shocks in order to reduce the likelihood of financial crises and mitigate 
their damage.
24. Financial Sector Reform & Strengthening To help strengthen financial systems in low-income countries and middle-income countries 
so that the financial systems of such countries may make a strong and positive contribution 
to growth and poverty reduction.
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Development objectives 
• Leveraging resources (through a variety of funding arrangements). 
To provide other grants that have strategic positioning value for the Bank and its partners, including:
• Watching briefs on countries in conflict
• Early assessment, planning, and piloting of reconstruction activities
• A small number of capacity-building and action research activities.
To develop a common analytical framework for understanding and studying child labor and assessing the impact of government policies in 
the area.
To improve data collection, data analysis, and research on child labor.
To enhance country capacity in child labor data collection and research.
To improve impact assessments of child labor interventions.
To strengthen and disseminate tools and methods for addressing child labor by:
• Developing common methodologies for child labor data collection and analysis, including development of a data bank of statistics to 
facilitate analysis
• Working with local participants to carry out intensive studies on child labor in selected countries, resulting in country-specific 
recommendations to address the problem
• Conducting training programs to enhance local capabilities in data collection and analysis, policy analysis, and intervention assessment.
To provide technical assistance to help least-developed countries:
• Meet their WTO requirements and ensure the compatibility of the countries’ laws with WTO commitments.
• Devise strategies to benefit from opportunities resulting from the Uruguay Round agreements, which had placed a heavy administrative 
burden on LDCs to ensure that their trade regimes conformed to agreements.
• Analyze trade policies and problems facing the external sector.
To strengthen, streamline, and improve the efficiency of trade-related technical assistance by reducing donor overlap, increasing synergies, 
and improving coordination among the six international agency partners.
To enhance the coherence of advice provided on trade policy and increase its acceptability.
To identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of a country’s financial system in order to reduce the potential for a financial crisis.
To determine how key sources of financial risks are being managed.
To help prioritize policy responses.
To provide a foundation for financial sector technical assistance programs by ascertaining the financial sector’s developmental and technical 
assistance needs.
To emphasize prevention and mitigation, rather than crisis resolution.
For the IMF and World Bank:
• To optimize scarce expert resources, reduce duplication of efforts, and provide more uniform advice in financial sector work.
• To cooperate more closely in assisting countries reduce the likelihood and/or severity of financial crises.
To facilitate systematic follow-up of FSAP and ROSC recommendations in response to country needs and provide support to eligible 
countries strengthening their financial systems and implementing standards and codes in advance of FSAPs or ROSCs, in both cases, by 
funding the provision of technical assistance to support policy implementation and dialogue in the areas of financial sector regulation, 
supervision and development, including, but not limited to:
• Financial system reform
• Financial sector legal, regulatory & supervisory frameworks
(Table continues on the following page.)
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
1 6 6
G o a l s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  C a s e
S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  ( c o n t i n u e d )
T a b l e  H . 2
Mission/goal
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network To work together to address the problems of national and regional development.
26. World Links for Development To link secondary school students and teachers around the world via the internet, in order 
to improve educational opportunities, develop information technology skills, facilitate 
cultural understanding, and promote broad-based support for economic development.
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Development objectives 
• Banking systems
• Capital markets
• Payment systems
• Corporate governance
• Accounting and auditing
• Insolvency regimes
• Debt markets and management
• Insurance/other collective investment schemes, including pensions
• Market integrity and financial crime (anti-money laundering)
• Financial systems diversification (development of non-bank financial institutions and new market instruments).
To serve as an information exchange on the availability of financial and human resources to participate in projects and build an information 
base for countries and donors.
To promote better coordination in the delivery of technical assistance and capacity building.
To mobilize additional resources from the international community directed toward implementation of initiatives undertaken by FIRST.
To support research on and the dissemination of information about best practices and useful tools in financial sector reform and 
development in low-income and middle-income countries.
To work with international standard-setting bodies and other relevant partners to broaden the base of providers supporting countries’ efforts 
to implement standards and codes in accordance with FSAP/ROSC recommendations and strengthen their financial systems.
To support multidisciplinary research in social sciences.
To promote the generation of local knowledge in developing and transition countries.
To produce policy-relevant knowledge on a global scale.
To build research capacity to advance development and alleviate poverty.
To facilitate knowledge sharing among researchers and policymakers.
To disseminate development knowledge to the public and policymakers.
To establish sustainable, educational on-line communities for students and teachers around the world, in order to improve educational 
opportunities, facilitate cultural understanding across nations help develop skills needed for the knowledge-based global economy. 
To promote the application of information technology for economic and social development.
To provide training of trainers and teachers for the purposes of integrating technology as a learning tool in the classroom.
To contribute to initiatives that improve education, health, and employment and that reduce poverty in developing countries.
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Classification Scheme
I. Line management within the Bank IV. Secretariat inside external organization
A. Standard multidonor trust fund (Post-conflict Fund) A. External organization as lead partner (CEPF, 
B. Programmatic trust fund Global IPM Facility, RBM, Stop TB, UCW, IF)
C. Carefully coordinated parallel partner activities (FSAP) B. Independent governance structure (GAVI, TDR)
II. Secretariat inside the Bank V. Independent external entity
A. Bank as lead partner (Prototype Carbon Fund, WSP, ESMAP, A. Not a legal entity
CGAP, infoDev, PPIAF, Cities Alliance) B. Legal entity (MLF, Global Forum, GWP, UNAIDS)
B. Independent governance structure (GEF) C. Legal entity with close identification with the 
III. Secretariat functions shared between the Bank and an external organization Bank (GDN, World Links)
(CGIAR, FIRST)
Phase 2 Case Study Programs: Models of Governance and Management Arrangements
I. Bank line II. Internal 
management secretariat III. Shared
Program (and size)a A B C A B secretariat
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on International X
Agricultural Research ($395 million)
2. Global Environment Facility X
($387.53 million)
3. Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol
($158.6 million)
4. Prototype Carbon Fund X
($6.5 million)
G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t  A r r a n g e m e n t s  
o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s
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IV. External V. Independent 
secretariat external entity
A B A B C Comments
• World Bank is the legal entityb
• Program does not have a written charter
• CGIAR secretariat in Bank, Science Council secretariat in FAO, and 
16 centers (14 in developing countries)
• Staff are Bank, FAO and Center employees, respectively
• No agreed annual replenishments
• Bank policies apply to funds channeled through Bank
• World Bank is the legal entity
• Program is implementing international conventions
• GEF Secretariat in Bank, but with an independent governing council to whom 
CEO reports
• UNDP, UNEP and World Bank are implementing agencies
• GEF staff are Bank employees
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply to funds channeled through 
the Bank, i.e., the secretariat and Bank-implemented GEF portfolio
X • MLF is the legal entity – an intergovernmental organization under Canadian 
law
• Program is implementing an international convention
• Secretariat in Montreal, cost-shared between UNEP and the Government of 
Canada
• UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO and World Bank are implementing agencies
• MLF staff are MLF employees
• UNEP personnel and procurement policies apply
• World Bank is the legal entity
• Secretariat in Bank
• Prototype Carbon Fund staff are Bank employees
• Bank’s personnel and procurement policies apply
(Table continues on the following page.)
I. Bank line II. Internal 
management secretariat III. Shared
Program (and size)a A B C A B secretariat
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund
($20.19 million)
6. Global Water Partnership
($10.25 million)
7. Global Integrated Pest 
Management Facility 
($1.33 million)
Health
8. Special Program for Research 
and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (TDR)
($47.5 million)
9. Global Forum for Health 
Research
($3.07 million)
10. UNAIDS (Joint United 
Nations Program on 
HIV/AIDS)
($95.0 million)
11. Roll Back Malaria
($11.4 million)
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IV. External V. Independent 
secretariat external entity
A B A B C Comments
X • Conservation International (CI) is the legal entity – an NGO under U.S. law.
• Secretariat in CI (Washington, D.C.).
• Bank safeguard and procurement policies apply.
• CI’s administrative management practices apply to management and 
disbursement of grants.
X • GWP is the legal entity—an intergovernmental organization under Swedish law.
• Secretariat in Stockholm (not in SIDA)—initially located in World Bank.
• GWP staff are GWP employees.
• GWP personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • FAO is the legal entity.
• Program has a Program Document (signed by cosponsors).
• Secretariat in FAO (Rome).
• GIF staff are FAO employees.
• FAO personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • Although WHO is the legal executing agency, TDR has an independent gover-
nance structure and external chair.
• Program has a written MOU (first adopted in 1978, amended in 1988, changes 
proposed in 2003). 
• Secretariat in Geneva (moved physically out of WHO headquarters in Oct. 
2002). Joint Coordinating Board (JCB) with 31 members is the top governing 
body. 
• Scientific and Technical Advisory Council (15–18 members) meets annually. 
• TDR staff are WHO employees; TDR Director appointed by the WHO 
Director-General.
• WHO personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • Global Forum is the legal entity—an NGO under Swiss law.
• Secretariat in Geneva.
• GF staff are GF employees.
• GF personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • UNAIDS is the legal entity—a U.N. specialized agency with its own governing 
body, created by U.N. ECOSOC resolution.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in Geneva.
• UNAIDS staff are UNAIDS employees.
• UNAIDS personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • WHO is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in WHO.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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I. Bank line II. Internal 
management secretariat III. Shared
Program (and size)a A B C A B secretariat
12. Stop TB
($20.8 million)
13. Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization
($124.1 million)
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation X
Program
($12.4 million)
15. Energy Sector Management X
Assistance Program
($7.58 million)
16. Consultative Group to X
Assist the Poorest
($12.67 million)
17. The Information for X
Development Program 
(infoDev)
($8.90 million)
18. Public-Private X
Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility
($15.61 million)
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IV. External V. Independent 
secretariat external entity
A B A B C Comments
• RBM staff are WHO employees.
• WHO personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • WHO is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in WHO.
• Stop TB staff are WHO employees.
• WHO personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • Although UNICEF is the legal entity, GAVI has an independent governance 
structure and external chair.
• Program has a written charter.
• GAVI Secretariat housed in UNICEF.
• GAVI staff are UNICEF employees.
• UNICEF personnel and procurement policies apply.
• The Vaccine Fund, the GAVI finance mechanism, is an independent charitable 
body under U.S. law with its own governance structure.
• World Bank is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in World Bank.
• WSP staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply.
• World Bank is the legal entity.
• Secretariat in World Bank.
• ESMAP staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply.
• World Bank is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in World Bank.
• CGAP staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply
• World Bank is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in World Bank.
• infoDev staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply.
• World Bank is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in World Bank.
• PPIAF staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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I. Bank line II. Internal 
management secretariat III. Shared
Program (and size)a A B C A B secretariat
19. Cities Alliance X
($13.25 million)
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund X
($10.60 million)
21. Understanding Children’s 
Work
($0.56 million)
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework 
($2.71 million)
23. Financial Sector X
Assessment Program
($10.46 million)
24. Financial Sector Reform X
& Strengthening 
($4.64 million)
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development 
Network
($18.67 million)
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
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IV. External V. Independent 
secretariat external entity
A B A B C Comments
• World Bank is the legal entity.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat in World Bank.
• Cities Alliance staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply.
• World Bank is the legal entity and the only partner at the governance level.
• Program does not have a written charter.
• Secretariat located in Bank.
• Post-conflict Fund staff are Bank employees.
• Bank personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • UNICEF is the legal entity.
• MOU has remained in draft form over the life of the program.
• Secretariat located in Florence.
X • WTO is the legal entity.
• Secretariat located in WTO.
• UNDP manages the trust fund and World Bank is the principal implementing 
agency.
• IF staff are WTO employees.
• World Bank and IMF are the legal entities.
• Joint IMF-Bank program, coordinated through an Interagency Financial Sector 
Liaison Committee.
• Staff are Bank and IMF employees.
• Bank and IMF personnel and procurement policies apply.
• Program has a written charter.
• Management Unit is located in London and Coordination Unit is located in 
World Bank.
• Staff are employees of their respective organizations.
• Respective personnel and procurement policies apply.
X • GDN is the legal entity—an NGO under U.S. law.
• Spun off from the World Bank.
• Program has a written charter.
• Secretariat presently located in Washington, D.C., but moving to New Delhi.
• 11 regional research networks are implementing agencies for regional 
activities.
• GDN staff are GDN employees.
• GDN personnel and procurement policies apply.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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I. Bank line II. Internal 
management secretariat III. Shared
Program (and size)a A B C A B secretariat
26. World Links for Development
($6.52 million)
a. FY04 or Calendar Year 2003 expenditures in parentheses. For the following cases, updated audited data were not readily available so the previous fiscal or calendar year 
expenditures were used: Global Integrated Pest Management Facility, Water and Sanitation Program, The Information for Development Program, Integrated Framework for 
Trade-Related Technical Assistance. 
b. While the World Bank is the legal entity at the system level, the 16 international agricultural research centers are their own independent legal entities.
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IV. External V. Independent 
secretariat external entity
A B A B C Comments
X • World Links is the legal entity—an NGO under U.S. law.
• Spun off from the World Bank.
• Program does not have a written charter.
• Secretariat in Washington, D.C.
• Staff are World Links employees.
• Own personnel and procurement policies apply.
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Chair of Member of Housed 
Founder or governing governing in 
Program co-founder body body World Bank
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Yes Yes Yes Shared with FAO
2. Global Environment Facility Yes No No Noe
3. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol No No No No 
4. Prototype Carbon Fund Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund Yes Yes Yes No
6. Global Water Partnership Yes No Yes No
7. Global Integrated Pest Management Facility Yes No Yes No
Health
8. Special Program for Research and Training in 
Tropical Diseases (TDR) Yes No Yes No
9. Global Forum for Health Research No No Yes No
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) Yes No Yes No
11. Roll Back Malaria Yes No Yes No
12. Stop TB Yes No Yes No
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization Yes No Yes No
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program Yes Yes Yes Yes
15. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program Yes Yes Yes Yes
16. Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest Yes Yes Yes Yes
17. The Information for Development Program (infoDev) Yes Yes Yes Yes
18. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility Yes Yes Yes Yes
19. Cities Alliance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund Yes Yes Yes Yes
21. Understanding Children’s Work Yes – – No
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework Yes No Yes No
23. Financial Sector Assessment Program Yes – – Shared with IMF
24. Financial Sector Reform & Strengthening Yes Yes Yes Shared with DFID
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network Yes No Yes No
26. World Links for Development Yes No No No
a. In the case of in-house programs, not including secretariat staff—only if the Bank’s operational staff outside the secretariat are involved in supervision or 
implementation of program activities, typically on a cross-support basis. 
b. Financial contributions to the program itself, not including Bank budgetary resources spent on oversight and liaison activities.
c. Involves responsibility for oversight and management of how the trust fund resources are utilized.
d. The World Bank takes the initiative to organize meetings and conferences in the sector on issues related to but outside the scope of the program in order 
to advocate change, reach consensus and/or mobilize resources with respect to emerging issues in the sector.
e. While the GEF is physically housed in a World Bank building, it has its own management structure that is independent of the Bank’s management.
W o r l d  B a n k ’ s  R o l e s  i n  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m sT a b l e  H . 4
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
1 7 9
Lender Convener of 
Implementing TF TF to the initiatives in 
agencya Fundingb trustee managerc sector the sectord
No DGF Yes No Yes Yes
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No DGF No No Yes Yes
No No No No Yes Yes
No BB No No Yes No
No DGF No No Yes Yes
No DGF No No Yes Yes
No DGF No No Yes Yes
No DGF No No Yes Yes
No DGF Yes No Yes Yes
No DGF No No Yes Yes
No BB Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes BB Yes Yes Yes Yes
No DGF Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes BB, DGF Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes BB, DGF Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes DGF Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes DGF Yes Yes Yes No
Yes DGF No No Yes No
Yes DGF No No Yes Yes
Yes BB No No Yes Yes
Yes DGF Yes Yes Yes Yes
No DGF Yes No No Yes
No DGF Yes No Yes Yes
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Governing 
body (& executive  
body, if Chair of Program 
Program Location applicable) governing body management unit
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research World Bank Consultative Group Chair of both: Secretariat
& Executive Council Ian Johnson 
(World Bank)
2. Global Environment Facility World Bank Assembly & Co-chairs of both: Secretariat
Council Len Good (CEO) &
one rotating 
co-chair
3. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of Montreal Meeting of the Rotating chairs, Fund Secretariat
the Montreal Protocol Parties & selected annually 
Executive Committee from members
4. Prototype Carbon Fund World Bank Participants’ Separate chairs: Fund Management Unit
committee & Fund Jean-Claude Steffens
Management & Ken Newcombe
Committee (World Bank)
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FY03 budget 
Program manager World Bank Current allocation 
(and title) program oversighta Bank unit for oversight Commentsb
Francisco Reifschneider Kevin Cleaverc ARD Nil • Bank’s ESSD vice president chairs CG and ExCo.
(Director) (Director) • Director heads Secretariat, and reports to CG
Chair.
• ARD director is CG and ExCo member, and 
reports to the ESSD vice president.
Len Good (Chair and James Warren Evans ENV Not applicable • Independent, full-time CEO and one GEF 
CEO) & Kenneth (Sector Manager) member co-chair Assembly and Council.
King (Assistant CEO) • CEO heads Secretariat, and reports to GEF 
Assembly and Council.
• Bank attends Assembly and Council meetings 
as observer.
• The manager of the Bank’s GEF coordination 
unit reports to the ENV Director.
• BB allocation is for program coordination for the 
Bank as an implementing agency for the GEF.
Omar El-Arini Steve Gorman ENV Not applicable • Member chair of Executive Committee for one-
(Chief Officer) (Sr. Environmental year term, rotating among Article 5 and non-
Specialist) Article 5 members.
• Chief Officer heads secretariat, and reports to 
Executive Committee.
• Bank attends Executive Committee meetings as 
observer.
• The manager of the Bank’s MLF coordination unit
reports to the ENV Director.
• BB allocation is for program coordination for the 
Bank as an implementing agency for the MLF.
Ken Newcombe Ian Johnson ENV • Member chair of Participants’ Committee for 
(Senior Manager) 1-year term, rotating among public and private 
sector participants.
• Program manager chairs Fund Management 
Committee, heads secretariat and reports to 
ESSD vice president.
• Prototype Carbon Fund trust funds pay for entire 
secretariat costs (including Bank staff salaries).
• Fund Management Unit prepares projects for 
approval of Fund Management Committee and 
Participants’ committee.
(Table continues on the following page.)
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
1 8 2
C h a i r s ,  P r o g r a m  M a n a g e r s ,  a n d  B a n k  
O v e r s i g h t  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  ( c o n t i n u e d )
T a b l e  H . 5
Governing 
body (& executive  
body, if Chair of Program 
Program Location applicable) governing body management unit
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund Conservation Donor Council & James Wolfensohn CEPF Unit
International Working Group (World Bank) &
Jorgen Thomsen (CI)
6. Global Water Partnership Stockholm Steering Committee Margaret Catley-Carlson Secretariat
(Canada)
7. Global Integrated Pest Management Facility FAO Governing Group Not applicable Not applicable
Health
8. Special Program for Research and Training in WHO Joint Coordinating Dr. J. Lariviere (Canada) Secretariat
Tropical Diseases Board Vice Chair Professor 
N. K. Ganguly (India) 
9. Global Forum for Health Research Geneva Foundation Council Richard Feachem Secretariat
(GFATM)
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) Geneva Program Coordinating Brian Chituwo Secretariat
Board (Zambia) 
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FY03 budget 
Program manager World Bank Current allocation 
(and title) program oversighta Bank unit for oversight Commentsb
Jorgen Thomsen Michael Carroll LCSER $100,000 • Bank’s President chairs Donor Council.
(Executive Director) (Sr. Natural Resource • Program manager chairs Working Group, heads 
Management Specialist) secretariat and reports to both Donor Council and
CI Board.
• Bank’s overseer is member of Working Group and 
exercises management and fiduciary oversight.
• BB allocation covers two supervision missions 
per year, and staff time to a series of bilateral 
meetings between the Bank and CI, Working 
Group Meetings, and the annual Donor Council 
meeting.
Emilio Gabbrielli John Briscoe SASRD Nil • Independent, part-time chair of GWP Steering 
(Executive Secretary) Committee for term of how many years?
• Executive Secretary heads secretariat and reports
to Steering Committee.
• Bank is cosponsor and member of the Steering 
Committee, but no longer a donor.
Peter Kenmore Eija Pehu ARD Nil • Who chairs Governing Group?
(Coordinator) • Coordinator heads secretariat and reports to FAO 
and/or Governing Group.
• Bank’s overseer is Governing Group member.
Dr. R. Ridley Ok Pannenborg AFTHD Approximately • Member chair of JCB for three-year rotating term.
(Executive Director (Sr. Adviser) $500,000 • Executive Director heads secretariat; appointed 
ad interim) by the Director-General of WHO; and reports to JCB
• JCB meets annually
• Bank’s overseer is JCB member.
Stephen Matlin Robert M. Hecht HDNHE • Independent, part-time chair of Foundation 
(Sector Manager) Council for 2-year term.
• Executive Secretary heads secretariat and reports
to Foundation Council.
• Bank’s overseer is Foundation Council member.
• See TDR comment regarding oversight.
Peter Piot Debrework Zewdie HDNGA • Member chair of PCB for three-year rotating term.
(Executive Director) (Program Director) • Executive Director heads secretariat and reports 
to PCB.
• Bank’s overseer is PCB member.
• See TDR comment regarding oversight.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Governing 
body (& executive  
body, if Chair of Program 
Program Location applicable) governing body management unit
11. Roll Back Malaria WHO Steering Committee George Amofah Secretariat
(Ghana)
12. Stop TB WHO Coordinating Board Ernest Loevinsohn Secretariat
(Canada)
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization UNICEF GAVI Board Carol Bellamy Secretariat
(UNICEF)
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program World Bank Program Council Nemat Shafik Program Management 
(World Bank) Team
15. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program World Bank Consultative Group Nemat Shafik Secretariat
(World Bank)
16. Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest World Bank Council of Governors Separate chairs: Operational
& Executive Nemat Shafik Team
Committee (World Bank) &
David Stanton (U.K.)
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FY03 budget 
Program manager World Bank Current allocation 
(and title) program oversighta Bank unit for oversight Commentsb
Fatoumata Nafo-Traoré Ok Pannenborg AFTHD • Member chair of Steering Committee for two-
(Executive Director) (Sr. Adviser) year rotating term.
• Executive Director heads secretariat and reports 
to WHO for administrative purposes and Steering
Committee for operational purposes.
• Bank’s overseer is Steering Committee member.
• See TDR comment regarding oversight.
Marcos Espinal Diana Weil ECCKG/HDNHE • Member chair of Coordinating Board for two-year 
(Executive Director) (Sr. Public Health rotating term.
Specialist) • Executive Director heads secretariat and reports 
to WHO for administrative purposes and 
Coordinating Board for operational purposes.
• Bank’s overseer is Coordinating Board member.
• See TDR comment regarding oversight.
Tore Godal Amie Batson HDNHE • Member chair of GAVI Board for two-year rotat-
(Executive Secretary) (Sr. Health Specialist) ing term.
• Executive Secretary heads secretariat and reports
to GAVI Board.
• Bank’s overseer is GAVI Board member.
• See TDR comment regarding oversight.
Walter Stottman Jamal Saghir EWDDR • Bank’s INF vice president chairs Program Council.
(Manager) (Director) • Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
both to Program Council and EWD Director.
• No independent oversight outside INF vice 
presidency.
Dominique Lallement Jamal Saghir EWDDR • Bank’s INF vice president chairs Consultative 
(Manager) (Director) Group.
• Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
both to Program Council and EWD Director.
• No independent oversight outside INF vice 
presidency.
Elizabeth Littlefield Carlos Cuevas FSE/OPD • Bank’s INF vice president chairs Council of 
(Executive Director) (Lead Financial Governors.
Economist • Bilateral donor chairs Excom.
• Executive director heads secretariat and reports 
both to CG and INF vice president.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Governing 
body (& executive  
body, if Chair of Program 
Program Location applicable) governing body management unit
17. The Information for Development Program (infoDev) World Bank Donors’ Committee Nemat Shafik Secretariat
(World Bank)
18. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility World Bank Program Council Nemat Shafik Program Management 
(World Bank) Unit
19. Cities Alliance World Bank Consultative Group Co-chairs of both: Secretariat
& Steering Committee Nemat Shafik 
(World Bank) & Anna 
Kajumulo Tibaijuka 
(UN-Habitat)
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund World Bank Steering Committee Steen Jorgenson Secretariat
(World Bank) 
21. Understanding Children’s Work UNICEF Steering Committee Not applicable Secretariat
(Florence)
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework WTO Steering Committee Separate chairs: Secretariat
& Working Group Hendrik Reé Iversen 
(Denmark) &
Dr. Kipkokir Aly Azad 
Rana (WTO)
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FY03 budget 
Program manager World Bank Current allocation 
(and title) program oversighta Bank unit for oversight Commentsb
• Bank’s overseer is Excom member and CG mem-
ber. That he is located in a different vice presi-
dency from CGAP Chair enables some measure of
independent oversight.
Mostafa Terrab Mohsen Khalil CITDR • Bank’s INF vice president chairs Donors’ Committee
(Manager) (Director) • Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
both to Donors’ Committee and CIT Director.
• No independent oversight outside INF vice 
presidency.
Jyoti Shukla • Bank’s INF vice president chairs Program Council.
(Manager) • Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
both to Program Council and INF vice president.
• Who exercises oversight?
Mark Hildebrand Maryvonne TUDDR • World Bank and UN-Habitat co-chair both CG and 
(Manager) Plessis-Fraissard Steering Committee.
(Director) • Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
both to CG and to TUD Director.
• No independent oversight outside INF vice 
presidency.
Colin Scott Ian Bannon SDV • Bank’s SDV Director chairs Steering Committee.
(Program Manager) (Manager) • Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
to manager of Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction Team.
• Bank staff members of Steering Committee 
provide some oversight from outside SDV 
Department.
Furio Rosati Jean Fares HDNSP • Who chairs Steering Committee?
(Project Coordinator) (Economist) • Project Coordinator heads secretariat and reports 
to Steering Committee.
• Bank’s overseer is Steering Committee member.
Annet Blank John Panzer PRMTR • Member chair of Steering Committee for X-year 
(Sector Manager) rotating term
• WTO chairs Working Group.
• Program manager heads secretariat and reports 
to Working Group and WTO? 
• Bank’s overseer is Working Group member.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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body, if Chair of Program 
Program Location applicable) governing body management unit
23. Financial Sector Assessment Program IMF and Financial Sector Co-chairs:
World Bank Liaison Committee Larry Promisel 
(World Bank) &
Thomas Balino (IMF)
24. Financial Sector Reform & Strengthening DFID and Governing Council & Separate chairs: Management Unit &
World Bank Steering Committee Jeffrey Goldstein Coordination Unit
(World Bank) &
Larry Promisel 
(World Bank)
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network Washington, D.C. Governing Body Richard Cooper (USA) & Secretariat
Akilagpa Sawyerr 
(Africa)
26. World Links for Development Washington, D.C. Governing Board Co-chairs: Secretariat
Robert M. Chefitz 
(NJTC Venture Fund, 
USA) & Dina Dublon 
(JP Morgan Chase,
USA)
a. Person who is immediately responsible for oversight of the program from the point of view of the World Bank, as distinct from the person who is 
managing the program.
b. Comment in particular on the degree of independence of the oversight, and give brief reasons for the assessment. 
c. Bank management has recommended the Bank’s Chief Economist.
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FY03 budget 
Program manager World Bank Current allocation 
(and title) program oversighta Bank unit for oversight Commentsb
Co-managers: Larry Promisel FSEGP • Bank and IMF co-chair Liaison Committee.
Susan Marcus (Sr. Adviser) • Co-managers report to their respective managers.
(World Bank) & • Some financial sector board oversight (changed 
Mark O’Brien from no independent oversight outside FSE vice 
(IMF) presidency).
Robert Stone Larry Promisel FSEGP • Bank chairs both the Governing Council and 
(Head) & (Sr. Adviser) Steering Committee.
Dafna Tapiero • Manager of Coordination Unit reports to both the 
(Manager) Steering Committee and FSE Sr. Adviser.
• No independent oversight outside of FSE vice 
presidency.
Lyn Squire Guillermo Perry LCRCE Not applicable • Member co-chairs of Governing Body.
(Chief Economist, LAC) • Executive Director heads secretariat and reports 
to Governing Body.
• Bank’s overseer is member of Governing Body.
Hans Hoyer Sam Carlson LCSHE Not applicable • Member co-chairs of Governing Board.
(Sr. Human • Executive Secretary heads secretariat and reports 
Development Specialist) to Governing Board.
• Bank’s overseer is member of Governing Board.
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Program Convention/agreement
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 1992
International Agricultural World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002
Research (CGIAR)
2. Global Environment Facility (GEF) Montreal Protocol, 1987
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 1992
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992
Convention on Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD), 1992
U.N. Convention on Combating Desertification (CCD), 1994
Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (encompasses 
regional and bilateral conventions/agreements), and Washington Declaration, 1995
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002
3. Multilateral Fund for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985.
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987.
Montreal Protocol (MLF)
4. Prototype Carbon Fund U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
(ProCarbFund) Kyoto Protocol, 1997
Buenos Aires Plan of Action, 1998
Bonn Agreement, 2001
Marrakech Accords, 2001
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Convention on Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD), 1992
Fund (CEPF)
6. Global Water Partnership (GWP) Dublin Conference on Water and Environment, 1992.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992
7. Global Integrated Pest Agenda 21 and the Convention on Conservation of Biological Diversity
Management Facility (GIF)
Health
8. Special Program for Research Chiang Mai Declaration, 2000
and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (TDR)
9. Global Forum for Health Research
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Nations U.N. Special Session on HIV/AIDS 2001
Program on HIV/AIDS)
11. Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Abuja Summit 2000
Okinawa Summit 2000
12. Stop TB Amsterdam Declaration 2000
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines Dakar Declaration 2000.
and Immunization (GAVI)
R e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  t o  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n v e n t i o n s /  C o n f e r e n c e s /
A g r e e m e n t s
T a b l e  H . 6
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Rolea
The CGIAR responded to Rio 1992 by broadening its mission and has undertaken to help implement the goals adopted by the Johannesburg 
Summit.
GEF arose out of the 1992 U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED).
GEF is formally responsible for implementing the UNFCCC, CBD, CCD and Stockholm Convention.
The MLF is formally responsible for implementing the Montreal Protocol.
The Prototype Carbon Fund is facilitating implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. It is a prototype for project-based carbon-emissions trading under
flexible mechanisms established by Convention.
The CEPF is facilitating the implementation of the CBD.
The GWP built on the Dublin-Rio principles agreed during these conferences.
The GIF is facilitating implementation of Agenda 21.
Strongly endorsed the TDR/WHO global strategy for prevention and control of dengue and dengue hemorrhagic fever.
–
The U.N. General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and fully endorsed the UNAIDS program 
Both Summits endorsed actions synonymous with those proposed by the RBM Partnership.
Formally recognized the efforts of the Stop TB Initiative and endorsed the program.
The Summit formally requested that the partners of the GAVI and the Vaccine Fund continue to assist countries in the mobilization of additional 
financial resources for health and immunization.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Program Convention/agreement
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program World Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, 1977
(WSP) Dublin Conference on Water and Environment, 1992
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992
15. Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Program (ESMAP) –
16. Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (CGAP) –
17. The Information for Development Genoa Plan of Action to Address the Digital Divide, endorsed by G8 Heads of State, July 2001
Program (infoDev)
18. Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF) –
19. Cities Alliance Habitat II, Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements, June 1996
Millennium Declaration 2000
Social Development & Protection
20 Post-conflict Fund (PostConFund) –
21. Understanding Children’s Work Oslo Agenda for Action, adopted at the 1997 International Conference on Child Labor
(UCW)
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework for First WTO Ministerial Conference, Singapore, December 1996
Trade-Related Technical WTO High-Level Meeting, October 1997
Assistance (IF) Doha Ministerial Declaration, November 2001
23. Financial Sector Assessment International standards that have been established for banking supervision, payments system oversight, securities 
Program (FSAP) and insurance markets, accounting practices, corporate governance, and anti-money laundering, as well as data 
dissemination and monetary and fiscal policy transparency.
24. Financial Sector Reform International standards that have been established for banking supervision, payments system oversight, securities 
and Strengthening (FIRST) and insurance markets, accounting practices, corporate governance, and anti-money laundering, as well as data 
dissemination and monetary and fiscal policy transparency.
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network 
(GDN) –
26. World Links –
a. Indicates whether the program (1) is formally responsible for implementing the Convention, (2) is facilitating implementation of the Convention, or (3) arose out of the Convention.
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Rolea
WSP arose out of the World Water Conference and the declaration of the 1980s as the “International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade.”
WSP committed to implement the Dublin-Rio principles regarding policy and institutional reform and investments in the water sector.
–
–
infoDev served as Digital Opportunity Task Force secretariat that produced the Genoa Plan of Action. 
–
Arose out of Habitat II.
The Millennium Declaration endorsed the Cities Alliance’s own target regarding improving the lives of slum dwellers.
–
The Agenda, which provides guidance to UCW, identified the need for more data and research on child labor and called for stronger cooperation 
among international agencies involved in addressing child labor.
The 1997 High-Level Meeting formally endorsed the IF initiative.
The 2001 Doha Declaration explicitly identified IF as an important contribution to meeting LDC needs and encouraged its extension to all low 
income countries.
The program assesses country compliance with these standards and identifies vulnerabilities in domestic financial systems.
The program provides technical assistance to address weaknesses that have been identified in domestic financial systems in relation to these 
standards.
–
–
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Direct Less-direct 
Goals Targets relationshipa relationshipb
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion CGAP
of people whose income is less than one dollar 
a day.
2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion CGIAR
of people who suffer from hunger.
2. Achieve universal primary education 3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and UCW
girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling.
3. Promote gender equality and 4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
empower women education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of 
education no later than 2015.
4. Reduce child mortality 5. Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the GAVI TDR, UNAIDS, 
under-five mortality rate. RBM, Stop TB
5. Improve maternal health 6. Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, TDR, Global 
the maternal mortality ratio. Forum, UNAIDS, 
RBM, Stop TB, GAVI
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 7. Have halted and begun to reverse the spread of UNAIDS, 
diseases HIV/AIDS by 2015. GFATMc
8. Have halted and begun to reverse the incidence 
of malaria and other major diseases by 2015. RBM, TDR, Global Forum, 
Stop TB, GAVI
GFATM
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable GEF, MLF, CEPF, GWP, GIF
development into country policies and programs ProCarbFund, 
and reverse the losses of environmental resources. ESMAP
10. Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without WSP GWP, PPIAF
sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation.
11. Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement Cities 
in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. Alliance
8. Develop a global partnership 12. Further develop an open, rule-based, predictable, IF, FSAP, FIRST
for development nondiscriminatory trading and financial system.
13. Address the special needs of the least-developed IF PostConFund
countries.
14. Address the special needs of landlocked countries 
and small-island developing states.
15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of 
developing countries through national and 
international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term.
R e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  t o
M i l l e n n i u m  D e v e l o p m e n t  G o a l s
T a b l e  H . 7
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R e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  t o
M i l l e n n i u m  D e v e l o p m e n t  G o a l s  ( c o n t i n u e d )
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Direct Less-direct 
Goals Targets relationshipa relationshipb
16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop 
and implement strategies for decent and productive 
work for youth.
17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, TDR, UNAIDS, 
provide access to affordable essential drugs in RBM, Stop TB, 
developing countries. GAVI, GFATM
18. In cooperation with the private sector, make infoDev PPIAF, GDN, World 
available the benefits of new technologies, Links
especially information and communications.
a. The stated objectives of these programs are directly related to specific MDG targets, although their outputs are only part of the ingredients needed to achieve the MDGs.
b. The objectives of these programs are also related to the achievement of the MDGs in the sense that the goods and services the programs provide are important ingredients needed to
achieve particular MDG targets.
c. GFATM, not included in this review, is by far the largest effort to make resources available to developing countries for halting the spread of AIDS, TB, and malaria. Similarly, the Inter-
national AIDS Vaccine Initiative is attempting to develop vaccines for HIV/AIDS.
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(See definitions of OED’s subcategories at the end of the table. OED’s assessments of high, substantial, modest, or negligible are
internal to each program and therefore do not provide comparisons across programs, nor do these ratings represent assessments
of the quality or efficacy of these program activities.)
Activities High or substantial Modest Negligible
Providing global public goods
• Implementing conventions, rules, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund CGIAR, CEPF, GWP, GIF TDR, Global Forum, UNAIDS, 
or formal and informal standards Stop TB CGAP RBM, GAVI
and norms FSAP, FIRST WSP, ESMAP, infoDev, PPIAF, 
CA
PostConFund, UCW, IF, GDN, 
World Links
• Financing R&D for new products CGIAR Global Forum, Stop TB GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, CEPF, 
and technologies TDR, GAVI GWP, GIF
UNAIDS, RBM
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, 
PPIAF, CA
PostConFund, UCW, IF, FSAP, 
FIRST, GDN, World Links
• Financing country-level investments GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, CEPF Stop TB CGIAR, GWP, GIF
to deliver global public goods PostConFund TDR, Global Forum, UNAIDS, 
RBM, GAVI
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, 
PPIAF, CA
UCW, IF, FSAP, FIRST, GDN, 
World Links
• Promoting common approaches to UNAIDS, RBM, Stop TB CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarb
mitigating communicable diseases Fund, CEPF, GWP, GIF
TDR, Global Forum, GAVI
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, 
PPIAF, CA
PostConFund, UCW, IF, FSAP, 
FIRST, GDN, World Links
Supporting international advocacy for reform agendas to improve national-level policies
• Advocacy CGIAR, GEF, ProCarbFund, MLF
CEPF, GWP, GIF TDR
UNAIDS, Global Forum, UCW
RBM, Stop TB, GAVI
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, 
PPIAF, CA
PostConFund, FSAP, FIRST, 
IF, GDN, World Links
O E D  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  P r o g r a m s ’  A c t u a l  
A c t i v i t i e s ,  C l a s s i f i e d  A c c o r d i n g  t o  B a n k
M a n a g e m e n t ’ s  F o u r  S t r a t e g i c  F o c i  a n d  
O E D  S u b c a t e g o r i e s
T a b l e  H . 8
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O E D  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  P r o g r a m s ’  A c t u a l  
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O E D  S u b c a t e g o r i e s  ( c o n t i n u e d )
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Activities High or substantial Modest Negligible
• Supporting national-level policy, CGIAR, GEF, MLF ProCarbFund, CEPF, GWP, GIF TDR
institutional & technical reforms UNAIDS, GAVI Global Forum, RBM, Stop TB infoDev
WSP, ESMAP, PPIAF, CA CGAP UCW
IF, FSAP, FIRST PostConFund, GDN, World Links
• Financing country-level investments GAVI UNAIDS, Stop TB CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarb
to deliver national public goods PostConFund Fund, CEPF, GWP, GIF
TDR, Global Forum, RBM
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, 
PPIAF, CA
UCW, IF, FSAP, FIRST, GDN, 
World Links
Coordinated multicountry programs
• Generation and dissemination of CGIAR, GEF, ProCarbFund, GIF MLF, CEPF, GWP
information and knowledge TDR, Global Forum, UNAIDS, 
RBM, Stop TB, GAVI
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev, 
PPIAF, CA
PostConFund, UCW, IF, FSAP, 
FIRST, GDN, World Links
• Capacity building and training CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, GWP Global Forum
CEPF, GIF RBM, Stop TB UCW
TDR, UNAIDS, GAVI
WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev,
PPIAF, CA
PostConFund, IF, FSAP, FIRST, 
GDN, World Links
• Improving donor coordination CGIAR, GEF MLF, ProCarbFund, GIF CEPF, GWP
UNAIDS, Stop TB, GAVI RBM, Global Forum TDR
CGAP, PPIAF, CA WSP, ESMAP infoDev
PostConFund, IF, FIRST FSAP UCW, GDN, World Links
Mobilizing substantial incremental resources
• Directly CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund CEPF GWP, GIF
GAVI TDR, UNAIDS, Stop TB Global Forum, RBM
PPIAF, CA WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, infoDev
FIRST PostConFund, UCW, IF, FSAP, 
GDN, World Links
• Indirectly Global Forum, UNAIDS, RBM CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarb
Stop TB WSP, ESMAP, PPIAF, CA Fund, CEPF, GWP, GIF
TDR, GAVI
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Activities High or substantial Modest Negligible
CGAP, IinfoDev
PostConFund, UCW, IF, FSAP, 
FIRST, GDN, World Links
Bank Management’s Strategic Focus for Global Programs
Management noted that to enhance strategic focus, oversight will be strengthened to ensure that global programs comprise activities that: (a)
provide global public goods; (b) support international advocacy for reform agendas that in significant ways address policy framework condi-
tions relevant for developing countries; (c) are multicountry programs that crucially depend on highly coordinated approaches; and/or (d) mobi-
lize substantial incremental resources that can be effectively used for development.
Definitions of OED Subcategories to More Sharply Define Program Activities
Rules are generally formal. Standards can be formal or informal, and binding or nonbinding, but implementing standards involves more than
simply advocating an approach to development in a sector. In general, there should be some costs associated with noncompliance. Costs can
come in many forms, including exposure to financial contagion, bad financial ratings by the IMF and other rating agencies, with consequent
impacts on access to private finance; lack of access to OECD markets for failing to meet food safety standards, or even the consequences of
failing to be seen as progressive in international circles.
New products and technologies are generally physical products or processes—the hardware as opposed to the software of development.
Financing country-level investments to deliver global public goods refers primarily to physical and institutional investments of the type found
in Bank loans and credits (not the financing of studies) to deliver public goods such as conserving biodiversity of global value and reducing
emissions of ozone-depleting substances and carbon dioxide, the benefits of which accrue globally.
Promoting common approaches to mitigating communicable diseases may involve a range of activities intended to develop approaches to con-
taining communicable diseases with widespread application and to provide this specialized information and knowledge to developing countries.
Advocacy comprises proactive interaction with policymakers and decisionmakers concerning approaches to development in a sector, com-
monly in the context of global, regional, or country-level forums. Intended to create reform conditions in developing countries, as distinct from
physical and institutional investments in public goods, this is more proactive than generating and disseminating information and knowledge.
Supporting national-level policy, institutional, and technical reforms is more directed to specific tasks than advocacy. This represents concrete
involvement in specific and ongoing policy, institutional, and technical reform processes in a sector, from deciding on a reform strategy to im-
plementation of new policies and regulations in a sector. It is more than just conducting studies.
Financing country-level investments refers primarily to physical and institutional investments of the type found in Bank loans and credits (not
the financing of studies), the benefits of which accrue primarily at the national level.
Generation and dissemination of information and knowledge comprises two related activities. The first is gathering, analyzing and dissemi-
nating information on, for example, the evolving HIV/AIDS epidemic and responses to it, including epidemiological data collection and analy-
sis, needs assessment, resource flows, and country readiness. The second is the systematic assembling and dissemination of knowledge (not
merely information) with respect to best practices in a sector on a global basis. 
Capacity building refers to building the capacity of human resources through proactive training (in courses or on-the-job), as well as collabora-
tive work with the active involvement of developing country partners.
Improving donor coordination should be an active process, not just the side effect of other program activities. This may involve resolving
thorny interagency issues that need addressing.
Mobilizing substantial incremental resources represents substantial resources (in absolute size) from diverse and novel sources that have
been or appear to be sustainable over the long term. Direct resources are those that are mobilized for, and managed by, the program itself. In-
direct resources are those that are mobilized as a result of the program’s advocacy, but are managed and spent by others (such as the World
Bank and bilateral donors) outside the framework of the global program itself. 
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
1 9 9
Principal author
Network/sector Type of report Date Title (if applicable)
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
Social Development Bank sector December 2003 (DRAFT) Social Development In World Bank 
strategy Operations: Results and Way Forward
OED sector study June 1998 The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Alcira Kreimer 
Reconstruction et al.
Water Resources Bank sector February 2003 Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic 
strategy Directions for World Bank Engagement
OED sector study 2002 Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the George Pitman
World Bank Water Resources Strategy
Forestry Bank sector October 2002 A Revised Forest Strategy for the World 
strategy Bank Group
OED sector study October 2000 The World Bank Forest Strategy: Striking the Uma Lele et al.
Right Balance
Environment Bank sector December 2001 Making Sustainable Commitments: 
strategy An Environment Strategy for the World Bank.
OED sector study January 2002 Promoting Environmental Sustainability in Andres Liebenthal
Development: An Evaluation of the 
World Bank’s Performance
Rural Development Bank sector strategy October 2001 Reaching the Rural Poor: A Renewed Strategy 
for Rural Development
OED sector study April 2002 Toward Sharpening the Focus on Rural Poverty: Ridley Nelson
A Review of World Bank Experience
OED sector study June 2000 Rural Development: From Vision to Action? Chris Gerrard and 
(Phase II) John Heath
OED sector study June 1999 Rural Development: From Vision to Action? John Heath
Indigenous Peoples Operational policies/ March 2001 (DRAFT) Indigenous Peoples: Operational Policies
Bank procedures (DRAFT) Indigenous Peoples: Bank Procedures
OED sector study April 2003 Implementation of Operational Directive 4.20 
on Indigenous Peoples: An Evaluation of Results Gita Gopal
Human Development Network
Health, Nutrition, Bank sector September 1997 Health, Nutrition, and Population: Sector strategy
& Population strategy December 2003 The Millennium Development Goals for Health: 
Rising to the Challenges
Regional sector June 2000 The World Bank Strategy for Health, Nutrition 
strategy and Population in the East Asia and Pacific Region
Regional sector September 1999 A Health Sector Strategy for the Europe and 
strategy Central Asia Region
Regional sector No date World Bank: Middle East and North Africa Region 
strategy Strategy Paper
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Network/sector Type of report Date Title (if applicable)
OED sector study July 1999 Investing in Health Development Effectiveness 
in the Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector Susan Stout
Social Protection Bank sector September 2000 Social Protection Sector Strategy: From Safety 
strategy Net to Springboard
OED sector study May 2002 Social Funds: Assessing Effectiveness Soniya Carvalho
Education Bank sector July 1999 Education Sector Strategy
strategy
Infrastructure and Private Sector Development
Water & Sanitation Bank business September 2003 Water Supply and Sanitation Business 
strategy Strategy: Fiscal 2003–2007
OED sector study September 2003 Efficient, Sustainable Service for All? An OED Klas Ringskog
Evaluation of the World Bank’s Assistance to 
Water Supply and Sanitation
Private Sector Bank sector April 2002 Private Sector Development Strategy – 
Development strategy Directions for the World Bank Group
Energy Bank sector December 2001 The World Bank Group’s Energy Program – 
strategy Poverty Reduction, Sustainability, 
and Selectivity
OED/OEG/OEU October 2003 Power for Development: A Review of the Rafael Dominguez,
sector study World Bank Group’s Experience with Private Fernando 
Participation in the Energy Sector Manibog, and 
Stephan Wegner
OED sector study March 1998 The World Bank Environment Strategy for 
the Energy Sector: An OED Perspective
Information & OED/OEG sector January 2001 Information Infrastructure: The World Bank Alain Barbu, 
Communication study Group’s Experience. A Joint OED/OEG Review Rafael Dominguez,
Technologies and William 
Melody
Bank sector 2002 Information and Communication Technologies: 
strategy A World Bank Group Strategy
Urban Bank sector September 2000 Cities in Transition: World Bank Urban and 
strategy Local Government Strategy
OED sector study June 2002 Improving the Lives of the Poor through Roy Gilbert
Investment in Cities: An Update on the 
Performance of the World Bank’s Urban Portfolio
Financial Sector
Finance Bank sector March 2001 The World Bank Group Strategy for the 
strategy Financial Sector
OED sector study Forthcoming 2004 Financial Sector Reform Laurie Effron
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Principal author
Network/sector Type of report Date Title (if applicable)
OED sector study June 1998 Financial Sector Reform: A Review of World 
Bank Assistance Nicolas Mathieu
OED sector study 1996 A Review of Bank Lending for Agricultural 
Credit and Rural Finance (1948–1992): 
A Follow-Up
OED sector study 1993 A Review of Bank Lending for Agricultural 
Credit and Rural Finance (1948–1992)
a. Within each network, the sectors are sorted chronologically starting with the most recent sector strategy.
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Program Date Commissioned by Managed by Reported to
Environment and Agriculture
1. CGIAR 1998 CGIAR Chair CGIAR Secretariat Consultative Group
2. GEF 2002 GEF Secretariat GEF Secretariat GEF Council and Assembly
3. MLF March 1995
4. ProCarbFund
5. CEPF 2003
6. GWP June 2003
7. GIF Feb. 2001
Health
8. TDR October 1998 TDR Joint Coordinating Board TDR JCB
(JCB)
9. Global Forum Dec. 2001 Global Forum Foundation Foundation Council
Council
10. UNAIDS October 2002 UNAIDS Program Coordinating UNAIDS PCB
Board (PCB)
11. RBM August 2002 U.K. DFID DFID and the RBM Steering 
Committee
12. Stop TB December 2003 Stop TB Partnership Coordinating Board
Coordinating Board
April 2003 Stop TB Partnership Coordinating Board
Coordinating Board
13. GAVI June 2002 GAVI Board GAVI Board
Infrastructure
14. WSP May 1999 SIDA, NORAD, CIDA
June 1999 SDC
July 1999 DANIDA
Sept. 1999 DANIDA
15. ESMAP June 30, 2000 World Bank Energy, Mining, & infoDev Secretariat Energy, Mining, & Telecoms 
Telecoms Sector Board Sector Board
16. CGAP April 4, 2002 Excom CGAP Secretariat Excom and CG
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Conducted by Title
Maurice Strong The International Research Partnership for Food Security and
Sustainable Development: Third System Review of the CGIAR
Christoffersen, Davidson, Donoso, Fargher, Hammond, Hooper, Matthew, The First Decade of the GEF: Second Overall Performance Study
and Seyani
COWIconsult Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol
Mid-Term Evaluation
R. Hoare, Bert van Woersem, G. Brustzt, Doug Flint, and Juliet Pierce External Review of GWP
Janice Jiggins et al. The Mid-Term Review of the Global IPM Facility
H. Wigzell, F. K. Nkrumah, G. T. Castillo, J. Amor, W. P. Thalwitz, H. G. Boyer Final Report: Third External Review of TDR
Fred Binka, Jan Holmgren, Nimala Murthy Findings from the External Evaluation: A Report to the Foundation 
Council
Derek Poate (leading a four-person team) Five-Year Evaluation of UNAIDS, Final Report
R. Feachem (leading a seven-person team) Achieving Impact: Roll Back Malaria in the Next Phase
Karen Caines et al. Independent External Evaluation of the Global Stop TB Partnership
Institute for Health Sector Development, London, U.K.
McKinsey & Co. Review of the Global Drug Facilitya
Karen Caines, Hatib N’jie Report of the External Review of the Functions and Interactions of 
the GAVI Working Group, Secretariat, and Board
Ake Nilsson (leading a five-person team) Review of Support to the World Bank-UNDP Water & Sanitation 
Program – South Asia
François Münger (leading a three-person team) External Evaluation of the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation contribution to the UNDP-World Bank Water and 
Sanitation Program and to the Pan-American Center for Sanitary 
Engineering and Environmental Sciences (CEPIS/PHO)
Vagn Rehoj (leading a five-person team) Joint Assessment of the Regional Water and Sanitation Group for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (RWSG-ESA)
Review of the Support for the UNDP-World Bank Regional Water 
and Sanitation Groups for South Asia and for West and Central 
Africa
Guy Caruso (leading a five-person team) Donor-Funded Energy Programs: Final Report of the External 
Review
James W. Fox, Mark Havers, and Klaus Maurer Evaluation and Strategic Review of the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest (CGAP)
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17. infoDev May 2002 infoDev infoDev Secretariat infoDev Management
18. PPIAF
19. Cities Alliance Sept. 2002 CA Consultative Group CA Secretariat Consultative Group
Social Development and Protection
20. PostConFund February 2002 PostConFund Steering PostConFund PostConFund Steering Committee
Committee Secretariat
21. UCW June 2003 UCW Steering Committee UNICEF Evaluation UCW Steering Committee
Office
Trade & Finance
22. IF September 2003 IF Steering Committee UNDP Evaluation IF Steering Committee
Office
23. FSAP
24. FIRST
Information & Knowledge
25. GDN March 2004
26. World Links
a. The McKinsey Review of the Global Drug Facility and GAVI’s external review are not full program evaluations.
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Conducted by Title
Eduardo da Costa (coordinator), Ernest Wilson III, and Barbara Fillip infoDev External Evaluation 2002: Final Report
Development Planning Unit, University College, London Cities Alliance: An Assessment of the First Three Years
Development Alternatives Inc. Covering New Ground: Evaluation of the Post-conflict Fund
Roland Rodts Developing Strategies for Understanding Children’s Work and Its
Impact: Review Report
Capra International Inc. and Trade Facilitation Office, Canada Evaluation of the Revamped Integrated Framework for Trade-
related Technical Assistance to the Least Developed Countries: 
Final Report
Dr. H. Peter Muth
Dr. Frederick H. Gerlach Independent Evaluation of the Global Development Network
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Program Intended beneficiaries (intermediate and ultimate)
Environment & Agriculture
1. Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural 
Research
2. Global Environment Facility The intermediate beneficiaries are the Bank’s client countries—particularly their sectors that depend heavily on 
natural resources and the integrity of ecosystems, as well as those responsible for energy, transport and urban 
development. The ultimate beneficiaries are the international community, given the global environmental 
objectives of the GEF.
3. Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol
4. Prototype Carbon Fund
5. Critical Ecosystem The CEPF targets civil society, which includes nongovernmental organizations, community groups, academia, 
Partnership Fund and private sector partners in the biodiversity conservation field as the immediate beneficiaries and recipients of 
grant monies. Grant recipients implement programs in line with strategic priorities established within each 
critical ecosystem. The ultimate beneficiaries are humankind at the local and global levels. Local benefits are 
derived from the conservation of local environmental services and the natural resources derived from an area rich 
in biodiversity. The global community benefits from the preservation of globally important ecosystems.
6. Global Water Partnership The ultimate beneficiaries are the poor who lack access to water and water-related services. The intermediate 
beneficiaries are the stakeholders who, through the GWP, have a forum for interaction.
7. Global Integrated Pest Small resource-poor farmers (gender also explicitly mentioned). Extension systems, pesticide policy experts.
Management Facility 
Health
8. Special Program for Research The intended beneficiaries are the poor and disadvantaged populations affected by these diseases.
and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (TDR)
9. Global Forum for Health The intended beneficiaries are the poor in developing countries, the governments and agencies enabled to 
Research provide more effective remedies, and the institutions whose capacity is reinforced by involvement in the 
research efforts.
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Intermediate: Those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS.
Nations Program on Ultimate: The next generation in Africa (in its entirety) and potentially in other regions.
HIV/AIDS)
11. Roll Back Malaria People suffering with malaria. Health systems burdened with malaria patients.
G l o b a l  T M  S t a t e m e n t s  o f  B e n e f i c i a r i e s  a n d  
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Principal benefits (intended and unintended)
The principal benefit that beneficiaries receive from the GEF is grant financing that complements a financing package that consists of loans/
credits and other resources. GEF is also the financial mechanism for three international conventions (on biodiversity, climate change, and persist-
ent organic pollutants), and the financing it provides helps recipient countries fulfill their responsibilities under these conventions. The GEF 
resources enable the Bank to provide a more complete array of financing instruments to our clients, in response to the specific nature of inter-
ventions and project objectives. This package of financing is critical to supporting mainstreaming in our clients’ sectoral development plans.
Despite scattered successes, providing modest-scale, narrowly targeted, and expeditious assistance for privately implemented biodiversity con-
servation has proven a significant challenge for international financial institutions, including the World Bank. The CEPF is a new strategy for 
project delivery that attempts to overcome typical obstacles and delay through a nontraditional set of working arrangements between the Bank 
and nongovernmental organizations. CEPF makes grants to the leading international, national, regional and local NGOs and other conservation-
oriented stakeholders in the world’s most critically threatened ecosystems in Bank client countries. It targets effective organizations in each 
ecosystem in order to strengthen their ability to alter the course of each eco-region’s degradation.
The principal benefits received by the (intermediate) beneficiaries are the facilitating and networking functions of the program, particularly as it 
provides a neutral space for stakeholder interaction.
Small groups of farmers attend farmer field schools, learn the IPM methodology, and develop social cohesion; however, participants are few. 
There is some policy advice for subsidy policies to governments.
The ultimate benefit is poverty reduction, targeting the poorest of the poor, and promoting sustainable economic development. Beneficiaries 
enjoy a life without a disabling or disfiguring disease, restoring their human dignity.
At various levels, these comprise: products, information, development of prioritization methodology for use at country level, developing country 
involvement in international research efforts, and data on health research flows to guide decisionmakers. The October 2000 Global Forum 
prompted The Lancet’s decision to form a commission to address the 10/90 gap in health research publication. The commission will look at 
practical ways in which the journal can encourage researchers from resource-poor countries to submit their work, and also to participate in its 
peer-review process—an obvious boost to research capacity building, and an outlet for developing-country researchers’ voice in the research 
agenda.
Adequate funding, the creation of a favorable environment to execute culturally appropriate programs of their own design, better care and treat
ment (for the infected), better support (for the affected), and averted HIV infection (for those not infected).
Increased prioritization of malaria—resulting in better trained staff, more cost-effective protocols, increased education on malaria, access to bed
nets, access to effective antimalarials.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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12. Stop TB • Low-income developing nations and middle-income countries with high TB burdens, as well as industrialized 
nations with TB risks.
• Those working to control TB, develop new tools or related challenges (HIV/AIDS) (drug supply) 
in all nations.
• TB patients and populations at risk—ultimate beneficiaries.
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines The ultimate beneficiaries of GAVI’s efforts are the children, women, and men in the poorest 74 countries of 
and Immunization the world. National governments also benefit from direct support for their immunization infrastructure. To date, 
36 countries across all regions of the Global South are destined to receive vaccines and support for immunization 
services. Intermediate beneficiaries also include the partners—national governments, U.N. agencies, the World 
Bank, the private sector, bilateral governments, foundations, and others—who benefit from the enhanced 
collaboration that the GAVI umbrella/coordinating mechanism permits.
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program The ultimate beneficiaries of our activities are poor people living in developing countries and lacking adequate 
access to safe and affordable water and sanitation services.
Works through intermediate clients (governments and civil society) as illustrated in results framework.
15. Energy Sector Management The intermediate beneficiaries come in many shapes and sizes: government policymakers and planners, utility 
Assistance Program officials, administrators in bilateral aid programs, consultants and consulting firms, academics, and World 
Bank staff.
The ultimate beneficiaries are primarily poor energy consumers in developing countries who consume dirty energy 
inefficiently and spend up to 20% of their income on meeting their energy needs—if they have access to modern 
energy at all.
16. Consultative Group to Assist The ultimate beneficiaries of CGAP are the poor, including microentrepreneurs and very poor households, who lack 
the Poorest access to formal credit and savings services. The vast majority of these ultimate beneficiaries are poor women.
Local microfinance institutions that directly provide financial services to the poor at the community level are the 
intermediate beneficiaries. CGAP member donors and governments also benefit from activities aimed at improving 
donor microfinance practices and the policy environment for microfinance.
17. The Information for People are the ultimate beneficiaries of infoDev activities.
Development Program (infoDev) In the process, private and public organizations also benefit through an increase in their capacity to utilize ICT.
18. Public-Private Infrastructure The intended ultimate beneficiaries of PPIAF’s activities are citizens of developing countries, particularly the 
Advisory Facility poorest, who benefit from improved access to more reliable infrastructure services.
Intermediate beneficiaries include recipient economies as a whole, with PPIAF technical assistance helping to 
increase the efficiency of key sectors, supporting private investment and freeing up public resources for other 
social purposes. The World Bank Group is also an intermediate beneficiary since PPIAF supports and complements 
the Bank’s programs, including through better donor coordination.
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Principal benefits (intended and unintended)
• Access to new resources (either directly from Stop TB or through partners participating in Stop TB).
• Rapid sharing of news, best practices.
• Recommendations or priority investments, assistance in development and implementation of strategic plans.
• Political attention to problems.
• Direct access to drugs.
The principal benefits that the ultimate beneficiaries receive are protection against killer diseases through vaccination, such as the routine 6 
vaccines, and improved systems for immunizations. In addition, GAVI and the Vaccine Fund have made it possible for poor countries to protect 
their citizens against diseases for which newer and more expensive vaccines have been purchased, e.g., Hepatitis-B and Haemophilus influenzae 
type b (Hib). GAVI and the Vaccine Fund have also stimulated policy dialogue related to immunizations. Another GAVI benefit is that gaps—
financial and technical—in relation to immunizations are being identified and addressed. A perhaps unintended benefit has been increased focus 
on health outcomes, as GAVI has adopted a performance-based (so-called “shares”) approach. GAVI has also had the unintended effect of 
encouraging new and creative strategies that bring financing down to the community level. Thus, exploring new and creative financing 
schemes has been an important spinoff of the larger GAVI partnership.
Increased access to safe water and sanitation is the primary benefit. This is not achieved through direct investment and construction, but rather 
through support and development of suitable legal, regulatory, policy, and implementation practices in client countries.
In addition, intermediate (and some ultimate) clients also gain access to an international body of experience on sector reform and development 
issues. This benefit flows both ways. Many clients have become strong advocates for sector reform and for new ideas, both in their own coun-
tries and in a wider international arena.
Primarily knowledge that helps define choices. The beneficiaries receive quality, unbiased, and relevant advice based on emerging global best 
practice in technical, economic, and institutional options to meet their energy needs while minimizing impacts on the natural/social environment 
and on public financial resources.
The principal intended benefit that the poor, the ultimate beneficiaries, receive from CGAP’s activities is access to credit, savings and other 
financial services that are necessary to help them manage their daily lives. These financial services enable the poor to increase their income, 
build their businesses, reduce their economic vulnerability, and improve the well-being of their families in the process. Through this access to 
financial services, poor people, especially women, become more confident and assertive and have more control of their lives. They are better able 
to access public services and better able to negotiate and even confront the structures of patriarchy and inequity that traditionally have kept them
poor.
Beneficiaries have increased access to critical information directly related to their well-being (education, health, government, environmental 
management, etc.). They also directly benefit from the project by increasing their capacity to use ICT tools. infoDev projects also have positive 
unintended consequences such as the development and dissemination of local cultural content.
PPIAF’s interventions are directed to achieving the following benefits for client governments:
• Improve the coverage, quality, and efficiency of water, power, transport, and telecom services, particularly to the poorest, with consequential 
benefits for the broader economy and the delivery of specific services, including health and education.
• Reduce the fiscal and managerial burden on governments.
• Expand the flow of private investment (including foreign direct investment).
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Other participating donors also benefit through improved coordination of their programs and activities in this area, 
and by gaining access to global best practices in the design of such interventions. The private sector, both locally 
and internationally, benefits through expanded business opportunities.
19. Cities Alliance The ultimate beneficiaries are:
• The urban poor (particularly in the case of slum upgrading)—poor people living in slum settlements and typically 
lacking basic urban services and security of tenure
• Poor cities (particularly in cases of city development) committed to implementing improved urban service 
delivery, economic development, and governance in a financially sustainability manner 
Intermediate clients (national/state governments, associations of local authorities and civil society) as illustrated 
in the results framework.
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund Conflict-affected communities and their governments and institutions.
21. Understanding Children’s Work The main beneficiaries of this program are countries where child labor is a major problem. 
Intermediate beneficiaries also include multilateral, bilateral, and national agencies working on the issue.
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework Direct beneficiaries are those countries that participate.
23. Financial Sector The ultimate beneficiaries of the FSAP are developing countries vulnerable to financial instability, and particularly 
Assessment Program their poor inhabitants, who are usually the hardest hit by financial crisis.
In the intermediate term, the beneficiaries include all partners involved, particularly the World Bank, IMF, and other 
multilateral banks; bilateral agencies; and development organizations working on strengthening financial systems. 
The aim of the FSAP is to create a systematic mechanism for providing countries with the technical assistance 
support they need to build more robust financial systems.
24. Financial Sector Reform Least developed countries in the first instance, but ultimately, all low-and middle-income countries, as the tools, 
& Strengthening strategies, experiences, and (eventually) funding become available and applicable to them.
Also, the Bank itself is a beneficiary to the extent that the IF has prompted a much closer cooperation between 
various central units themselves (DECPG, PREMEP, DECRG) and among these and the operations.
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• PPIAF seeks to achieve these results in a way that helps: connect local policymakers with lessons of international best practices in a fast- 
moving area; build consensus for often politically sensitive reforms; and support local capacity building.
Additional benefits flow because PPIAF has been designed to respond very quickly to urgent requests for assistance. Donor resources are also 
structured to reduce any potential suspicion of conflicting commercial or other interests.
PPIAF also benefits participating donors by:
• Mobilizing and leveraging resources
• Exploiting the expertise and economies of scale and scope available from an integrated, multidonor work program
• Promoting the exchange of lessons of experience among sectors, regions, and donors
• Facilitating coordination between bilateral and multilateral programs addressing the same concerns.
In the case of the urban poor, increased access to safe water and sanitation and to security of tenure are the primary benefits. This is not 
achieved through direct investment and construction, but rather through support and development of suitable legal, regulatory, policy, and imple-
mentation practices in client countries.
In the case of poor cities, benefits include improved urban governance and management, increased economic growth and employment, and 
sustained poverty reduction.
Intermediate (and some ultimate) clients also gain access to an international body of experience on sector reform and development issues. This 
benefit flows both ways. Many clients have become strong advocates for sector reform and for new ideas, both in their own countries and in a 
wider international arena.
Rebuilding lives and livelihoods through critical activities such as demobilization, start-up support for land mine clearance, reintegration of IDPs 
and refugees, essential infrastructure rehabilitation, community development activities, reconciliation activities, etc.
It is essential to increase capacity building within countries, and this objective remains an integral part of the project. The UCW project aims to 
strengthen appropriate capacity for data analysis and use of information by helping identify and direct resources where they are most needed.
Specific activities to support this goal include the development of the Training Packet on Child Labor, hosting the Field-Based Needs 
Assessment/Regional Workshop, supporting research through direct funding to local researchers, promoting inclusion of child labor panels on 
economic symposiums, and the UCW Working Paper series.
By including researchers, field personnel of other agencies working on the issue, and others from developing countries in the listed activities, the 
UCW project will help develop a global network of experts, built on the principles of increased knowledge-sharing and effective use of limited
resources.
Enhanced capacity of the financial sector to intermediate growth, and improved access to financial services—two goals intended for countries 
that participate in the FSAP—benefit the full spectrum of people living in those countries.
The benefits received include: improved coordination of donor activities (which will prevent duplication of efforts), better leveraging of resources, 
increased resources devoted to financial sector strengthening, greater diversity of technical capacity drawn from many resources, improved 
coordination of technical assistance delivery, and a simple, straightforward mechanism for accessing the resources to address vulnerabilities or 
target development opportunities.
Thorough analysis of the impediments to their integration into the world economy and how to tackle these and the poverty impact. Capacity 
building, technical assistance, greater voice in international forums. A more focused and better-coordinated approach by development agencies in 
their assistance strategy.
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Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network Intended beneficiaries of the program include developing-country researchers, who receive support to undertake 
their work; the broader development community, which gains access to this research; and policymakers, who can 
use both the research and the increased local pool of expertise.
26. World Links for Development Intended direct beneficiaries are secondary students, teachers, pre-service teacher trainees, and education 
policymakers in World Links countries.
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Principal benefits include support for research undertaken in developing and transition countries, building networks with researchers in other 
countries, and access to expert commentators on their work. In addition, policymakers receive more locally produced research and a greater pool 
of research expertise to draw upon.
These individuals will receive improved and expanded educational opportunities and develop skills in effective use of information and communi-
cation technologies. In the medium to long term, employment prospects for participating youth are expected to be enhanced, and graduates will 
be able to help their countries compete in a global economy in the Information Age. It is also expected that the program will contribute to narrow-
ing the in-country gap between the “information haves” in urban areas and the “information have-nots” in rural areas, as two-thirds of World 
Links schools are public schools located outside capital cities, a share that is expected to grow with DGF funding. Finally, in FY02, a new 
training initiative designed with FY01 DGF funds to disseminate lessons learned from three years of World Links Program experience will 
benefit senior-level policymakers in ministries of education, telecommunications, and finance.
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High Substantial
Clear and coherent program objectives and strategies 5 11
MLF, ProCarbFund, GEF, TDR, Global Forum, 
Stop TB, GAVI, PPIAF UNAIDS, RBM, ESMAP, 
CGAP, CA, FIRST, WSP, GDN
A structured set of quantitative or qualitative indicators 4 8
MLF, ProCarbFund, CGIAR, TDR, UNAIDS, RBM, 
Stop TB, GAVI ESMAP, WSP, PPIAF, GDN
Systematic and regular processes for data collection 8 7
and management CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, Global Forum, RBM, 
TDR, UNAIDS, GAVI, PPIAF Stop TB, CA, GDN, 
World Links, UCW
Independence of program-level evaluations 5 7
TDR, UNAIDS, RBM, CEPF, Global Forum, 
Stop TB, IF CGAP, ESMAP, CA, 
WSP, PostConFund
Effective feedback of evaluations on the strategic 5 6
focus of the program TDR, RBM, WSP, GEF, UNAIDS, Stop TB, 
CA, IF ESMAP, CGAP, PostConFund
Effective feedback of evaluations on program-level 6 6
organization, management, and financing TDR, RBM, WSP, CGIAR, UNAIDS, Stop TB, 
ESMAP, CA, IF CGAP, PostConFund
Note: The five criteria are based upon OED’s standards of best practice as identified in OED’s report, Monitoring and Evaluation Plans in Staff Appraisal Reports Issued in Fiscal Year 1995 (OED 1995),
pp. 23–24.
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Not enough information No program-level 
Modest Negligible or too early to rate evaluations yet
10
CGIAR, GWP, GIF, 
infoDev, IF, UCW, PostConFund, 
World Links, CEPF, FSAP
4 9 1
Global Forum, CGAP, GEF, CEPF, GIF, FIRST
CA, World Links infoDev, PostConFund, 
FSAP, IF, GWP, UCW 
8 1 2
CEPF, WSP, ESMAP, CGAP, GWP FIRST, FSAP
infoDev, PostConFund, 
GDN, GIF, IF
8 6
CGIAR, GEF, MLF, GWP, ProCarbFund, GAVI, PPIAF, 
GIF, infoDev, UCW, GDN FSAP, FIRST, World Links
6 3 6
CGIAR, MLF, CEPF, Global Forum, ProCarbFund, GAVI, PPIAF, 
GIF, infoDev, GDN UCW, GWP FSAP, FIRST, World Links
5 2 1 6
GEF, MLF, CEPF, GWP, GIF GDN ProCarbFund, GAVI, PPIAF, 
Global Forum, infoDev FSAP, FIRST, World Links
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
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International/regional 
Program organizationsa Industrial countries Developing countries
Environment & Agriculture AfDB, Arab Fund for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, 
1. Consultative Group on International Economic and Social Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Agricultural Research Development, AsDB, FAO, IDB, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, 
(62 members) IDRC, IFAD, OPEC Fund for Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
International Development, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
UNEP, UNDP, World Bank Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Philippines, Romania, Russia, 
Switzerland, U.K., U.S., South Africa, Syria, Thailand, Uganda
Executive Council FAO, IFAD, World Bank Denmark, Germany, Japan, China, Colombia, South Africa,
(21 members) Netherlands, U.S. Syria, AARINENA
2. Global Environment Facility UNDP, UNEP, World Bank 55 GEF member countries 129 GEF member countries
GEF Assembly (implementing agencies)
(174 members and 3 
implementing agencies)
GEF Council UNDP, UNEP, World Bank 14 GEF member countries 18 GEF member countries
(32 members) (observers)
3. Multilateral Fund for the UNIDO, UNDP, UNEP, 
Implementation of the Montreal World Bank 55 MLF member countries 129 MLF member countries
Protocol (implementing agencies) (non Article 5 countries) (Article 5 countries)
Meeting of the Parties
(187 members and 4 
implementing agencies)
Executive Committee UNIDO, UNDP, UNEP, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Bolivia, Burundi, China
(14 members and 7 observers) World Bank France, Japan, Hungary, U.S. El Salvador, India, Jordan, 
(observers) (Japan, U.S., and one EU Mauritius, Saint Lucia
member are permanent; (rotating members; 
others rotate) India and China rotate 
among themselves) 
4. Prototype Carbon Fund World Bank Canada, Finland, Japan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
(23 participants—6 public sector Netherlands, Norway, Sweden Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech 
and 17 private sector—and Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
27 host countries) Honduras, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Poland, Romania, South 
Africa, Thailand, Uganda, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam
P h a s e  2  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s :  M e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  G o v e r n i n g  a n d  E x e c u t i v e  B o d i e s
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Civil society 
Foundations Commercial private sector organizationsb Others
Ford, Kellogg, Rockefeller, – – –
Syngenta
Rockefeller Private Sector NGO Committee Chair CDC Chair, CBC Chair, 
Committee Chair (temporarily vacant) TAC/SC Chair, GFAR Chair
– – – –
– – – –
– – – –
– Industry representatives NGOs Treasurer (observer)
(observers) (observers)
– BP Amoco, Chubu Electric Power – –
Company, Chugoku Electric Power 
Company, Deutsche Bank, 
Electrabel, Fortum OYJ, Gilde 
Strategic Situations BV, Gaz de 
France, Kyushu Electric Power 
Company, MIT Carbon Fund, 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Norsk Hydro 
ASA, RWE AktiengesellschaftShikoku, 
Statoil, Tohuku Electric 
Power Company, 
Tokyo Electric Power Company
(Table continues on the following page.)
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International/regional 
Program organizationsa Industrial countries Developing countries
Participants’ committee (7 members) – Four representatives One observer
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund GEF, World Bank Japan –
Donor Council
(5 members)
Working Group GEF, World Bank Japan –
(5 members)
6. Global Water Partnership UNDP Canada, Denmark, Finland, Regional partnerships in 
(12 financial partners and 9 France, Germany, Luxembourg, Southern Africa, West Africa, 
regional partnerships) Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K. China, Southeast Asia,
Southern Asia, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the 
Mediterranean, South America, 
and Central America. 
Consulting Partners UNDP, World Bank, France, Germany, –
(10 members) WMO, WSSCC Netherlands, Switzerland
(cosponsors) (financial partners)
Steering Committee UNDP, World Bank, France, Germany, –
(22 members) WMO, WSSCC Netherlands, Switzerland
(cosponsors) (financial partners)
7. Global Integrated Pest FAO, UNEP, UNDP, Netherlands, Norway, –
Management Facility World Bank Switzerland
Governing Group (cosponsors) (donors)
(4 cosponsors, 3 donors, and 
3 specialized technical partners)
Health
8. Special Program for Research and UNDP, World Bank, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Training in Tropical Diseases WHO, UNICEF (2003) Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Joint Coordinating Board (cosponsors) Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Cameroon, China, Cuba, 
(30 members) Switzerland, Sweden, India, Kuwait, Laos, 
U.K., U.S. Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand
9. Global Forum for Health Research GFATM, TDR, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, India, National Institute 
Foundation Council World Bank, WHO Norway, Sweden, Switzerland of Medical Research (Tanzania), 
(19 members currently out of Academy of Sciences (Russia)
maximum of 20)
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
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Civil society 
Foundations Commercial private sector organizationsb Others
– Three representatives – –
MacArthur – Conservation International –
MacArthur – Conservation International –
Ford – – –
– – World Water Council Executive Secretary, 
(permanent observer) Technical Committee Chair
(ex officio)
– – World Water Council 12 individuals, including 
(permanent observer) the chair, from public 
agencies and NGOs in 
industrialized and developing 
countries
Executive Secretary, 
Technical Committee Chair
CERES/Locustox Foundation – GTZ/University of Hannover, –
CABI Bioscience
– – – –
Gates, Rockefeller – Asian-Pacific Research and –
Resource Center for Women, 
Center for Research and
Advanced Studies, International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Associations, 
(Table continues on the following page.)
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International/regional 
Program organizationsa Industrial countries Developing countries
10. UNAIDS (Joint United Nations ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Bahamas, Brazil, Burundi, 
Program on HIV/AIDS) UNICEF, UNODC, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, 
Program Coordinating Board World Bank, WFP, WHO Spain, Sweden India, Kenya, Myanmar, 
(35 members) Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, 
(cosponsors) Russian Federation, Tunisia, Zambia
11. Roll Back Malaria UNICEF, World Bank, WHO Italy, Netherlands, U.S. Ghana, D.R. Congo, 
Steering Committee (cosponsors) India, Senegal, Zambia
(15 members currently, out of a 
maximum of 17)
12. Stop TB UNICEF, World Bank, WHO Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Brazil, India, Mexico, 
Coordinating Board (cosponsors) U.K., U.S. Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines
(27 members)
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines UNICEF, World Bank, WHO Canada, Centers for Disease India, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
and Immunization Control (USA), Institut Serum Institute of India
GAVI Board Pasteur (France), U.K.
(16 members)
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program UNDP, World Bank Australia, Austria, Belgium, One country-level member, 
Program Council Canada, Denmark, France, representing the national 
(19 members) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, advisory committees
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K.
15. Energy Sector Management UNDP, World Bank Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Two members at large 
Assistance Program Finland, France, Germany, from countries receiving 
Consultative Group Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, ESMAP assistance
(16 members) Switzerland, U.K
16. Consultative Group to Assist AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, IDB, Australia, Belgium, Canada, –
the Poorest IFAD, ILO, UNCDF, UNDP, Denmark, EU, Finland, 
Council of Governors World Bank France, Germany, Italy, 
(28 members) Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
U.K., U.S.
Executive Committee AsDB, World Bank Norway, U.K. –
(10 members)
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
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Civil society 
Foundations Commercial private sector organizationsb Others
International 
Planned Parenthood Federation, 
International Women’s 
Health Coalition
Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy, – AAL HDN Organizacion –
Hong Kong AIDS Foundation de SIDA-Redla+
(Argentina), Abraco (Portugal),
Faith, Hope and 
Love (Guatemala),
Ghana HIV/AIDS Network
– Bayer Pharmaceutical Health and Nutrition Executive Secretary of RBM 
International Secretariat, The Executive 
Director of the Global 
Fund for ATM
Soros – Six chairpersons of the Six regional representatives
working groups
Gates, UN Foundation, Wyeth-Ayerst Global Sierra Leone Red Cross –
Vaccine Fund Pharmaceuticals
– – One member from a strategic One internationally recognized 
partner organization water supply and 
sanitation expert
UN Foundation – – –
Argidius, Ford – – –
Ford – World Council of Four microfinance 
Credit Unions industry leaders
(Table continues on the following page.)
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International/regional 
Program organizationsa Industrial countries Developing countries
17. The Information for Development World Bank Australia, Belgium, Canada, –
Program (infoDev) Denmark, EU, Finland, 
Donors’ Committee France, Germany, Ireland, 
(18 members) Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K., U.S.
18. Public-Private Infrastructure UNDP, AsDB, World Bank Canada, France, Germany, –
Advisory Facility Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Program Council Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
(12 members)
19. Cities Alliance AsDB, UNEP, UN-Habitat, Canada, France, Germany, Brazil
Consultative Group World Bank Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
(18 members) Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S.
Steering Committee UN-Habitat, World Bank Two representatives: –
(5 members) Netherlands, U.K.
Social Development & Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund World Bank – –
(1 member)
21. Understanding Children’s Work ILO, UNICEF, World Bank Canada, Finland, Netherlands, –
Steering Committee Norway, Sweden, U.K.
(3 members and 6 donors)
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework ITC, IMF, UNCTAD, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 49 least-developed
Steering Committee UNDP, World Bank, WTO EU, Finland, France, countries
(70 members) Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K., U.S.
Interagency Working Group ITC, IMF, UNCTAD, Two donor representatives Two LDC representatives
(10 members) UNDP, World Bank, WTO,
OECD/DADC (observer)
23. Financial Sector Assessment IMF, World Bank – –
Program
Liaison Committee
(2 members)
24. Financial Sector Reform & IMF, World Bank Canada, Netherlands, –
Strengthening Initiative Switzerland, U.K.
Governing Council Sweden (observer)
(6 members)
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
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Civil society 
Foundations Commercial private sector organizationsb Others
– – –
–
– – – –
– – International Union of –
Local Authorities, Metropolis, 
World Federation of United Cities, 
World Association of Cities and 
Local Authorities Coordination 
– – One representative –
– – – –
– – – –
– – – –
– – – –
– – – –
– – – –
(Table continues on the following page.)
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
2 2 4
P h a s e  2  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s :  M e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  G o v e r n i n g  a n d  E x e c u t i v e  B o d i e s  ( c o n t i n u e d )
T a b l e  H . 1 3
International/regional 
Program organizationsa Industrial countries Developing countries
Steering Committee IMF, World Bank Canada, Netherlands, –
(6 members) Switzerland, U.K.
Sweden (observer)
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network UNDP, World Bank – 11 regional research 
Governing Body networks of developing and 
(18 members) transition economies
26. World Links for Development World Bank – Senegal
Governing Board
(14 members)
a. Refers to international and regional public sector organizations only, including the World Bank.
b. Broadly defined to include NGOs, umbrella organizations, professional and trade associations, and the like that are independent of the state or
governments and without a commercial, for-profit motive.
A N N E X  H :  C A S E  S T U D Y  S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M AT I O N
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Civil society 
Foundations Commercial private sector organizationsb Others
– – – –
– – International Economics 2 members-at-large
Association, International (academia)
Political Science Association, 
International Sociological 
Association
– Accenture, DireqLearn, – 5 private entrepreneurs
Goldman Sachs, 
J. P. Morgan Chase,
NJTC Venture Fund,
Schools Online, 
Talal Abu-Ghazaleh & Co
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World Bank
Program expenditures World Bank DGF allocation
(US$ millions) share (%)a (US$ millions)
Program FY03 (CY02) FY04 (CY03) FY03 FY04 FY03 FY04 FY05
Environment & Agriculture
1. CGIAR 380.0 395.0 14 13 50.0 50.0 50.0
2. GEF 447.2 387.53d 0.0 0.0 – – –
3. MLF 156.3 158.6e 0.0 0.0 – – –
4. Prototype Carbon Fund 5.01 6.5f 0.0 0.0 – – –
5. CEPF 21.79 20.19 27.6 35.0 4.00 4.00 4.00
6. GWP 7.75 10.3 5.3 0.0 0.40 – –
7. GIF 1.3 n.a. n.a. 0.0 – – –
Health
8. TDR 47.8 47.4g 5.5 5.5 2.50 2.50 2.00
9. Global Forum for 2.47 3.07 25.9 33.3 0.70 1.00 6.78h
Health Research
10. UNAIDS 95.0i 95.0 4.2 4.2 4.00 4.00 4.00
11. RBM 11.4 11.4 13.2 13.2 1.50 1.50 1.00
12. Stop TB 10.5 20.8j 15.4 15.4 0.70 0.70 0.70
13. GAVI 101.3 124.1k 1.5 1.2 1.50 1.50 1.50
Infrastructure
14. WSP 12.4 13.6 6.1 10.9 – – –
15. ESMAP 6.01 7.58 12.6 7.0 – – –
16. CGAP 13.2 12.67 51 55.5 6.73 6.33 5.52
17. infoDev 8.90 6.07 21.9 n.a. 3.00 2.54 2.50
18. PPIAF 14.5 15.61 7.8 10.5 2.00 2.00 2.00
19. Cities Alliance 9.67 13.25 27.6 9.8 1.70 1.70 1.70
Social Development 
& Protection
20. Post-conflict Fund 13.7 10.6 9.72 99.0 14.3l 9.22 8.00
21. UCW 0.39 0.56 0.0 6% – 0.10 0.10
Trade & Finance
22. IFn 2.71 n.a. 25.2 24.5 0.63 0.80 -
23. FSAP 10.51 10.46p 45 45 – – –
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World Bank Other donor
BB contributionb contributions
(US$ millions) (US$ millions)
FY03 (CY02) FY04 (CY03) Trustee FY03 FY04 How program is fundedc
– – World Bank 307.1 331.0 Annual donor contributions, either directly to centers or 
channeled through Bank-administered trust funds
– – World Bank 673.44 805.46 Triennial donor replenishments
– – UNEP 142.4 142.1 Triennial donor replenishments
Funds transferred from UNEP to Bank’s ozone TF for 
Bank expenditures
– – World Bank 6.50 23.18 Public and private sector participant contributions
– – CI 10.5 7.35 Annual donor contributions
– – GWP 7.16 9.31 Annual donor contributions
n.a. – FAO n.a. 1.3 Annual donor contributions
– – TDR 45.2 45.0 Annual donor contributions
– – Global Forum 2.0 2.3 Annual donor contributions
– – UNAIDS 91.0 91.0 Annual donor contributions
– – WHO 9.90 9.90 Annual donor contributions
– – WHO, 3.85 3.83 Annual donor contributions to WHO-administered trust 
World Bank funds
Supplementary Bank-administered TF created in FY03 
for specific activities
– – GAVI, Vaccine Fund 2.10 13.0 Annual donor contributions to these two trust funds
1.00 n.a. World Bank 15.5 12.12 Annual donor contributions
1.03 0.55 World Bank 7.14 7.27 Annual donor contributions
– – World Bank 6.19 6.27 Annual donor contributions
0.76 .09 World Bank 10.98 n.a Annual donor contributions
– – World Bank 23.5 17.15 Annual donor contributions
– – World Bank 15.6 13.67 Annual donor contributions
– – World Bank 0.27 0.33 Annual donor contributions
– – UNICEF 2.04m 1.5 Annual donor contributions
.760 n.a. UNDP,  2.77 4.30 Annual donor contributions to a UNDP-administered TF
World Bank Funds transferred from UNDP to Bank-administered TF 
for Bank expenditures
4.71 4.73 – 5.8 5.73 World Bank and IMF administrative budgets
(Table continues on the following page.)
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World Bank 
Program expenditures World Bank DGF allocation
(US$ millions) share (%)a (US$ millions)
Program FY03 (CY02) FY04 (CY03) FY03 FY04 FY03 FY04 FY05
24. FIRST .78 2.58 3.2 2.25 .50 0.40q 0.60
Information & Knowledge
25. GDN 10.9 8.67 51.1 54.7 4.70 4.45r 4.00
26. World Links 3.96 6.52 28.6 21.4 1.52 1.51 _
Total
a. Of total financial contributions to the program in each year.
b. BB contributions to the program itself, not including BB resources for oversight and liaison activities.
c. The process by which the program is financed.
d. Includes GEF administrative expenses, fees to implementing agencies, and investment grants to recipient countries.
e. Includes MLF secretariat expenses, fees to implementing agencies, and investment grants to recipient countries.
f. Includes administrative expenses plus capital grants (emissions reductions) of $295,000 in FY02 and $918,000 in FY03.
g. $95.2 million for the 2002/03 biennium.
h. Out of the total for Global Forum, $1.5 million goes to GAVI. Additionally,  funding is channeled through the Global Forum umbrella to several other partnerships as well, 
including, for example, IAVI. OED was not able to obtain an updated breakdown of this distribution for FY05. 
i. $190.0 million for the 2002/03 biennium.
j. Includes $5.6 million disbursed by the Global Fund facility in 2002 and $15.6 million in 2003.
k. Includes $14.5 million expended by GAVI and $109.6 million disbursed by the Vaccine Fund.
l. Includes a special $5 million allocation for East Timor.
m. Finland, Sweden, and Norway contributed $2.04 million in FY01 for the 2001-03 triennium.
n. Program expenditures include Bank’s in-kind contributions.
o. In-kind contributions, not included in the official IF expenditures reported by UNDP, the administrator of the principal IF trust fund.
p. Based on a World Bank share of 45 percent. Precise IMF expenditures on FSAP are not known.
q. For FY02. The FY03 application was deferred to FY04 and the uncommitted FY02 balance was carried over to FY03.
r. For the core program only, not including the 1.18 m for the Education Research Component in GDN.
s. Does not include in-kind contribution of $45,115.00 for FY04. 
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World Bank Other donor
BB contributionb contributions
(US$ millions) (US$ millions)
FY03 (CY02) FY04 (CY03) Trustee FY03 FY04 How program is fundedc
– – World Bank 15.1 17.4 Annual donor contributions to Bank-administered trust 
funds
– .40s GDN 6.30 3.65 Annual donor contributions to GDN-administered trust 
funds
– – World Links 3.8 5.5 Annual donor contributions to World Links-administered 
trust funds
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High Substantial
Transparencya 6 9
GEF, TDR, GAVI, PPIAF, CA, FSAP MLF, ProCarbFund, CEPF, UNAIDS, 
Stop TB, ESMAP, CGAP, GDN, World Links
Clarity of roles and responsibilitiesb 9 9
ProCarbFund, TDR, RBM, Stop TB, GEF, MLF, CEPF, GWP, WSP, ESMAP, 
GAVI, PPIAF, CA, FSAP, FIRST CGAP, PostConFund, World Links
Fairness to immediate client c 3 14
ESMAP, PPIAF, CA CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, 
GWP, TDR, UNAIDS, RBM, 
Stop TB, GAVI, UCW, IF, FSAP, GDN
Accountability to donorsd 17 7
CGIAR, MLF, ProCarbFund, CEPF, GEF, GWP, GIF, WSP, 
TDR, Global Forum, UNAIDS, RBM, infoDev, PostConFund, UCW
Stop TB, GAVI, ESMAP, CGAP, PPIAF, 
CA, FSAP, FIRST, World Links
Accountability to developing countries 5 6
GEF, MLF, TDR, RBM, Stop TB CGIAR, ProCarbFund, UNAIDS, 
WSP, CGAP, CA
Accountability to scientists/professionals 4 9
MLF, ProCarbFund, TDR, Stop TB CGIAR, Global Forum, GAVI, ESMAP, 
CGAP, PPIAF, CA, FSAP, GDN
a. Transparency – the program provides both shareholders and stakeholders with the information they need in an open and transparent manner (such as accounting, audit, and 
nonfinancial but material issues).
b. Clarity of roles and responsibilities – of the various officers and bodies that govern and manage the program, as well as clear mechanisms to modify and amend the governance and management 
of the program in a dynamic context.
c. Fairness – the program does not favor some immediate clients over others (such as Bank staff, central governments and their agencies, municipal agencies, local authorities, private service providers, 
NGOs, and community organizations).
d. Accountability – of the program for the exercise of power over resources to each of the four groups of stakeholders listed here, “other stakeholders” being those not otherwise mentioned with a 
legitimate interest in the activities of the program (such as international NGOs).
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Not enough information or 
Modest Negligible too early to rate
9 1 1
CGIAR, GWP, Global Forum, RBM, GIF FIRST
WSP, infoDev, PostConFund, IF, UCW
6 2
CGIAR, Global Forum, GIF, UCW
UNAIDS, infoDev, IF, GDN
4 1 4
GIF, WSP, CGAP, infoDev CEPF Global Forum, PostConFund, 
FIRST, World Links
2
IF, GDN
7 7 1
GIF, Global Forum, GAVI, CEPF, GWP, infoDev, FIRST
ESMAP, PPIAF, World Links, GDN PostConFund, UCW, IF, FSAP
8 4 1
GEF, CEPF, GWP, UNAIDS, GIF, PostConFund, UCW, IF FIRST
RBM, WSP, infoDev, World Links
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
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Program Regarding the program
Environment & Agriculture
1. CGIAR
2. Global Environment Facility None.
3. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
4. Prototype Carbon Fund As a pilot activity, the Prototype Carbon Fund does not endeavor to compete 
in the emission reductions market; it is restricted to $180 million and is 
scheduled to terminate in 2012.
5. Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund Initially, the closing date for the program was June 30, 2006, but the Financing 
Agreement for the Fund was amended on February 11, 2003, to extend the 
closing date of the program to June 30, 2010. The current partners are still 
trying to identify additional organizations to join the partnership and 
effectively extend the life of the program.
6. Global Water Partnership
7. Global Integrated Pest Management Facility Facility was initially established for a five-year period in 1997. No clear exit 
strategy is in place.
Health
8. Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) Because of the time needed to develop new therapeutic agents and the 
specific epidemiological features of some diseases, the TDR has an open-
ended time frame. However, through its internal review mechanism, the 
program “exits” from diseases once tools have become available. Examples 
include leprosy, onchocerciasis, and, to a large extent, schistosomiasis.
9. Global Forum for Health Research The Global Forum for Health Research works to correct the 10/90 gap in health 
research. The 10/90 gap has also been highlighted by the Commission on 
Microeconomics & Health. The program is a long-term endeavor.
10. UNAIDS HIV/AIDS will require a long-term commitment from the UNAIDS co-sponsors 
and partner organizations.
11. Roll Back Malaria Sustaining program activities will be accomplished through increasing 
recognized credibility of the institution and of the activities, which will 
increasingly be supported by other financiers and beneficiary countries 
themselves.
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Regarding the Bank’s involvement in the program Regarding DGF funding
None given
Not applicable
Last project completion reports are scheduled to be finalized in 2011. Not applicable
Not applicable
Currently, the Bank’s involvement, as outlined in the Memorandum 
of Understanding, is effective until 30 days after delivery of a 
final report, which is due June 30, 2006, or a later date (because the 
Donor Council may determine that continuation of program 
beyond this time frame is necessary).
DGF support has been key in getting the GWP off the ground. There is an 
application for a fourth year of funding from the DGF.  
The Bank’s resources are key in paying the costs of the Technical Commit-
tee and the Secretariat.
FY02 is the final year of DGF funding.
Bank has exited financially, but continues to be a cosponsor. Not applicable
The Bank has been involved with TDR since its inception, with a Window 1
full understanding that combating the diseases that the program 
targets will take a long-term commitment.
The Bank has been involved in the Global Forum since its inception, Window 1
as a financial donor, catalyst of additional resources, and legitimizing 
force. Moreover, the Bank channels some of its funds through the 
Global Forum for use by other programs and organizations. Presently, 
there is no strategy for Bank disengagement from the program.
The Bank has been involved in UNAIDS from the outset. It is a Window 1
co-sponsor of the program and appears as a permanent member on 
the UNAID Program Coordinating Board. There is presently only a 
partial strategy for Bank disengagement from the program—based 
on partnership progress as monitored by the sector board.
The Bank has been involved in RBM since the program’s inception as a Request to move from Window 2 to Window 1a
co-sponsor and appears as a permanent member on the RBM Governing 
Board. There is presently no stated disengagement strategy on behalf 
of the Bank regarding the program.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Program Regarding the program
12. Stop TB The Stop TB Initiative was launched as a two-year activity, 1999–2000. 
However, as its work program has evolved, its partners have agreed that 
it must continue to operate at least until 2005.
13. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization Childhood immunization is seen to be the most cost-effective health 
intervention. There exist 33 million annual unvaccinated children, and the 
program has strong financial support from the Gates Foundation and other 
international agencies, including UNICEF and the Bank, to not only immunize, 
but also establish the basic infrastructure to carry out child immunization 
programs for the near future.
Infrastructure
14. Water and Sanitation Program There is no exit strategy. The program will operate as long as there are 
participating partners and available funding. Termination is not anticipated. 
All funding is ongoing. Some donors renew annually, and some make 
longer-term commitments.
15. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program There is no exit strategy. The program will continue as long as there is a 
demand for it.
16. Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest The present mandate of CGAP extends through FY08. The Council of Governors 
will conduct a review in FY06 in order to determine post-FY08 options for CGAP 
(disband, expand, or transform).
17. Information for Development Program (infoDev) The program is expected to continue as long as new knowledge will have to 
be generated about ICT for development and poverty reduction.
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Regarding the Bank’s involvement in the program Regarding DGF funding
The Bank has been involved in Stop TB since the program’s inception Request to move from Window 2 to Window 1.b
and appears as a permanent member on the Stop TB Coordinating 
Board. There is no stated disengagement strategy on behalf of the 
Bank regarding the program.
The Bank has been involved in GAVI since the program’s inception as Window 1
a co-sponsor and permanent member on the GAVI Board. There is no 
stated disengagement strategy on behalf of the Bank.
No changes in the Bank’s role are anticipated. Not applicable
INFVP does not have a strategy for Bank disengagement from ESMAP. Not applicable
The two sponsoring vice presidencies, FSE and INF, have no strategy CGAP is a Window 1 program.
at the present time for completely disengaging the Bank from CGAP. When CGAP was established, it was with the full expectation that the Bank 
However, they are supporting CGAP’s current strategy of reducing its would remain the majority funder because of CCAP’s global mandate. Since 
financial dependence on the Bank (amount requested from DGF is CGAP’s integration into the DGF, non-Bank member donors have contributed 
reduced by $400,000 every year). financially, and some have increased their funding commitments in order to 
meet the DGF’s 15% funding criterion. This has resulted in an increase in 
ownership among other members and a more balanced treatment of all 
donors, even though the Bank remains CGAP’s largest donor.
CGAP’s present strategy is to gradually reduce the share of DGF funding in 
its total budget by $400,000 annually, by seeking increased contributions 
from other member donors as well as new member donors. Accordingly, the
DGF allocation declined from $7.5 million in FY01 to $7.13 million in FY02, 
to $6.73 million in FY03, and to $6.33 million in FY04.
In the light of the new ICT Strategy endorsed by the Bank’s Executive infoDev is a DGF Window 1 program.
Directors on September 6, 2001, there is an increasingly closer integration Following a modification of the strategy, focusing essentially on “flagship” 
of infoDev activities with World Bank Group operations. Indeed, the activities and knowledge dissemination, support from the DGF, at the 
experience of recent years has shown that in the fast-changing environ- requested level, is expected at least through FY08 in order to ensure conti-
ment of ICT, a program like infoDev is uniquely placed to respond quickly nuity in implementing the new strategy and provide other donors with suffi-
to new opportunities and challenges. cient assurance of the World Bank Group’s commitment to the objectives 
It is expected that an independent external review will be conducted in and strategy of infoDev.
FY05 to assess the relevance of infoDev, its objectives, and the value of 
housing infoDev within the Bank. Based on the results of the external 
review, an exit strategy will be considered and activated, if deemed 
appropriate.
(Table continues on the following page.)
A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  O F  G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
2 3 6
S t a t e d  E x i t  S t r a t e g i e s  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  
( c o n t i n u e d )
T a b l e  H . 1 6
Program Regarding the program
18. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
19. Cities Alliance Cities Without Slums Action Plan has a 20-year target. All funding is ongoing, 
some donors renewing annually, some with longer-term commitments.
Social Protection & Development
20. Post-conflict Fund
21. Understanding Children’s Work Phase I was completed in August 2003. Phase II is scheduled to end 
January 2007.
Trade & Finance
22. Integrated Framework
23. Financial Sector Assessment Program
24. FIRST
Information & Knowledge
25. Global Development Network GDN’s objectives are to support the generation and sharing of knowledge 
and also to support the capacity of research in developing countries. There is 
no stated exit strategy for the program, and it proposes to continue as long as 
there is a demand for it.
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Regarding the Bank’s involvement in the program Regarding DGF funding
Based on informal discussions with existing and potential donors, it is PPIAF is a DGF Window 2 program. Current DGF funding is until end 
our assessment that PPIAF could not credibly continue without World FY04. Other donors have made commitments for continued funding for at 
Bank financial and substantive participation. The Bank brings intellectual least 3 years.
leadership, convening power, and much-needed independence to the PPIAF recognizes the budget constraints faced by DGF at this time. While a 
commercially important topic of private participation in infrastructure. medium-term commitment from the Bank is important, it is recommended 
From the Bank’s perspective, there is a view that PPIAF’s work on the that the Window 1 status for PPIAF should not be open-ended. It is sug-
challenging issues facing private participation in infrastructure remains gested that a fixed-term commitment would be more appropriate, with an 
a high priority and that Window 1 funding is the only way to signal its independent evaluation to consider exit from Window 1 at the end of that
commitment under the current rules. period. One option could be to have a period that runs in parallel with 
PPIAF’s three-year life cycle.
The INF vice president has no plans to exit the partnership at any time in Cities Alliance is a Window 2 program.
the foreseeable future. The VPU launched the partnership, as part of its Current DGF funding is through the end of FY04, all of which is for core 
renewed engagement with UN-HABITAT, and through VPU leadership has funds. The program disengaged from DGF funding for financing the Cities 
helped position the partnership to become a focal point for the Bank’s Alliance Secretariat in FY03. All Secretariat costs are now covered by donor 
interventions in urban development. The partnership’s Cities Without trust funds.
Slums Action Plan (now established as MDG Target 11) sets impact 
targets to be achieved by 2020, leaving the partnership only 17 years to 
achieve the goals. The Bank’s urban-sector strategy recognized that the 
challenges facing cities require coordinated and concerted efforts, beyond 
what any single development agency could provide alone.
All individual activities financed by the PostConFund have a specific grant 
period. The FY02 DGF application continues a 3-year strategy to maintain 
DGF support while the potential for donor support is tested.
Expected that donors will eventually support the program independently. In 
three years (by FY04), trade policy reforms should have been mainstreamed 
in Bank work in LDCs.
Not applicable.
The proposed disengagement strategy is for the FSSF Governing Council, 
beginning July 2003, to evaluate two options for disengagement from DGF 
Window 2 funding: (1) bilateral donor funding of the entire budget or (2) 
DGF Window 1 funding.
The Global Development Network launched with the strong personal lead- Window 1
ership of the president of the World Bank. Since then, the program has
spun off from the Bank and is independent. However, the program still
receives Bank funding, as the president of the Bank has assured the fund-
ing of GDN’s administrative costs up to US$1.8 million per year through 
2006. The Bank is also represented on the program’s governance board.
(Table continues on the following page.)
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Program Regarding the program
26. World Links for Development The World Links program started as a pilot initiative of the Bank, explicitly 
designed to have a 3-year lifespan in each country in which it operated. 
It was expected that, after 3 years, participating countries would be able to 
continue and expand activities on their own. Presently, the program has 
evolved into an independent legal organization and continues its work on a 
long-term basis with no disengagement strategy.
a. As a Window 2 program, Roll Back Malaria will soon hit the three-year limit for Window 2 programs and will have to exit from DGF funding in FY04 if current rules are applied rigidly. The program has 
requested extending DGF support to the RBM Malaria Partnership beyond FY04 until FY15 under Window 1. In its most recent annual report, DGF indicates that RBM is considered important for Bank’s 
clients by the sector boards and networks because it is closely aligned with sector priorities and essential for sustaining Bank engagement. Thus, the sector board is expected to request longer-term 
DGF support starting in FY05.
b. As a Window 2 program, Stop TB will hit the three-year limit for Window 2 programs and will have to exit from DGF funding in FY04. It has been proposed that DGF financing continue at a level that 
enhances the Bank’s active engagement with key agencies and demonstrates Bank commitment to overcoming obstacles to meeting the MDGs (#8). In its most recent annual report, DGF indicates that 
Stop TB is considered important for Bank’s clients by the sector boards and networks because it is closely aligned with sector priorities and essential for sustaining Bank engagement.
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Regarding the Bank’s involvement in the program Regarding DGF funding
World Links was a pilot initiative of the president of the World Bank. Window 2. Scheduled to exit in FY04.
Since then, the program has spun off from the Bank and is independent. 
However, the program still receives Bank funding, and the Bank is 
represented on the program’s governance board. A Memorandum of 
Understanding is proposed between the program and the World Bank 
Institute to delineate the roles and responsibilities relating to the 
activities of the program.
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Too early 
High Substantial Modest Negligible to ratea
An international consensus currently 13 7 6
exists that global collective action is CGIAR, GEF, MLF, ProCarbFund, GIF, CEPF, PPIAF, 
required. GWP, TDR, UNAIDS, Global Forum, UCW, IF, GDN,
RBM, Stop TB, ESMAP, CGAP, World Links
GAVI, WSP, CA, infoDev, FIRST
PostConFund, FSAP
The program is currently known to 4 11 6 2 3
be adding value to achieving the CGIAR, TDR, GEF, MLF, CEPF, GIF, GWP, infoDev FIRST, GDN, World 
Bank’s development objectives of UNAIDS, GAVI ProCarbFund,  Global Forum, Links
poverty alleviation and sustainable RBM, Stop TB, CGAP, UCW, IF
development. WSP, ESMAP, 
PPIAF, CA, 
PostConFund, 
FSAP
The Bank’s presence is currently 10 6 6 4
catalyzing other non-Bank resources CGIAR, GEF, MLF, UNAIDS, GAVI, CGAP, PostConFund, 
for the program. ProCarbFund, WSP, ESMAP, infoDev, IF, GDN, GWP, GIF, UCW
CEPF, TDR, PPIAF, FIRST World Links
Global Forum, RBM, 
Stop TB, CA, FSAP
The Bank is currently playing up to 9 7 5 3 2
its comparative advantages at the CGIAR, GEF, MLF, CEPF, RBM, Global Forum, GWP, GIF, FIRST, FSAP
global level.a ProCarbFund, Stop TB, GAVI, CGAP, UCW, GDN, infoDev
TDR, UNAIDS, WSP, IF, PostConFund
ESMAP, PPIAF, CA World Links
The Bank is currently playing up to 3 6 11 4 2
its comparative advantages at the MLF, PPIAF, CA GEF, ProCarbFund, CGIAR, GIF, TDR, CEPF, GWP, FIRST, FSAP
country level.b PostConFund, Global Forum, CGAP, 
UNAIDS, WSP, RBM, Stop TB, infoDev
ESMAP GAVI, UCW, IF, 
GDN, World Links
a. Global mandate and reach, convening power, and mobilizing financial resources.
b. Multisector capacity, expertise in country and sector level analysis, in-depth country-level knowledge.
O E D  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  C u r r e n t  L e v e l  o f  
C o n s i s t e n c y  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  P r o g r a m s  w i t h
t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o m m i t t e e  C r i t e r i a  f o r
t h e  B a n k ’ s  E n g a g e m e n t  i n  G l o b a l  P r o g r a m s
T a b l e  H . 1 7
2 4 1
I. Introduction
Management welcomes this report, which has
been read with great interest and stimulated
constructive discussion throughout the Bank.
This second phase of OED’s major study of global
programs reinforces the actions management
put in train in response to OED’s Phase 1 find-
ings. Core findings of this Report continue to un-
derscore the Bank’s important global role, and
the need for more systematic attention to the
management of global programs. OED’s rec-
ommendations pick up many of the same themes
as the first report and focus on (i) strategic
framework; (ii) linking financing to priorities; (iii)
selectivity and oversight of the global program
portfolio; (iv) governance and management of
individual programs; and (v) OED’s role in eval-
uation.1
II. Management Comments
Overall, management agrees with the direction
of this report, which deepens core messages of
the Phase 1 Report (OED 2002c), such as the
need for strong and proactive management by
the Bank of this important area of activity. Man-
agement has taken these Phase 1 recommenda-
tions on board, moving forward in a range of key
areas. A Global Programs and Partnerships (GPP)
Council has been established as the senior man-
agement committee overseeing the strategic di-
rection and operational policies for Bank
involvement in GPPs.2 The Council develops the
Bank’s vision and priorities for its engagement
in GPPs; reviews VPU portfolios and the Bank’s
institutional partnerships; and oversees criteria
for selection and evaluation of GPPs, including
governance structures, risk management, exit
strategies, and best practice. A new GPP Group
was established in mid-2003, led by a Director re-
porting to the Vice President, Concessional Fi-
nance and Global Partnerships. The GPP Group
provides primary support for the GPP Council.
It works closely with Trust Funds, LEG, SFR, and
OPCS as well as a network of GPP liaisons in
VPUs managing GPP portfolios, and provides
advice to task teams in the Networks and Regions
undertaking new partnership initiatives at the Re-
gional or global level. The GPP Group is en-
gaged in a substantial work program in
developing business processes, portfolio man-
agement approaches, governance models, and
good evaluation procedures for GPPs, and it
manages the annual Development Grant Facil-
ity allocation process. A community of best prac-
tice on global programs and partnerships is
developing across the Bank. 
Lessons that are Consistent with the Phase 1 Report.
Broadly speaking, OED’s ambitious Phase 2 re-
port is consistent with—and will in future in-
form—ongoing work on GPPs. The report
emphasizes the importance of GPPs as devel-
opment vehicles, and notes the Bank’s global role
and comparative advantage in this field. It rein-
forces the point that GPPs are now a significant
business line for the Bank and strongly rein-
forces the Bank’s existing work program on
GPPs, in particular the need for a more system-
atic approach to managing the GPP portfolio, and
the implementation of more rigorous selectivity
and oversight of GPPs from birth to final evalu-
ation. The report’s recommendations follow the
major areas of work we are undertaking to im-
prove GPP processes and management, such as
fostering more effective links between global
programs and country programs, and instituting
best practice approaches to the GPP lifespan—
design, financing, governance, selectivity, ap-
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proval, evaluation, exit/reauthorization, and port-
folio assessment. Management’s response to
OED’s recommendations is outlined in more
detail in the Annex.
Assessment of Specific Programs. Moving from the
big picture assessment to specific programs,
however, management has found less consensus
among operational units involved in managing
global programs about the report’s conclusions
and categorizations. Moreover, the overall con-
clusions of the report do not reflect equally the
situation of each individual global program, nor
do they apply in all cases to the wider popula-
tion of partnerships in which the Bank is in-
volved. Management will carefully consider the
relevance of the recommendations to global
programs but will consider each case individu-
ally going forward. 
Case Studies. Some program-specific differences
of view relate to the process surrounding the
background papers covering the 26 case studies
underlying OED’s Report. These studies have
been discussed in draft among OED, Bank staff,
and other partners, given the necessity of pro-
viding those being evaluated with the opportu-
nity to provide further information or alternative
analysis. Some differences in opinion among
partner organizations are to be expected given
the diversity and evolving nature of global pro-
grams. However, since individual programs are
cited in support of broader conclusions, man-
agement notes that it will need to take account
of the outcome of these important ongoing OED
discussions with partners and program man-
agers on the case studies as it follows up on the
findings of the OED review.
Global Programs Versus Country Programs. One area
where greater clarity would be helpful is the
issue of determining which activities should be
pursued via global programs versus through
country programs. This difficult question is
placed by OED sometimes in the context of
strategic selectivity (global programs should sup-
port global public goods whose externalities cut
across many countries) and sometimes as a pro-
gram design and financing issue (GPPs should ex-
hibit subsidiarity to country programs). Man-
agement agrees with OED that a more tailored
perspective may be appropriate. Some global
programs relate not to global public goods but
are inherently multi-country programs that de-
liver country-level services that may be best or-
ganized at the sector or thematic level in order
to benefit from cross-country knowledge shar-
ing, specialized expertise, economies of scale,
and targeted resource mobilization. The activi-
ties and objectives of a global program should be
assessed for the benefit to developing countries
and value in leading to poverty reduction, and
different approaches to ensuring global to coun-
try linkages are possible. 
Governance of Global Programs. The OED review
brings out some of the difficulties with regard to
the governance of global programs. On the one
hand (in Chapter 5), OED findings suggest that
global programs have governance structures in-
dependent from the Bank, to avoid the poten-
tial for even the perception of dual loyalties and
to bring in new knowledge and perspectives.
Yet (in Chapter 4) OED recommends stronger
linkage of global programs to country programs
and indicates that programs where Bank staff im-
plement the global program activities often have
better country operational linkages. Reviewers
in the Bank found merit in both the arguments
for independence and for Bank country team in-
volvement, but also thought it was unrealistic to
expect a governance structure to do both things
well. OED recognized these tensions and pointed
out that its findings present a challenge for the
Bank. Management believes that decisions about
governance arrangements should reflect best
practice and sound principles—but be driven
by the needs of specific programs, particularly in
terms of their activities and objectives. 
III. Conclusion
OED has provided valuable insights for strength-
ening the Bank’s management of its involve-
ment in global programs. Management broadly
agrees with four key recommendations: that a
strategic framework is needed for global pro-
grams; that financing for global programs should
be allocated with due regard to priorities and
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value added for developing countries; selectiv-
ity and oversight of the Bank’s global program
portfolio should continue to be strengthened;
and that individual program design should reflect
good practice with respect to governance, man-
agement, results orientation, and evaluation. As
noted earlier, the review has already fed into
the work of the Bank on global programs.
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OED Recommendation Management Response
Strategic Framework
In consultation with U.N. partners, donors, devel-
oping countries, and other partners, management
should develop a global strategy that is approved by
the Board and periodically updated, and that:
• Exploits the Bank’s comparative advantage as a mul-
tisectoral development financing institution with a
global reach and strong capacity in policy analysis.
• Gives greater prominence to alleviating poverty and to
addressing global public policies that adversely affect
developing countries’ prospects for rapid, sustainable,
poverty-reducing growth.
• Fosters stronger linkages between global programs
and the Bank’s Regional and country operations and en-
sures that global programs add value beyond what
the Bank can accomplish through partnerships at the
country level alone.
Linking Financing to Priorities
Management should develop a financing plan for
high-priority programs, particularly for those pro-
viding genuine global public goods of benefit to the
poor. This requires:
• Identifying long-term global public goods programs of
benefit to the poor that are currently under-funded, and
using the Bank’s convening power to mobilize additional
resources for such programs, such as a global health
research and product development network for the
diseases of the poor.
• Improving the current criteria and procedures relating
to the DGF’s Window 2 in order to foster a more rational
and informed approach to funding “venture capital” pro-
grams in which the DGF provides initial but not long-
term financial support.
• Developing a policy on the roles and uses of trust
funds in the context of the overall Board-approved
global strategy and financing plan for global programs.
Management agrees that the Bank’s role in global programs
must be based on a strong strategic framework. This must
reflect the Bank’s corporate strategic agenda as agreed with
the Board and in the Development Committee, and consider
the Bank’s role in supporting country programs. The strate-
gic framework will draw on OED’s findings, a review of the
Bank’s ongoing portfolio of global and regional partnership
programs, as well as discussions in international fora on
global issues and priorities. The Bank will consult with key
partners in this process. The strategic framework paper will
be presented to the Board before the end of FY05. 
Management broadly accepts this recommendation and
agrees that financing for global programs—which is often
mobilized in a program-specific fashion—should be con-
sidered in a more systematic fashion by the Bank and its part-
ners. The GPP Group will raise the issue of financing
modalities and strategies with the GPP Council during FY05.
Management believes that the first explanatory bullet on
global public goods is primarily about selectivity and is the
responsibility of the GPP Council. While global programs (as
defined in the OED report) can often be useful delivery
mechanisms for global public goods, important positive ex-
ternalities are delivered by country programs as well.
The Window 2 “venture capital” approach needs to be re-
visited. The GPP Group will sponsor a discussion within the
GPP Council on the DGF criteria during FY05. 
With regard to trust funds, work is already under way on
the Bank’s trustee role and relevant financial manage-
ment issues in global programs. As already discussed with
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Selectivity and Oversight of the Global Program
Portfolio
Management should establish approval, oversight,
evaluation, and exit/reauthorization criteria and pro-
cedures for global programs so that Bank-supported
global programs routinely demonstrate value added
to the Bank’s mission of sustainable poverty allevi-
ation. This includes:
• Improving, streamlining, and clarifying the eligibility and
approval criteria for Bank selectivity and grant support,
and instituting a two-stage approval process for global
programs at the concept and appraisal stages.
• Sharpening and more rigorously applying the sub-
sidiarity criterion for approval and grant support.
• Separating Bank oversight from the management chain
responsible for implementation of each global pro-
gram; and for Bank staff serving on the governing bod-
ies of global programs, clarifying their roles,
responsibilities, and accountabilities by means of stan-
dard terms of reference and training.
• Allocating Bank budgetary resources for oversight,
and for Network anchor and Regional staff to access
on a competitive basis to operationalize the content of
global programs in the Bank’s Regional operations.
• Instituting clear, well-planned, and well-executed reau-
thorization/exit processes, and ensuring that programs
that exit from the Bank have an independent identity,
with accountability for results and a good chance of suc-
ceeding.
the Board, management believes that trust funds should
be shifted over time into broader programmatic vehicles. 
Management broadly accepts this general recommenda-
tion and is moving ahead on a number of areas. 
During FY04, management established a GPP Council as
the senior management committee overseeing the strate-
gic direction and operational policies for Bank involve-
ment in GPPs. Its role is to develop the Bank’s vision and
priorities for its engagement in GPPs; review VPU portfo-
lios and the Bank’s institutional partnerships, and oversee
criteria for selection and evaluation of GPPs, including
governance structures, risk management, and exit strate-
gies. A GPP Group was established in CFP to support the
Council, and its work program includes developing busi-
ness processes, portfolio management approaches, gov-
ernance models, and good evaluation procedures for GPPs.
GPPs will be integrated into the Bank’s operational pro-
cedures and management information systems, including
a two-stage review process involving an appraisal for new
programs and exit/reauthorization processes for ongoing
ones. The new system will go online during FY05. 
Management agrees that subsidiarity is an important prin-
ciple; its implementation in global and country programs
can be complex. Both management and OED have recog-
nized that some global programs deliver country-level
services. Multi-country programs may be best organized
at the sector or thematic level in order to benefit from cross-
country knowledge sharing, specialized expertise,
economies of scale, and targeted resource mobilization, but
will depend on close coordination with the Bank’s coun-
try programs, particularly when the Bank is the imple-
menting agency. 
Separation of Bank oversight from the management chain
responsible for implementation depends critically on the
nature of the program itself; in some cases this may im-
prove governance, while in others, the Bank is effectively
responsible for implementation, and clarity of management
accountability should be maintained. An additional and
growing issue is the Bank’s role as trustee for global pro-
grams and the fiduciary responsibility of the Bank in such
OED Recommendation Management Response
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OED Recommendation Management Response
Governance and Management of Individual 
Programs
Management should work with its global partners
to develop and routinely apply to all Bank-supported
global programs universally accepted standards of
good governance, management, results-orientation,
and evaluation. These include:
• Legal status and/or written charters as appropriate.
• Transparent selection criteria and processes for board
chairs and board members; clarifying their roles, re-
sponsibilities, accountabilities, and what constituen-
cies they represent; and ensuring that they have the
necessary authority to exercise strategic direction and
oversight of the program, its policies, and its budget-
ary resources. 
• Effective voice of the Bank’s client countries on the gov-
erning bodies of global programs to achieve better
balance between developed and developing countries. 
• Guidelines on conflicts of interests, on the roles of
NGOs and the private sector on governing bodies, and
on the roles and quality of advisory boards.
• Evaluation and audit designated as functions of the gov-
erning body not the management of the program, and
routinely made available to program financiers and
other stakeholders.
Evaluation
OED should include global programs in its standard
evaluation and reporting processes to the Board.
This includes:
• Working with the Bank’s global partners to develop in-
ternational standards for the evaluation of global pro-
grams. 
• Reviewing selected program-level evaluations con-
ducted by Bank-supported global programs (both in-
ternally and externally managed), much as OED reviews
other self-evaluations at the project and country levels.
cases. (This was not one of the topics covered in depth in
the OED review.) With regard to principles governing the
terms of reference for Bank staff serving on boards, man-
agement agrees, and the GPP Group, in coordination with
LEG, will develop these during FY05.
Management accepts this recommendation. The Bank is
working to influence positively the quality of governance
for global programs in which it is involved. Work is under
way to develop standard governance models to strengthen
transparency and provide more systematic approaches to
GPPs. At the same time, management notes that, while core
principles of good governance are essential to the design
and management of global programs, the wide diversity
of GPPs, the range of governance arrangements, the Bank’s
varied roles and level of responsibility for program imple-
mentation and other factors all require sensible, not me-
chanical, application of core governance principles program
by program. 
The diversity of global programs and the weight and in-
fluence of other stakeholders means that, in many cases,
the Bank can press for better standards of governance. As
one of many stakeholders, however, and in support of in-
creasing voice, the Bank alone cannot—and should not—
dictate the governance approach. 
This recommendation is primarily directed at OED, al-
though it has implications for the self-evaluation structure
discussed above. 
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On September 20, 2004, the Committee on De-
velopment Effectiveness (CODE) met to discuss
Addressing the Challenges of Globalization—An
Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s
Approach to Global Programs—Phase 2 Report. 
OED Evaluation Findings. OED conducted the eval-
uation of global programs in two phases. The
World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs: An
Independent Evaluation - Phase 1 was dis-
cussed at a CODE meeting on June 12, 2002. A
major global program case study, The CGIAR at
31, was discussed by CODE on April 23, 2003.
In March 2003, management updated the Board
about a number of organizational and proce-
dural changes. The Phase 2 report, based on
case studies of 26 global programs, has three dis-
tinguishing features. First, it looks across the
global programs to compare and draw cross-
cutting lessons with regard to the design, im-
plementation, and evaluation of global
programs. Second, it provides an overview of
the 26 case studies. Third, it focuses specifically
on the role of the Bank in the global program
partnerships. OED’s recommendations pick up
many of the themes presented in the Part 1
Report and cover the following areas: (i) strate-
gic framework; (ii) linking financing to priori-
ties; (iii) selectivity and oversight of the global
program portfolio; (iv) governance and man-
agement of individual programs; and (v) OED’s
role in evaluation.
Management Comments. Overall, management
agrees with the direction of the report, and
noted that many actions were put in train since
the OED’s Phase 1 report, such as the estab-
lishment of Global Programs and Partnership
(GPP) Council and Group. Management under-
stands that the ongoing work on GPP is consis-
tent with the Phase 2 report, and agrees that (i)
financing should be allocated with due regard to
priorities and value added for developing coun-
tries; (ii) selectivity and oversight should con-
tinue to be strengthened; and (iii) that individual
program design should reflect good practice
with respect to governance, management, re-
sults orientation, and evaluation. Management
committed to present a strategic direction paper
on GPP which will report on the state and fo-
cusing of the portfolio, and on the strategic view
defining the Bank’s comparative advantage in this
field.
Key Outcomes. Members broadly commended
OED for a comprehensive and coherent report
on an intrinsically challenging evaluation, and ap-
preciated the pragmatic Draft Management Re-
sponse (MR). There was broad agreement on the
issues elicited by OED. In some areas there ap-
pears to be a difference of opinion between
OED and management. With management’s offer
to come back to the Board with a strategic frame-
work in the second half of FY05, speakers felt that
the difference had narrowed. The discussion
evolved around the following issues: (i) the need
for a stronger strategic framework for the Bank’s
involvement in global programs; (ii) selectivity
and oversight of the Global Program Portfolio;
(iii) exit strategy; (iv) governance; and (v) eval-
uation. Among the specific issues raised during
the Committee meeting were:
Global Strategy. Many speakers agreed with
OED’s recommendation that in consultation
with U.N. agencies, donors, developing coun-
tries, and other partners, management should
develop a global strategy that is approved by the
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Board and periodically updated. These speak-
ers also welcomed management’s intention to
prepare a paper on the strategic directions of
the Bank’s involvement in global programs.
They stressed that the paper should be pre-
pared in consultation with Stakeholders, in-
cluding developing and developed country
partners. They emphasized that the strategic
framework paper should not result in another
bureaucratic layer and that it should be very re-
sults-oriented. Management expressed its com-
mitment to results orientation, and to do
consultation with other partners at the pro-
gram level and at the corporate level. A speaker
said that in his view the Bank’s comparative
advantage is in financing and implementing
measures for addressing global issues, rather
than in defining the global agenda, which is
better left to the UN. Another speaker noted
that donor coordination is a Bank role. Man-
agement responded that the Bank’s distinctive
advantage for participation in global programs
is its financial and technical capacity as well as
country expertise and presence.
Selectivity of the GPP. Some speakers said that the
Bank is involved in too many GPPs and may be
spreading its resources too thinly and losing the
focus on its main mission. They were joined by
other speakers in stressing that a better process
is needed to select new global programs, to jus-
tify the existing ones, and to merge overlapping
programs in order to take advantage of
economies of scale—i.e., integrating adminis-
trative structures. Management agreed with this
observation, but indicated that some caution is
needed because the Bank is just one of many
partners and players in GPPs, sometimes a minor
one. Speakers indicated that the four selectivity
criteria endorsed by the Development Commit-
tee are a good starting point, with some aspects
to be clarified. Establishing sound results-based
frameworks and enhancing the monitoring of
program quality and results with effective per-
formance indicators would foster increased se-
lectivity. Several members broadly supported
the need for prioritization of programs, con-
centration on feasible regional and country ini-
tiatives that directly address the local needs,
benefit the poor, and improve the investment
climate. Other speakers said that the Bank should
focus its interventions on global issues relevant
to its core mandate and should keep the clients’
needs at the forefront of its decisionmaking. It
was also mentioned that global programs must
be based on country ownership, be consistent
with the country’s priorities, and avoid being
supply driven. A speaker noted that having case
studies completed before the Phase 2 Report
discussions would have been helpful.
Oversight of GPP. With respect to OED’s recom-
mendation that Bank oversight should be sepa-
rated from the management chain responsible
for implementation of a global program, the
committee expressed a diversity of opinions.
Several speakers acknowledged that some
progress had been made to improve oversight,
but more needed to be done, and therefore
agreed with the recommendation. Others agreed
with management that it is not always practical
or beneficial to separate oversight from the man-
agement chain. The issue should be addressed
on a case-by-case basis in their view. In this re-
spect management noted that the Bank engages
in several ways with its development partners, in-
cluding through a multiplicity of governance
structures of Global Programs, which include
board and oversight structures. Several speakers
suggested that the Board should play a more
proactive role in overseeing the Bank’s involve-
ment in global programs, including reviewing the
recommendations of the GPP Council.
Exit Strategy. Several speakers stressed the im-
portance of a strategy that allows the Bank to exit
global programs in a way that ensures sustain-
ability and integration into country development
programs. An accountability structure should
also be in place. A few speakers noted that the
DGF’s “two-window” approach helped to im-
prove program exit management. A speaker said
that the GPP Council should have greater influ-
ence on the decision to continue or exit from
global programs.
Governance of Programs. Several speakers agreed
with OED’s recommendation that the client
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countries should have an effective voice on the
governing bodies of the global programs. They
suggested that the Bank could help to address
this challenge by promoting country ownership,
encouraging the participation of civil society,
improving overall transparency and accounta-
bility, and strengthening the demand orienta-
tion of global programs. Several speakers said
that the GPP Council should take a more proac-
tive role in establishing and promoting stan-
dards of good governance and management of
all Bank-supported global programs. Speakers
noted that the identification of financing plans
requires a clear Bank internal governance system
that defines the use of financing mechanisms
(trust funds, global funds, Bank resources) and
differentiation of windows (DGF, administrative
budget, Bank-administered trust funds). Others
cautioned that the convergence of funds to
global programs should not create a crowding
out of funds to other relevant poverty reduction
initiatives. They also stressed that the activities
of the global programs should not simply sub-
stitute what the Bank would provide through its
normal operations.
Evaluation. Several speakers endorsed OED’s sug-
gestion that global programs should be included
in its standard evaluation and reporting processes
to the Board, but stressed that OED should be
pragmatic and cost-conscious in this regard. A
speaker stressed the importance of working with
partners to develop a common framework for
evaluating global programs to avoid overbur-
dening countries with multiple evaluation re-
quirements.
Next steps. The Draft MR will be revised based on
the comments and suggestions raised during the
discussion, including the linkage to the strategic
paper that management has committed to pres-
ent for Board discussion in a few months time.
The OED Phase 2 report will be made publicly
available after the CODE discussion together
with management’s response and a summary of
the Chairman’s report. The 21 case studies un-
dertaken in parallel with the Phase 2 Report will
be disclosed to the public after the disclosure of
the Phase 2 Report. If members desired, one or
more of these studies could be discussed either
at CODE or at the CODE Subcommittee meeting.
A N N E X  J :  C H A I R M A N ’ S  S U M M A R Y:  C O M M I T T E E  O N  D E V E L O P M E N T  E F F E C T I V E N E S S  ( C O D E )
2 4 9
Pietro Veglio
Acting Chairman

2 5 1
Foreword
1. The case studies that have been disclosed are in
the OED Working Paper series at <http://www.world
bank.org/oed/gppp/>
Prologo
1. Los estudios de casos que se difundido se en-
cuentran en la serie de Documentos de Trabajo del DEO
en <http://www.worldbank.org/oed/gppp/>
Avant-propos
1.  Les études de cas qui ont été publiées sont
reprises dans la série de documents de travail de
l’OED sur le site web www.worldbank.org/oed/gppp/
Chapter 1
1. The Bank’s capacity to give grants to global pro-
grams is limited by its earnings, which come from
two major sources—the returns on its investments and
the interest charges on its loans to borrowing coun-
tries. In FY05, the DGF, which is funded from the
Bank’s gross administrative budget, allocated $50 mil-
lion to CGIAR, $76 million to 46 other global pro-
grams, $34.5 million to 10 regional programs, and
$19.8 million to the Institutional Development Fund.
While the Bank’s governors may also authorize ex-
ceptional grants out of the Bank’s net income, these
are typically for country programming trust funds
such as West Bank and Gaza, Kosovo, and East Timor,
and most recently for the Low-Income Countries
under Stress (LICUS) trust fund.
2. Nineteen of the 26 programs have had program-
level evaluations. For CGIAR, there were over 700 re-
ports.
3. Stakeholders are parties who are interested in
or affected, either positively or negatively, by the pro-
gram. Partners are a subset of the stakeholders. 
4. The phase 1 report (OED 2001d) details how
these programs were identified. The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) became
operational in January 2002 and thus is neither in-
cluded in the figures cited here nor reviewed in this
report.
5. These figures exclude HIPC and IFC trust funds.
The total funds held in trust by the World Bank Group,
including HIPC were US$7.1 billion at the end of
FY04.
6. GFATM Web site: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en 
Chapter 2
1. These expenditures refer to FY04 or to the most
recent fiscal (FY) or calendar year (CY) for which data
are available. See table H.1, “Phase 2 Case Study Pro-
grams at a Glance.” The quality and coverage of the
information on sources and uses of program funds vary
widely across programs and OED takes no responsi-
bility for their accuracy. See chapter 6 for further dis-
cussion of this issue.
2. While the arrival of GFATM has not changed
DGF allocations in any significant way, it has changed
the global shares of expenditures going to health and
environment, as indicated earlier.
3. The generic term “lending” is used to refer to
IBRD lending, IDA credits, and IDA grants. When the
lending instrument is critical to determine global and
country linkages with Bank operations, it is discussed
explicitly.
4. As shown in table H. 8, OED assessed the extent
to which each program has been undertaking each of
the 12 activities listed in figure 2.2. OED categorized
these 12 activities according to the Bank’s 4 strategic
foci for global programs: (1) providing global public
goods, (2) supporting international advocacy, (3) co-
ordinating multi-country programs and (4) mobilizing
substantial incremental resources, introduced by the
Bank in March of 2003. 
5. The Stop TB Partnership and the Global Forum
are also conducting similar activities for tuberculosis
ENDNOTES
and a few other diseases (in the case of the Global
Forum, through fostering public-private partnerships).
However, their financing for these activities is so small
at the global level that OED has not included them in
this category. Indeed, staff of both programs told
OED during consultations on the case studies that cur-
rent levels of funding for health research, including
their own, are too small.
6. In commenting on the draft phase 2 report,
Bank management acknowledged that, in practice, it
is difficult to differentiate CGIAR Center investment
activities that regular Bank instruments could support
from the so-called complementary investments (at
the country level that the countries or donors could
finance), because the two share common character-
istics irrespective of financing source. There is often
similarity between the activities of some CGIAR cen-
ters that the Bank finances out of DGF funds and ac-
tivities that the Bank could finance at the country
level out of loans and credits. This challenges the
subsidiarity principle that the Bank has correctly
adopted in the use of the limited DGF funds. 
7. See Annex C, table C.4, for the DGF subsidiar-
ity criterion not to “compete with, or substitute for,
regular Bank instruments.” The CGIAR Centers also
mobilize funding from local donors for country-level
activities that the donors think the countries are un-
able to carry out or to carry out well.
8. Health research in this report is broadly defined
to include the development of new vaccines and
drugs, surveillance, epidemiological research, test-
ing and monitoring responses to various interven-
tions, and multisectoral factors underlying the
containment of communicable and noncommunica-
ble diseases that particularly afflict the poor in de-
veloping countries.
9. GEF also finances regional-level investments.
10. Public intervention in immunization has been
justified on three grounds: (1) the spread and in-
complete course of treatment in the absence of pub-
lic provision; (2) some options (such as vector control
and information) are pure public goods; and (3) on
equity grounds, since immunization-preventable dis-
eases disproportionately affect the poor. While most
non-informational services involved are private (rival
and exclusionary), there are substantial social exter-
nalities associated with immunization. For example,
polio vaccination is unique because it exhibits both
characteristics of public goods. The oral vaccine allows
the virus to multiply in the child’s intestine and is re-
leased in much larger quantities in excreta. The at-
tenuated virus competes in the environment with the
wild virus, which is responsible for polio, making
benefits both non-rival and non-exclusionary, and
therefore a public good. See Hammer 1996.
11. The objective of the program is to position
the Bank through constructive engagement in such
countries where normal instruments and budget pro-
visions cannot apply. This includes countries that
have just emerged from a conflict, have no function-
ing government, have arrears on previous loans and
credits, or have just become new members. More
than 90 percent of the program’s expenditures have
been devoted to country-level investments—primarily
small-scale pilot reconstruction activities such as con-
flict mitigation, internally displaced persons and
refugees, rehabilitation of social sectors, start-up sup-
port for land mine clearance, economic recovery, and
private sector governance and capacity building. These
activities contribute to national peace and security, with
potential spillovers into regional and even global
peace. While global peace and security are global
public goods, OED has concluded that the magni-
tude and scope of most of the Post-conflict Fund’s ac-
tivities are too small and country-specific to have a
significant impact on global, or indeed even regional,
peace and security.
12. The Stop TB Partnership has a small drug fa-
cility associated with it, which is reported to have
treated 1.5 million patients. However, the financing for
the drug facility has been uncertain and does not in-
clude financing for infrastructure or for institutional
development of the type that large World Bank loans
and credits include. The Bank has committed $104 mil-
lion in a tuberculosis control project in China and
$142 million in India, compared with the TB Drug Fa-
cility’s annual expenditures of $16 million. UNAIDS
similarly provides training for monitoring and evalu-
ation coordination, but its financing is small relative
to the Bank’s $1.41 billion in commitments to
HIV/AIDS projects between 1990 and 2004.
13. GFATM was established in part because devel-
oping countries seemed unwilling or unable to bor-
row or to receive donor grants to address
communicable diseases on the scale the global com-
munity prefers. 
14. See table H.12 for the list of partners represented
on the governing bodies of the study programs.
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Chapter 3
1. As indicated in figure ES.1 in the summary, “pro-
viding global public goods” and “supporting interna-
tional advocacy” are direct references to the Bank’s
global public goods and corporate advocacy priorities,
as enunciated in the Bank’s Strategic Directions Paper
for FY02–04 (World Bank 2001b). 
2. OED 2002c, pp. 57-59. Reprinted in this volume
as Annex D.
3. The GEF, established in 1991, provides addi-
tional grant and concessional funding to meet the
agreed incremental costs of actions related to bio-
logical diversity, climate change, international waters,
ozone-layer depletion, land degradation, and per-
sistent organic pollutants. The GEF is the financial
mechanism for global conventions and protocols
under the United Nations in these areas. 
4. The MLF is the financial mechanism created in
1990 by the London Amendment to the Montreal Pro-
tocol to help developing countries meet the agreed
incremental costs of eliminating the production and
consumption of ozone-depleting substances (ODS).
5. The negotiations for the mechanisms were note-
worthy because they established the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibility” between
countries. The financing mechanisms were prece-
dent-setting because industrialized countries ac-
knowledged that developing countries should be
refunded the “full agreed incremental costs” of pro-
viding global environmental benefits.
6. In the health sector, for example, the World
Bank recently estimated that client countries would
need $15 to $30 billion more per year in 15 to 20 tar-
get countries to achieve the health MDGs by 2015,
whereas only $6.7 billion is spent annually on health.
Scientists have estimated that $30 billion is needed to
protect the world’s biodiversity in 21 hotspots covering
less than 2 percent of the world’s surface. GEF’s an-
nual disbursements of $400 million plus were dis-
tributed among six focal areas, including biodiversity. 
7. Some developing-country representatives to the
WTO are in favor of setting up a separate funding
mechanism to finance such activities in individual
countries. Donors, including the World Bank, do not
support this position. 
8. Reflecting the challenges of linking global pro-
grams with country operations, OED obtained quite
different responses to the IF case study from the team
in charge of the program in the Poverty Reduction
and Economic Management (PREM) Network and
from the Bank’s country economists. The latter ac-
knowledged the importance of integrating trade into
the overall development strategy of the least-developed
countries, but stress the competing demands on lim-
ited country capacity and on the Bank’s resources in
relation to other donors’ priorities, such as health and
education.
9. WHO indicated, for instance, that it spent the
equivalent of $10 million in support to developing-
country governments to prepare applications for
GFATM. 
10. OED’s 2002 Annual Review of Development Ef-
fectiveness also pointed out that the MDGs “represent
risks to the Bank and to the larger development com-
munity—risks posed by the cynicism that failure (or
only partial success) could engender. Such cynicism
is a danger, given that health and social sector goals
the development community had set for itself over the
past quarter century . . . remain either unattained or
only partially attained” (OED 2003c). 
11. See Annex C, table C.2.
12. Even evaluations of GEF have stressed the dif-
ficulties of mainstreaming GEF objectives in Bank
country operations.
13. The preparation of sector strategies is the re-
sponsibility of the Bank’s networks (ESSD, FSE, HDN,
INF, and PREM) and of the sector boards within each
network. Since the Bank created its thematic net-
works in 1997, Sector Strategy Papers have been ex-
pected to scan the universe of relevant players in
each sector and to discuss existing or potential part-
nerships, based on the Bank’s comparative advan-
tages. See table H.8 for the list of recent sector
strategies and OED sector studies relating to the case
study programs.
14. ESMAP activities in the 1980s contributed most
of the information on environmental issues in en-
ergy that influenced strategy and policymaking in the
early 1990s, and ESMAP staff wrote the Bank’s rural
energy strategy. 
15. OED interviews of Bank and IMF staff and AERC
current and past board members.
16. A recent variant on this case indicated that as
long as health programs bring external grant funds
with no domestic budgetary implications, the IMF
sees no issues. However, most such grant programs
also imply increased domestic expenditures, either
public or private or both. See Piot 2003.
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17. OED 2002b. Management has responded to
this criticism by observing that FSAP should still pro-
mote coherence to good practices even though “not
all countries can or should implement good practices
in all respects, at least in the near term”—an obser-
vation with which OED concurs.
18. Nonetheless, in chapter 2 OED classified these
2 programs among the 16 programs that provide pri-
marily national public goods, since their primary focus
is to strengthen country-level capacity in relation to
national financial markets. As in the case of other
programs, the programs’ current resources are too
small relative to the demand for their services to
make a significant global impact. 
Chapter 4
1. The guidelines were recently revised in No-
vember 2003. (See World Bank 2003b.)
2. These criteria are based on OED’s standards of
best practice, as identified in OED 1995, pp. 23–24. 
3. While the Global Water Partnership’s mission is
to support countries in the sustainable development
of their water resources, comprehensive integrated
water resource management is complex and intensely
political. Reforms require more than the “articula-
tion of prioritized, sequenced, practical, and patient
interventions.” Findings of the World Bank’s Water Re-
sources Sector Strategy (World Bank 2004).
4. This is an area in which the efforts of programs
such as UNAIDS may be bearing fruit. An agreement
announced at the 2004 spring meetings of the World
Bank and IMF noted that the major OECD donors
would improve coordination of their country-level
efforts to fight AIDS. Following an approach advo-
cated by UNAIDS, they would use a single action pro-
gram in each country for coordinating donations, a
single authority for receiving the donations, and a
single system for monitoring and evaluating how the
money is spent. 
5. It is generally agreed, for instance, that the trans-
action costs of organizing the Integrated Framework
for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF) have been
considerable. In interviews with OED, some have
wondered whether it is adding sufficient value to de-
veloping countries beyond what the Bank could have
done through economic and sector work on trade.
Others have argued that the Bank would not have been
able to devote an average of $300,000 per study from
its administrative budget to the analysis of trade in
small African countries. Moreover, IF’s other reported
benefits include increased demand from middle-in-
come countries for technical studies, which is bring-
ing more resources to the Bank’s research department
for trade-related research and putting the trade issue
back on the international agenda.
6. That is, programs such as GEF, MLF, and the Pro-
totype Carbon Fund, which finance investments sim-
ilar to those financed by the World Bank, have used
a results-based framework. Their projects have con-
crete objectives, specific schedules with discrete end-
points, well-defined responsibility for various aspects
of the project implementation, and well-identified
outcomes. Among programs providing country-level
technical assistance, ESMAP adopted a results-based
management framework, including output and out-
come indicators, in FY02, and WSP in FY04.
7. The 2002 evaluation of the Cities Alliance is
among the best program-level evaluations to date.
This assessed the relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of
the Cities Alliance during its first three years against
its four stated objectives, its three strategies, and the
six guiding principles laid out in its Charter, and fol-
lowed a results chain (inputs => outputs => out-
comes => impacts) so far as was practicable, given
the program’s recent provenance.
8. The 2003 UNICEF-managed external evaluation
of Understanding Children’s Work observed that,
when agreeing on an open project design, the par-
ticipating agencies did not apply their usual standards
of results-based management and did not include a
critical set of intermediate results and indicators. The
evaluator therefore could not assess the effectiveness
of the program results. The other two partners dispute
these findings. While the 2003 IF evaluation assessed
effectiveness, some of the program’s staff indicated
that the program would have benefited from a criti-
cal evaluation of the diagnostic studies in the IF eval-
uation.
9. On the other hand, CGIAR has historically been
an outlier in its lack of regular system-level evaluations
and of systematic mechanisms to reflect these evalu-
ations’ findings in design and implementation. 
10. In the case of research programs with long
gestation periods, such as in agriculture and health,
the pressure to demonstrate immediate results can dis-
tort resource allocation. In other cases, which do not
involve such long-term activities, demonstrating im-
mediate results may well be essential.
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11. In its first three years of operation up to June
30, 2003, PPIAF funded the drafting of 25 sets of laws
and regulations; facilitated the design of 30 public-pri-
vate infrastructure transactions, such as management
contracts, leases, auctions of telecom licenses, priva-
tizations, and concessions; made recommendations
leading to the implementation of 14 different sector
reform strategies in 11 countries; funded the creation
or strengthening of 20 regulatory institutions; and
funded training courses, primarily in the field of reg-
ulation, attended by more than 1,500 participants
(PPIAF data).
12. Conservation of biodiversity is difficult to meas-
ure or document, except when conserving charis-
matic animals such as the panda. In addition,
measuring water-quality improvements in interna-
tional waters can take up to 10 years; reduction in the
production of ozone-depleting substances or carbon
dioxide is inherently easier to measure.
13. Some GEF programs use satellite imagery and
GIS techniques in their monitoring and evaluation, as
do some of the more advanced middle-income de-
veloping countries. In Brazil and Indonesia, this helps
to track forest fires and manage forests. Such infor-
mation is not being synthesized to show how effec-
tive GEF is in helping developing countries to improve
what they do in aggregate terms—that is, to improve
country and global outcomes.
14. The divergence between perceived global and
local costs and benefits is a major issue, as are the chal-
lenges of assessing the incremental costs for GEF fi-
nancing and developing incentives for local
populations to produce global benefits.
15. Even so, some evaluations do not evaluate the
quality of either the governance or the secretariats of
the program.
16. Global Forum for Health Research 2002. Some
commentators on the earlier draft of this paper con-
sidered this estimate out of date. Global Forum is
making a new assessment, and results are not yet
available.
17. GEF evaluations suggest that there is scope to
improve mainstreaming of environment concerns in
Bank operations. This essentially means shifting the
view of the environment from an externality and a sep-
arate sector to an integral part of development. How-
ever, a broader interpretation of mainstreaming also
implies the integration of GEF priorities and strategies
into the Bank’s various sectoral strategies (for exam-
ple, environment strategy, energy strategy, forest strat-
egy) or in the client’s own strategies (such as PRSPs).
This integration could also take place at the individ-
ual project level, blending GEF priorities and strate-
gies in the project’s objectives and expected outcomes.
18. Moreover, because these programs are financ-
ing incremental expenditures, over and above what the
countries can and do undertake, to realize global ben-
efits, there is greater likelihood of the sustainability
of at least the underlying national benefits, even grant-
ing that there are a number of conceptual and meas-
urement issues with regard to the concept of
“incrementality.”
19. The eight countries receiving $36.801 million,
or more than half of all PCF funding since the pro-
gram’s inception, are Somalia ($6.607 million), Kosovo
($5.782 million), Afghanistan ($5.175 million), the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ($4.855 million),
Burundi ($3.993 million), Haiti ($3.714 million), Sudan
($3.398 million), and East Timor ($3.275 million). 
20. Development Alternatives, 2002. The Post-
ConFund has made available nine evaluation reports
of its larger grants. However, many completed grants
(mostly small- to medium-size grants for which the
Fund’s procedures typically do not require an inde-
pendent assessment) still lack enough basic report-
ing to demonstrate their impact. 
21. Initial results from one survey indicate that
more than $4 billion of investments are linked with Al-
liance-funded activities. Approximately $1.5 billion
are from investments already committed, and $2.5
billion are prospective investments in various stages
of preparation or appraisal. More than $2.3 billion
are from World Bank loans and credits (Cities Alliance
2003).
22. infoDev’s 2002 evaluation concluded that its ca-
pacity building grants (of up to $250,000) to help re-
cipients design, test, and apply innovative uses of
information and communication technologies (ICTs)
have had little impact at the country level beyond the
direct beneficiaries. Rather, its biggest success has
been its advocacy of access to ICTs. Since infoDev
now operates in a crowded field with many alternative
sources of supply, the evaluation concluded that in-
foDev must reinvent itself and “focus on its knowledge
activities in order to capitalize on its initial success and
stay ahead of the growing pack of ICT-for-develop-
ment programs” (da Costa, Wilson, and Fillip 2002). In
response to these concerns, the new infoDev man-
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agement and team have embarked on a restructuring
of infoDev’s programs and priorities.
23. In 2003, for example, the Trust Funds Quality
Assurance and Compliance Unit found examples of
Bank-executed activities financing what should have
been recipient-executed civil works in the case of
WSP, a practice that has now been stopped. The 2001
report of infoDev’s Technical Advisory Panel found that
infoDev spent a great deal of its resources screening
project proposals, then applying very little supervision
or monitoring once these were approved, noting that
this appears to have been based on the assumption
that correct choice leads to successful projects.
24. These estimates are based on a World Bank clas-
sification of its lending activities. A more detailed as-
sessment of the precise amounts committed and
disbursed for HIV/AIDS is under way in OED’s forth-
coming evaluation on the Bank’s HIV/AIDS assistance.
The data presented here may diverge from the data
presented in that report because of differences in
definitions, diseases, and periods covered.
Chapter 5
1. The Business Sector Advisory Group found a sim-
ilar diversity of private-sector corporate governance
models, with a particular dichotomy between the
“shareholder” tradition in Anglo-American countries
and the “stakeholder” tradition in continental Euro-
pean countries and Japan. They concluded that re-
gardless of model, these four underlying principles
were part of a well-functioning corporate governance
system, and enshrined these in the OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance, endorsed by ministers at
the OECD Council meeting in May 1999. OED is grate-
ful to Anne Simpson, manager of the Global Corpo-
rate Governance Program, for bringing this to our
attention.
2. This is not to say that the stakeholder model is
always preferable or appropriate. Both FSAP and
FIRST, for example, argue that it is not desirable to have
stakeholders represented on their Liaison Committee
and Steering Committee, respectively. 
3. CGAP’s director is also ex officio. Four members
of the restructured Executive Committee were ex-
plicitly sought from the former Policy Advisory Group
to ensure continuity in the new governance structure.
4. When programs have in-house secretariats, who
determines performance is a complex issue. In some
cases, managers’ performance evaluations are com-
pleted as if they were employees of the organizations
in which the programs are housed. In other cases,
feedback is obtained from the board—another as-
pect of the “two masters” problem.
5. For example, the evaluations of the Global Forum
and of the Global Water Partnership did not review ei-
ther board governance or the secretariat, although
there was an earlier external review of GWP board gov-
ernance. The third system-level review of CGIAR did
not review the secretariat.
6. The UNAIDS evaluation suggested that the pro-
gram secretariat intensify its support to national gov-
ernments, civil society, and the private sector in the
preparation of funding proposals. The highest gov-
erning body of UNAIDS, the Program Coordinating
Board, clarified the roles and functions of the various
program actors. Citing the “sub-optimal” impact of the
Roll Back Malaria Partnership, and noting that the
program’s loose governance structure had introduced
inefficiencies in decisionmaking and hampered ac-
countability within the partnership, the evaluation
proposed specific changes: (a) the establishment of
an RBM Governance Board to set the strategic direc-
tion of the partnership and oversee the RBM Secre-
tariat’s activities; (b) de-linking WHO Technical Malaria
functions from the RBM Secretariat; (c) multipartner
working groups to develop guidance on strategies
for going to scale with RBM interventions; and (d) four
interagency, inter-country teams in the Africa region
to coordinate technical and programmatic support to
countries. With respect to the Stop TB Secretariat, the
evaluation noted that the location of the secretariat
in WHO benefits both parties, despite some admin-
istrative frustrations. The technical relationships be-
tween the WHO and the Stop TB Partnership
Secretariat are strong and do not compromise the
partnership’s independence.
7. Because of unforeseen circumstances, GDN
lacked an active chairman over an extended period,
resulting in a lack of clarity about accountability and
responsibilities for program governance. Program
agendas were not determined in sufficient consulta-
tion with board members. Board members were there-
fore insufficiently consulted on certain aspects of the
program. OED’s meta-evaluation found similar prob-
lems with CGIAR’s Executive Committee. Verbatim
minutes, which CGIAR used to keep, are kept no
longer. Minutes of GDN board meetings are also not
available from their Web site.
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8. The Stop TB evaluation observes: “The Board is
struggling to handle the volume of business . . . given
the current conjunction of a number of strategic is-
sues and pressure of work-planning activities, the
Board had planned to hold a third Board meeting in
2003, in tandem with the 2003 Partners’ Forum, until
the latter was postponed. It has now substituted a tele-
conference, although this cannot deal adequately
with the range of items originally intended” (Institute
for Health Sector Development 2003, p. 55).
9. For example, the evaluation of Stop TB observes
that the aim of securing long-term annual financing
of $20–$30 million to sustain the Global Drug Facil-
ity, starting in 2004, is unrealistic, and that alternative
options are needed.
10. The scientific achievements of CGIAR centers
and their contribution to development continue to be
internationally recognized, as for example by the 2004
World Food Prize awarded to CGIAR scientist Dr.
Monty Jones. Yet the CGIAR’s spending on produc-
tivity-enhancing agricultural research declined in real
terms by 6.5 percent annually between 1992 and 2001,
and larger developing countries have caught up with,
and sometimes surpassed, the CGIAR scientifically. 
11. The committee meets annually, reviews TDR’s
scientific, technical, and operational issues, and reports
its findings directly to the Joint Coordinating Board.
The committee consists of 15 to 18 scientists and
other technical personnel that serve in their personal
capacities to represent the range of biomedical and
other disciplines required by TDR activities. The mem-
bers of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Com-
mittee, appointed to serve for three years, are selected
on the basis of their scientific or technical competence
by the Executing Agency, in consultation with the
Standing Committee, and with the endorsement of the
Joint Coordinating Board. Stakeholders stressed the
challenges of maintaining the competence of the
committee members and the quality of the advice
they provide.
12. Task forces, now disbanded, were funded and
managed by their respective lead agency(ies) and in-
clude representatives of the relevant partner agencies.
The Advocacy and Communications Task Force was
chaired by UNICEF; the Implementation Task Force
was co-chaired by WHO; the Financing Task Force
was chaired by the World Bank; and the Research and
Development Task Force was co-chaired by WHO,
NIH, and Chiron Vaccines. http://vaccinealliance.org/
home/General_Informat ion/About_al l iance/
Governance/ whoweare.php#wg
13. In several countries, board members require in-
surance because of their expected responsibilities
and liabilities due to board accountabilities.
14. FIRST requires an annual financial contribution
of $2 million for membership, CGIAR requires
$500,000, and PPIAF and Cities Alliance require
$250,000. According to FIRST, the program’s steering
committee felt that representation should be limited
to keep the board’s size manageable. This was deemed
important because decisions are made by consensus.
FIRST argues that, since discussions were at a very early
stage regarding the type of contribution, it remained
unclear whether the country in question would ulti-
mately have chosen to participate.
15. Cities Alliance is an example. CGIAR does this,
but sometimes regions decide to disqualify nonpay-
ing members from being eligible to serve on the Ex-
ecutive Committee, even when nonmember,
nonpaying private sector and NGO representatives
were invited.
16. One notable example comes from an inter-
view with a cabinet official who was not consulted dur-
ing the design of a country-level study. Because the
ministry’s role is integral to outcomes related to child
labor, including the need to expand access to pri-
mary schooling, the program should have at least in-
formed the Ministry of the program’s policy-related
components attached to the study’s statistics-gathering
function. 
17. WHO has recently announced its commitment
to the “3 by 5 Plan,” which would provide three mil-
lion people living with AIDS with antiretroviral med-
icines by the end of 2005. Dr. Lee Jong-wook, the
Director-General of WHO, in a speech in September
2003 to African health ministers, emphasized the ur-
gent need for treatment for people living with
HIV/AIDS. WHO stresses that treatment must be of-
fered as part of a strategy that includes prevention and
care. The Bank has similarly begun to finance anti-
retrovirals (ARVs) in some countries. 
18. Private firms working through partnerships,
for example, are suspected of merely seeking future
profits and markets, trying to control the agendas of
international organizations, or to benefit from tax de-
ductions and subsidies for their new products.
19. According to Lucas (2000), there has been an
“honest recognition by the public sector” of the
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“unique, unrivalled monopoly of the pharmaceutical
industry in drug and vaccine development . . . (and
that) they own the ball. If you want to play, you must
play with them.” New developments in biotechnology
are making drug and vaccine discovery and develop-
ment increasingly expensive, as are changes in intel-
lectual property rights. Concomitantly, extensive
consolidation of the pharmaceutical industry has led
to reduced competition. Although public-private part-
nerships in health research of relevance to the poor
have increased considerably, the commercial devel-
opment of research results into affordable products
would require large investments. 
20. The GAVI Board includes the multinational
pharmaceutical manufacturer Wyeth Pharmaceuti-
cals, as well as the Serum Institute of India. Wyeth rep-
resents the developed-country manufacturers of
patented multivalent vaccines. The Serum Institute of
India represents the manufacturers’ association of 30
developing countries, and its members supply 60 per-
cent of all the cheaper monovalent vaccines to de-
veloping countries. Both groups have an interest in
promoting their own vaccines. Although GAVI’s orig-
inal mandate was to promote new vaccines and to sup-
port traditional, less expensive vaccines, GAVI initially
(and with good intentions) stressed the patented
multivalent vaccines, which require fewer vaccina-
tions but cost more per vaccine. The goal in doing so
was to reduce demand on vaccine-delivery systems in
developing countries, promote the production of the
newer vaccines, and develop a market by replacing old
vaccines. Some developing countries, such as India,
indicated at the outset that they would find it finan-
cially and politically difficult to deliver multivalent
vaccines in “GAVI-covered” areas and cheaper vac-
cines elsewhere, on grounds of cost and equity. Other
countries, such as Ghana, accepted the new vaccines
but later indicated to GAVI that they could not sustain
spending on them. Timely and reliable supplies of
both types of vaccines have been issues.
21. In particular, targets 17 and 18. See table H.7.
22. State-funded U.S. land-grant institutions, by
contrast, are expected to routinely report research con-
ducted through public-private partnerships to the
university offices, which engage patent lawyers to ne-
gotiate contracts for such research.
23. The Bank did not have a policy when a private
sector representative was brought on the CGIAR ex-
ecutive council, or earlier made chairman of the pri-
vate sector committee and given resources and a seat
at the CGIAR table, or when Syngenta became a mem-
ber.
24. Each fiscal year, two to five regions are ap-
proved to begin funding at regional levels. Initially re-
gions where Conservation International had a historic
presence were approved, whereas now regions where
they have not been active are being approved.
Chapter 6
1. While ODA has been stagnant for a decade, the
share of ODA allocated to health has increased. Al-
though TDR’s research funding has not increased
much, and although global health research expendi-
tures are nowhere near the $3 billion annually rec-
ommended by the Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health, recent evidence (assembled by the Global
Forum, but incomplete at the time of writing) suggests
that public health research expenditures have in-
creased since the early 1990s. Some of this increase is
directed at the research on communicable diseases in
poorer countries and the poorer populations. A report
on the major consultation conducted by the Initiative
on Public-Private Partnerships for Health issued at the
time of issuance of this report indicates that a signifi-
cant amount of funds have been pledged to new not-
for-profit ventures in the last 5 years to research on
diseases of the poor. But product development re-
quires a long-term commitment, and current donors
may have reached the limit of their funding, given
other responsibilities, priorities, and the like.
2. Whether official development assistance would
have declined without the support of global-program
constituencies, and whether it will increase in the fu-
ture, is impossible to know.
3. India and the Eastern Mediterranean regional of-
fice (EMRO) of the WHO, for example, have made com-
mitments to achieve the 2 percent target of their
health spending going to health research (information
provided by the Global Forum for Health Research). 
4. OED acknowledges that some flexibility may be
needed for defined periods of time if the Bank helps
to put in place strong boards, oversight, and well-de-
signed financing plans; but in most cases these have
been absent. The DGF eligibility criterion continues:
“Where grant programs belong to new areas of activ-
ities (involving, e.g., innovations, pilot projects, or
seed capital), some flexibility is allowed for the Bank’s
financial leverage to build over time, and the target for
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the Bank grant not to exceed 15 percent of total per-
cent of total funding will be pursued after allowing for
an initial start-up phase (maximum 3 years).”
<http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/dgf/dgf.nsf/DOCs/
Eligibility+Criteria?OpenDocument>
5. While PostConFund grants have contributed to
activities at key junctures in a number of countries and
helped position the Bank in the reconstruction process
by providing quick and flexible funding, issues have
arisen with respect to several DGF criteria for the use
of Bank earnings, such as leveraging DGF funding
with other sources and arm’s-length relationship from
the Bank. The DGF’s provision that the Fund should
eventually comply with the criteria was vague and
has not been sufficiently followed up. Since more
than half of the Fund’s grants have gone to eight of
the most urgent conflict areas, the Fund appears to
serve as a quick channel to respond to specific issues
through targeted country-by-country grants. But these
grants do not sufficiently generate broader cross-
country lessons and do not exploit the program’s full
potential to serve the Bank and its partners strategi-
cally. 
6. Indeed, OED recommended in the CGIAR meta-
evaluation that donors should contribute their share
of the in-house secretariat costs in order to promote
greater efficiency and accountability to all donors in
terms of costs and performance. (OED 2003b, p. 106.)
This would also bring CGIAR in line with the DGF’s
own guidelines (issued in June 2000) on the burden-
sharing of in-house secretariat costs, which other in-
house programs already comply with. 
7. Another example of different treatment con-
cerns how DGF grants are transferred to different in-
house programs. CGAP and the Post-conflict Fund’s
annual DGF allocations are transferred into a Bank-
administered trust fund that does not have to be dis-
bursed in the fiscal year in which the allocation was
received. Other in-house programs’ annual DGF al-
locations are transferred as internal budgetary allo-
cations that must be spent by the end of the fiscal year.
8. IF, which has six international agency partners
and 42 meetings, seems to have had higher start-up
costs than programs like FSAP, which has similar ob-
jectives but fewer partners. Hence the share of re-
sources actually going to activities that benefit
developing countries, in the form of research, diag-
nostic studies, and technical assistance, seems to have
been smaller in IF’s case (GDN has had similar weak-
nesses). Recipient countries have complained about
the lack of follow-up activities at the country level.
Chapter 7
1. This is also one of the six criteria for approving
a global program at the initial concept stage that Bank
Management established in April 2000, and one of
the eight eligibility criteria for grant support estab-
lished by the DGF Council in September 1998.
2. Developing countries cited CGIAR, GEF, and
GFATM as examples of programs that seriously address
issues over the long term, with a dedicated set of re-
sources and expertise. 
3. As the largest actor in the water sector globally,
the Bank was the leader in establishing the GWP,
which aims to promote integrated water-resource
management, an idea that staff argue was ahead of its
time. However, the Bank has subsequently lost in-
terest in the partnership, and links between the pro-
gram and the Bank have become very weak. This
affects both the future effectiveness of the partnership
and the quality of the Bank’s engagement in water re-
source management.
4. Only the Coordination Unit of FIRST is housed
in the Bank. While a Bank managing director cur-
rently chairs the governing body, he is not the per-
manent chair. 
5. This would exclude trust fund-financed external
consultants, even if they are only representing a busy
senior Bank manager who is the Bank’s formal rep-
resentative on the governing body. There is likely to
be insufficient reflection of Bank institutional per-
spectives and concerns when programs are overseen
by persons with little Bank institutional perspective.
6. But the Bank is not exiting from the carbon
trading business, in which it has just established two
new and quite different funds from ProCarbFund.
7. GDN is a DGF Window 1 program that receives
long-term support, while World Links is a Window 2
program scheduled to exit in FY04.
8. Management has indicated that it agrees with the
main findings, conclusions and lessons from the OED
case study of GDN. While GDN is worthy of Bank
support, it is important to address its strategic weak-
nesses, including mission and objectives, governance
structure, financing, other matters of organizational
status, and Bank oversight.
9. World Links may also fall into this category, pro-
vided its objectives are clarified and Bank oversight and
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its own governance improve. Continued support to
both World Links and GDN could then give them time
to develop independent identities and demonstrate re-
sults, which would justify long-term donor support.
10. Except in rare cases, even new “long-term de-
velopment” programs that receive DGF grants for the
first time should start out in Window 2, and not be
promoted to Window 1 until they have demonstrated
acceptable performance on the eight DGF criteria. 
Chapter 8
1. While the four Development Committee crite-
ria do not provide an adequate basis for ex ante se-
lectivity or ex post evaluation, they are the set of
criteria in figure ES.1 that comes closest to providing
a basis for assessing each program, and align roughly
with the central chapters in this report. “An emerging
international consensus that global action is required”
is one aspect of relevance covered in chapter 3. “A clear
value added to the Bank’s development objectives” re-
lates broadly to outcomes and impacts covered in
chapter 4. “The need for Bank action to catalyze other
resources and partnerships” is an important aspect of
governance, management and financing covered in
chapters 5 and 6. “A significant comparative advantage
for the Bank” is a vital dimension of Bank performance
covered in chapter 7.
Annex C
1. OED 2001a, p. 21. “Partnerships and participa-
tion” were originally listed as two separate evalua-
tion issues in the evaluation strategy document.
“Monitoring and evaluation” is now interpreted more
broadly to include not only an assessment of each pro-
gram’s monitoring and evaluation procedures but
also the findings of previous evaluations about each
program’s outcomes and impacts, and their sustain-
ability.
Annex E
1. Interview with Mohamed El-Ashry.
2. Analysts have justified public intervention in
immunization on three grounds: (1) the spread and
incomplete course of treatment in the absence of
public provisions; (2) some options are pure public
goods (vector control and information); and (3) on
equity grounds, since such diseases disproportionately
strike the poor. While most non-informational serv-
ices involved are private (rival and exclusionary),
there are substantial social externalities associated
with immunization. For example, polio vaccine is
unique because it exhibits the characteristics of a
public good—the oral vaccine multiplies in the child’s
intestine and is released in much larger quantities in
excreta. The attenuated vaccine then competes with
the non-attenuated virus—making benefits both non-
rival and non-exclusionary (see Hammer 1996).
3. GAVI’s objective is 90 percent immunization
coverage for all developing countries nationally, and
at least 80 percent coverage in every district, by 2010.
The program estimates that the total incremental
cost, beyond the current expenditures by developing
countries, of achieving such coverage ranges from
$226 million using the traditional monovalent EPI
(Expanded Program Immunization) vaccines to $352
million with new multivalent vaccines.
4. Obviously this does not mean that they have had
no impacts, only that impacts are undocumented.
5. This followed its first evaluation in 1991, the
1992 Dublin Conference on Water and the Environ-
ment, and the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference on
Environment and Development. The Rio-Dublin prin-
ciples emphasize universal access (rather than uni-
versal coverage) and a participatory and
demand-responsive approach to investments in water
and sanitation—as does the Global Water Partner-
ship, which has a broader scope for dealing with man-
aging water resources.
6. The Bank is also working in close partnership
with other international agencies under a new global
umbrella effort, the Global Facilitation Partnership
for Transportation and Trade.
7. Several stakeholders suggested that the evalu-
ation did not sufficiently address (a) the steps needed
to strengthen country-level operations and scale up
work; (b) the steps needed to improve synergy and
coordination between the secretariat and co-spon-
sors for country-level capacity building, the potential
for U.N. reform, or increased synergy with MAP and
the GFATM; and (c) how to measure increased co-
sponsor commitment and activities at the global and
country level. (See the September 2002 stakeholder
workshop discussions on the draft final report of the
five-year evaluation of UNAIDS.) Some stakeholders
reported that the UNAIDS evaluation focused too
much on the secretariat’s role and too little on analy-
sis of its current and future structure. They also crit-
icized the relative inattention to factors that
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contributed to the success or failure of national
HIV/AIDS responses. Some interviewees felt that the
evaluation did not provide strategic recommenda-
tions, and that there was insufficient clarity or analy-
sis of the monitoring and evaluation of the program.
The lack of country-based evidence makes it difficult
to assess how well country-coordinating mechanisms
work or to attribute their success to UNAIDS. The OED
team frequently encountered the issues of scalability
and sustainability of the approaches being promoted,
even when multiple channels are being used to make
up for the limited public sector capacity for service de-
livery. 
8. WHO, one of the partners, announced its “3 by
5” plan to provide anti-retroviral therapy to 3 million
of the 42 million people currently affected by 2005.
9. The value that global programs add to the Bank’s
country operations is not always clear, because the
links between various global programs and the Bank’s
country-level analytic work and lending are unclear.
Stakeholders expressed frustration with the weak
links between the Bank’s sector staff, who manage
global programs, and its country directors and re-
gional task managers, who manage its country health-
sector operations. The links vary among programs
and regions, though. For example, there are better
links between TB activities and Stop TB in China and
India than there are on malaria activities and RBM in
India. Systematic, global monitoring of the links be-
tween individual global programs and country oper-
ations is urgently needed. Better links—that focus
on results and that leverage the Bank’s influence and
country experience—are themselves needed.
10. The OED review of Bank project documents
found that every tuberculosis-related investment uses
the DOTS approach, and therefore creates links be-
tween the Stop TB program and Bank lending.
Annex I
1. Management understands from OED that the Re-
port’s first four recommendations are directed to
Bank management and that the fifth relates to OED
itself. The sub-bullets under the recommendations are
meant to be explanatory and do not represent addi-
tional subrecommendations. 
2. Two managing directors chair the Council, and
its members are vice presidents from networks, Re-
gions, and corporate areas. 
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Note: Please refer to the individual case studies
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